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1 ABSTRACT 
This  dissertation  examines  the  work  of  the  British  philosopher  and  novelist  Iris  Murdoch.  A 
central  concern  of  this  work  is  a  question  Murdoch  poses  more  than  once:  `How  can  we  make 
ourselves  morally  better?  '  This  question  is  understood  to  initiate  a  form  of  philosophy  which  is 
critical  of  much  of  its  tradition  and  its  understanding  of  reasoning  and  argument.  It  also 
recognises  its  dependence  on  other  disciplines. 
Murdoch  develops  this  form  of  philosophy  in  reply  to  the  cultural  phenomenon  of 
secularisation.  In  the  absence  of  God,  she  attributes  tasks  to  philosophy  formerly  performed  by 
religion.  Most  importantly,  she  advocates  a  concept  of  transcendent  reality  in  philosophical 
discourse.  This  reality  is  the  Good.  She  finds  that  in  order  to  do  so,  she  has  to  reconsider 
philosophy's  central  faculty  of  reason.  Drawing  on  literary,  philosophical  and  theological  sources, 
Murdoch  develops  an  understanding  of  reason  and  of  argument  in  which  images,  imagery  and 
imagination  are  central. 
This  study  has  three  objectives.  It  first  aims  to  present  Murdoch  as  an  imaginative 
philosopher  by  exploring  the  role  of  literature  in  her  philosophical  writing.  In  doing  so,  it 
challenges  various  presuppositions  about  philosophy,  held  by  both  philosophers  and  non- 
philosophers.  Its  second  aim  is  to  reconsider  these  assumptions  in  general  terms.  This  part  draws 
significantly  on  the  work  of  Le  Doeuff.  In  particular,  it  considers  the  presence  of  imagery  in 
philosophy  as  well  as  philosophy's  assumed  neutrality,  which  has  arisen  from  its  long  affiliation 
with  science.  Thirdly,  the  thesis  presents  a  reconsideration  of  the  notion  of  imagination.  This 
notion  is  often  invoked  in  the  interdisciplinary  debate  between  theology,  philosophy  and  the  arts. 
Murdoch's  notion  of  imagination  challenges  two  important  assumptions.  By  releasing 
imagination  from  the  limited  corner  of  art,  it  first  challenges  a  strict  distinction  between  literary 
and  systematic  writing.  By  introducing  fantasy  as  the  bad  opposite  of  good  imagination,  it 
secondly  critically  assesses  unconditional  `praises  of  imagination'. 
2 PREFACE 
This  thesis  examines  the  work  of  the  philosopher  and  novelist  Iris  Murdoch.  `Her  work  not  her 
life',  I  feel  almost  compelled  to  add,  because  of  the  notable  media  attention  her  life  has  received 
in  the  years  in  which  I  have  been  working  on  this  thesis.  A  film  was  released,  depicting  in 
particular  her  last  years,  Conradi  published  his  biography  and  Wilson  added  his  memoirs.  ' 
I  shall  not  deny  having  enjoyed  the  more  serious  coverage  as  well  as  the  sheer  gossip, 
which  have  almost  transformed  Murdoch  from  a  thinker  into  -  as  I  once  read  in  a  review  of 
Conradi's  biography  in  The  Times  -  `the  patron  saint  of  senility'.  This  change  in  interest  is  perhaps 
worthy  of  its  own  research,  yet  while  this  thesis  does  not  pretend  to  reverse  the  interest,  I  have 
felt  the  desire  to  do  so.  I  hope  this  thesis  confirms  Murdoch  as  a  thinker  of  great  originality  and 
importance  and  invites  its  readers  into  Murdoch's  work  and  world,  which  features  various 
philosophers  (except  Aristotle),  theologians,  and  novelists,  as  well  as  Oxford  dons  and  London 
artists,  and  which  I  have  come  to  appreciate  so  much  in  the  past  years. 
I  would  like  to  thank  all  those  people  who  have  helped  me  in  writing  this  thesis.  First  of 
all,  I  like  to  thank  David  jasper  for  letting  me  share  in  his  vast  knowledge  of  thinkers  and  texts 
from  various  traditions  and  for  his  ability  to  challenge  my  habits  in  thinking.  I  like  to  thank  Edith 
Brugmans  for  the  careful  reading  she  has  given  my  work,  and  the  many  discussions  we  have  had 
about  Murdoch.  Thanks  also  to  Mariette  Willemsen,  with  whom  I  have  spent  many  hours 
working  on  the  translation  of  Murdoch's  The  Sovereignty  of  Good,  until  we  couldn't  recognise  one 
word  from  another  from  sheer  exhaustion  or  helpless  laughter.  Thanks  to  the  University  of 
Glasgow  for  granting  me  a  scholarship  with  which  to  pursue  this  research  and  to  the  Heyendaal 
Institute  for  first  enabling  me  to  start  it  and  in  the  end  providing  me  again  with  a  place  to  work 
and  an  income  to  pursue  it  till  the  end.  Of  its  members  I  would  like  to  thank  Ria  van  den  Brandt 
and  Erik  Borgman  in  particular  for  their  interest  in  this  research.  I  would  like  to  thank  Maria 
Antonaccio  for  encouragement  and  suggestions  in  the  early  stages  of  this  research.  Darlene  Bird, 
Angus  Paddison  and  Karen  Wenell  I  thank  for  proofreading  parts  of  the  final  draft.  The 
members  of  the  Centre  for  Theology,  Literature  and  the  Arts  I  like  to  thank  for  the  many  lively 
and  interesting  discussions.  Lastly,  my  gratitude  is  for  Ardo  van  den  Hout  for  being  a  constant 
companion,  far  away  and  nearby. 
I  The  film,  Iris,  had  the  curious  tagline  `Her  greatest  talent  was  for  life'.  See  also  P.  Conradi,  his  Murdoch.  A  Life 
(London:  HarperCollinsPublishers,  2001),  A.  N.  Wilson,  Iris  Murdoch,  As  I  Knew  Her  (London:  Hutchinson,  2003),  and 
the  various  newspaper  items,  in  particular  in  The  Times,  about  these  works. 
3 CHAPTER  ONE 
'HOW  CAN  WE  MAKE  OURSELVES  MORALLY  BETTER? 
MURDOCH'S  IMAGINATIVE  RESPONSE  To  SECULARISM 
1.  Introduction:  An  Overview  Of  The  Reception  Of  R7urdoch's  Work 
It  is  not  easy  to  characterise  the  thought  of  Iris  Murdoch  in  only  a  few  lines.  Murdoch  has  left  an 
original  oeuvre,  with  respect  to  both  content  and  form.  Over  a  period  of  more  than  forty  years, 
she  has  written  26  novels.  She  is  also  the  author  of  several  philosophical  works,  including  the  first 
book  on  Sartre  written  in  the  English  language.  1  This  already  significant  and  diverse  amount  of 
works  is  complemented  by  several  plays,  an  opera  libretto  and  poems.  2 
Her  unusual  oeuvre  has  engendered  a  vast  and  diverse  body  of  commentaries.  An 
important  and  returning  question  in  many  of  these  works  is  whether  and  how  the  literary  and  the 
philosophical  works  may  be  understood  to  be  related.  3  At  first  encounter,  there  seems  to  be  a 
strong  relationship  between  the  two.  On  the  one  hand,  the  characters  in  her  novels  use 
vocabulary  taken  out  of  her  philosophical  essays  or  they  write  treatises  with  similar  titles  and  in 
similar  tone,  thus  suggesting  that  the  essays  provide  a  clue  for  reading  the  novels.  So,  Marcus  in 
The  Time  of  the  Angels  is  working  on  a  book  provisionally  entitled  Morality  in  a  World  Without  God. 
An  excerpt  from  that  work  in  the  novel  leaves  little  doubt  that  Murdoch  had  her  own  The 
Sovereignty  of  Goodin  mind.  4  A  work  of  the  philosopher  Rozanov  in  The  Philosopher's  Pupil  is  called 
Nostalgia  for  the  Particular,  which  is  also  the  title  of  one  of  Murdoch's  earliest  articles.  Even  more 
often,  characters  simply  quote  lines  taken  literally  or  almost  literally  out  of  her  essays  .5 
In  her  systematic  essays,  on  the  other  hand,  Murdoch  often  writes  about  art  and  especially 
about  literature.  Art  and  literature  play  an  important  role  in  her  moral  philosophy.  Novels,  in 
particular  a  selection  of  novels  from  the  nineteenth  century,  she  considers  to  reveal  what 
philosophical  texts  have  much  more  difficulty  in  arguing  for.  Art  thus  indicates  what  an 
exemplary  state  of  consciousness  can  be  like,  but  also  shows  more  common,  less  ideal  states  of 
I  Conradi  claims  that  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist  is  `the  first  book  in  any  language  on  Sartre',  but  a  quick  search  shows 
that  this  is  simply  not  true.  (P.  Conradi,  `Editor's  Preface',  in  I.  Murdoch,  Ex  stentialists  and  Mystics.  li'ritings  on 
Philosophy  and  Literature  (London:  Chatto  and  'Mndus,  1997)  p.  xix-xxx.  The  quotation  is  found  on  p.  xxi) 
2  See  Fletcher  and  Bove  for  a  complete  list  of  works  published.  The  bibliography  in  the  thesis  contains  a  selection. 
3  For  some  it  is  even  `the  central  problem  which  Iris  Murdoch's  work  poses  for  us...:  is  she  a  novelist-philosopher  or 
a  novelist  and  a  philosopher?  In  other  words,  is  there  a  relationship  between  her  novels  and  her  philosophy  and  if  so, 
what  is  this  relationship?  '  (B.  Le  Gros,  Rencontnt  auec  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  63  as  quoted  in  and  translated  by  H.  Spear,  Iris 
Murdoch  (Basingstoke,  etc.:  MacMillan,  1995)  p.  7) 
4  Murdoch,  The  Time  of  the  Angels,  p.  128. 
5  Compare  for  example:  `What  does  he  fear?  is  usually  the  key  to  the  artist's  mind.  '  (Murdoch,  The  Black  Prince,  p.  85) 
and:  `(It  is  always  a  significant  question  to  ask  about  any  philosopher  what  is  he  afraid  of?  )'  (Murdoch,  `On  `God' 
and  `Good",  p.  359)  All  references  to  Murdoch's  essays  use  her  collection  Existentialists  and  Mystics.  Il°riting  on 
Philosophy  and  Literature  (London:  Chatto  and  Windus,  1997)  unless  indicated  differently.  This  also  applies  to 
4 mind.  `Art',  Murdoch  argues  in  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  `presents  the  most  comprehensible 
examples  of  the  almost  irresistible  human  tendency  to  seek  consolation  in  fantasy  and  also  of  the 
effort  to  resist  this  and  the  vision  of  reality  which  comes  with  success.  '6  In  particular 
contemporary  literature  Murdoch  assesses  critically.  She  considers  it  no  longer  `concerned  with 
`the  human  condition'...  with  real  individuals  struggling  in  society  .7  Because  of  this  failure 
Murdoch  gradually  loses  interest  in  contemporary  literature. 
Murdoch's  oeuvre  thus  suggests  different  ways  to  relate  the  novels  to  the  philosophical 
texts.  It  has  been  examined  for  example  whether  MTurdoch's  own  novels  meet  the  standards  she 
describes  in  her  systematic  essays.  Some  agree  they  do,  others  that  they  don't.  8  It  has  also  been 
argued  that  the  novels  are  illustrative  or  expressive  of  ideas  explored  in  the  philosophical  works, 
or  that  Murdoch  probes  her  philosophical  ideas  in  her  novels  .9 
By  and  large,  it  is  assumed  that 
there  is  relationship  between  the  two. 
It  is  then  remarkable  that  the  fiercest  opposition  to  the  suggestion  that  her  novels  and  her 
philosophical  texts  are  in  some  way  related  has  come  from  Murdoch  herself.  Most  prominently  in 
an  interview  with  Magee  she  has  denied  that  the  presence  of  philosophical  ideas  in  her  novels  has 
any  significance,  baffling  her  readers  by  stating  that 
I  feel  in  myself  such  an  absolute  horror  of  putting  theories  or  `philosophical  ideas' 
as  such  into  my  novels.  I  might  put  in  things  about  philosophy  because  I  happen 
to  know  about  philosophy.  If  I  knew  about  sailing  ships  I  would  put  in  sailing 
references  to  The  Fire  and  the  Sun,  The  Sovereignty  of  Good,  as  well  as  the  interview  with  Magee,  `Philosophy  and 
Literature:  A  Conversation  with  Bryan  Magee'. 
6  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  352. 
7  Murdoch,  'Against  Dryness',  p.  291.  Contemporary  literature  thus  fails  in  moral  terms  and  her  essays  on  literature 
often  end  with  explicit  recommendations  what  the  contemporary  should  be  concerned  with.  See  for  example 
Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  294-5:  `Real  people  are  destructive  of  myth,  contingency  is  destructive  of  fantasy  and 
opens  the  way  for  imagination. 
... 
Literature  must  always  represent  a  battle  between  real  people  and  images;  and 
what  it  requires  now  is  a  much  stronger  and  more  complex  conception  of  the  former.  '  Murdoch  has  been  criticised 
for  evaluating  literature  in  moral  terms.  For  such  a  criticism  see  in  particular.  J.  Wood,  `Iris  Murdoch's  Philosophy  of 
Fiction'  in  The  Broken  Estate:  Essays  on  Literature  and  Belief  (London:  Jonathan  Cape,  199),  p.  174-185.  Bronzwaer 
argues  that  in  this  form  of  criticism  Murdoch  shows  her  affinity  to  Plato.  (W.  Bronzwaer,  `Images  of  Plato  in  `The 
Fire  and  the  Sun"  and  "Acastos"'  in  R.  Todd,  (ed.  ),  Encounters  with  Iris  Murdoch  (Amsterdam:  Free  University  Press, 
1988)  p.  55-67) 
8  In  chapter  three  I  argue  that  this  concerns  in  particular  the  plea  for  portraying  real  characters.  Conradi  considers 
her  novels  to  do  so,  whereas  Bergonzi  thinks  they  don't.  (P.  Conradi,  The  Saint  and  theArtist.  A  Study  of  the  Fiction  of 
Iris  Murdoch  (Londen:  HarperCollinsPuhlishers,  2001),  B.  Bergomi,  The  Situation  of  the  Novel  (London  and  Basingstoke: 
MacMillan,  1979)) 
9  See  for  the  former  P.  O'Connell,  To  Love  the  Good  The  Moral  Philosophy  of  Iris  Murdoch  (New  York,  etc.:  Peter  Lang, 
1996)  and  for  the  latter  M.  Willemsen,  "`We  are  simply  here":  Over  de  metafysica  van  Iris  Murdoch'  in  ILL  Hoenen 
(ed),  Metamorphosen:  Acten  van  de  20e  Nederlands-Vlaamse  Filosofiedag  (Katholieke  Universiteit  Nijmegen,  1998)  p.  101- 
114. 
5 ships;  and  in  a  way,  as  a  novelist,  I  would  rather  know  about  sailing  ships  than 
about  philosophy.  10 
The  presence  of  philosophical  ideas  in  the  novels,  Murdoch  suggests  here,  is  incidental  and 
should  not  be  considered  as  a  tool  for  interpretation  of  the  work. 
Despite  this  strong  defiance  of  general  agreement  commentators  have  considered  the 
novels  from  the  philosophical  ideas  extracted.  Such  research  is  often  couched  in  terms  of  the 
question  whether  Murdoch  was  a  philosophical  novelist.  As  the  first  to  write  a  book  about 
Murdoch's  work  Byatt  wonders  what  the  notion  `philosophical  novelist'  means,  and  `even 
whether  it  is  a  term  of  praise  or  abuse.  '11  Murdoch  may  feel  `horror'  at  being  called  a 
philosophical  novelist,  but  this  sentiment  is  not  a  general  one. 
For  Byatt  Murdoch's  criticism  of  Sartre  is  essential  to  her  appraisal.  She  wonders  that  if 
for  Murdoch  `Sartre  displays  to  us  the  structure  of  his  own  thought,  but  he  does  not  give  to  us 
the  stuf  of  human  life.  How  far,  loosely,  does  this  critical  attitude  to  the  philosopher  as  novelist 
apply  to  Miss  Murdoch  herself?  '12  Byatt  continues:  `I  think  that  much  of  the  uneasiness  that  her 
readers  experience  with  her  symbols  in  particular  and  patterning  in  general  might  well  be 
attributed  to  the  tension  she  herself  seems  to  feel  between  her  natural  ability  intellectually  to 
organize,  and  her  suspicion  of  the  tidying  function  of  the  kind  of  literary  form  which  now  comes 
naturally  to  us.  A  novels,  she  says,  has  got  to  have  form;  but  she  seems  to  feel  a  metaphysical 
regret  about  it.  '13 
Quoting  yet  another  interview  in  which  Murdoch  considers  the  possibility  that 
philosophical  ideas  seeping  into  the  novels  but  where  she  also  denies  being  a  philosophical 
novelist  in  the  sense  of  Sartre  or  De  Beauvoir,  Byatt  concludes: 
But  here  she  is  disclaiming  partly  the  didactic  intention  of  which  Sartre  is  proud; 
and  in  any  case  the  result  of  the  deliberate  planning  which  she  does  not  disclaim, 
is  that  the  novels  certainly  appear  to  centre  on  ideas,  the  variations  on  a  theme,  in 
terms  which  we  can  analyse  them  without  feeling  that  we  are  seriously  distorting 
them.  The  characters  are  approached  from  the  theme,  whereas  with  other  writers, 
10  Magee,  `Philosophy  and  Literature:  A  Conversation  with  Bryan  l  1agee',  p.  19-20. 
11  A.  S.  Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom:  The  Early  Novels  of  Iris  Murdoch  (London:  Vintage,  1994),  p.  208.  Byatt  also  rightly 
remarks:  `Reviewers  have  talked  a  great  deal  about  whether  Miss  Murdoch  is  or  is  not  a  `philosophical  novelist'; 
those  who  say  she  is  not  tend  to  describe  her  as  a  compulsive  storyteller,  which  is  not  of  course  incompatible  with 
being  a  philosophical  novelist'  (Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom,  p.  207) 
12  Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom,  p.  209. 
13  Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom  p.  209  and  216-7  respectively. Joyce  Cary,  Angus  Wilson,  one  has  the  sense  that  character  or  action  is  where  the 
novel  began  and  that  theme  developed  from  there.  14 
Byatt  here  argues  that  it  is  no  more  than  natural  that  Murdoch,  as  a  `practising  philosopher',  is 
considering  ideas  when  writing  novels.  It  is  this  practise  which  has  been  recognised  by  various 
commentators. 
In  contrast,  the  possible  influence  of  her  novel-writing  on  her  philosophy  has  been  much 
less  debated.  Still,  in  the  interview  with  Magee  Murdoch  does  not  only  deny  the  relevance  of 
philosophy  for  her  novels,  but  also  tries  to  save  philosophy  from  any  literary  contagion.  These 
remarks  have  occasioned  confusion,  when  she  argues  that  whereas  there 
is  not  one  literary  style  or  ideal  literary  style  ... 
I  am  tempted  to  say  that  there  is  an 
ideal  philosophical  style  which  has  a  special  unambiguous  plainness  and  hardness 
about  it,  an  austere  unselfish  candid  style.  A  philosopher  must  try  to  explain 
exactly  what  he  means  and  avoid  rhetoric  and  idle  decoration.  Of  course  this  need 
not  exclude  wit  and  occasional  interludes;  when  the  philosopher  is  at  it  were  in  the 
front  line  in  relation  to  his  problem  I  think  he  speaks  with  a  certain  cold  clear 
recognisable  voice.  15 
The  statement  has  been  severely  criticised  by  Martha  Nussbaum  in  The  Fragility  of  Goodness. 
Nussbaum  introduces  the  quotation  as  exemplification  of  the  prevalent  philosophical  style  in  the 
Anglo-American  philosophical  tradition.  She  understands  Murdoch  to  defend  a  philosophical 
style  of  `plain  hard  reason,  pure  of  appeal  to  emotions  and  sense',  which  is  `content-neutral'.  This 
style,  however,  is  not  at  all  Murdoch's.  Nussbaum  acknowledges  this  in  a  later  text-16 
The  interview  with  Magee  then  contains  curious  remarks  for  anyone  familiar  with 
Murdoch's  oeuvre.  She  seems  to  defend  a  style  which  is  not  her  own.  The  misunderstanding, 
created  by  the  quotation  above,  is  partly  explained  by  Murdoch's  choice  of  words,  which  is 
surprisingly  similar  to  that  of  scientific  objectivity.  Such  remarkable  vocabulary  is  not  uncommon 
14  Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom,  p.  210.  Byatt  quotes  from  an  interview  in  The  Times,  13  February  1964. 
15  Magee,  `Philosophy  and  Literature',  p.  4-5. 
16  See  NI.  C.  Nussbaum,  The  Fragility  of  Goodness:  Luck  and  Ethics  in  Greek  Tragedy  and  Philosophy  (Cambridge:  Cambridge 
University  Press,  1986)  p.  16.  In  Love's  Knowledge  Nussbaum  repeats  her  argument,  but  adds  that  she  cannot 
understand  how  these  statements  relate  to  Murdoch's  own  thoughts.  (NI.  C.  Nussbaum,  Love's  Knowledge:  Essays  on 
Philosophy  and  Literature  (Oxford  etc.:  Oxford  University  Press,  1990)  p.  251  and  note  8)  Compare  M.  Antonaccio, 
Picturing  the  Human:  The  Moral  Thought  of  Iris  Murdoch  (Oxford  etc.:  Oxford  University  Press,  2000)  p.  19-20  and 
199n58,  and  See  also  M.  C.  Nussbaum,  `Love  and  Vision:  Iris  Murdoch  on  Eros  and  the  Individual'  in  M. 
Antonaccio  and  W.  Schweiker  (eds.  ),  Iris  Murdoch  and  the  Search  for  Human  Goodness  (Chicago  and  London:  The 
University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996)  p.  29-53. in  Murdoch's  writing.  Antonaccio  notes  how  in  one  of  her  more  distinctive  examples  Murdoch 
also  suggest  an  analogy  between  her  understanding  of  moral  realism  and  scientific  observation: 
[Murdoch]  writes:  "Rilke  said  of  Cezanne  that  he  did  not  paint  `I  like  it',  he 
painted  `There  it  is'.  "  The  sharp  contrast  drawn  in  the  passage  between  the  artist's 
personal  or  subjective  desire  on  the  one  hand  ("I  like  it"),  and  the  clear  vision  he 
achieves  on  the  other  ("There  it  is"),  suggests  that  "reality"  stands  apart  from  the 
self  as  something  wholly  "impersonal".  17 
At  first  glance,  in  the  interview  with  Magee  Murdoch  seems  indeed  to  support  the  scientific 
approach  Nussbaum  discerns  by  speaking  of  `unambiguous  plainness  and  hardness',  the 
avoidance  of  `rhetoric  and  idle  decoration'  and  the  `cold  clear'  voice.  It  is indeed  possible  that 
Murdoch  is  here  more  supportive  of  a  scientific  approach  than  in  most  other  texts.  Yet,  it  could 
be  too  that  Murdoch  is  considering  a  form  of  objectivity  which  is  acquired  through  consideration 
of  self,  rather  than  by  disregarding  it.  18  Here  I  am  reminded  of  the  opening  sentence  of  `On 
`God'  and  `Good",  where  Murdoch  argues  that  `[t]o  do  philosophy  is  to  explore  one's  own 
temperament,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  to  attempt  to  discover  the  truth.  '19  An  unselfish  style  is 
acquired  through  exploration  of  personal  temperament. 
By  calling  this  style  `austere'  Murdoch  suggests  that  the  ability  to  explore  in  this  way  is  not 
easily  acquired.  Murdoch  is  reluctant  to  call  herself  a  philosopher.  In  answer  to  Le  Gros  she 
states  that  she  is  `a  teacher  of  philosophy  and  I  am  trained  as  a  philosopher  and  I  `do'  philosophy 
and  I  teach  philosophy,  but  philosophy  is  fantastically  difficult  and  I  think  those  who  attempt  to 
write  it  would  probably  agree  that  there  are  very  few  moments  when  they  rise  to  the  level  of  real 
philosophy.  One  is  writing  about  philosophy  ... 
One  is  not  actually  doing  the  real  thing.  '2°  The 
real  thing  is  an  austere  ideal  to  aspire  to.  21 
The  remarks  in  the  interview  may  also  be  explained  by  observing  the  rigid 
presuppositions  in  Magee's  introduction  and  questions.  The  interview  is  part  of  a  series  called 
`Men  of  Ideas',  after  the  gender  of  the  other  participants.  Magee  had  invited  Murdoch  to  talk 
17  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  138.  Compare  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  348. 
11  Compare  in  this  respect  Antonaccio's  notion  of  `reflexive  realism',  to  be  discussed  in  the  next  part. 
19  Nfurdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  337. 
20  Interview  with  M.  Le  Gros  in  Rencontrer  avec  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  79,  as  quoted  in  Spear,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  8. 
21  Her  reluctance  to  call  herself  a  real  philosopher  is  perhaps  even  better  portrayed  in  the  comic  image  of  pupils  of 
the  philosopher  Dave  Gellman  in  Under  the  Net  to  whom  `the  world  is  a  mystery,  a  mystery  to  which  it  should  be 
reasonably  possible  to  discover  a  key.  The  key  would  be  something  of  the  sort  that  could  be  contained  in  a  book  of 
some  eight  hundred  pages.  To  find  the  key  would  not  necessarily  be  a  simple  matter,  but  Dave's  pupils  feel  sure  that 
the  dedication  of  between  four  and  ten  hours  a  week,  excluding  University  vacations,  should  suffice  to  find  it.  ' 
(I  furdoch,  Under  the  Net,  p.  25) 
8 about  `some  of  the  respects  in  which  philosophy  and  literature  do  overlap.  '  From  the  very 
beginning,  however,  Magee's  firm  assertions  and  subsequent  questions  ban  many  possible  points 
of  overlap  from  the  conversation.  He  begins  the  interview  by  stating  firmly  at  the  outset  that  `[i]f 
a  philosopher  writes  well,  that's  a  bonus  -  it  makes  him  more  enticing  to  study,  obviously,  but  it 
does  nothing  to  make  him  a  better  philosopher.  '  In  his  first  questions  to  Murdoch  he  maintains  a 
strict  division  between  philosophy  and  fiction.  Hence,  he  asks  her.  `When  you  are  writing  a  novel 
on  the  one  hand  and  philosophy  on  the  other,  are  you  conscious  that  these  are  two  radically 
different  kinds  of  writing?  ',  or  he  asserts:  `In  your  novels  the  sentences  are  opaque,  in  the  sense 
that  they  are  rich  in  connotation,  allusion,  ambiguity;  whereas  in  your  philosophical  writing  the 
sentences  are  transparent,  because  they  are  saying  only  one  thing  at  the  time.  '  So,  from  the  outset 
one  perceives  in  Magee's  words  the  desire  to  ascertain  a  clear  distinction  between  philosophy  and 
literature.  Philosophy  is  pictured  as  straightforward  and  unambiguous,  whereas  literature  is  messy 
and  ambiguous. 
These  remarks  by  Magee  evince  to  a  commonly  held  position  that  whereas  the  influence 
of  philosophy  on  literature  may  be  a  matter  of  debate,  a  possible  reverse  influence  of  literature  on 
philosophy  is  less  often  considered.  This  position  is  in  particular  prominent  among  analytical 
philosophers.  It  is  therefore  not  accidental  that  the  field  of  philosophy  and  literature  has  arisen  in 
particular  within  the  Anglo-American  tradition.  Yet,  even  in  that  field  the  relationship  between 
philosophy  and  literature  is  not  always  considered  to  be  one  of  equals.  The  prominent  work  of 
Nussbaum  exemplifies  this  attitude.  In  a  critical  reading  of  her  work  Eaglestone  argues  that 
Nussbaum  engages  literature  as  a  way  of  expressing  what  cannot  be  said  in  philosophy. 
Philosophy  thus  considers  literature,  but  only  to  `help  the  work  of  philosophy'.  This 
apprehension  of  literature  is  revealed  in  Nussbaum's  limited  recognition  of  the  artistic  aspect  of 
literature:  `Nussbaum  reads  art  works  as  people,  made  real  through  enactment  and  emotional 
involvement,  but  she  is  never  able  to  admit  that  they  are  just  art  works.  ' 
Murdoch  occupies  a  more  complex  position  in  this  debate.  The  importance  she  attributes 
to  art  also  appears  in  her  answers  to  Magee.  These  only  superficially  concur  with  the  image  of 
philosophy  and  literature  delineated.  Even  though  she  replies  in  the  affirmative  to  Magee's 
questions  and  assertions,  in  her  answers  the  distinction  between  philosophy  and  literature 
becomes  more  confused.  Thus,  she  introduces  a  third  category  of  `thinker'  to  accommodate 
`great  writers'  such  as  Kierkegaard  and  Nietzsche. 
Murdoch's  oeuvre  then  raises  the  question  of  the  relationship  between  philosophy  and 
literature  and  it  offers  different  ways  to  consider  this  relationship.  Yet,  her  oeuvre  has  not  only 
22  R.  Eaglestone,  Ethical  Criticism:  Reading4fterLevinas  (Edinburgh:  Edinburgh  University  Press,  1997),  p.  57. 
9 been  studied  because  of  this  relationship,  prominent  though  that  it  may  be.  The  importance  of 
her  work  is  not  only  or  even  primarily  decided  by  the  unusual  combination  of  disciplines. 
Murdoch's  novels  and  her  philosophical  work  have  been  independently  considered  in  relation  to 
contemporary  works  and  issues  in  both  literature  and  philosophy. 
Byatt  remarks  how  it  is  not  easy  to  position  Murdoch  as  a  novelist.  23  Murdoch  was  first 
associated  with  the  `Angry  Young  Men'  and  Under  the  Net's  Jake  Donaghue  was  compared  to  their 
`rootless  picaresque  heroes  .  24  Subsequent  novels  showed  that  this  classification  would  not  do. 
The  Sandcastle  and  The  Bell  separated  Murdoch  from  these  contemporaries25  Henceforth,  she  has 
been  regarded  as  a  novelist  in  her  own  kind,  where  her  yearly-published  novel  becomes  a 
phenomenon,  wittily  portrayed  in  the  character  of  Arnold  Baffin  in  The  Black  Prince.  26 
Interpretations  of  the  novels  have  ranged  from  such  divers  perspectives  as  feminist,  post- 
modern,  and  various  religious  ones.  One  prominent  aspect  in  many  of  these  interpretations  has  in 
recent  times  taken  a  rather  peculiar  form.  This  body  of  interpretation  namely  testifies  that 
Murdoch  must  have  been  a  most  imposing  person.  Murdoch  is  indeed  considered  to  have 
decided  up  to  a  considerable  extent  the  interpretation  of  her  novels.  Backus  points  out  that  the 
narratives  of  both  Murdoch's  `detractors  and  her  supporters'  are  inadequate,  precisely  because  of 
their  shared  starting-point  `that  Murdoch's  readings  of  her  novels  is  critical,  or  at  least  of 
overwhelming  importance,  for  their  correct  reading.  '27  Even  if  one  considers  Murdoch's  reading 
as  critical  (to  which  Backus  objects  in  general),  then  it  remains  difficult  to  distil  a  distinct  voice, 
for  Murdoch's  own  criticism  is  full  of  inconsistencies,  especially  in  the  interviews.  28  It  may  be 
most  natural  to  ask  Murdoch  about  her  own  work,  but  it  would  be  misleading  to  regard  these 
interviews  as  unequivocal  instruction  for  reading  it.  The  interview  with  Magee  may  serve  as 
illustration  here. 
Murdoch's  personal  concern  for  the  criticism  of  her  work  has  recently  had  its  parallel  in 
the  attempts  of  some  scholars  to  reinterpret  her  work  from  life.  Conradi's  biography  and  recent 
23  See  also  Spear,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  121:  `One  problem  is  that  she  defies  classification:  she  is  not  a  Modernist;  she  is  not 
a  Post-Modernist;  she  is  not,  like  many  of  her  female  contemporaries,  a  feminist  writer;  yet,  despite  the  fact  that  she 
employs  many  Victorian  devices  in  her  novels,  no  serious  reader  of  her  fiction  could  place  her  among  the 
traditionalists.  ' 
24  Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom  p.  207,  Spear,  his Murdoch,  p.  23-24. 
25  Byatt,  Degrees  of  Freedom,  207. 
26  See  the  various  biting  remarks  by  his  fellow  author  Bradley  Pearson,  in  particular  his  review  of  Baffin's  latest 
book.  (Murdoch,  The  Black  Prince,  p.  151-2)  For  a  concise  outline  of  the  development  of  Murdoch's  novels  in 
different  periods,  as  well  as  a  description  of  returning  imagery,  see  R.  Todd,  `Iris  Murdoch:  veertig  jaar 
romanschijven'  in  TV' 
, geng  Per  pectief  35-3  (1994/5),  p.  66-71. 
27  G.  Backus,  Iris  Murdoch:  The  Novelist  as  Philosopher,  The  Philosopher  as  Novelist:  The  Unicorn'  ac  a  Philosophical  Novel 
(Bern  etc.:  Peter  Lang,  1986),  p.  13. 
28  Backus  phrases  his  general  objection  as  follows:  `...  to  locate,  as  a  general  principle,  the  controlling  intention  in  a 
work  of  art  or  philosophy  squarely  with  the  artist  is  mistaken.  Heidegger's  compelling  accounts  of  Descartes  as 
preoccupied  with  being  and  Nietzsche  as  the  last  metaphysicians  of  the  West,  Derrida's  story  of  I  fussed  as  a 
protogrammatologist:  these  interpretations  are  falsifications  enough.  '  (Backus,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  13) 
10 article  represent  this  approach.  29  Already  in  the  preface  to  Existentialists  and  Mystics  Conradi 
speculates  on  a  similarity  between  the  novels  and  real  life:  `Is  it  an  impertinent  speculation  to  find 
something  owed  to  Franz  Stein  in  the  gentle,  scholarly  and  dying  Peter  Saward,  a  character  in 
Murdoch's  second  published  novel  The  Flight  from  the  Enchanter  (1956) 
... 
Or  in  Mischa  Fox,  the 
enchanter  himself,  something  owed  to  the  book's  dedicatee,  Elias  Canetti?  '30  In  his  biography  his 
tone  is  much  more  assertive,  writing  `Mischa  Fox/Canetti'  as  if  the  enchanter  from  The  Flight  from 
the  Enchanter  and  Canetti  are  one  and  the  same.  31  He  considers  this  way  of  reading  most  natural, 
remarking  in  his  preface  to  the  reissue  of  the  second  edition  of  The  Saint  and  the  Artist  that  `[i]t  is  a 
relief  to  be  able  to  report  that  writing  her  biography  did  not  substantially  change  my  view  of  the 
shape  of  Murdoch's  work.  32  Not  all  reviewers  were  taken  in  by  Conradi's  reading  of  Murdoch's 
novels  from  her  life. 
Murdoch's  philosophical  career  experienced  an  original  beginning  with  the  publication  of 
Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist  in  1953,  one  year  before  the  publication  of  her  first  novel,  Under  the  Net. 
To  write  this  first  work  on  Sartre  in  those  days  was,  as  Mary  Warnock  emphasises  `an  act  of 
genuine  imagination  and  originality'.  In  the  analytical  philosophy  of  that  time  there  was  very  little 
interest  in  philosophy  of  the  continent  33  Murdoch's  interest  in  existentialism  originated  out  of  a 
deep  dissatisfaction  with  much  of  the  analytical  philosophy  she  encountered  in  Britain  in  the 
beginning  of  her  career.  Unlike  many  philosophers  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge  in  those  days 
Murdoch  was  interested  in  moral  value  and  concepts  of  consciousness.  Existentialism  promised  a 
philosophical  consideration  of  these  ideas.  Yet,  it  is  not  certain  if  she  ever  considered  herself  an 
existentialist.  From  the  very  beginning  of  her  career  she  was  not  just  curious  about,  but  also 
critical  of  the  tradition. 
Her  second  book  of  philosophy,  The  Sovereignty  of  Good  from  1970,  was  also 
unconventional.  At  its  first  reception  various  commentators  remarked  on  its  unusual  form  of 
argumentation.  34  Now,  it  is  regarded  as  an  influential  work  in  the  analytical  tradition.  35  This  is  not 
29  See  also  P.  Conradi,  `Did  Iris  Murdoch  Draw  from  Life?,  in  Iris  Murdoch  News  Letter  15  (winter  2001),  p.  4-7  and  a 
presentation  at  the  first  Iris  Murdoch  Conference:  `On  Writing  Iris  Murdoch:  A  life.  Freud  versus  Multiplicity',  1st 
Annual  Conference  of  the  Iris  Murdoch  Society,  St.  Anne's  Oxford,  14  September  2002.  Conradi  has  thus 
contributed  to  the  recent  interest  in  Murdoch's  private  life,  which  in  some  respect  has  overshadowed  the  interest  in 
her  work. 
30  Conradi,  `Editor's  Preface',  p.  xx. 
31  As  noted  by  M.  Levers,  [review  of  Conradi's  A  Life],  in  NRC  Handelsblad,  19  October  2001. 
32  Conradi,  The  Saint  and  the  Artist,  p.  xvii. 
33  Warnock  writes  how  Ayer  `was  the  only  person  (apart  from  Iris)  who  was  credited  with  any  knowledge  of  [the 
existentialists']  philosophy;  and  I  remember  a  peculiarly  dismissive  talk  he  gave  in  the  Oxford  Playhouse,  to 
introduce  a  translated  version  of  Huis  Cdos  that  was  staged  there.  '  (M.  Warnock,  A  Memoir.  People  and  Places  (London: 
Duckworth,  2002)  p.  86.  ) 
3;  See  for  example  G 
. 
J.  Warnock,  `The  Moralists:  Value  and  Choices'  in  Encounter  36  (April  1971),  p.  81-84. 
35  Arguing  the  historical  as  well  as  contemporary  importance  of  Murdoch's  criticism  of  the  distinction  between  fact 
and  value,  Diamond  mentions  H.  Putnam,  Reaksm  with  a  Human  Face  (Cambridge,  MA:  Harvard  University  Press, 
1990)  as  one  to  regard  The  Sovereignty  of  Good  as  `groundbreaking  in  this  regard'.  (C.  Diamond,  "`We  Are  Perpetually 
11 (yet)  true  of  Murdoch's  last  and  largest  work  of  philosophy.  36  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals 
(1992)  has  baffled  her  readers  even  more  with  its  many  asides,  its  long  quotations  and  vast 
amount  of  ideas  and  thinkers.  Antonaccio  argues  that  is  may  be  best  described  with  Murdoch's 
own  words  as  `a  huge  hall  of  reflection  full  of  light  and  space  and  fresh  air,  in  which  ideas  and 
intuitions  can  be  unsystematically  nurtured.  '37  While  still  working  on  it  Murdoch  suggested 
another  description,  as  noted  by  one  reviewer  of  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals.  The  review 
quotes  from  a  conversation  between  Crimond,  and  Gerrard  in  The  Book  and  the  Brotherhood  on  the 
book  the  first  is  writing 
`So,  it's  like  a  very  long  pamphlet?  ' 
`No,  it's  not  a  long  simplification.  It's  about  everything.  ' 
`Everything?  ' 
`Everything  except  Aristotle.  I  regard  him  as  an  unfortunate  interlude,  now 
happily  over.  '38 
This  quotation  is  not  only  an  apt  description  of  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  as  a  book  about 
everything  except  for  Aristotle,  it  also  indicates  that  Murdoch  was  keenly  aware  of  possible 
criticism  of  her  writing.  For  both  Murdoch's  novels  and  philosophical  works  have  received 
severe  criticism.  Whereas  the  novels  have  been  criticised  in  relation  to  the  philosophy  most  of  all, 
the  philosophical  works  have  been  criticised  for  diverting  from  the  philosophical  tradition  in 
different  aspects.  Reviewers  of  Murdoch's  work  often  argue  that  their  expectations  have  not  been 
met.  In  particular  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  has  been  accused  of  unclear  argumentation  or 
even  lack  of  argument.  All  the  same,  it  has  also  been  called  the  most  original  contribution  to 
philosophy  of  the  past  century.  This  diversity  in  judgement  raises  the  question  what  philosophy  is 
and  what  philosophical  argument  is.  These  questions  motivate  the  present  research.  In  particular, 
it  considers  how  Murdoch's  philosophical  writing  is  affected  by  her  interest  in  religion  and 
literature.  It  argues  that  her  understanding  of  imagination,  as  pervading  all  perception  and 
thought  and  related  to  the  Good,  is  a  most  valuable  contribution  to  philosophy. 
Moralists":  Iris  Murdoch,  Fact,  and  Value'  in  Al.  Antonaccio  and  W.  Schweiker  (eds.  ),  Iris  Murdoch  and  the  Search  for 
Human  Goodness  (Chicago  and  London:  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996)  p.  79-109,  p.  104n.  22) 
36  That  is,  the  last  work  published.  Murdoch  was  writing  a  work  on  Heidegger  and  Wittgenstein,  which  she 
abandoned  when  she  became  ill. 
37  Al.  Antonaccio,  [Review  of  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals]  in  The  Journal  of  Religion  74.2  (1994),  p.  278-280. 
Compare  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  422. 
38  Murdoch,  The  Book  and  the  Brotherhood,  quoted  in  I.  Hacking,  `Plato's  Friend'  in  London  Review  of  Books,  17 
December  1992,  p.  8-9. 
12 2.  Vow  can  we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  ' 
The  present  research  proposes  an  exposition  of  Murdoch's  philosophical  writings.  I  just  noted 
how  in  comparison  to  the  novels  the  philosophical  texts  have  received  limited  attention.  Whereas 
there  are  many  monographs  on  the  novels,  so  far  only  a  few  works  attempt  to  situate  Murdoch  in 
contemporary  philosophical  debates.  Of  these  Antonaccio's  Picturing  the  Human  provides  the  first 
and  thus  far  only  systematic  account  of  all  of  Murdoch's  philosophical  writing.  39  The  book  is  a 
remarkable  achievement  for  different  reasons.  By  identifying  Murdoch  as  a  `reflexive  realist'  it  has 
assembled  Murdoch's  scattered  oeuvre  into  a  systematic  framework  and  placed  Murdoch's 
thought  in  a  contemporary  debate  with  which  Murdoch  was  not  directly  engaged.  Moreover,  in 
its  methodological  considerations  it  also  provides  means  for  reading  Murdoch's  unusual 
philosophical  works. 
The  framework  of  `reflexive  realism'  Antonaccio  derives  from  the  work  of  Schweiker.  40 
Schweiker  develops  this  framework  as  an  intermediary  position  in-between  naive  realism  and 
mere  subjectivism.  Reflexive  realism  has  its  starting  point  in  consciousness,  but  avoids  a  purely 
subjective  position  by  assuming  the  possibility  of  surpassing  consciousness  in  its  reflexive 
moments.  Antonaccio  uses  this  idea  in  particular  when  analysing  Murdoch's  understanding  of  the 
ontological  proof.  The  Good  that  the  proof  is  to  prove  does  not  exist  `outside  consciousness  as  a 
property  of  things  or  states  of  affairs',  Antonaccio  argues.  In  this  respect  the  position  of  reflexive 
realism  differs  from  that  of  naive  realism.  The  Good  `can  only  be  apprehended  though  the 
reflexive  activity  of  cognition.  '41  However,  the  Good  that  is  grasped  by  the  consciousness  is  not 
an  invention  of  that  consciousness.  Instead,  it  surpasses  consciousness  as  a  reality  which 
confronts  the  self.  Reflexive  realism  is  thus  distinguished  from  mere  subjectivism.  42  Antonaccio 
identifies  Murdoch  as  such  a  reflective  thinker,  comparing  her  to  other  reflexive  thinkers,  like 
Descartes,  Kant,  Taylor  and  Schweiker. 
With  this  understanding  of  reflexive  realism  Antonaccio  analyses  what  she  considers 
Murdoch's  most  important  contribution  to  contemporary  ethics:  her  concern  for  humans  in  their 
variety,  and  for  the  individual  in  philosophy: 
39  O'Connor,  To  Love  the  Good  omits  Murdoch's  last  and  largest  work,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals. 
40  See  for  the  importance  of  Schweiker  for  this  work  p.  197n.  35.  Antonaccio  refers  here  to  his  Rssponsibility  and 
Christian  Ethics,  p.  106-114,  and  admits  to  being  deeply  influenced  by  it.  Schweiker,  in  his  turn,  confesses  to  borrow 
terms  from  Taylor.  See  W.  Schweil:  er,  Responsibility  and  Christian  Ethics  (Cambridge  etc.:  Cambridge  University  Press, 
1995),  p.  114,  and  the  chapters  seven  and  eight.  He  refers  here  to  Ch.  Taylor,  Sources  of  the  Seff..  The  making  of  the 
Modern  Identity  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1989),  in  particular  its  23rd  chapter,  and  its  conclusion.  as 
well  as  to  Ch.  Taylor,  `Responsibility  for  Self'  n  G.  Watson  (ed.  ),  Free  lY/i11(Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press)  1982, 
p.  111-126.  On  the  difference  between  Murdoch  as  a  reflexive  thinker  and  Descartes,  Kant,  Taylor,  Schweil:  er  see 
Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  216n.  123  and  p.  214n.  27,  and  also  p.  220n.  4. 
41  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  128. 
42  See  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  15,  and  p.  123ff.  For  a  more  elaborate  discussion  of  the  ontological  proof 
see  chapter  five. 
13 The  moral  philosophy  of  Iris  Murdoch  presents  an  important  challenge  to  current 
ethical  inquiry:  the  effort  to  reclaim  a  notion  of  the  self  as  individual  and  to 
reconceive  its  relation  to  an  idea  of  moral  value  or  the  good.  Specifically,  Murdoch 
seeks  to  retrieve  the  notion  of  consciousness  as  morally  central  to  an  account  of 
human  being  and,  further,  to  conceive  consciousness  as  inescapably  related  to  the 
idea  of  the  good.  Such  an  argument  is  bound  to  be  controversial  in  an  intellectual 
climate  characterized  by  an  unrelenting  critique  of  the  idea  of  subjectivity,  as  well 
as  a  suspicion  of  any  attempt  to  make  substantive  claims  about  humanity  or  the 
human  good.  43 
Here  one  encounters  two  groups  of  words  which  Murdoch  -  against  the  objections  of  an 
`intellectual  climate'  that  has  largely  abandoned  these  notions  -  seeks  to  retrieve  and  connect:  self, 
individual  and  consciousness  on  the  one  hand,  and  moral  value  and  the  idea  of  the  good  on  the 
other. 
Antonaccio  notes  how  Murdoch's  concern  for  the  individual  finds  to  some  extent  its 
expression  in  her  use  of  `persona'.  Antonaccio  speaks  of  `conceptual  "persona"',  in  quotation 
marks,  when  referring  to  Ordinary  Language  Man,  Totalitarian  Man  and  others  44  These  personae 
`represent  abstract  theoretical  positions  in  the  form  of  identifiable  human  types.  '45  They, 
Antonaccio  argues,  signify  Murdoch's  understanding  of  moral  philosophy  as  `the  making  of 
models  and  pictures  of  what  different  men  are  like'46.  She  acknowledges  that  for  Murdoch 
moral  philosophy  needs  a  method  appropriate  to  the  nature  of  human  beings  as 
imaginative,  self-interpreting  creatures.  ... 
Murdoch  understands  metaphysical 
reflection  as  a  form  of  imaginative  construction  that  makes  use  of  concepts, 
images,  explanatory  schema,  and  metaphors  to  describe  reality  and  human 
experience.  In  her  view,  metaphysics  is  not  (as  some  analytical  philosophers  would 
hold)  a  logically  neutral  attempt  to  explain  the  nature  of  reality,  but  a  "figurative" 
43  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  3.  This  persuasion  is  repeated  at  the  beginning  of  almost  every  chapter.  Compare  the 
beginning  of  chapter  three,  where  Antonaccio  recapitulates  `the  book's  general  thesis  that  the  importance  of 
Murdoch's  thought  for  contemporary  ethics  lies  in  her  effort  to  redescribe  the  moral  self  and  its  integral  relation  to 
the  good.  '  (Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  61).  Compare  too  the  first  pages  of  chapter  four,  five  and  six. 
44  Ordinary  Language  Man  and  Totalitarian  Man  appear  in  'The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'.  (Murdoch, 
`The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  268-270) 
41  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  23. 
46  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  23.  The  quotation  is  taken  from  `Metaphysics  and  Ethics',  p.  74. 
14 activity  of  creating  myths,  concepts,  and  images  to  describe  and  illuminate  human 
existence.  47 
Yet,  despite  acknowledging  the  importance  of  imaginative  construction  for  Murdoch's 
philosophy,  Antonaccio  chooses  a  conceptual  approach  to  Murdoch.  In  Picturing  the  Human  she 
distils  from  Murdoch's  scattered  writings  the  systematic  position  of  `reflexive  realism'. 
Picturing  the  Human  has  thus  undoubtedly  made  a  significant  contribution  to  Murdoch's 
recognition  as  philosopher.  By  fitting  Murdoch  into  an  existing  framework  Antonaccio  has  not 
only  translated  the  arguments  into  a  systematic  whole,  but  also  given  Murdoch's  work  a  status  it 
has  frequently  been  denied.  It  is  likened  to  the  work  of  such  established  philosophers  as 
Descartes  and  Kant.  Picturing  the  Human  has  also  directed  the  present  research  in  particular  in  the 
beginning.  Certain  assumptions  I  now  consider  mine  originated  in  reading  Antonaccio's  book. 
This  is  in  particular  true  for  the  importance  of  the  ontological  proof  in  Murdoch's  philosophical 
thinking.  Antonaccio  is  not  the  only  one  to  attest  to  the  importance  for  this  proof  for  Murdoch's 
thought,  but  she  does  provide  the  most  extensive  reading  of  it. 
Nevertheless,  while  pursuing  this  research  points  of  divergence  have  emerged.  In 
particular  I  question  whether  understanding  Murdoch  as  a  reflexive  realist  satisfactorily 
acknowledges  her  originality  and  creativity.  By  positioning  Murdoch's  work  within  an  existing 
framework  Antonaccio  has  not  only  provided  status  and  recognition,  but  also  overlooked  some 
of  its  original,  imaginative  and  comic  features.  By  disregarding  the  fiction  Antonaccio  in  a  way 
endorses  Magee's  strict  distinction  between  philosophy  and  literature. 
This  thesis  differs  from  Antonaccio  in  considering  Murdoch's  contribution  to  philosophy 
in  closer  relation  to  her  interest  in  literature  and  her  practise  as  a  novelist.  It  argues  that  Murdoch 
is  an  important  philosopher,  because  she  has  not  confined  herself  to  philosophy.  In  order  to 
encompass  the  truths  from  literature  in  her  philosophical  writing,  it  becomes  literary  and 
incorporates  literary  elements  as  metaphor,  imagery  and  imagination.  This  incorporation,  I  argue, 
has  significant  consequences  when  regarding  the  scope  and  nature  of  her  argument. 
The  present  research  starts  from  a  question  or  from  questions  Murdoch  herself  poses  on 
different  occasions.  I  consider  these  the  central  questions  of  her  oeuvre: 
What  is  a  good  man  like?  How  can  we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  Can  we 
make  ourselves  morally  better?  48 
47  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  22. 
48  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  'Good",  p.  342.  Compare  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts', 
p.  364  and  p.  368.  Murdoch  uses  `man'  when  speaking  of  the  whole  human  race.  In  chapter  two  it  is  argued  that  she 
15 These  are  the  questions,  Murdoch  writes,  `the  philosopher  should  try  to  answer.  '49 
The  addition  that  `the  philosopher  should  try  to  answer'  these  questions  reveals 
Murdoch's  assessment  of  contemporary  philosophy.  Philosophers  should  try  to  answer  these 
questions  yet,  Murdoch  would  maintain,  in  current  philosophy  the  questions  are  neither  posed 
nor  answered.  On  the  contrary,  ethics  and  moral  philosophy  have  almost  been  forced  out  of 
philosophy.  -50  And  even  the  few  philosophers  who  are  concerned  with  ethics  do  not  ask  questions 
about  becoming  morally  better.  Rather,  their  intention  is  to  provide  neutral  descriptions  of 
different  forms  of  morality,  concentrating  on  the  notions  of  will  and  decision. 
Murdoch,  in  contrast,  considers  it  impossible  to  provide  such  neutral  descriptions.  She 
objects  to  the  way  in  which  the  objective  of  neutrality  has  substantially  affected  the  language 
used.  At  the  beginning  of  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  Murdoch  argues 
against  attempts  of  what  she  calls  `modern  behaviourist  philosophy'  to  divide  metaphors  into 
non-metaphorical  components: 
One  of  the  motives  of  the  attempt  is  a  wish  to  `neutralize'  moral  philosophy,  to 
produce  a  philosophical  discussion  of  morality  which  does  not  take  sides. 
Metaphors  often  carry  a  moral  charge,  which  analysis  in  simpler  and  plainer  terms 
is  designed  to  remove.  This  too  seems  to  me  to  be  misguided.  Moral  philosophy 
cannot  avoid  taking  sides,  and  would-be  neutral  philosophers  merely  take  sides 
surreptitiously.  51 
Murdoch  strongly  objects  to  any  attempt  to  neutralise  moral  philosophy.  In  different  essays  she 
persistently  tries  to  show  how  the  assumed  neutral  views  of  the  world  are  not  neutral  after  all,  but 
instead  assume  a  particular  set  of  values.  52 
considers  the  position  of  `man'  to  be  universal,  whereas  `woman'  is  not.  I  do  not  comment  on  this  use  of  these 
words  apart  from  the  designated  pages  in  chapter  two.  In  my  own  writing  I  try  to  avoid  using  concepts  which  apply 
to  considerably  less  people  than  intended. 
49  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  342. 
50  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  339:  `Empiricism,  especially  in  the  form  given  to  it  by  Russell,  and  later  by 
Wittgenstein,  thrust  ethics  almost  out  of  philosophy.  ... 
Ethics  took  place  in  this  scene.  After  puerile  attempts  to 
classify  moral  statements  as  exclamations  or  expressions  of  emotion,  a  more  sophisticated  neo-Kantianism  with  a 
utilitarian  atmosphere  has  been  developed. 
... 
The  cult  of  ordinary  language  goes  with  the  claim  to  be  neutral.... 
Linguistic  analysis  claims  simply  to  give  a  philosophical  description  of  the  human  phenomenon  of  morality,  without 
making  any  moral  judgments.  In  fact  the  resulting  picture  of  human  conduct  has  a  dear  moral  bias.  ' 
51  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  363. 
52  See  Diamond,  `Fact  and  'Value',  on  the  importance  of  Murdoch's  criticism  of  the  distinction  between  fact  and 
value.  Diamond  points  out  that  Murdoch  was  one  of  the  first  to  criticise  `two  closely  related  ideas',  `accepted  as 
virtually  unquestionable'  in  the  1950s:  `that  it  is  a  logical  error  to  attempt  to  infer  any  evaluative  conclusion  from 
factual  premises,  and  hat  there  is  a  fundamental  distinction  between  fact  and  value.  '  (Diamond,  "`We  Are  Perpetually 
16 Instead  of  aiming  at  neutrality,  Murdoch  argues,  moral  philosophy  should  do  two  things. 
First,  it  should  provide  a  realistic  picture  of  human  beings  and  secondly  recommend  an  ideal.  53  In 
recommending  an  ideal,  but  also  in  its  "realistic"  picture  of  human  beings  Murdoch's  position  is 
significantly  different  from  that  of  her  contemporaries.  The  "realistic"  picture  of  human  beings 
Murdoch  provides  is,  as  she  describes  herself,  `rather  depressing'  and  could  not  be  more  removed 
from  `the  world  in  which  people  play  cricket,  cook  cakes,  make  simple  decisions,  remember  their 
childhood  and  go  to  the  circus'  of  contemporary  analytical  philosophy54: 
[H]uman  beings  are  naturally  selfish  [which]  seems  true  on  the  evidence,  wherever 
and  wherever  we  look  at  them,  in  spite  of  a  very  small  number  of  apparent 
exceptions.  About  the  quality  of  this  selfishness  modern  psychology  has  had 
something  to  tell  us.  The  psyche  is  a  historically  determined  individual  relentlessly 
looking  after  itself.  In  some  ways  it  resembles  a  machine;  in  order  to  operate  it 
needs  sources  of  energy,  and  it  is  predisposed  to  certain  patterns  of  activity.  The 
area  of  its  vaunted  freedom  of  choice  is  not  usually  very  great.  One  of  its  pastimes 
is  day-dreaming.  It  is  reluctant  to  face  unpleasant  realities.  Its  consciousness  is  not 
normally  a  transparent  glass  through  which  it  views  the  world,  but  a  cloud  of 
more  or  less  fantastic  reverie  designed  to  protect  the  psyche  from  pain.  It 
constantly  seeks  consolation,  either  through  imagined  inflation  or  self  or  through 
fictions  of  a  theological  nature.  55 
`Selfish'  is  the  crucial  word  in  Murdoch's  description  of  human  beings.  Human  beings  are  very 
selfish,  concerned  with  their  own  anxieties,  safety  and  well-being,  and  in  preservitg  themselves 
they  rather  act  like  a  machine:  `The  area  of  its  vaunted  freedom  of  choice  is  not  usually  very 
great.  '  Murdoch  considers  this  description  self-evident,  `true  on  the  evidence,  whenever  and 
wherever  we  look  at  them.  '  Such  references  to  the  obvious  one  often  encounters  in  Murdoch's 
Moralists",  p.  79)  In  the  conclusion  of  this  part  Diamond  outlines  points  where  Murdoch's  work  is  still  relevant  for 
contemporary  analytical  philosophy,  in  particular  her  understanding  of  fiction. 
53  'It  should  be  realistic.  Human  nature,  as  opposed  to  the  natures  of  other  hypothetical  spiritual  beings,  should  be 
suitably  considered  in  any  discussion  of  morality.  Secondly,  since  an  ethical  system  cannot  but  commend  an  ideal,  it 
should  commend  a  worthy  ideal.  Ethics  should  not  be  merely  an  analysis  of  ordinary  mediocre  conduct,  it  should  be 
a  hypothesis  about  good  conduct  and  about  how  it  can  be  achieved.  '  (Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over 
Other  Concepts',  p.  363-4)  In  the  earlier  discussion  of  the  notion  of  `reflexive  realism'  it  was  argued  that  this  notion 
of  `realism'  can  be  understood  in  different  ways,  hence  the  quotation  marks  around  the  word  in  the  subsequent 
sentences.  See  also  the  discussion  of  realism  in  chapter  four. 
54  The  image  of  cricket  playing  and  cake  eating  comes  from  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  78-79.  It  is  a 
description  of  Ryle's  The  Concept  of  Mind. 
55  Murdoch,  The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  364. 
17 writing.  She  frequently  uses  words  like  `simply',  or  `surely'.  These  words  often  designate  the 
`realistic  picture'  which  philosophy  should  acknowledge.  56 
The  modern  psychology  which  Murdoch  refers  to,  is  mainly  the  work  of  Freud.  Murdoch 
is  reluctant  to  call  herself  a  `Freudian',  but  adopts  his  `important  discovery  about  the  human 
mind'.  This  discovery  Murdoch  describes  with  the  theological  terms  of  original  sin  and  fallen 
man: 
modern  psychology  has  provided  us  with  what  might  be  called  a  doctrine  of 
original  sin,  a  doctrine  which  most  philosophers  either  deny  (Sartre),  ignore 
(Oxford  and  Cambridge),  or  attempt  to  render  innocuous  (Hampshire). 
... 
One 
may  say  that  what  [Freud]  presents  us  with  us  a  realistic  and  detailed  picture  of  the 
fallen  man.  57 
In  Freud  Murdoch  recognises  her  `depressing'  image  of  human  beings.  This  image  she  considers 
not  `anything  very  new,  since  partially  similar  views  have  been  expressed  before  in  philosophy,  as 
far  back  as  Plato.  '58  So,  this  image  of  human  beings  is  not  a  creation  of  Freud,  or  Murdoch. 
Rather,  it  is  an  insight  almost  lost  with  the  recent  decline  of  religion.  For  Murdoch,  Freud  merely 
retrieves  rather  than  creates  this  image.  Murdoch  does  not  consider  these  insights  Christian,  but 
rather  insights  also  expressed  by  Christianity. 
When  this  is  indeed  the  state  human  beings  are  in,  it  is  obvious  why  Murdoch  considers  it 
impossible  for  moral  philosophers  to  remain  neutral.  For  to  provide  neutral  descriptions  of 
different  forms  of  morality,  when  faced  with  this  unfortunate  state  of  being,  is  to  ignore  what 
Murdoch  regards  as  obvious  reality.  It  is  also  a  moral  decision,  namely  the  decision  not  to  get 
involved,  in  which  the  reality  is  (consciously)  ignored,  whereas  one  could  also  decide  to  try  to,  as 
Murdoch  puts  it,  `defeat'  `the  enemy',  which  is  `the  fat  relentless  ego.  '59 
Philosophers,  according  to  Murdoch,  should  be  engaged  in  this  `fight  with  the  enemy',  as 
she  phrases  it  dramatically.  Indeed,  for  Murdoch  it  has  become  all  the  more  important  for 
56  See  also  chapter  three,  in  particular  the  discussion  of  lei  and  D. 
57  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  341.  Several  works  have  in  recent  years  provided  an  account  of  TMurdoch's 
ambiguous  relationship  with  Freud  and  psychoanalysis.  J.  Turner,  Murdoch  vs.  Freud:  A  Freudian  Look  at  an  Anti- 
Freudian  (New  York:  Lang,  1993  (American  University  Studies.  Series  4,  English  Language  and  Literature,  vol.  146)) 
provides  a  psychoanalytic  reading  of  eight  of  Murdoch's  novels.  Turner  distinguishes  different  reasons  why 
Murdoch  distances  herself  from  Freud  so  strictly.  She  distrust  the  emphasis  put  on  introspection,  fearing  that  the 
other  will  disappear  in  this  process.  In  addition,  Turner  argues,  `[Freud],  too,  is  a  father-figure  she  is  emulating  and 
castrating  in  order  to  be  effective  as  herself.  '  (Turner,  Murdoch  vs.  Freud,  p.  12)  This  last  remark  indicates  the 
disappointing  turn  the  readings  of  Murdoch's  novels  take.  Based  on  admittedly  little  biographical  information 
Turner  reads  Nfurdoch's  novels  from  assumptions  about  the  relationship  between  her  and  her  parents.  I  find  his 
readings  rather  constrained.  He  ignores  possible  arguments  against  Freudian  ideas  in  favour  of  personal  analysis. 
58  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  341. 
18 philosophers  to  do  so,  because  of  what  she  calls  `the  collapse  of  religion'.  Religion  shared  with 
moral  philosophy  this  aim  of  combating  against  the  fat  relentless  ego  and  its  assumed  collapse 
makes  it  all  the  more  important  for  moral  philosophy  to  undertake  this  task.  6° 
Murdoch  does  not  substantiate  her  assumption  that  religion,  and  by  religion  is  meant  the 
Christian  religion,  is  disappearing.  She  admits  that  the  assumption  `that  `there  is  no  God'  and  that 
the  influence  of  religion  is  waning  rapidly'  may  be  challenged.  61  However,  this  challenge  does  not 
affect  her  thought,  because  such  a  challenge,  she  would  argue,  does  not  acquit  moral  philosophy 
of  its  task  to  consider  the  question  of  becoming  morally  better.  The  disappearance  of  religion 
merely  makes  it  all  the  more  urgent  for  moral  philosophy  to  do  so.  Murdoch  is  writing  for  a 
growing  number  of  people  for  whom  religion,  in  particular  Christianity,  no  longer  provides  any 
help  or  direction  when  they  looks  for  answers  to  the  question  `How  can  we  make  ourselves 
morally  better?  '.  In  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  Murdoch  refers  to  these  people  as  `those  who  are  not 
religious  believers'.  Her  own  relation  to  Christianity  she  abridges  to  `a  neo-Christian  or  Buddhist- 
Christian  or  Christian  fellow  traveller.  '62 
Her  concern  for  the  disappearance  of  religion  underlines  both  her  fiction  and  her 
philosophy.  From  The  Bell  onwards  her  literary  imagination  forcefully  reveals  this  preoccupation. 
The  novels  may  feature  nuns,  priests  and  even  bishops  who  are  often  in  doubt  about  their  calling, 
but  very  few  ordinary  churchgoers.  The  Bell  in  particular  provides  a  most  powerful  image  of  the 
situation  Murdoch  considers  her  readers  to  be  in:  an  interim  period,  the  time  of  the  angels  G3  The 
Bell  features  two  communities:  one  of  nuns  and  another,  next  to  the  abbey,  of  people  who  belong 
neither  in  a  religious  order  nor  to  the  world.  The  latter  have  limited  access  to  the  abbey,  only 
some  of  them  are  allowed  to  enter  and  then  only  when  they  are  called  for.  This  limitation  is 
however  in  a  way  self-imposed.  The  youngest  member  once  climbs  into  the  convent,  imagining  `a 
picture  of  nuns  fleeing  from  him  with  piercing  screams  [or]  nuns  leaping  upon  him  like 
bacchantes.  '64  Instead,  he  meets  a  very  friendly  nun,  who  invites  him  to  try  the  swing  and  shows 
him  that  the  door  is  not  locked  at  all  65 
Murdoch's  concern  with  Christian  imagery  in  her  novels  has  invited  various  responses,  in 
particular  from  theologians.  Jansen  at  the  beginning  of  his  chapter  on  Murdoch  points  out  how 
the  identification  of  Murdoch  as  a  `religious  writer'  is  interpreted  very  differently: 
59  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  342. 
60  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  337. 
61  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  'Good",  p.  361. 
62  See  respectively  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  344  and  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  419. 
63  This  is  the  tide  of  one  novel,  which  features  a  rectory  of  an  atheist  priest  isolated  from  the  world  by  permanent 
fog.  It  is  also  a  term  used  by  the  philosopher  Rozanov  to  characterise  the  present  era.  (Murdoch,  The  Philoropher''s 
Pupil,  p.  187) 
61  Murdoch,  The  Bell,  p.  177. 
19 For  Elizabeth  Dipple,  the  religious  character  of  Murdoch's  novels  consists  in 
spiritual  discernment  of  "bourgeois  complacency  and  prejudice.  "  Suguna 
Ramanathan  argues  that  "...  [Murdoch]  penetrates  to  the  very  heart  of  Christianity 
and  interprets  it  to  the  contemporary  world  in  terms  which  it  will  find 
acceptable.  "  Yet  a  third  point  of  view  is  offered  by  Peter  Hawkins  who  has 
recently  purported  to  find  in  Murdoch's  novels  "the  strange  possibility  that  an 
avowedly  non-Christian  writer,  using  Christian  language  and  tradition  for  her  own 
different  ends,  can  produce  novels  of  powerful  and  genuine  Christian 
interpretation.  "66 
Even  though  Murdoch  maybe  `an  avowedly  non-Christian  writer',  her  novels  can  be  interpreted 
in  quite  different  ways,  ranging  from  the  `spiritual'  to  the  `Christian'.  This  variety  in  interpretation 
may  be  understood  as  affirmation  of  the  strength  of  her  art.  However,  Jansen  cautions  against 
interpretations  favouring  one's  own  intention  over  those  of  the  author. 
The  readings  which  consider  Murdoch's  novels  as  reinterpretation  of  Christianity 
interestingly  contrast  to  Murdoch's  understanding  of  contemporary  literature,  expressed  in 
different  essays.  In  this  sense  she  is  a  rather  odd  companion  for  those  interested  in  the  relation 
between  literature  and  theology.  Murdoch  has  little  belief  in  contemporary  literature.  Her 
emphatic  statement  that  `[f]or  both  the  collective  and  the  individual  salvation  of  the  human  race, 
art  is  doubtless  more  important  than  philosophy,  and  literature  most  important  of  all'  is  about 
literature  from  the  nineteenth  century,  rather  than  contemporary  art  67  Of  course,  this  general 
judgement  allows  for  felicitous  exceptions,  and  her  own  novels  may  be  those. 
Murdoch  may  not  have  much  esteem  for  contemporary  literature,  yet  she  cherishes 
particular  nineteenth  century  novels.  This  literature  she  considers  most  important  for  the 
salvation  of  the  human  race,  after  the  collapse  of  religion.  It  is  her  most  important  tool  when 
considering  the  question  which  I  consider  the  central  question  of  her  oeuvre:  `How  can  we  make 
ourselves  morally  better?  '.  The  answer  concerns  an  understanding  of  consciousness  in  relation  to 
an  external  reality.  Literature  is  not  the  only  tool  in  answering  this  question,  but  its  importance  is 
65  Murdoch,  The  Bell,  p.  180. 
66  H.  Jansen,  LaughterAmong  the  Ruin:  Postmodern  ComicApproaches  to  SSJering  (Frankfurt  am  Main:  Peter  Lang  Verlag, 
2001)  p.  61.  The  quotations  are  taken  from  E.  Dipple,  Iris  Murdoch:  !  fork  for  the  Spirit  (London:  Methuen,  1982)  p.  3, 
S.  Ramanathan,  Iris  Murdoch:  Figures  of  Good  (Houndsmills,  Basingstoke,  London:  MacMillan  Press,  1990)  p.  23,  and 
P.  S.  Hawkins,  The  Language  of  Grace:  Flannery  O'Connor,  IF,  alker  Perry  and  Iris  Murdoch  (Cambridge,  Antonaccio:  Cowley 
Publications,  1993)  p.  91. 
67  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  362. 
20 signified  in  its  presence  and  influence  in  Murdoch's  philosophical  writing  when  considering  this 
question. 
This  thesis  argues  that  Murdoch's  understanding  of  this  literature  provides  the  position  in 
her  philosophical  writing  from  which  she  criticises  contemporary  philosophy,  in  particular 
linguistic  analysis  and  existentialism,  and  which  inspires  her  own  philosophy.  From  incidental 
remarks  in  early  essays  literature  develops  into  an  intrinsic  part  of  the  argument.  The  thesis 
further  argues  that  the  form  of  the  philosophical  argument  changes  accordingly,  featuring  images, 
imagery  and  metaphors.  This  form  of  imaginative  philosophy  receives  its  fullest  expression  in 
Murdoch's  understanding  of  imagination  and  fantasy  in  relation  to  the  Good. 
Before  I  proceed  to  distinguish  the  different  chapters  of  this  thesis,  it  should  be  noted 
that  the  terms  used  above  -  imagination,  image,  imagery  -  are  notoriously  difficult  to  define  or 
describe.  This  point  is  evidenced  when  studying  imagination,  and  it  has  indeed  proven  to  be  a 
popular  point  to  make  at  the  beginning  of  any  book  or  article  on  imagination.  Thus  Strawson  at 
the  beginning  of  an  article  which  has  inspired  other  works  on  imagination  writes: 
The  uses,  and  applications,  of  the  terms  `image',  `imagine',  `imagination', 
`imaginative',  and  so  forth  make  up  a  very  diverse  and  scattered  family.  Even  this 
image  of  a  family  seems  too  definite.  It  would  be  a  matter  of  more  than  difficulty 
exactly  to  define  and  list  the  family's  members,  let  alone  establish  their 
relationships  of  parenthood  and  cousinhood.  68 
Because  it  is  more  than  difficult  to  define  and  distinguish  these  related  words,  Strawson  briefly 
acknowledges  different  areas  of  association.  He  subsequently  pursues  to  connect  two  particular 
modes  in  which  the  word  imagination  is  used,  and  thus  to  acquire  better  understanding  the 
notion  of  imagination.  69 
Similarly,  the  pursuit  of  this  thesis,  in  particular  its  second  and  fourth  chapter,  further 
develops  understanding  of  the  notions  of  imagination,  image  and  imagery  by  considering 
Murdoch's  understanding  of  these.  Murdoch's  understanding  proceeds  from  what  she  assumes  to 
be  an  immediate  understanding  of  imagination  and  imagery.  Imagination  is  not  always  described 
in  detail,  but  also  introduced  by  urging  her  readers  to  consider  -  what  she  regards  as  -  great  art: 
68  P.  Strawson,  `Imagination  and  Perception'  (L.  Foster,  J.  W.  Swanson  (eds),  Experience  and  Theory.  London: 
Duckworth,  1971,  p.  31-54),  p.  31. 
69  The  three  areas  distinguished  are  `the  area  in  which  imagination  is  linked  with  image  and  image  is  understood  as 
mental  image 
...  the  area  in  which  imagination  is  associated  with  invention 
...  the  area  in  which  imagination  is  linked 
with  false  belief...  '.  In  the  remainder  of  the  article  he  is  intend  to  connect  Kant's  use  of  imagination  in  The  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason  to  perceptual  recognition.  (Strawson,  `Imagination  and  Perception',  p.  31) 
21 the  novels  of  Tolstoy,  the  paintings  of  Velasquez  and  Titian.  70  This  understanding  inspires  the 
present  preliminary  understanding  of  imagination  as  a  faculty  of  the  mind,  at  work  in  particular  in 
art  and  literature,  but  not  only  there.  This  faculty  creates  images,  examples  of  which  have  been 
mentioned  in  this  chapter,  as  for  example  in  the  image  of  human  beings  retrieved  from  Freud,  or 
the  image  taken  from  The  Bell.  71  Images  collectively  are  called  imagery. 
The  argument  of  this  thesis  proceeds  as  follows.  The  second  chapter  considers  the 
presence  of  imagery  in  philosophical  discourse  and  more  generally  the  often  problematic 
relationship  between  philosophy  and  rhetoric.  The  chapter  features  a  study  of  the  work  of 
Michele  le  Doeuff  and  her  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary.  The  work  of  Le  Doeuff  is  of 
importance  for  two  reasons.  It  provides  first  a  general  consideration  of  the  relationship  between 
philosophy  and  imagery,  and  secondly  methodological  considerations  for  regarding  the  imagery 
in  Murdoch's  philosophical  writing. 
The  third  chapter  examines  the  role  of  literature  and  in  particular  of  character  in 
Murdoch's  early  work.  It  considers  the  role  of  these  in  the  confrontation  with  contemporary 
analytical  and  existentialist  philosophy.  It  thus  considers  Murdoch's  earlier  writings,  from  the  first 
essays  in  the  beginning  of  the  1950s  to  The  Idea  of  Perfection'  from  1964.  This  last  essay  also 
features  the  image  of  a  mother  M  and  her  daughter-in-law  D,  which  has  taken  a  prominent  place 
in  commentaries  on  Murdoch's  work.  The  discussion  of  this  image  in  this  chapter  wonders  to 
what  extent  Murdoch  is  able  to  uphold  an  understanding  of  the  inner  life  and  of  transcendent 
reality. 
The  fourth  chapter  discusses  the  notion  of  imagination  as  in  a  way  the  successor  to 
Murdoch's  understanding  of  character.  It  presents  the  distinction  between  good  imagination  and 
bad  fantasy  and  Murdoch's  discussion  of  the  notion  in  Kant  and  Plato.  By  leaving  Kant's 
understanding  of  the  aesthetic  imagination  out  of  the  small  corner  Kant  had  allowed  it,  Murdoch 
presents  an  epistemology  in  which  different  faculties  are  no  longer  strictly  distinguished.  She 
subsequently  considers  Plato's  understanding  of  the  Good  not  only  as  the  means  of  guiding  this 
imagination,  and  distinguishing  it  from  fantasy,  but  also  as  a  source  of  inspiration  for  high 
imagination. 
The  fifth  and  last  chapter  considers  this  notion  of  the  Good.  It  argues  that  understanding 
of  this  notion  of  the  Good  needs  elaboration  of  Murdoch's  concept  of  religion.  The  discussion 
of  Acastos  presents  the  particular  point  of  view  with  which  Murdoch  considers  religion.  The 
70  See  for  example  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  353,  where  the  imperative  `consider'  urges  the  reader  to  look 
at  Velasquez  or  Titian,  or  to  read  Shakespeare  or  Tolstoy.  See  chapter  four  for  a  more  thorough  discussion  of  this 
and  similar  parts. 
71  See  p.  18  and  p.  19  respectively. 
22 chapter  proceeds  to  discuss  her  perception  of  the  Ontological  Proof,  wondering  in  particular 
about  the  position  of  the  fool. 
3.  Keading  Murdoch 
Reading  Murdoch's  texts  can  be  an  exhilarating  and  also  exasperating  activity.  I  have  already 
noted  that  Murdoch's  texts  and  in  particular  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  are  difficult  to  read. 
She  refers  to  many  different  texts,  from  philosophy,  literature  as  well  as  theology.  Especially 
when  first  reading  her  texts,  or  when  unfamiliar  with  Murdoch's  intellectual  tradition  a  reader 
encounters  various  unfamiliar  arguments,  ideas  and  thinkers,  which  are  often  referred  to  only  in 
passing. 
Understanding  of  these  ideas  and  thinkers  seems  assumed,  but  it  would  be  impossible  to 
study  all  these  different  ideas  as  well  as  Murdoch's  use  of  them.  Even  a  limited  study  may  lead 
one  ultimately  from  Murdoch's  writing,  for  the  ideas  and  thinkers  she  refers  to  are  often  of  great 
complexity.  Moreover,  her  use  of  texts  and  ideas  does  not  always  ask  for  a  thorough  study  of  the 
thinkers  and  ideas  she  mentions.  It  is  not  uncommon  that  statements  are  not  based  on  any 
thorough  study,  even  though  it  is  suggested  differently.  72 
Also,  in  considering  Murdoch's  work  I  encountered  a  variety  of  thinkers,  which  were 
sometimes  unfamiliar  to  me,  or  discussed  in  an  unfamiliar  way.  To  this  difficulty  of  interpretation 
another  one  is  added,  because  I  consider  texts  from  a  period  of  more  than  forty  years,  on  a  wide 
variety  of  topics.  Most  explanation  of  the  way  I  have  handled  these  difficulties  is  to  be  found  in 
the  different  chapter,  where  I  comment  on  the  difficulties  encountered  when  reading  the  text  and 
I  explain  my  reasons  for  reading  the  text  in  the  way  I  do.  I  consider  the  texts  Murdoch  refers  to 
sometimes,  but  not  always  thoroughly.  Generally  speaking  I  have  chosen  to  stay  with  Murdoch's 
text  as  much  as  possible.  Disputable  interpretations  are  noted,  but  I  am  more  concerned  with  the 
way  in  which  Murdoch's  interpretation  affects  her  thinking,  rather  than  with  any  confrontation 
with  another,  more  generally  accepted  interpretation.  My  concern  has  been  with  the  development 
of  Murdoch's  thought  and  I  have  been  guided  in  these  interpretations  by  what  she  considers 
important  herself:  literature,  metaphor  and  imagery. 
Even  though  I  am  concerned  with  literature  and  imagery  I  do  not  provide  a  lengthy 
discussion  of  any  of  Murdoch's  novels,  though  I  occasionally  refer  to  them.  I  do  not  regard 
72  In  an  earlier  version  of  this  thesis  I  added  here  within  brackets  that  I  doubted  that  Murdoch  ever  read  The  Critique 
of  Pure  Reason,  basing  this  doubt  on  her  reading  of  Kant's  notion  of  imagination  discussed  in  chapter  four.  In 
between  first  submitting  my  thesis  and  defending  it  I  have  had  the  opportunity  to  look  at  her  library,  presently  held 
in  the  Iris  Murdoch  Centre  at  Kingston  University.  I  found  that  it  contains  a  well  annotated  copy  of  The  Critique  of 
Pure  Reason.  I  thus  revoke  my  earlier  supposition,  and  I  am  excited  by  the  possibility  of  new  research  to  be  done  once 
this  collection  is  fully  catalogued. 
23 Murdoch's  novels  as  well  as  her  consideration  of  literature  as  spheres  separate  from  the 
philosophical  concerns.  Yet,  a  lengthy  discussion  of  the  novels  is  not  indispensable  for  my 
research.  It  focuses  on  Murdoch's  understanding  of  literature  in  her  philosophical  writing. 
Though  I  consider  her  considerations  of  literature  most  likely  to  proceed  from  her  own 
experience  as  a  novelist,  it  would  be  hard  to  decide  in  what  way.  I  refer  to  the  novels  mainly  to 
argue  the  pervasiveness  of  certain  ideas  in  Murdoch's  thought.  More  importantly,  this  study  does 
not  aim  to  assess  the  philosophical  texts  in  relation  to  the  novels,  as  the  novels  have  been 
assessed  in  relation  to  the  philosophy.  Rather,  it  intends  to  show  Murdoch's  imaginative 
philosophy,  which  is  a  form  of  philosophy  inspired  by  her  understanding  of  literature,  as  a 
important  challenge  to  many  supposition  about  philosophy,  and  makes  ample  use  of  imagery.  I 
examine  the  presence  of  imagery  in  philosophy.  Such  examination  may  seem  unusual  if  not 
recalcitrant,  as  it  can  go  against  the  grain  of  the  text  or  of  ordinary  interpretations.  As  the  work  of 
Le  Doeuff  argues,  such  characteristics  are  neither  unexpected  nor  regrettable.  The  next  chapter 
introduces  her  thought  as  inspiration  for  reading  Murdoch's  philosophy. 
24 Cl  [AFTER  Two 
MICHELE  LE  DOEUFF  AND  THE  PHILOSOPHICAL  IMAGINARY: 
WOMEN,  PHILOSOPHY,  REASON,  ETC. 
1.  Introduction 
, 
The  previous  chapter  argued  that  Murdoch  entrusts  philosophy  with  a  task  occasioned  by  the 
decline  of  religion.  In  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  she  urges  philosophy  to  rescue  the  values  involved 
in  this  `collapse  of  religion'.  In  111etaplysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  she  contends  that  in  order  to  change 
Christianity  `into  something  that  can  be  generally  believed 
... 
it  might  also  be  necessary  for 
philosophers  to  become  theologians  and  theologians  to  become  philosophers,  and  this  is  not  very 
likely  to  happen  either.  "  Philosophy's  main  concern  becomes  the  question  `How  can  we  make 
ourselves  morally  better?  '.  An  answer  to  this  question,  I  shall  argue,  comes  most  importantly  in 
an  understanding  of  self  in  relation  to  the  Good,  which  involves  the  use  of  images,  imagery  and 
imagination. 
In  her  last  work  of  philosophy  published  in  1992  Murdoch  considers  it  unlikely  that 
philosophy  is  to  assume  this  task.  In  the  philosophy  she  encountered  at  the  beginning  of  her 
career  -  linguistic  analysis  and  existentialism,  to  be  discussed  in  the  subsequent  chapter  -  she  had 
great  difficulties  merely  raising  the  possibility.  Any  discussion  of  the  notion  of  the  Good  was 
likely  to  have  been  frowned  upon.  Linguistic  analysis,  on  the  one  hand,  is  modelled  after  a 
positivistic  idea  of  science,  in  which  there  is  no  room  for  a  more  substantial  understanding  of  self 
or  for  metaphysical  concepts  as  God  or  the  Good.  In  different  articles  Murdoch  pictures  how 
Moore's  successors  banished  the  Good  from  philosophy.  Existentialism,  on  the  other  hand, 
seems  reluctant  to  ever  grant  any  authority  to  anything  but  the  individual  consciousness  itself. 
The  difficulty  Murdoch  faced  when  introducing  the  Good  has  been  more  complicated 
than  presenting  an  unappreciated  subject  matter.  Linguistic  analysis  in  particular  did  not  only  not 
regard  the  Good  as  some  sort  of  `property',  but  also  employed  a  language,  and  favoured  a  form 
of  argumentation  which  thwarted  any  consideration  of  the  Good,  or  a  more  substantial 
understanding  of  self.  '-  So,  one  finds  that  Murdoch  is  not  only  proposing  consideration  of  an 
unfashionable  topic,  but  also  constantly  probing  what  philosophy  should  and  could  be  like,  what 
is  proper  philosophical  questioning  and  proper  philosophical  argumentation. 
I  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  419. 
2N1urdoch  considers  Moore  to  have  initiated,  though  not  endorsed  this  understanding  of  good,  by  distinguishing  the 
question  `what  things  are  good"  from  the  question  `what  does  good  mean'.  Yet  Moore,  Murdoch  argues,  'was  not 
wholly  of  the  modern  time  in  that  although  he  pointed  out  that  `good'  was  not  the  second  name  of  any  natural  or 
metaphysical  property,  he  could  not  rid  himself  of  the  conviction  that  it  was  nevertheless  the  name  of  a  property, 
the  unanalysible  non-natural  property  of  goodness...  '.  (Murdoch,  `Metaphysics  and  Ethics',  p.  60)  See  for  a 
25 In  doing  so,  Murdoch  is  concerned  with  an  aspect  of  philosophy,  which  has  been 
disregarded  by  many  philosophers.  Even  to  suggest  that  philosophy  prefers  a  form  of  language  or 
argumentation  which  is  unfriendly  to  certain  topics  is  an  intricate  thing  to  do.  It  suggests  that  the 
language  and  arguments  used  are  not  neutral  to  the  object  of  argumentation,  and  that  the  author 
intends  to  convince  his  or  her  readers  by  other  than  pure  argumentation.  It  presumes  the 
presence  of  rhetoric  in  philosophy. 
This  suggestion  is  not  easy  to  maintain,  for  it  counters  a  conviction  long  held  in  the 
history  of  philosophy.  Especially,  but  certainly  not  exclusively  in  the  analytical  tradition 
philosophy  is  considered  to  be  contrary  to  rhetoric.  3  Indeed,  it  partly  receives  its  identity  from 
not  being  rhetorical.  Rhetoric  is  regarded  as  superfluous,  even  inimical  to  philosophy.  It  is  hereby 
assumed  that  it  is  possible  to  fully  distinguish  philosophy  and  rhetoric.  Yet,  the  rhetoric  Murdoch 
discerns  in  analytical  philosophy  is  one  which  is  intrinsically  bound  with  the  argument  and  cannot 
be  entirely  separated  from  it.  She  denies  philosophy  its  assumed  position  of  neutrality. 
The  opposition  between  philosophy  and  rhetoric  is  found  throughout  philosophy's 
history  and  not  limited  to  linguistic  analysis.  In  this  chapter  I  discuss  the  implication  of  this  long 
held  conviction  in  general  terms.  In  particular  I  am  concerned  with  the  presence  of  images  and 
imagery  in  philosophical  texts.  My  discussion  focuses  on  the  work  of  the  French  philosopher 
Michele  Le  Doeuff  and  her  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary. 
Le  Doeuff  is  a  philosopher  and  also  a  feminist  thinker.  She  holds  that  "thinking 
philosophically'  and  `being  a  feminist'  appear  as  one  and  the  same  attitude'.  In  Ho  p  archia's  Choice 
she  argues  that  it  is  not  just  possible  to  think  the  two  together,  but  even  that  `[b]eing  a  feminist  is 
also  a  way  of  integrating  the  fact  of  being  a  philosopher.  Because  for  two  centuries  a  feminist  has 
been  a  woman  who  does  not  leave  others  to  think  for  her....  4  Still,  I  first  consider  objections 
made  against  regarding  Murdoch's  work  from  a  feminist  perspective.  I  do  so  not  just  because  I 
find  that  these  objections  tend  to  come  up  anyway,  but  also  because  underlying  such  objections, 
as  well  as  underlying  Murdoch's  understanding  of  feminist  thinking,  are  presuppositions  about 
philosophy  and  rhetoric  central  to  this  chapter.  These  considerations  well  introduce  the  chapter's 
central  concerns  of  the  relation  between  rhetoric  and  philosophy.  Starting  from  a  discussion  of 
feminism,  philosophy  and  rationality  I  proceed  to  imagery  in  philosophy  and  the  work  of  Le 
Doeuff.  In  particular  I  discuss  her  methodological  propositions  for  considering  imagery  in 
discussion  of  the  differences  between  Moore's  and  Murdoch's  understanding  of  the  Good,  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the 
Human,  p.  116-123. 
3  However,  Le  Doeuff's  work  confirms  that  the  strict  distinction  between  rhetoric  and  philosophy  is  not  absent 
from  the  work  of  philosophers  on  the  continent. 
4  Le  Doeuff,  Hz)  parchia'r  Choice:  An  Essay  Concerning  Women,  Philosophy,  etc.,  translated  by  T.  Selous  (Oxford  UK  & 
Cambridge  MA:  Blackwell,  1991)  p.  29. 
26 philosophy.  I  finally  apply  these  to  the  image  of  the  fool,  which  I  consider  to  be  Le  Doeuff's 
founding  myth. 
2.  Women,  Philosophy,  Rationality 
It  may  seem  immaterial  to  observe  in  a  study  on  Murdoch  that  for  a  long  period  women  were  not 
allowed  to  enter  universities  and  study  philosophy  in  an  academic  environment.  Murdoch  did  not 
write  about  feminism.  Only  when  questioned  in  interviews  she  commented  on  it,  and  then  merely 
to  admit  in  general  terms  that  she  regarded  it  of  great  importance.  5  When  studying  her  work  it  is 
easy  to  forget  that  for  women  to  study  and  teach  philosophy  at  a  university,  as  she  did,  was  a 
rather  new  thing  to  do.  Indeed,  Murdoch  actually  experienced  some  of  the  past's  regulated 
inequality  when  she  was  at  Cambridge.  The  University  did  not  grant  degrees  to  women  until 
1948.  Murdoch  was  there  a  year  before. 
There  are  not  many  discussions  of  Murdoch's  work  in  relation  to  feminist  philosophy.  6 
Indeed  Murdoch  -  always  impressive  when  it  comes  to  the  interpretation  of  her  work  -  has 
dissuaded  critics  from  considering  it  from  a  feminist  perspective.  Griffin  writes  that  `Murdoch 
does  not  want  to  acknowledge  any  gender  difference 
...  while  being  aware  of  the  fact  that 
Western  culture  has  been  dominated  by  men.  '7  When  asked  about  her  preference  of  male 
narrators  Murdoch  explains: 
I  think  I  want  to  write  about  things  on  the  whole  where  it  does  not  matter 
whether  you're  male  or  female,  in  which  case  you'd  better  be  male,  because  male 
represents  ordinary  human  beings,  unfortunately,  as  things  stand  at  the  moment, 
whereas  a  woman  is  always  a  woman!  8 
Murdoch  may  express  her  sympathy  for  feminism  and  her  discontent  with  the  situation  where 
women  only  represent  women.  However,  the  quotation  above  also  suggests  a  strong  sense  of 
resignation  and  disinterest  to  explore  this  situation. 
5  G.  Griffin,  The  Influence  of  the  I  1"°ritings  of  Simone  IT'ei!  on  the  Fiction  of  Iris  Murdoch  (San  Francisco:  Mellen  University 
Press,  1993)  p.  6-7. 
6  There  are  a  few  commentaries  on  her  novels  from  a  feminist  perspective.  (For  a  discussion  of  these  works,  reading 
the  novels  from  a  feminist  perspective  see  Griffin,  The  Influence  of  the  Ii°ritings  of  Simone  IT"eil  on  the  Fiction  of  Iris 
Murdoch,  p.  7-  13.  )  I  know  of  only  one  short  reference  to  her  systematic  writing:  M.  Deveraux,  `Feminist 
Aesthetics',  in  J.  Levinson  (ed.  ),  Oxford  Handbook  ofAesthetics  (Oxford:  Oxford  University  Press,  2003)  p.  647-666. 
Tiurdoch's  work  is  here  mentioned  as  possible  subject  for  future  research. 
7  See  Griffin,  The  Influence  of  the  Iº"'ritinns  of  Simone  WC'eil  on  the  Fiction  of  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  7. 
8  J.  -L.  Chevalier  (ed.  ),  Recontres  avec  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  82,  as  quoted  by  D.  Johnson,  his  Murdoch  (Brighton:  The 
Harvester  Press,  1987)  p.  xii. 
27 This  emphatic  statement  made  Johnson  practically  apologise  in  her  Iris  Murdoch  for  using 
feminist  theory: 
My  aim  in  this  short  book  has  been  to  suggest  a  critical  evaluation  of  the  novels 
based  on  close  reading  and  located  within  the  context  of  contemporary  feminist 
debate  about  the  nature  of  `women's  writing'. 
Such  an  approach,  especially  when  conducted  within  the  narrow  limits  of  a  very 
short  book,  will  necessarily  appear  partial  and  eccentric  (that  is,  at  a  tangent  to  the 
dominant  cultural  tradition  in  which  Iris  Murdoch  writes).  I  undertook  the  work 
with  some  misgivings,  being  particular  anxious  to  avoid  what  might  be  construed 
as  a  `narrowly  feminist'  reading. 
In  her  `short'  or  `very  short'  book  Johnson  aims  at  placing  Murdoch  within  a  debate  that  is 
different  from  Murdoch's  own  tradition.  Both  the  modest  length  of  the  work  and  the  different 
angle  introduce  her  misgivings  for  doing  so. 
However,  it  is  not  clear  what  Johnson's  misgivings  are.  In  her  discussion  of  Johnson's 
book  Griffin  appropriately  remarks  that  `[o]ne  cannot  help  wondering  (and  these  questions 
remain  unsolved  in  the  text)  why  Qohnson]  was  "particularly  anxious  to  avoid",  what  she 
assumes  would  "construe",  and  what  she  takes  to  be  "narrowly  feminist  reading"'.  10  One 
wonders  whether  Johnson  would  have  had  similar  misgivings  if  her  approach  had  been  equally 
un-Murdochian  yet  not  feminist.  Does  Johnson  think  that  feminist  readings  as  such  are  more  likely 
to  be  narrow,  or  that  a  feminist  reading  ofAfurdoch's  work  in  particularis  more  vulnerable  to  such 
criticism? 
Still,  Johnson's  qualms  do  not  stand  on  their  own.  Rather,  they  reflect  the  atmosphere 
surrounding  Murdoch  and  her  work.  There  seems  here  no  need  to  be  reminded  of  the  long  and 
pervasive  bias  of  much  of  Western  Culture  against  intellectual  women.  On  the  other  side  of  the 
Canal,  Simone  de  Beauvoir,  Murdoch's  senior  by  only  eleven  years,  was  `taken  in  hand'  by  Sartre 
and  only  in  recent  studies  has  she  been  established  as  an  independent  thinker.  11  In  the  year  that 
Murdoch  went  to  Oxford  Virginia  Woolf  published  Thn'e  Guineas,  and  yet  Murdoch  can  confess 
9  Johnson,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  xi. 
Griffin,  The  Influence  of  the  I  f'riting  of  Simone  Feil  on  the  Fiction  of  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  12. 
See  for  example  K.  Vintges,  Filosofie  als  passier  bet  denken  van  Simone  de  Beauvoir  (Amsterdam:  Prometheus,  1992),  and 
Ai.  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia.  r  Choice,  in  particular  the  second  and  third  notebook.  The  quotation  'taking  in  hand'  she 
discusses  in  this  third  notebook.  It  is  taken  from  Simone  de  Beauvoir,  Memoirs  o fa  Dutiju!  Da:  «hter. 
28 to  be  `not  very  interested  in  the  female  predicament'.  12  Because  of  Murdoch's  own  reluctance  to 
consider  her  position  as  a  woman  philosopher  and  writer  they  have  hardly  been  discussed  at  all. 
Instead,  it  has  been  considered  to  be  no  more  than  normal,  that  at  the  time  when 
Murdoch  started  her  philosophical  career  Oxford  and  Cambridge  employed  quite  a  number  of 
female  scholars.  Among  them  were  prominent  philosophers,  friends  and  colleagues  of  Murdoch. 
With  Elizabeth  Anscombe  Murdoch  shared  a  passion  for  the  work  of  Wittgenstein  and  she 
dedicated  Aletaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  to  her.  With  Mary  Midgley  she  vied  for  the  same  job  at 
St.  Anne's  and  from  their  studies  at  Sommerville  Philippa  Foot  was  a  life  long  friend.  13 
These  women  seldom  addressed  their  novel  existence  as  female  philosophers  employed 
by  a  college.  Yet  another  Oxford  philosopher,  Mary  Warnock,  has  done  so.  Both  in  her  Women 
Philosophers  and  in  her  memoirs  she  comments  on  the  gender  of  these  philosophers.  In  the 
memoirs  she  is  rather  brief  and  evasive.  She  notes  that  Foot,  Anscombe  and  Murdoch  are  all 
three  `remarkable  and  original  women',  and  adds:  `[o]n  whether  their  originality,  had  anything  to 
do  with  gender,  I  cannot  make  a  final  judgement,  but  I  suspect  that  women  are  less  prone  to 
jump  on  bandwagons  than  at  least  some  of  their  male  colleagues,  and  more  reluctant  to  abandon 
common  sense'.  14  This  remark  seems  based  on  an  everyday  psychological  observation,  even 
though  it  may  be  stretched  to  support  Le  Doeuff's  suggestion  that  feminism  and  philosophy  as  a 
form  of  thinking  for  oneself  are  indeed  very  close. 
However,  this  suggestion  does  not  find  any  support  from  Warnock  in  her  collection  of 
essays  by  female  philosophers,  where  she  naturally  has  to  comment  on  `women  and 
philosophy'.  15  Yet,  for  one  who  has  compiled  this  collection  she  is  surprisingly  reluctant  to 
consider  the  possibility  that  there  would  anything  different  to  say  about  `women  and  philosophy' 
than  there  is  to  be  said  about  `men  and  philosophy'.  This  is  in  particular  clear  when  Warnock 
explains  why  she  has  included  only  a  few  feminist  texts  in  the  collection.  She  admits  that  much  of 
what  is  written  on  `the  Women  Question'  would  satisfy  her  `criteria  of  generality  and  of  the 
hoped-for  explanation  of  phenomena;  a  great  deal  is  concerned  to  go  behind  the  superficial  and 
to  expose  the  presuppositions  of  society  as  a  whole.  '  She  mentions  a  number  of  works,  `all 
plausibly  purporting  to  be  philosophical'.  However,  they  are  not  included  for  the  following 
reasons: 
12  In  an  interview  with  J.  I.  Biles,  `An  Interview  with  Iris  Murdoch',  in  Studies  in  the  IJteray  Imagination  XI  (Fall  1978), 
p.  115-125.  The  quotation  is  taken  from  p.  119,  as  quoted  by  Gri  ffur,  The  Influence  of  the  II'ritingr  of  Simone  I!  -'eil  on  the 
Fiction  of  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  6. 
13  See  Conradi,  Iris  Murdoch:  A  Life  and  also  Warnock,  A  Memoir.  The  latter  provides  an  intellectual  as  well  as 
personal  description  of  Anscombe,  Murdoch,  and  Foot. 
14  Warnock,  A  Memoir,  p.  37. 
15  With  these  words  Le  Doeuff  describes  the  topic  of  Hipparchia'c  Choice.  (Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia'.  r  Choice,  p.  3ff.  ) 
29 yet,  just  as  in  the  case  with  religion,  there  tends  to  be  too  much  unexamined 
dogma  in  these  writings,  too  much  ill-concealed  proselytising,  too  little  objective 
analysis,  to  allow  them  to  qualify  for  inclusion  among  philosophical  writing 
proper.  Moreover,  as  we  look  at  these  titles  and  others  like  them  it  becomes  clear 
that  they  fail,  after  all,  the  test  of  generality.  For  the  great  subjects  of  philosophy, 
the  nature  of  human  knowledge,  the  limits  of  science,  the  foundations  of  morality 
or  aesthetics,  the  relation  between  our  language  and  the  world,  must  be  concerned 
with  `us'  in  the  sense  in  which  `we'  are  all  humans.  The  truths  which  philosophers 
seek  must  aim  to  be  not  merely  generally,  but  objectively,  even  universally,  true. 
Essentially,  they  must  be  gender-indifferent....  And  so,  with  some  misgivings,  I 
decided  to  represent  the  most  famous  and  one  of  the  earliest  feminists,  Mary 
Wollstonecraft,  and  no  one  else  who  published  under  that  banner.... 
My  other  reason  for  omitting  most  writing  that  would  be  called  specifically 
feminist  is  that  I  wanted  to  show  the  variety  of  philosophical  topics  on  which 
women  have  written,  and  written  well.  16 
Feminism  for  Warnock  fails  to  be  general  enough  for  inclusion  in  a  volume  of  philosophical 
texts.  Her  plea  to  include  only  writing  which  is  universal  seems  to  me  one  which  many 
philosophers  would  support.  Yet,  Warnock  seems  unaware  of  the  fact  that  this  criterion  used 
strictly  would  abandon  many  prominent  works  from  the  philosophical  canon.  Many  texts 
consider  only  a  privileged  group,  often  of  male  Europeans,  and  thus  are  neither  `concerned  with 
`us'  in  the  sense  in  which  `we'  are  all  humans'. 
Warnock's  book,  while  being  an  interesting  collection  of  texts,  uncomfortably  steers 
between  two  thoughts.  17  On  the  one  hand,  she  has  selected  texts  by  women  philosophers  only, 
and  it  cannot  have  escaped  her  that  the  fact  that  there  is  no  need  for  such  a  selection  of  texts  by 
men  is  significant.  The  cover  text  wonders  whether  `the  woman  philosopher  [has]  a  distinctive 
voice'.  On  the  other  hand,  however,  the  possibility  that  women  may  have  a  distinct  voice  is 
repudiated  from  the  very  beginning.  The  text  on  the  cover  states  that  the  `great  subjects  of 
philosophy  ...  are  arguably  gender  indifferent  since  the  search  for  truth  is  objective.  '  Warnock 
16  M.  Warnock,  Women  Philosophers  (London:  Everyman,  1996),  p.  xxxiii-xxxiv.  Warnock  does  include  Anne  Conway, 
Catherine  Cockburn,  Mary  Wollstonecraft,  Harriet  Martineau,  The  Hon.  Victoria  Lady  Welby,  Mary  Whiton  Calkins, 
L.  Susan  Stebbing  (the  first  woman  professor  of  philosophy  in  Britain  and  in  this  volume  the  only  British  academic 
preceding  Murdoch),  Susanne  K  Langer,  Hannah  Arendt,  Simone  De  Beauvoir,  Iris  Murdoch,  Mary  hiidgley, 
G.  E.  M.  Anscombe,  Philippa  Foot,  Judith  Jarvis  Thomson,  Onora  O'Neill  and  Susan  Haack. 
17  As  reviews  can  hardly  fail  to  notice.  S.  Gonzalez  Arnal  [review  of  M.  Warnock,  Women  Philosophers],  in  British 
Journal  for  the  History  of  Philosophy,  6-2  (1998),  p.  306-8)  is  milder  than  B.  Clack  [review  of  M.  Warnock,  Women 
30 then  recognises  that  female  and  male  philosophers  are  not  equal  in  all  respects,  but  her  idea  of 
philosophy  prevents  her  from  researching  whether  any  possible  difference  may  be  significant.  18 
Warnock's  selection  bears  out  that  women  philosophers  are  still  exceptional.  For  her,  this 
exception  is  only  one  of  numbers.  There  have  not  been  many  women  philosophers,  yet  presently 
this  limited  number  will  be  only  something  of  the  past  as  women  are  now  allowed  to  pursue 
academic  careers.  Warnock  cannot  allow  any  change  to  philosophy  because  of  this  growing 
number  of  women  (and  of  individuals  from  other  groups  formerly  excluded  from  pursuing 
academic  careers),  for  then  she  would  have  to  admit  that  philosophy  has  not  been  the  quest  of 
general  truth  she  considers  it  to  be.  Admitting  the  change  would  diminish  the  image  of 
philosophy.  Feminist  perspectives  are  too  particular  to  qualify  as  philosophical  reasoning  proper. 
I  do  not  assume  that  Warnock  here  fully  represents  Foot's,  Anscombe's  or  Murdoch's 
conception  of  women  and  philosophy.  Her  remarks  on  women  philosophers  writing  on  religion, 
for  example,  testify  to  the  contrast,  as  they  clearly  dissent  from  Murdoch's  interest  in  religion. 
Nor  do  I  maintain  that  it  is  always  necessary  to  remark  on  the  gender  of  a  philosopher.  I  use 
Warnock  here  for  different  reasons.  Her  work  reveals  a  tension  between  recognising  the  different 
positions  of  women  and  men  in  philosophy,  and  at  the  same  a  desire  to  maintain  philosophy's 
claim  of  universality.  This  tension  I  find  also  present  in  Murdoch's  writing  as  well  as  in 
commentaries  on  her  writing.  Moreover,  the  tension  is  not  just  a  difficulty  within  a  philosophical 
discourse,  but  instead  it  concerns  a  central  argument  as  well  as  anxiety  in  the  history  of 
philosophy.  In  order  to  conceive  how  profound  this  difficulty  and  this  anxiety  are  I  turn  to  an 
article  by  Alcoff,  from  a  recent  discussion  of  this  problem. 
Alcoff  in  her  article  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  '  not  only  shows  how 
these  presuppositions  are  still  prevalent,  but  she  also  considers  the  arguments  as  well  as  anxieties 
sustaining  them.  She  engages  in  a  discussion  with  recent  articles  by  Nussbaum  and  Lovibond.  19 
In  a  critique  of  feminist  philosophy  Nussbaum  wonders  whether  it  is  correct  to  criticise  the 
philosophical  canon  for  being  patriarchal,  whether  it  is  possible  to  critique  philosophical 
Philoropherc],  in  I  'omen  'r  Studies  International  Forum,  5-6  (1997),  p.  452-3).  Where  the  former  speaks  of  'wonder',  the 
latter  moves  from  `limitations'  to  `inadequacy'  and  `poverty'. 
18  Warnock  has  included  De  Beauvoir,  even  though  she  had  doubts  about  doing  so,  not  because  she  does  not 
consider  De  Beauvoir  a  philosopher,  but  rather  because  she  thinks  it  impossible  to  distinguish  her  thoughts  from 
those  of  Sartre.  Interestingly,  she  finds  at  the  end  of  the  introduction  that  despite  the  omission  of  feminist  texts,  still 
a  disproportionally  large  number  of  texts  is  concerned  with  one  topic,  i.  c.  moral  or  political  philosophy.  Warnock 
remarks:  `This,  I  suppose,  lends  some  colour  to  the  view  prevalent  in  the  1950s  and  1960s 
...  that  moral  philosophy 
was  a  woman's  subject,  a  kind  of  soft  option.  It  is  certainly  true  that  there  are  many  women  who  are  good  at  moral 
philosophy.  But  this  is  not  to  say  that  women  have  not  worked  successfully  in  other  fields  as  well.  '  She  concludes: 
`In  the  end,  I  have  not  found  any  clear  `voice'  shared  by  women  philosophers....  [T]hey  turn  out,  unsurprisingly,  to 
be  as  various  as  their  male  colleagues.  I  believe  this  is  a  matter  not  for  disappointment  but  for  pride.  '  (Warnock, 
16'omen  Philosophers,  p.  )dvii) 
19  See  M.  C.  Nussbaum,  'Feminists  and  Philosophy',  in  New  l  Wk  Review  of  Books  20  October  1994,  p.  59-63,  and  S. 
Lovibond,  `Feminism  and  the  `Crisis  of  Rationality"  in  New  Left  Review  207  (Sept/Oct  1994),  p.  72-86). 
31 reasoning  while  at  the  same  time  using  this  reason  as  means  of  critique,  and  lastly  if  such  a 
critique  does  not  undermine  the  process  of  emancipation.  She  fears  that  by  abandoning  reason 
women  lose  the  means  to  claim  their  equality.  -'0 
The  accusation  that  the  philosophical  canon  is  patriarchal  has  been  around  for  some  time 
and  thanks  to  years  of  research  there  now  exist  impressive  collections  of  examples  of  misogynist 
quotations  as  well  as  of  their  opposite.  21  Alcoff  provides  ample  of  both,  opposing  Nussbaum's 
collection  and  her  own.  Nussbaum  `cites  Mill's  argument  for  women's  liberation,  Plato's  against 
the  use  of  convention  to  maintain  women's  exclusion  from  sports,  and  Aristotle's  emphasis  on 
the  role  of  emotion  in  practical  reasoning.  '  Alcoff,  in  contrast,  wonders  if  philosophy  is  at  all 
concerned  with  truth  when  `Aristotle  explains  that  women  are  deformed  males,  when  Rousseau 
advises  to  consult  women's  opinions  only  in  bodily  matters  and  never  in  matters  of  morality  or 
understanding,  when  Kant  jokes  that  a  woman  who  reasons  might  as  well  have  a  beard,  and  when 
Hegel  likens  the  differences  between  males  and  females  to  those  between  animals  and  plants'.  2'- 
How  is  one  to  relate  to  these  remarks,  are  they  a  mere  triviality  or  do  they  imply  a  more 
important  problem? 
Alcoff  describes  how  a  common  reaction  when  she  was  in  school  was  to  consider 
remarks  as  those  from  her  list  as  `relative  trivialities,  asides  rather  than  central  theses  ... 
This 
explanation  then  justified  the  fact  that  these  passages  lay  unattended  to,  passed  over  in  class 
except  perhaps  to  joke  about  in  was  which  were  usually  discomforting  (as  if  painful  sexism  was 
simply  funny),  but  never  examined  for  their  relationship  to  the  central  ideas  of  the  text.  '23  That 
this  may  be  still  the  case  in  certain  departments  is  partly  explained  by  the  dissatisfaction  with  the 
alternative  conceived.  This  alternative  discards  the  possibility  that  reason  can  be  universal  and 
independent. 
Of  the  two  authors  Alcoff  responds  to,  Nussbaum  in  particular  seems  to  suggest  that  the 
alternative  to  this  position  is  a  radical  banishment  of  philosophical  reasoning,  which  she 
considers  the  acceptance  of  irrationalism.  This  position,  which  worries  Nussbaum  and  Lovibond 
most,  is  that  of  radical  feminism,  a  term  introduced  by  Braidotti  and  adopted  by  Lovibond. 
Radical  feminists,  among  whom  Braidotti  and  Grosz,  and  Alcoff  suggests  also  Irigaray,  consider 
20  Lhi.  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  '  in  Philosophic  Exchange  26  (1995-96),  p.  59-79.  The 
quotations  are  taken  from  p.  59,61-63. 
21  See  for  an  extensive  selection  of  philosophical  writings  about  women  -  from  Laotse,  Konfuzius  and  Demokritos 
to  Horkheimer,  Marcuse  and  Gehlen  -  A.  Stopczyk  (ed.  ),  Was  Philosophen  über  Frauen  denken  (München:  Matthes  & 
Seitz  Verlag,  1980). 
22  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  65  and  p.  61  respectively.  Nussbaum  argues  these  are 
`only  temporary  lapses  of  reasoning'. 
23  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  65. 
32 reason  as  essentially  tainted  by  `complicity  with  the  sexual  power  structure'.  Reason  is  beyond 
repair  and  radical  feminism  suggests  a  replacement  of  reason  by  a  `feminist  symbolic'.  24 
In  response,  Alcoff  challenges  the  limitations  in  Nussbaum's  understanding  of  reason.  25 
More  importantly  for  the  present  discussion  she  offers  a  third  possibility,  next  to  the  alternatives 
outlined  above.  She  first  illustrates  how  the  feminist  project  of  rethinking  reason  and  enlarging 
the  understanding  of  reason  may  be  situated  within  a  long  philosophical  tradition  of  criticising 
reason,  and  not  in  opposition  to  it.  26  Referring  to  Maclntyre  she  argues  that  a  historicist 
understanding  of  reason  does  not  imply  relativism:  `to  locate  an  epistemology  or  a  concept  of 
reason  in  a  social  history 
... 
is  not  to  say  that  it  cannot  understand  or  communicate  with  other 
traditions,  that  is  it  shares  no  common  ground  with  them  upon  which  it  can  criticize  their 
positions  or  learn  from  them  how  its  own  positions  are  limited.  Nor  does  it  follow  that  nothing 
we  say  represents  the  real.  '27  Rethinking  reason  is  not  restricted  to  feminist  philosophers.  It  is  a 
general  philosophical  activity. 
In  a  most  interesting  footnote  Alcoff  wonders  also  whether  the  distinction  between 
`dutiful  versus  rebellious  daughters'  holds.  This  distinction  is  introduced  by  Braidotti,  who 
positions  herself  with  the  latter,  while  Nussbaum  may  be  assumed  to  join  the  former.  Alcoff 
wonders,  whether  `this  trope  of  dutiful  versus  the  rebellious  progeny,  representing  as  it  does  what 
is  really  a  male  oedipal  scenario,  can  be  correctly  applied  to  any  woman.  '  Referring  to  a  Nye's 
Philosophia,  on  Rosa  Luxembourg,  Simone  Weil  and  Hannah  Arendt,  who  did  not  find  either 
attitude  in  the  thinkers,  Alcoff  concludes,  that  `[p]erhaps  our  female  status  as  the  disinherited  may 
free  us  from  the  dialectic  of  the  sons  oscillating  between  loyalty  and  rebellion,  and  will  make  it 
possible  to  create  a  new  relationship  to  the  fathers,  less  caught  in  binaries,  more  capable  of 
independence.  '28 
Lastly,  while  wondering  why  feminist  philosophy  has  been  singled  out  in  receiving  the 
criticism  of  being  irrational  Alcoff  points  out  how  the  discussion  is  also  troubled  by  a  deep 
philosophical  anxiety.  This  anxiety  does  not  immediately  disappear  when  noticed.  From  the 
examples  given  in  the  beginning  of  the  article  Alcoff  shows  herself  not  exempt  from  these.  This 
is  an  anxiety  held  deeply,  the  `the  Philosophy/Rhetoric  split  we  all  intoned  in  graduate  school  as 
the  primary  legitimation  for  philosophy,  that  is  philosophy's  distinctiveness  from  and  superiority 
over  writing  which  aims  primarily  to  persuade, which  appeals  to  emotion,  which  supplants 
24  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  66.  The  quotations  are  from  Lovibond,  `Feminism  and 
the  `Crisis  of  Rationality",  p.  76. 
25  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  62ff. 
26  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  Off. 
27  Akoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  69. 
28  Akoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  77n.  18. 
33 aesthetic  for  logical  criteria,  or  which  conceals  from  view  its  ideological  content  or  overriding 
strategic  aim.  '29  In  contrast  to  philosophy,  rhetoric  has  been  of  old  considered  at  its  best  as 
superfluous  and  at  its  worst  as  misleading. 
So,  in  conclusion  Alcoff  pleads  for  `philosophy 
...  to  become  more  rhetorically  self- 
conscious'.  30  Referring  to  Gadamer  she  introduces  a  `dialogical  model  of  truth.  Here,  the 
positivist  model  of  knowing  in  which  an  active  knowing  agent  confronts  a  passive  object  is 
reconceptualized  as  a  conversation  between  participants  all  of  whom  have  their  own  horizon  or 
interpretive  perspective.  '31  She  concludes:  `If  truth  is  understood  as  the  product  of  an  argument 
(involving  two  or  more  participants),  then  all  the  contributing  elements  of  that  argument  need  to 
be  analysed  within  an  epistemological  characterisation  of  its  results.  '32  The  imagery,  metaphors 
and  myths  of  a  philosophical  text  are  part  of  this  conversation. 
This  emphasis  on  the  dialogical  character  is  one  which  fits  Murdoch's  work  well. 
Murdoch  wrote  dialogues,  texts  properly  deserving  this  title,  as  well  as  many  conversations 
between  fictional  characters  in  her  novels.  It  has  also  been  argued  that  her  philosophical  writing 
in  general  and  Metaplysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  in  particular  is  best  characterised  by  a  dialogical  or 
mime-like  character.  33 
Murdoch  then  occupies  a  complex  position  in  between  the  two  extremes  discussed.  When 
asked  in  interviews  she  argues,  that  because  she  is  concerned  with  `things  on  the  whole'  her  main 
characters  are  males.  When  thus  considering  her  novels  Murdoch  equates  the  male  with  the 
universal  position.  34  She  recognises  the  particularity  of  the  position  of  women,  but  also  retains 
the  possibility  of  a  universal  position.  Could  one  infer  from  these  reflection  on  her  novels,  that  in 
her  philosophy  she  also  regards  philosophical  reasoning  as  universal? 
Murdoch  does  not  commend  on  feminism  in  relation  to  philosophy,  or  on  the  presence 
of  misogynist  excerpts.  35  However,  she  exposes  the  assumed  neutrality  of  arguments  and  does 
not  hesitate  to  consider  temperament  a  valid  part  of  philosophy.  Then  again,  like  many 
philosophers,  she  is  also  imbued  with  anxiety  about  the  split  between  philosophy  and  rhetoric. 
This  is  found  in  her  writing,  but  most  of  all  in  interviews.  Murdoch,  other  than  Alcoff  or  Le 
29  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  69 
30  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  70. 
31  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  71. 
32  Alcoff,  `Is  the  Feminist  Critique  of  Reason  Rational?  ',  p.  71. 
33  See  especially  D.  Tracy,  `Iris  Murdoch  and  the  Many  Faces  of  Platonism'  in  D1.  Atonaccio  and  W.  Schweiker 
(eds.  ), Iris  Murdoch  and  the  Search  for  Human  Goodness  (Chicago  and  London:  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996)  p. 
54-75. 
34  Then  again,  the  readings  of  for  example  Griffin  and  Johnson  testify  that  her  novels  do  not  simply  approve  of  this 
situation. 
35  I  know  of  no  occasion  in  which  Murdoch  comments  on  feminism  and  philosophy.  Conradi  notes  that  Murdoch 
read  De  Beauvoir's  The  Second  Sex  and  considered  it  a  book  'whose  `fierce  war-like  manner'  [she]  believed  fifty  years 
ahead  of  its  time.  '  (Conradi,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  309)  She  does  not  discuss  this  book  in  her  own  writing. 
34 Doeuff,  never  explicitly  pursues  the  question  of  the  split  between  rhetoric  and  philosophy.  When 
questioned  in  interviews  about  aspects  relating  to  this  split,  her  arguments  are  confusing  rather 
than  elucidating  in  relation  to  her  own  writing. 
To  recognise  the  importance  of  rhetoric,  in  particular  of  imagery  and  imagination  in 
Murdoch's  philosophical  work,  I  turn  to  the  work  of  Le  Doeuff  and  her  notion  of  the 
philosophical  imaginary.  Le  Doeuff  addresses  more  extensively  than  Murdoch  the  presence  of 
imagery  in  philosophical  texts.  In  particular,  she  discusses  the  way  in  which  philosophers'  interest 
or  disinterest  in  imagery  decides  their  understanding  of  philosophy.  In  the  first  chapter  the  aim  of 
the  present  thesis  was  described  as  presenting  Murdoch's  philosophy  as  a  form  of  imaginative 
philosophy,  thus  expressing  the  importance  of  imagery  and  of  imagination  in  Murdoch's  thought. 
Reading  Murdoch  through  Le  Doeuff's  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary  highlights  features  of 
her  work  which  a  reading  using  her  own  vocabulary  may  leave  more  obscure.  In  particular,  it 
reveals  Murdoch's  generous  use  of  imagery  throughout  her  philosophical  works. 
3.  Philosoply,  Metaphors  and  Imagery 
That  recognising  the  presence  of  imagery  in  philosophical  texts  may  change  one's  expectation 
and  understanding  of  philosophy  becomes  apparent  at  the  introduction  of  the  topic.  A  study  on 
imagery  and  imagination  in  philosophical  texts  may  be  expected  to  define  these  concepts  at  its 
start.  However,  Murdoch  nor  Le  Doeuff  commence  their  work  by  decisively  answering  the 
question  what  images  are,  or  what  imagination  is.  Neither  do  they  state  fully  what  is  and  what  is 
not  philosophy.  One  way  in  which  they  uphold  their  positions  as  philosophers  is  by  finding 
themselves  competent  companions:  Le  Doeuff  claims  that  the  Shakespearean  fools  she  wanted  to 
be  when  she  was  a  child,  `were  the  distant  heirs  of  Socrates'  and  Plato  is  for  Murdoch  `the 
philosopher  under  whose  banner  [she  is]  fighting'.  36 
Even  if  they  are  excused  for  not  defining  philosophy  -  as  they  are  certainly  not  the  only 
philosophers  to  shy  away  from  this  question  -a  definition  of  images  and  imagery  may  still  be 
expected.  This  expectation  has  to  be  adjusted,  with  respect  to  the  work  of  Murdoch  and  Le 
Doeuff.  In  the  opening  of  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  Murdoch  most 
explicitly  maintains  that  the  use  of  images,  pictures,  and  metaphors  is  neither  marginal  nor 
accidental  and  that  philosophy  cannot  and  should  not  avoid  using  these: 
Metaphors  are  not  merely  peripheral  decorations  or  even  useful  models,  they  are 
fundamental  forms  of  our  awareness  of  our  condition:  metaphors  of  space, 
36  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparc/ia'r  Choice,  p.  9,  and  Murdoch,  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  364. 
35 metaphors  of  movement,  metaphors  of  vision.  Philosophy  in  general,  and  moral 
philosophy  in  particular,  has  in  the  past  often  concerned  itself  with  what  it  took  to 
be  our  most  important  images,  clarifying  existing  ones  and  developing  new  ones. 
Philosophical  argument  which  consists  of  such  image-play,  I  mean  the  great 
metaphysical  systems,  is  usually  inconclusive,  and  is  regarded  by  many 
contemporary  thinkers  as  valueless.  The  status  and  merit  of  this  type  of  argument 
raises,  of  course,  many  problems.  However,  it  seems  to  me  impossible  to  discuss 
certain  kinds  of  concepts  without  resort  to  metaphor,  since  the  concepts 
themselves  are  deeply  metaphorical  and  cannot  be  analysed  into  non-metaphorical 
components  without  loss  of  substance.  37 
Murdoch  argues  here  that  her  interest  in  consciousness  or  `our  awareness  of  our  condition' 
requires  the  use  of  imagery  and  of  metaphors.  Even  though  contemporary  philosophers  may  not 
consider  them  of  any  value,  she  considers  herself  in  alliance  with  philosophy  of  the  past  versus 
contemporary  thinkers. 
Murdoch  does  not  distinguish  `metaphor'  and  `image'  sharply.  The  notions  are  explored 
throughout  the  essay.  In  the  quotation  above  Murdoch  argues  that  metaphors  make  one  aware  of 
one's  condition,  and  that  it  is  impossible  to  discuss  certain  concepts  without  using  metaphors. 
She  also  indicates  three  possible  forms:  `metaphors  of  space,  metaphors  of  movement, 
metaphors  of  vision'.  Later  on  in  the  same  essay  she  reflects  on  the  metaphor  of  the  Good, 
which  she  deems  the  most  important  of  all.  38  Here  she  also  considers  the  imagery  by  which  the 
Good  is  explained:  the  image  of  the  sun  and  the  allegory  of  the  cave.  39  She  also  mentions  Love  as 
a  metaphor. 
It  is  possible  to  extend  this  list  of  what  may  be  understood  as  image  or  metaphor. 
Antonaccio  remarks  how  Murdoch  uses  pictures  and  imagery  in  her  thought.  As  a  prominent 
example  she  mentions  the  mother  M  and  her  daughter-in-law  D  from  The  Idea  of  Perfection'.  41 
Yet,  this  addition  revives  the  question  of  definition.  Is  it  right  to  speak  of  picture  or  imagery  with 
respect  to  M  and  D,  or  would  story  be  a  better  term?  If  so,  what  distinguishes  the  two  notions? 
Then  again,  it  could  even  be  suggested  that  any  study  of  metaphors  does  not  need  to  limit  itself 
37  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  363. 
38  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  377ff. 
37  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  376  and  382. 
40  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  384. 
41  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  22. 
36 to  the  Good  or  Love,  but  would  also  include  for  example  the  battle-like  metaphors  which 
Murdoch  has  a  preference  for  in  The  Soveregnty  of  Good.  42 
At  the  beginning  of  The  PhilosophicalIrrma,  ginay  Le  Doeuff  also  refrains  from  any  definition. 
Arguing  that  `philosophical  discourse  is  inscribed,  and  declares  its  status  as  philosophy  through  a 
break  with  myth,  fable,  the  poetic,  the  domain  of  the  image',  she  notes  that  nevertheless  one 
finds  in  philosophical  texts  `statues  that  breathe  the  scent  of  roses,  comedies,  tragedies,  architects, 
foundations,  dwellings,  doors  and  windows,  sand,  navigators,  various  musical  instruments, 
islands,  clocks,  horses,  donkeys  and  even  a  lion,  representatives  of  every  craft  and  trade,  scenes  of 
sea  and  storm,  forests  and  trees'43. 
The  absence  of  any  general  description  is  deliberate  here.  Even  though  Le  Doeuff  does 
not  explain  the  absence  immediately,  one  finds  her  explanation  in  the  pursuit  of  the  text.  For  one, 
such  a  description  may  make  one  disregard  that  `there  is  not  one  reason,  or  one  imaginay.  '44  More 
importantly,  for  Le  Doeuff,  imagery  is  connected  to  the  question  of  philosophical  reasoning. 
What  counts  as  imagery  in  a  particular  philosophical  text  is  also  decided  by  the  reasoning  of  that 
text  45  Therefore,  what  is  and  what  is  not  an  image  cannot  be  decided  in  general  terms,  or  prior  to 
the  reading  of  any  particular  text.  Moreover,  using  imagery,  or  disapproving  of  such  use  in 
philosophical  texts,  is  not  just  engaging  in  an  argument  on  stylistic  means  within  such  texts. 
Rather,  such  use  or  disapproval  arises  from  values  underlying  the  thought.  These  values  often 
concern  the  nature  or  status  of  philosophical  reasoning  and  of  philosophy. 
With  the  term  `imaginary'  another  member  of  what  Strawson  characterised  as  `a  diverse 
and  scattered  family'  of  terms  is introduced.  Chapter  one  argued  that  the  terms  imagination, 
image  and  imagery  are  part  of  an  extensive  family  of  related  terms.  These  terms  were  said  to  be 
notoriously  difficult  to  define  or  describe  and  the  relationship  of  one  to  another  best  understood 
from  careful  examination.  A  preliminary  understanding  of  imagination  and  image  I  retrieved 
from  what  Murdoch  considers  an  immediate  understanding  of  these  terms  obtained  from 
considering  art. 
The  term  `imaginary',  however,  cannot  be  treated  in  quite  the  same  way  as  imagination 
and  image  were  in  the  first  chapter.  `Imaginary',  the  word  introduced  by  discussing  Le  Docuff,  is 
42  In  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  for  example,  Murdoch  treats  the  history  of  philosophy  as  a  chronicler.  She  uses  many 
words  relating  to  adventure  and  battle.  To  do  philosophy  is  to  e.  %plore  one'  own  temperament,  and  yet  at  the  same 
time  to  discover  the  truth.  '  Present-day  philosophers,  however,  are  experiencing  hard  times,  because  'areas  peripheral 
to  philosophy  expand  ...  or  collapse',  and  the  proper  heir,  existentialism,  is  degenerated,  yet  still  capable  of  'getting 
into  the  minds  of  those  ...  who  have  not  sought  it  and  may  be  unconscious  of  its  presence.  '  Battle  is  everywhere: 
`Wittgenstein  had  attacked  the  idea  of  the  Cartesian  ego  or  substantial  self  and  Ryle  and  others  had  developed  the 
attack.  '  And:  `Determinism  as  a  philosophical  theory  is  not  the  enemy  ... 
In  the  moral  life  the  enemy  is  the  fat 
relentless  ego.  '  (Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  'Good",  p.  337ff.,  emphasis  added) 
43  M.  Le  Doeuff,  The  PhilosophicalImaginay,  translated  by  C.  Gordon  (London:  The  Atlilone  Press,  1989)  p.  1. 
44  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophlca/Imaginary,  p.  5. 
37 an  important  word  in  feminist  thinking.  Indeed,  Le  Docuff  has  been  criticised  by  certain  feminist 
thinkers  for  using  the  term  the  way  she  does.  It  has  been  argued  that  Le  Doeuff's  use  of  the  term 
`imaginary'  is  vague,  and  does  not  provide  `a  reading  position  in  relation  to  the  whole',  or  a  `stable 
reference  point'.  46 
In  reply  to  this  criticism  it  should  first  be  reiterated  that  Le  Doeuff  argues  that  there  is 
not  one  imaginary.  Le  Doeuff  accentuates  that  even  though  this  statement  may  be  accepted  in 
general  terms,  `yet  as  soon  as  it  comes  to  putting  it  into  effect,  almost  everyone  abandons  the 
principle  in  favour  of  a  preponderant  reference  to  `the  imaginary'  -  and  Jung  remains  the  great 
provider  of  tools  for  interpretation.  '47  The  call  for  a  `stable  reference  point'  suggests  such  an 
understanding  of  `imaginary'  as  the  imaginary.  Le  Doeuff,  in  contrast,  arguing  against  the  `radical 
heterogeneity  of  reverie  and  objective  knowledge'  concludes  that  `imagery  copes  with  problems 
posed  by  the  theoretical  enterprise  itself'.  She  consequently  assumes  that  if  image  and  theory  are 
so  closely  connected  a  work  may  feature  its  own  particular  images,  rather  than  a  `collective 
imaginary'  a8 
In  this  context  it  is  illuminating  to  repeat  the  argument  put  forward  by  Anderson,  in  her 
A  Feminist  Philosophy  of  Religion  where  she  maintains  `a  critical  distinction  between  Le  Doeuff  s 
philosophical  imaginary  and  Irigaray's  male  imaginary'.  Quoting  Grosz  it  is  argued  that  Le  Doeuff 
`distinguishes  her  [philosophical]  notion  sharply  from  Lacan's.  It  is  not  a  psychological  term 
describing  the  narcissistic  and  identificatory  structure  of  two-person  relations;  rather,  it  is  a 
rhetorical  term  which  refers  to  the  use  of  figures  of  imagery  in  philosophical  texts.  '49  Le  Doeuff's 
notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary  is,  thus,  a  rhetorical  term.  Consequently,  and  to  be 
discussed  at  length  in  the  fifth  part  of  this  chapter,  Le  Doeuff  proposes  with  her  notion  of  the 
philosophical  imaginary  a  form  of  research  into  philosophy's  rhetoric  and  the  specific  use 
particular  texts  make  of  imagery.  Thus  the  imagery  under  scrutiny  is  not  necessarily  found  in  any 
collection  of  images  known.  The  variety  of  the  imagery  to  be  possibly  considered  becomes 
apparent  from  the  use  I  make  of  the  notion  to  understand  the  working  of  Murdoch's 
45  See  the  fifth  part  of  this  chapter. 
46  hf.  Morris,  'Operative  Reasoning:  Michele  Le  Doeuff,  Philosophy  and  Feminism'  (Ideolgy  and  Consciousness  9  (1981- 
82)  p.  71-101)  p.  72,  as  quoted  in  S.  Maras,  `Translating  Michele  Le  Doeuff's  Analytics'  (ILL  Deutscher  (ed.  ),  Alichele 
Ii  Doeuff.  "  Operative  Philosophy  and  Imaginary  Practice  (New  York.  Humanity  Books,  2000)  p.  83-104),  p.  87.  Maras 
criticises  certain  interpretations  (Grosz  and  Morris)  which  have  arisen  from  certain  translations  of  the  term  !  'imagier, 
complaining  that  Le  Doeuff's  use  of  the  term  imaginary  is  vague. 
47  Ix  Doeuff,  The  Philo  ophicallmo&inary,  p.  5. 
48  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophicallmaginary,  p.  5-6. 
ao  E.  Grosz,  Sexual  Subversion:  Three  French  Feminists  (London  and  Sydney:  Allen  and  Unwin,  1989),  p.  xviii-1:  iX,  as 
quoted  in  P.  S.  Anderson,  A  Feminist  Philosophy  of  Religion:  The  Rationality  and  A  yths  of  Rekgious  Belief  (Oxford:  Blackwell, 
1998),  p.  210. 
38 understanding  of  literary  character  in  her  work,  but  also  for  example  in  the  reading  of  analytical 
imagery  by  La  Caze.  so 
The  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary  thus  introduces  a  strong  connection  between 
imagery  and  argument.  Such  a  connection  between  imagery  and  argument  is  only  suggested  by 
Murdoch  when  she  writes  that  `[p]hilosophical  argument  which  consists  of  such  image-play 
... 
is 
usually  inconclusive,  and  is  regarded  by  many  contemporary  thinkers  as  valueless.  '  Is  one  justified 
to  discern  a  causal  relationship  here?  Is  it  that  because  this  image-play,  which  needs  metaphors,  is 
inconclusive,  that  it  is  regarded  as  valueless?  Le  Doeuff  would  be  more  assertive  here.  Yet  both 
thinkers  agree  on  the  importance  of  imagery  and  are  constantly  questioning  what  philosophy  is 
and  should  be  about.  51  In  an  examination  of  imagery  the  latter  question  cannot  be  ignored. 
What  is  regarded  as  imagery  by  either  Murdoch  or  Le  Doeuff  may  be  learnt  from  the  lists 
they  provide  and  from  their  reading  of  actual  texts.  Le  Doeuff  considers  it'impossible  to  decide 
what  imagery  is  before  reading  a  particular  text,  as  this  would  counter  the  exercise  of  considering 
the  imagery  in  philosophical  texts  as  she  conceives  it.  What  is  imagery  is  also  decided  by  that  text. 
If  one  acknowledges  the  presence  of  such  elements  in  a  philosophical  text,  it  may  be  impossible 
for  philosophy  to  remain  conclusive. 
4.  Michele  Le  Doeuj  A  Philosopher-Fool 
From  the  beginning  Le  Doeuff  shows  herself  to  be  an  unusual  guide  into  the  world  of  the 
philosophical  imaginary.  This  impression  remains  on  further  acquaintance.  One  could  introduce 
her  by  describing  her  present  position  as  Director  of  Research  at  the  Centre  Nationale  de 
Recherche  Scientifique  in  Paris  or  her  major  works.  52  While  these  works  may  confirm  Le 
Doeuff's  standing  as  philosopher,  it  has  also  been  noted  that  it  is  not  easy  to  characterise  her 
philosophy.  Gordon,  in  his  note  preceding  his  translation  of  The  PhilosophicalImaginay,  asks  and 
so  See  M.  La  Caze,  (M.  Deutscher  (ed.  ),  111iche%  Le  Doeuj  Operatit'e  Philosophy  and  Imaginary  Practice  (New  York: 
Humanity  Books,  2000)  p.  61-80). 
51  See  for  example  the  opening  paragraphs  of  the  other  two  essays  which  together  with  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good 
Over  Other  Concepts'  make  up  Murdoch's  best  known  philosophical  work  The  Sovereignty  of  Good.  In  `The  Idea  of 
Perfection'  she  mentions  those  `musts'  in  which  `lie  the  deepest  springs  and  motives  of  philosophy'.  Murdoch  lists 
two:  `Contemporary  philosophers  frequently  connect  consciousness  with  virtue,  and  although  they  constantly  talk  of 
freedom  they  rarely  talk  of  love.  But  there  must  be  some  relation  between  these  latter  concepts,  and  it  must  be 
possible  to  do  justice  to  both  Socrates  and  the  virtuous  peasant.  '  ('The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  299,300)  `On  `God' 
and  `Good"  starts  thus:  `To  do  philosophy  is  to  explore  one's  own  temperament,  and  yet  at  the  same  time  to 
discover  the  truth.  '  ('On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  337) 
52  L  imgTinaire  phi/osophique  (1980)  was  translated  into  Engl  i  sh  in  1989  as  The  Philosophicallmadinay.  IIer  second  book, 
L'  etude  et  le  rouet  der  femmes,  de  la  philosophie  etcetera  (1989)  was  translated  in  1991  as  Hipparchia'r  Choice:  An  Essay 
Concernin,.  Nomen,  Phi/osopiy,  etc..  I1er  latest  work  is  call  ed  Le  rege  du  savoir,  publi  shed  in  1998  and  translated  into 
English  in  the  autumn  of  2003  as  The  Sex  of  Knowing  (London:  Routledge,  2003).  Added  to  these  three  works  a 
number  of  essays  have  been  translated  into  English.  Less  well  known  in  the  English  speaking  world  is  that  her  work 
is  much  more  divers  than  these  three  titles  suggest.  She  has  also  published  on  philosophy  of  science  and  has 
translated  Shakespeare's  Venus  and  Adonis  into  French  as  well  as  different  works  by  Bacon. 
39 answers  the  `unavoidable'  question  '[w]  here...  is  Michele  Le  Doeuff  to  be  located  on  the  maps  of 
contemporary  French  philosophy  and  feminism?  The  shortest  answer,  and  one  which  the  author 
might  herself  favour,  would  be:  elsewhere,  or  nowhere.  Her  writing  is  singularly  bare  of  the 
period's  usual  fashionable  impedimenta;  it  shows  no  systemic  affiliation,  no  signs  of  a  formative 
debt  or  repudiation.  '53  Le  Doeuff's  philosophy  is  then  in  no  obvious  way  described  by  an  -ism  or 
-can.  It  would,  however,  be  incorrect  to  consider  it  in  any  way  insular,  for  being  clearly  rooted  in 
the  French  feminist  movement  she  is  concerned  with  topics  which  are  also  discussed  by  other 
French  feminist  thinkers  and  she  is  a  critical  reader  of  different  authors  in  the  philosophical 
tradition.  54 
In  his  introduction  to  Michele  Le  Doesff.  Operative  Philosophy  and  Imaginary  Practice  Deutscher 
likewise  remarks  on  the  difficulty  of  characterising  her  work:  `People  seem  always  to  have  found 
it  hard  to  place  the  writings  of  Michele  Le  Doeuff.  '55  His  introduction  is  preceded,  however,  by  a 
quotation  from  Hpparchia'c  Choice  to  which  he  never  refers,  but  which  reveals  a  possible  reason 
for  these  difficulties.  At  the  beginning  of  Hoparchia  s  Choice  Le  Doeuff  describes  how  her 
inspiration  to  become  a  philosopher  was  preceded  by  a  childhood  desire  to  be  a  Shakespearean 
fooL  After  initial  disappointment  that  life  was  not  written  by  Shakespeare,  that  there  were  no 
fools  around  and  that  Shakespeare's  fools  were  all  men,  she  found  the  possibility  to  live  by  this 
aspiration  in  philosophy: 
Looking  back  it  seems  to  me  that  what  had  seduced  me  in  the  Shakespearian 
characters  was  already  philosophy.  With  their  sarcastic  and  corrosive  utterances, 
their  unseasonable  taste  for  truth  without  pomposity,  their  corruption  of  words 
and  their  art  of  impertinence  which  forces  authority,  sometimes  royal  authority,  to 
enter  into  their  irony,  my  fools  were  the  distant  heirs  of  Socrates,  of  Diogenes  the 
Cynic,  of  Epictetus  and  many  others.  One  day  Aristippus  of  Cyrene  was  asked 
what  benefits  he  had  gained  from  philosophy.  And  he,  whom  they  called  `the 
royal  dog',  replied:  `that  of  being  able  to  speak  freely  to  everyone.  '  Shakespearian 
53  C. Gordon,  Translator's  Note',  p.  vii. 
54  Le  Doeuff  prefers  to  speak  of  the  Movement,  with  capital  M.  See  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia''s  Choice,  p.  320n.  21  for  her 
reasons  for  doing  so.  See  M.  Walleer,  `Silence  and  Reason:  Woman's  Voice  in  Philosophy'  in  Ausiralarian  Journal  of 
Philosophy  71-  4  (1993),  p.  400-424,  for  a  comparison  between  Irigaray,  Uoyd  and  Le  Docuff  on  the  exclusion  of 
women  from  philosophy.  E.  Grosz's,  Sexual  Subversions:  Three  French  Feminists  (Sydney:  Allen  &  Unwin,  1989)  is  an 
introduction  to  Irigaray,  Kristeva  and  Le  Doeuff;  Maras  `Translating  Michele  Le  Doeuff's  Analytics'  distinguishes  Le 
Doeuff  from  other  forms  of  textual  analysis,  in  particular  Derrida  and  Foucault. 
ss  M.  Deutscher,  `Introduction'  in  Micfiele  Le  Doeuff.  Operative  Philosophy  and  Imagrnary  Practice  (New  York:  Humanity 
Books,  2000)  p.  9. 
40 characters  are  certainly  closer  to  the  Greek  philosophers  than  Auguste  Comte  ever 
was.  56 
Thus  in  the  first  pages  of  Hipparchia's  Choice  Le  Doeuff  proclaims  to  be  a  philosopher  and  a  fool. 
As  if  to  demonstrate  this  particular  disposition  she  adds  the  rather  shrewd  remark  on  Comte  and 
Socrates  which  concludes  the  paragraph.  Such  remarks,  she  seems  to  suggest,  one  should  expect 
from  an  author  of  `sarcastic  and  corrosive  utterances',  from  `a  corrupter  of  words',  from 
someone  with  `an  unseasonable  taste  for  truth  without  pomposity'  and  `an  art  of  impertinence 
which  forces  authority,  sometimes  royal  authority,  to  enter  into  [her]  irony'. 
Even  though  Le  Doeuff  emphasises  that  philosopher-fools  are  not  exceptional  in  the 
history  of  philosophy,  her  defensive  remark  on  Comte  illustrates  that  this  image  is  not  undisputed 
either.  To  speak  of  the  wisdom  of  fools,  or  desired  by  fools,  is  a  deliberate  twist  on  the  prevalent 
image,  where  fools  are  regarded  as  the  opposite  of  wise,  and  philosophers  (as  their  name  gives 
away)  desire  wisdom.  Indeed,  fools  have  been  introduced  into  philosophical  work  to  show  its 
potency  when  it  proves  itself  able  to  convince  even  them.  Such  fools  should  not  be  thought  of  as 
stupid  or  simple-minded.  Convincing  the  simple  does  not  signify  a  victory  of  reasoning.  Rather 
they  are  intelligent  but  reluctant  to  appreciate  an  argument  or  its  conclusion.  57  To  convince  such 
fools  may  indicate  reason's  strength,  as  even  those  who  are  not  sympathetic  to  what  is  argued 
have  to  yield  to  the  conclusion.  A  famous  example  of  such  a  fool  can  be  found  in  Anselm's 
Proslogion,  where  an  infidel  against  his  own  (dis)belief  is  convinced  of  God's  existence.  58 
The  fool  is  clearly  an  ambiguous  image.  Hence,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  the 
writing  of  one  who  calls  herself  a  fool  is  not  easily  characterised.  Closer  analysis  of  the  image  of 
the  fool  may  thus  be  needed.  Such  an  analysis  is  also  expedient  because  this  image  appears  in  the 
work  of  an  author  who  claims  that  her  first  interest  is  always  in  imagery.  59  These  reasons  are 
supplemented  by  yet  another,  for  the  image  appears  at  a  pivotal  stage  in  Hipparchia'.  r  Choice.  It  is 
56  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia'c  Choice,  p.  9-10.  For  Aristippus  Le  Doeuff  refers  to  Diogenes  Laertius,  lives  and  Opinions  of 
Eminent  Philosophers,  R.  D.  Hicks  trans.  (London:  Heinemann  and  Cambridge,  Mass,  Harvard  University  Press,  1925), 
vol.  II,  p.  98-102.  Deutscher  does  not  use  this  exact  quotation,  but  offers  an  abbreviated  quote  from  the  longer 
section,  leaving  out  some  of  the  more  scathing  remarks. 
57  See  V.  K.  jank,  'Introduction',  in  Fools  and  jesters  in  literature,  Art,  and  History:  A  Bio-Bibliographical  Sourcebook 
(Westport,  Connecticut:  Greenwood  Press,  1998)  p.  1-22,  on  different  kinds  of  fools. 
58  Anselm's  Ontological  Proof  is  discussed  at  length  in  chapter  five.  There  I  also  argue  that  the  fool  does  not 
necessarily  signify  the  opposite  of  Ansehe. 
59  In  the  interview  with  Nlortley,  she  remarks  that  the  imaginary  is  indeed  a  unifying  them,  adding:  'Some  people  find 
it  strange  that  I  sometimes  work  on  imaginary  islands,  utopias,  or  the  idea  of  the  island  of  reason,  for  example,  and 
sometimes  on  the  representation  of  women  in  philosophical  texts.  I  can't  see  why  they  wonder,  since  it  is  one  and 
the  same  approach  in  a  sense...  My  work  is  about  the  stock  of  images  you  can  find  in  philosophical  works,  whatever 
they  refer  to:  insect,  clocks,  women  or  islands.  I  try  to  show  what  part  they  play  in  the  philosophical  enterprise.  But, 
obviously,  when  I  work  on  the  figure  of  `woman',  something  more  important  is  at  stake  than  when  I  work  on 
imaginary  islands.  '  See  R.  Mortley,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff'  in  French  Philosophers  in  Conversation:  Levinar,  Schneider,  Serres, 
Irigaray,  Le  Doeuf'  Derrida  (London  and  New  York:  Routledge,  1991)  p.  80-91.  The  quotation  is  taken  from  p.  85-86. 
41 introduced  at  a  point  where  self-validation  seems  unavoidable.  Is  it  worth  writing  on  women  and 
philosophy  as  Le  Doeuff  proposes  to  do?  Yet  self-validation  is  what  Le  Doeuff  criticises 
philosophy  most  for.  Her  recurrent  argument  is  that  philosophy  can  only  be  self-validating  at  the 
expense  of  exclusion.  It  needs  to  exclude  what  is  other:  images,  primitives,  women.  60  Le  Doeuff 
then  tries  to  avoid  self-validation  and  its  unfortunate  consequences,  but  is  unable  to  do  so 
without  stating  what  she  herself  values  in  philosophy.  At  this  point,  where  a  premature  collapse  in 
contradiction  is  looming,  Le  Doeuff  introduces  the  fool.  The  fool  is  in  a  way  Le  Doeuffs 
founding  myth. 
Regarding  these  reasons  for  examining  the  image  of  the  fool,  it  is  remarkable  that  in  most 
commentaries  it  is  not  even  mentioned.  Deutscher  cites  part  of  Le  Doeuff's  text  introducing  this 
image,  but  he  does  not  entertain  the  image  in  his  introduction.  Sanders  includes  the  fool  in  an 
article  on  the  use  of  the  concepts  `philosophy'  and  `rationality'  in  feminist  writing.  She  argues  that 
for  Le  Doeuff  the  fool  is  the  connection  between  the  past  and  the  future  of  philosophy:  `The 
perspective  of  the  fool  was  always  an  important  part  of  philosophy...,  and  it  will  represent  the 
best  of  the  philosophy  of  the  future.  '61  Here  the  image  of  the  fool  depicts  the  acceptance  of  the 
limitations  of  philosophy  in  its  the  dependence  on  other  forms  of  writing,  as  well  as  a  critical 
stance  towards  any  theory.  Sanders  does  not  pursue  this  image  in  the  main  argument  of  her 
article.  G2 
In  the  remainder  of  this  chapter  I  consider  the  fool  with  regard  to  Le  Doeuff's  own 
`methodological  propositions'  from  the  introduction  to  The  Phi1osophica1Imaginay.  These 
propositions  I  shall  also  use  when  considering  Murdoch's  texts.  I  first  introduce  those 
propositions  and  further  examine  this  founding  myth  of  the  fool. 
S.  Methodological  Propositions  from  The  Philosophical  Imaginary 
Le  Doeuff  does  not  introduce  her  methodological  propositions  without  the  proviso  that  these 
`do  not  encapsulate  a  method  systematically  deployed  in  these  essays  but  rather  are  their  result,  a 
concluding  appraisal  designed  to  help  outline  a  programme  for  further  work.  '63  Indeed,  neither  in 
these  essays  nor  in  later  work  should  one  expect  Le  Doeuff  to  exactly  follow  these  propositions. 
This  should  not  be  regarded  as  an  omission  but  rather,  as  will  become  apparent,  as  an  intrinsic 
element  of  her  thought64 
00  See  for  example  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophicallmaginay,  p.  6-7,  and  Le  Doeuff,  Ilipparchia''s  Choice,  p.  26. 
61  K.  Sanders,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff  Reconsidering  Rationality',  in  Australasian  Journal  of  Philosophy  71-4  (1993),  p.  425- 
435,  p.  426. 
62  Sanders,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff,  p.  425-426. 
63  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophical  Imaginary,  p.  7. 
64  See  also  La  Caze,  Analytic  Imaginary',  p.  71.  Although  La  Caze  uses  the  word  'method'  when  applying  it  to 
images  in  analytical  philosophy  she  notes  that  `it  would  not  work  if  one  were  simply  to  imitate  her  method.  ' 
42 The  methodological  propositions  are  written  after  the  different  essays  which  make  up  The 
PhilosophicalImaginay.  This  notion  of  philosophical  imaginary  designates  a  particular  approach  Le 
Doeuff  encountered  while  working  on  these  essays.  She  started  her  work  on  the  different  essays 
not  with  this  notion  or  methodological  propositions,  but  with  different  hypotheses  about  `the 
functioning  of  imagery  in  texts  when  its  presence  is  supposedly  abnormal'.  The  one  she  still 
deems  `essential  and  serviceable'  she  expresses  in  a  minimalist  and  maximalist  form: 
The  narrow  version  states  that  the  interpretation  of  imagery  in  philosophical  texts 
goes  together  with  a  search  for  points  of  tension  in  a  work.  In  other  words,  such 
imagery  is  inseparable  from  the  difficulties,  the  sensitive  points  of  an  intellectual 
venture. 
The  broader  version  states  that  the  meaning  conveyed  by  images  works 
both  for  and  against  the  system  that  deploys  them.  For,  because  they  sustain 
something  which  the  system  cannot  itself  justify,  but  which  is  nevertheless  needed 
for  its  proper  working.  Against,  for  the  same  reason  -  or  almost:  their  meaning  is 
incompatible  with  the  system's  responsibilities  65 
According  to  both  versions  images  cannot  be  dismissed  without  change  in  content.  The  narrow 
version  speaks  of  difficulties  and  sensitive  points,  where  it  remains  possible  that  these  may  be 
solved.  The  broader  version  speaks  of  something  which  the  system  -  by  which  presumably  is 
meant  the  argument  or  what  the  different  arguments  amount  to  -  cannot  itself  justify.  Here  it 
seems  impossible  to  maintain  the  system  without  its  images. 
Images  are  then  a  substantial  part  of  philosophy,  yet,  Le  Doeuff  maintains,  this  has 
seldom  been  acknowledged  in  the  history  of  philosophy.  Philosophy  has  affiliated  itself  with  `the 
rational,  the  concept,  the  argued,  the  logical,  the  abstract',  she  writes  in  the  first  paragraph  of  her 
preface.  Even  if  philosophers  have  avoided  such  an  affirmative  statement  they  have  been  decisive 
about  what  philosophy  is  not.  `Philosophy  is  not  a  story,  not  a  pictorial  description,  not  a  work  of 
literature.  Philosophical  discourse  is  inscribed  and  declares  its  status  as  philosophy  through  a 
break  with  myth,  fable,  the  poetic,  the  domain  of  the  image.  '66  To  maintain  then  that  `imagery  is 
inseparable  from  the  sensitive  points  of  an  intellectual  venture',  or  that  it  `works  both  for  and 
against  the  system  that  deploys  them'  goes  beyond  assumptions  of  even  those  philosophers  for 
65  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophicallmaginarg,  p.  3. 
66  Le  Doeuff,  The  PhilosophicalImaginay,  p.  1. 
43 whom  `thinking  in  images'  has  become  acceptable.  67  Le  Doeuff  maintains  not  just  that  images  are 
a  suitable  topic  for  philosophy,  but  that  they  form  an  essential  part  of  philosophical  discourse. 
For  the  analysis  of  such  imagery  Le  Doeuff  distinguishes  four  stages:  denegation, 
iconographic  investigation,  erudition,  and  structural  analysis  G8  The  division  into  these  stages 
reads  as  a  rhetorical  device.  Philosophy,  it  was  argued  earlier,  as  a  discipline  has  almost  always 
denied  its  own  rhetoric.  In  contrast,  Le  Doeuff  maintains  not  just  that  philosophy  uses  rhetoric, 
but  even  that  it  has  developed  rhetoric  of  its  own.  This  philosophical  rhetoric  is  developed  in  a 
tradition  which  has  denied  its  existence.  These  four  stages  are  designed  to  expose  and  examine 
the  philosophical  rhetoric  or  imaginary  which  has  arisen  from  this  peculiar  situation. 
The  first  stage  is  that  of  denegation.  It  calls  attention  to  denial  which  often  introduces 
images  into  a  philosophical  text.  An  image  is  introduced  into  the  text,  yet  at  the  same  time  it  is 
denied  any  (genuine)  significance.  Le  Doeuff  concludes: 
`Thus  between  the  writing  subject  and  his  text  there  is  a  complex  and  negating 
relationship,  which  is  a  sign  that  something  important  and  troubling  is  seeking 
utterance  -  something  which  cannot  be  acknowledged,  yet  is  keenly  cherished.  As 
far  as  I  am  concerned,  taking  an  interest  in  images  and  enquiring  into  this  sort  of 
evasion  are  one  and  the  same  activity.  '69 
This  first  stage  of  denegation  exposes  the  relationship  between  an  author  and  precarious  aspects 
of  his  (or  her)  text. 
In  general,  Le  Doeuff  finds  that  denegation  describes  the  attitude  of  philosophers 
towards  the  imagery  in  their  texts.  Images  are  not  a  real  part  of  the  text,  but  instead  they  are 
directed  to  an  (irrational)  Other  who  does  not  grasp  the  philosophical  argument.  Yet,  because 
`the  image  is  not  part  of  the  enterprise  ...  the  good  reader,  who  has  passed  through  the 
67  Le  Doeuff  explains  the  difference  between  her  work  and  two  perspectives  of  thinking  in  imager.  `our  time  has  seen 
major  studies  of  myth  and  dream,  locations  where  thought  in  images  is  in  some  sense  at  home.  Bachelard, 
conversely,  has  offered  analysis  of  the  imaginary  component  within  scientific  work,  whose  final  aim  is  to  extradite  an 
element  judged  alien  and  undesirable,  and  assign  it  a  residence  elsewhere.  The  perspective  I  am  adopting  here  differs, 
as  will  be  seen,  from  both  these  approaches,  since  it  involves  reflecting  on  strands  of  the  imaginary  operating  in 
places  where,  in  principle,  they  are  supposed  not  to  belong  and  yet  where,  in  principle,  nothing  would  have  been 
accomplished.  '  (Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophical  lmqginag,  p.  2) 
68  In  a  footnote  Le  Doeuff  suggests:  `This  successive  order  should  not  be  taken  as  a  hard-and-fast  rule.  at  us  say 
that  there  are  several  complementary  ways  of  approaching  the  image...  The  interpretation  of  the  image  lies  at  the 
intersection  of  these  different  areas  of  investigation.  '  (M.  Le  Doeuff,  The  Phi  lo  ophicalImaginary,  p.  172n  10)  Le 
Doeuff  illustrates  these  four  by  discussing  a  passage  from  Kant.  In  chapter  II  of  part  III  of  the  Critique  of  Purr  Reason 
Kant  sums  up  what  has  been  achieved  so  far  and  immediately  introduces  the  image  of  an  island  to  which  he 
compares  `the  territory  of  pure  understanding,  which  has  been  `explored',  `carefully  surveyed',  and  `measured'  in  the 
preceding  text. 
L9  Le  Doeuff,  The  PhilosophicalImaginary,  p.  8-9. 
44 philosophical  discipline,  will  know  he  should  pass  it  by.  '70  However,  when  the  use  of  imagery  is 
acknowledged,  as  it  is  especially  by  Le  Doeuff,  but  also  by  Murdoch,  this  stage  may  be  less 
significant.  In  such  works  one  may  expect  the  recognition  of  the  limits  and  inconclusiveness  of 
thought  as  well  as  a  philosopher's  dependence  on  other  than  pure  rational  thought.  71 
The  second  stage  is  one  of  iconographic  investigation.  In  this  stage  it  is  asked  whether  the 
image  is  a  hapax,  an  isolated  feature  in  the  text,  or  whether  it  occurs  at  other  places  as  well.  This 
stage  again  is  intended  to  reveal  the  peculiar  nature  of  the  philosophical  rhetoric.  With  this  form 
of  rhetoric  it  is  important  to  look  for  recurrences  of  this  image,  for  these  may  reveal  the 
significance  of  the  image  encountered  and  suggest  whether  or  not  one  has  to  do  with  a  structural 
element  in  the  thought  of  the  thinker.  This  stage,  as  well  as  the  third  stage,  originates  in  the 
supposition  that  an  image  is  more  difficult  to  recognise  as  such,  when  it  has  become  a  recurrent 
element  of  the  debate.  72 
The  third  stage  is  that  of  erudition.  Here  one  looks  for  earlier  usages  of  the  image  by 
philosophers  as  well  as  to  a  precise  source.  Le  Doeuff  explains  this  strategy  in  `Red  Ink  in  the 
Margin',  one  of  the  essays  in  The  Philosophical  Imaginary.  In  the  preface  she  only  discloses  its  main 
principle:  `it  is  a  good  thing  not  only  to  bear  in  mind  all  the  earlier  usages  of  an  image  by 
philosophers  but  also  to  locate  a  precise  source,  an  image  which,  at  the  level  of  the  signifier,  is 
close  to  the  one  being  studied.  '73  Borrowing  an  image  from  a  particular  source,  Le  Doeuff  argues 
in  `Red  Ink',  is  to  continue  something  in  that  source  without  argument.  Le  Doeuff  urges  to 
consider  both  the  image  as  it  appears  in  the  source  and  its  transformation  in  the  present  text  74 
Imagery,  it  is  implied,  gains  in  importance  when  it  has  become  part  of  a  tradition,  not  just  of  a 
thinker.  It  is  then  also  more  difficult  to  acknowledge  its  presence. 
Le  Doeuff  more  than  once  argues  how  this  is  particularly  true  for  the  image  of  woman. 
Both  in  her  article  `Ants  and  Women,  or  Philosophy  without  Borders'  and  in  the  interview  with 
Mortley  she  relates  an  occasion  on  which  she  gave  a  paper  on  Bacon.  In  his  explanation  of 
70  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophical  Imaginary,  p.  7. 
71  The  analytical  tradition  interestingly  enough,  may  be  suspicious  of  the  use  of  metaphors,  but  does  not  conceal  the 
use  of  examples.  Compare  here  La  Caze:  `The  image  or  imaginary  anecdote  is  displayed  rather  than  hidden  by  the 
analytical  philosopher,  but  the  blatant  use  of  fantasy  as  a  method  of  uncovering  allegedly  necessary  conceptual  truths 
distracts  attention  from  the  assumptions  made  by  the  way  the  story  is  told'.  (La  Caze,  'Analytic  Imaginary',  p.  67) 
72  With  respect  to  the  example  she  uses  Le  Doeuff  wonders  whether  Kant  has  only  one  island  or  does  he  speak  of 
various  ones,  and  how  do  they  relate  to  one  another?  Le  Doeuff  indicates  the  direction  such  research  may  take:  `It 
would  show,  for  instance,  that  the  northern  isle  in  the  quoted  passage,  the  island  one  must  content  oneself  with,  has 
its  symmetric  antithesis  in  the  island  of  the  South  Seas,  the  seat  of  the  Golden  Age,  which  must  be  utterly 
renounced.  So  far  this  investigation  generates  no  interpretation,  but  it  enables  us  to  specify  the  images  of  the  island 
of  the  Analytic  and  its  distinctive  trait,  embedded  in  a  system  of  opposition  between  islands  in  the  South  which  must 
be  abandoned  and  islands  in  the  North  which  must  not  be  left.  '  (Le  Docuff,  The  Pbilorophica1Imaginary,  p.  9)  The 
second  island  is  to  be  found  in  Con,  jectural  Beginning  of  Human  History  (1786). 
73  Le  Doeuff,  The  PhilosophicalImaginary,  p.  9 
7+  M.  Le  Doeuff,  `Red  Ink  in  the  Margin:  The  Invention  of  `Descartes'  Morality'  and  the  Metaphors  of  Cartesian 
Discourse',  in  The  PhilosophicalImaginay,  p.  57-99.  The  passage  referred  to  is  to  be  found  on  p.  92ff. 
45 intellectual  attitudes  and  knowledge  Bacon  uses  the  image  of  ants  as  well  as  of  that  of  woman.  In 
response  to  her  paper  a  man  in  the  audience,  Le  Doeuff  recounts,  objected  to  Bacon's  use  of 
ants.  This  objection  did  not  surprise  Le  Doeuff  as  much  as  the  fact  that  nobody  objected  to  his 
use  of  "woman".  Le  Doeuff  concludes:  `I  have  come  to  the  conclusion  that  insects  are  more 
protected  against  philosophical  abuse  than  women.  '  75 
The  last  phase  is  that  of  structural  analysis  Le  Doeuff  calls  this  the  essential  stage  in  which 
one  looks  for  the  `sensitive  or  problematic  theoretical  point  an  image  bears  on',  which  is  often 
difficult  to  find.  76  This  stage  brings  together  the  previous  stages  in  order  to  detect  what  the  role  is 
of  the  imagery  whose  presence  is  denied. 
Le  Doeuff  distinguishes  here  between  an  image's  emblematic  and  its  fantasy-function.  In 
its  emblematic  role  the  image  produces  a  dogma. 
Images  are  the  means  by  which  every  philosophy  can  engage  in  straightforward 
dogmatization,  and  decree  `that's  the  way  it  is'  without  fear  of  counterargument, 
since  it  is  understood  that  a  good  reader  will  pass  by  such  `illustrations'-  a 
convention  which  enables  the  image  to  do  its  work  all  the  more  effectively.  77 
On  the  subjective  or  fantasy  level  the  image  seduces  its  readers  into  accepting  it.  It  does  so,  Le 
Doeuff  maintains,  by  opposing  a  more  general  imagery,  which  it  claims  it  can  do  without.  This 
general  imagery  is  replaced  by  particular  imagery,  appealing  only  to  a  specific  group.  78  One 
fantasy  is  replaced  by  another  fantasy,  even  though  it  is  presented  as  if  the  first  fantasy  is 
abolished.  Analysing  imagery  is  then  also  emancipatory,  as  in  the  analysis  the  excluding  nature  of 
the  philosophy  becomes  apparent  and  may  be  criticised: 
The  idea  of  a  dialectical  solidarity  between  the  reverie  and  theoretical  work  must, 
in  my  view,  necessarily  lead  to  a  study  of  the  particularism  of  a  social  minority  and 
its  problematic  encounter  with  other  thought  and  other  discourses  -  and  also  to  an 
appreciation  to  the  tension  between  what  one  would  like  to  believe,  what  it  is 
necessary  to  think  and  what  is  possible  to  give  logical  form.  79 
Is  Mortley,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff, 
,  p.  86-7.  Le  Doeuff,  "Ants  and  Women,  or  Philosophy  without  Borders'  in  A. 
Phillips  Griffith  (ed.  ),  Contemporary  French  Philosoply  (Cambridge:  Cambridge  University  Press,  1987)  p.  41-54.  The 
incident  is  related  on  p.  41. 
76  Le  Doeuff,  The  PhilosophicalImaginary,  p.  10. 
77  Le  Doeuff,  The  P/,  ilorophica/Imaginary,  p.  12. 
78  See  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophicallmaginary,  p.  14ff.  for  examples  of  such  imagery. 
79  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophicallmasinary,  p.  19 
46 The  four  stages  thus  intend  to  reveal  a  rhetoric  directed  by  being  disregarded.  Imagery  is  used 
and  yet  it  has  seldom  received  recognition  by  philosophers,  even  though  Le  Doeuff  maintains  it 
has  had  the  important  function  of  maintaining  an  understanding  of  what  philosophy  is  or  should 
be  like.  This  understanding  often  rests  on  the  exclusion  of  forms  of  reasoning  and  of  social 
groups.  Le  Doeuff's  methodological  propositions  suggest  that  this  problem  is  not  limited  to 
individual  texts  or  even  the  work  of  particular  authors.  Rather,  the  stages  of  iconographic 
investigation  and  erudition  confirm  the  opposite.  Imagery,  while  being  denied  any  relevance, 
often  upholds  established  convictions.  Le  Doeuff  has  often  argued  how  this  is in  particular  true 
for  the  image  of  woman  and  the  exclusion  of  women  from  doing  philosophy. 
6.  The  question-which-has-already  obviously  Geen-settled  8° 
These  methodological  propositions  sharply  diverge  from  an  understanding  of  philosophy  as 
distinguished  from  rhetoric,  which  at  least  in  theory  philosophers  profess  to  hold.  Of  the 
different  reasons  for  this  divergence  the  most  important  for  Le  Doeuff  is  philosophy's  attempt  at 
self-justification.  With  this  notion  she  refers  to  an  understanding  of  philosophy  in  which  it 
justifies  itself  and  is  independent  of  any  other  discipline.  Philosophy  is  understood  to  rely  on 
anything  but  itself,  even  or  in  particular  for  its  foundations. 
How  prevalent  this  image  is,  becomes  clear  from  the  pages  preceding  the  introduction  of 
the  fool.  At  the  beginning  of  her  work  she  faces  the  problem  of  self-justification.  Le  Doeuff  finds 
herself  compelled  to  argue  that  her  subject  is  worthwhile  pursuing.  From  the  beginning  of  her 
work  Le  Doeuff  foresees  objections  to  her  undertaking.  Yet,  she  does  not  refute  these  objections, 
but  rather  questions  them.  Refuting  them  would  constrain  her  into  a  formal  argument  on  value 
which  is  exactly  the  form  of  argument  she  has  criticised  in  The  Philosophica1Ima,,  Pinary  and  will 
criticise  again  in  Hoparchia's  Choice.  Her  unwillingness  to  do  so  is  important  here  for  two  reasons. 
It  explains  the  introduction  of  the  fool  and  it  also  shows  the  persistent  as  well  as  peculiar  nature 
of  refuting  objections  before  one  has  started. 
In  the  first  pages  of  Hipparchia''c  Choice  Le  Doeuff  introduces  her  topic,  `women  and 
philosophy'.  She  notes  that  it  is  significant  that  this  topic  is  generally  rendered  with  the  vague 
term  of  `women  question'.  The  subsequent  notebooks  show  what  she  is  concerned  with  in  the 
present  work:  the  image  of  woman  in  philosophy,  elaborated  in  an  examination  of  the  use  which 
De  Beauvoir  made  of  Sartre's  existentialism,  as  well  as  political  implications  of  images  of  woman. 
80  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia's  Choice,  p.  3:  `whatever  the  `woman  question'  may  consist  of  (and  the  fact  that  we  are 
obliged  to  speak  of  it  so  vaguely  is  already  significant),  it  always  presents  itself  to  the  conscious  mind  as  the 
question-which-has-already-obviously-been-settled.  ' 
47 The  first  and  most  devastating  objection  is  that  her  topic  is  not  a  topic  at  all,  because 
`whatever  the  `women  question'  may  consist  of  (and  the  fact  that  we  are  obliged  to  speak  of  it  so 
vaguely  is  already  significant),  it  always  presents  itself  to  the  conscious  mind  as  the  question- 
which-has-already-obviously-been-settled'.  She  notes  how  De  Beauvoir  expressed  the  same 
sentiments  in  her  introduction  to  The  Second  Sex,  which  may  surprise  those  who  see  forty  years 
later  than  in  1949  problems  were  not  solved  at  all.  81  Le  Doeuff  wonders  how  to  refute  this 
suggestion  to  her  undertaking,  and  to  demonstrate  that  the  question  has  not  been  settled  in  many 
areas,  in  particular  that  women  are  still  banned  from  philosophy.  The  one  approach  she  does  not 
want  to  take  is  providing  shocking  examples,  `just  as  others  begin  their  books  by  having  the  chill 
wind  of  the  Gulag  blow  across  the  first  page.  '82  Besides  moral  and  aesthetic  reasons  Le  Docuff 
also  finds  intellectual  ones  not  to  follow  this  suggestion:  it  stops  the  thinking  of  all  involved. 
Should  she  then  argue  that  philosophy  is  a  good  in  which  women  should  (therefore) 
desire  to  participate?  This  approach  she  cannot  follow  either.  From  the  first  paragraph  Le  Docuff 
expresses  her  ambiguous  feelings  about  philosophy.  `On  occasion  I  have  maintained  that  this 
discourse  which  claims  to  understand  everything  better  than  any  other  is  a  mode  of 
phantasmagorical  hegemony;  all  the  same,  in  it  I  saw  my  road  to  freedom.  '83  Yet,  whether  it  is  a 
good  or  bad  thing,  this  should  not  make  any  difference  to  women's  participation:  `Philosophy  is 
like  military  life:  either  you  think  it  is  a  good  thing,  and  in  that  case  you  should  be  pleased  to  see 
women  in  West  Point  and  the  other  military  academies,  or  you  think  it  despicable  and  support 
conscientious  objectors.  '84 
Without  an  argument  from  the  Gulag  or  the  Good,  how  is  one  to  explain  the  worth  of 
her  work?  Le  Doeuff  here  provides  the  answer  one  finds  throughout  her  work.  She  will  not  look 
for  such  an  affirmation  first  (or  even  at  all),  for  `it  is  precisely  when  philosophers  undertake  to 
give  the  value  of  their  own  efforts  a  theoretical  basis  that  they  start  to  drift  off  into  myth.  '85 
Precisely  these  myths  have  marred  the  freedom  of  thinking: 
`What  value  can  there  be  in  philosophical  thinking  about  politics  if  it  is 
understooped  from  the  outset  that  the  conclusion  will  be  that  it  is  the  vocation  of 
philosophers  to  govern?  ... 
Everything  can  gradually  become  distorted  by  the 
corporatist  imperative,  which  is  often  implicit  but  always  categorical:  think  what 
s1  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia'c  Choice,  p.  3-4.  Le  Doeuff  argues:  `In  those  days  there  was  no  freedom  of  contraception  or 
abortion,  for,  among  other  things,  a  certain  French  law,  passed  in  1920  and  banning  every  publicity  about 
contraception,  was  in  force.  It  still  is,  by  the  way.  ' 
sz  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia's  Choice,  p.  4. 
83  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia  t  Choice,  p.  1 
sa  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia't  Choice,  p.  2 
ss  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia''s  Choice,  p.  6. 
48 you  like,  but  in  the  end  your  words  must  once  more  reaffirm  the  value  of 
philosophy.  At  least  that  of  your  own  philosophy.  '86 
Le  Doeuff  is  convinced  that  value  comes  first  and  precisely  therefore  it  is  impossible  to  state 
clearly  at  the  beginning  what  this  value  is.  There  is  no  (neutral)  standpoint  from  which  the  value 
can  be  described:  `The  abandonment  of  all  attempts  to  establish  the  value  of  my  own  project,  and 
ultimately  that  of  philosophy  itself,  has  for  me  gone  hand  in  hand  with  a  belief  which  can  be 
stated  as  follows:  if  the  value  of  philosophy  cannot  totally  be  put  into  thought,  this  is  because  in 
philosophical  work  essential  values  comes  first,  before  even  thought  itself.  '87  This  revelation 
places  Le  Doeuff  in  a  difficult  position.  She  does  not  want  to  establish  the  value,  but  she  assumes 
it  nevertheless.  Le  Doeuff  rejects  `thinking  about  the  value  of  philosophy,  in  advance  and  even  in 
retrospect',  yet  she  cannot  help  expressing  her  desire  to  philosophise  either.  `The  self- 
justification',  she  makes  an  imaginary  critic  say,  `may  not  be  a  preliminary,  but  it  comes  along  the 
way  just  the  same.  '88 
7.  The  Fool 
At  this  point  the  fool  enters  the  text: 
It  is  impossible  to  see  how  such  a  desire  [i.  e.  to  philosophise]  can  be  rationalized 
or  deduced  from  an  essence  of  philosophy  of  such  great  value  that  one  would  be 
conquered  on  first  perceiving  it  and  would  decide  to  devote  all  one's  energy  to  it. 
The  origins  of  my  taste  are  known  to  me  only  in  the  contingency  of  my 
autobiography.  When  I  was  still  a  child  I  developed  a  passion  for  Shakespeare, 
and  especially  for  the  characters  of  the  fools.  I  wanted  to  be  Feste,  or  the 
nameless  Fool  of  King  Lear  when  I  grew  up.  Then  I  realized  that  life  is  not  as  well 
written  as  it  would  have  been  if  Shakespeare  had  taken  charge  of  it;  it  is  very  grey 
and  there  is  no  place  in  it  for  a  fool.  Besides,  Shakespeare's  fools  are  all  men.  This 
is  a  strange  thing,  in  an  author  who  often  portrays  women  characters  disguised  as 
men.  Viola  passes  for  a  page  in  this  way,  Portia  for  lawyer  and  Rosalind  for  an 
116  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia''s  Choice,  p.  6-7 
87  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia's  Choice,  p.  11.  Compare  p.  17  ff.  where  Le  Docuff  argues  against  teaching  philosophy  from 
an  absolutely  neutral,  which  is  an  empty,  critical  standpoint.  `Ants  and  Women,  or  Philosophy  without  Borders', 
provides  a  similar  argument.  Here  Le  Doeuff  writes  how  feminist  thinking  is  guided  by  certain  values.  After  a 
disturbing  example  of  a  scientific  work  which  defended  a  theory  of  an  unknown  chromosome  'supposed  to  `explain' 
the  'fact'  of  women's  inferiority  on  various  activities'  Le  Doeuff  writes:  'he  task  of  carrying  out  a  critical 
epistemology  is  among  philosophy's  duties,  and  it  has  an  ethical  end.  '  (Le  Doeuff,  'Ants  and  Women,  or  Philosophy 
without  Borders',  p.  48) 
49 older  brother.  They  are  all  very  `wise'  and  often  praised  as  such;  none  of  them  is  a 
`clown',  that  is  to  say,  they  are  not  `corrupters  of  words',  although  Feste  explains 
that  foolery  is  an  omnipresent  thing  that  `does  walk  about  the  orb  like  the  sun,  it 
shines  everywhere.  '  So  Shakespeare  played  on  sexual  identity  to  the  maximum,  but 
he  could  not  go  so  far  as  to  imagine  a  certain  form  of  comic  utterance  spoken  by  a 
female  character.  The  two  `Merry  Wives  of  Windsor'  are  certainly  jokers,  but  they 
are  not  given  the  subversive  speech  of  the  Fool. 
I  gave  up  my  first  vocation.  Some  years  later  I  began  to  read  philosophy;  it 
seemed  to  me  every  close  to  the  language  of  fools  and,  marvels  of  marvels,  it  was 
a  way  of  speaking  that  existed  on  this  earth:  there  are  no  longer  any  Fools  in  real 
life,  but  it  would  seem  that  there  are  still  philosophers  around.  And  women  are 
not  kept  out  of  the  business;  indeed  it  is  even  a  compulsory  subject  for  all 
students  in  their  last  year  at  any  French  lycee,  so  I  was  about  to  be  required  to 
carry  out  my  apprenticeship.  Blessed  obligation  which  removed  all  risk  of  being 
forbidden. 
Looking  back  it  seems  to  me  that  what  had  seduced  me  in  the  Shakespearian 
characters  was  already  philosophy.  With  their  sarcastic  and  corrosive  utterances, 
their  unseasonable  taste  for  truth  without  pomposity,  their  corruption  of  words 
and  their  art  of  impertinence  which  forces  authority,  sometimes  royal  authority,  to 
enter  into  their  irony,  my  fools  were  the  distant  heirs  of  Socrates,  of  Diogenes  the 
Cynic,  of  Epictetus  and  many  others.  One  day  Aristippus  of  Cyrene  was  asked 
what  benefits  he  had  gained  from  philosophy.  And  he,  whom  they  called  `the 
royal  dog',  replied:  `that  of  being  able  to  speak  freely  to  everyone'.  Shakespearian 
characters  are  certainly  closer  to  the  Greek  philosophers  than  Auguste  Comte  ever 
was.  89 
Le  Doeuff  presents  herself  here  as  a  fool  and  as  such  she  transpires  to  an  unusual  guide  into  the 
topic  `women  and  philosophy'.  Though  she  mentions  imagery  from  the  Good  or  the  Gulag  in 
favour  of  her  argument,  she  professes  that  she  does  not  want  to  use  these.  Instead  she  refers  to 
`the  contingency  of  [her]  autobiography'  and  introduces  this  image  of  the  fool,  which  at  first  may 
not  seem  related  at  all. 
ss  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia''s  Choice,  p.  8 
89  Le  Doeuff,  Hipparchia°s  Choice,  p.  9-10.  The  image  of  the  Shakespearean  fool  (or  `clown'  as  it  is  called  as  well) 
returns  in  the  interview  with  rfortley.  There  the  image  is  introduced  after  Le  Doeuff  remarks  that  she  never  had  a 
mentor  or  maitre,  but  always  discussed  philosophy  with  her  equals.  (Nfortley,  `N  ichcle  Le  Doeufr,  p.  83). 
50 The  quotation  above  starts  with  a  striking  juxtaposition  of  desire  and  seduction  on  the 
one  hand  and  conquest  on  the  other:  `It  is  impossible  to  see  how  such  a  desire  [i.  e.  to 
philosophise]  can  be  rationalized  or  deduced  from  an  essence  of  philosophy  of  such  great  value 
that  one  would  be  conquered  on  first  perceiving  it  and  would  decide  to  devote  all  one's  energy  to 
it.  '  The  expressed  desire  to  do  philosophy  cannot  be  transformed  into  a  defeating  philosophical 
argument.  90 
Le  Doeuffs  affair  with  philosophy  is  then  not  a  story  of  conquest  but  of  seduction.  As  a 
child  she  felt  a  passion  for  Shakespeare,  yet  when  growing  up  she  realised  that  the  role  she 
desired  most  in  his  world  he  would  not  give  her.  It  was  one  of  the  few  parts  he  would  not  let 
women  play.  91  Moreover,  his  world  did  not  exist.  Life,  if  written  at  all,  had  been  written  by 
someone  else.  Fortunately,  she  did  not  have  to  forfeit  her  first  love,  for  in  philosophy  she  found 
`approximate  fulfilment's-  of  her  desires  in  an  actually  existing  world. 
It  has  been  suggested  that  being  seduced  is  not  common  for  philosophers.  In  her  article 
on  Le  Doeuff's  `Philosophy  in  the  Larynx',  on  voice  in  philosophy  and  on  the  myths  of  the 
Syrens,  Bassett  observes  that  `[t]he  voice  of  the  Syrens  is  perilous  if  you  are  open  to  its  seduction, 
but  if  you  are  a  philosopher,  you  are  protected  by  rigor  and  thus  are  able  to  be  seduced  without 
harm.  '93  Cunning  as  Odysseus,  philosophers  have  let  themselves  be  safely  tied  to  the  mast.  In 
turn,  they  may  seduce  mere  mortals,  who  are  not  in  danger  either,  because  the  philosopher's 
rigour  protects  all  from  shipwreck. 
By  admitting  to  being  seduced,  therefore,  does  Le  Doeuff  then  reveal  she  is  lacking 
philosophical  rigour?  Or  by  acting  the  seduced  and  not  the  conquering  part  does  Le  Doeuff 
confirm  the  image  of  woman  as  other  than  philosopher?  Le  Doeuff  often  makes  jokes  about 
stereo-types  about  women,  and  thus  about  herself.  It  appears  here  too  that  it  is  not  easy  to 
apprehend  a  fool,  if  it  is  possible  at  all.  Seduction  may  be  unusual,  but  is  not  entirely  lacking  from 
the  history  of  philosophy.  Socrates,  whom  Le  Doeuff  considers  to  be  Feste's  predecessor,  is  one 
philosopher  who  does  not  mind  admitting  to  being  seduced. 
90  Compare  Le  Doeuff,  The  Philosophical  Imaginary,  p.  14. 
91  In  a  footnote  Le  Doeuff  mentions  'one  woman  with  a  clown's  aspiration  in  Shakespeare's  work  and  that  is 
Beatrice  in  Much  Ado  about  Nothin 
, g.  What  she  challenges  is  the  touchy  pride  of  the  play's  male  protagonists  and  its 
effects  on  the  position  of  women.  We  who  have  been  involved  in  feminism  are  all  Beatrices.  '  (Le  Doeuff, 
Hipparchia''s  Choice,  p.  319n.  9) 
92  Nfortley,  `INfichele  Le  Doeuff',  p.  83. 
93  L.  Bassett,  `Blind  Spots  and  Deafness'  in  M.  Deutscher  (ed.  ),  AVchele  Le  Doeuf.  Operative  Philosophy  and  Imaginary 
Practice  (New  York:  Humanity  Books,  2000)  p.  105-125.  The  quotation  is  take  from  p.  106.  See  also  Le  Doeuff, 
"Philosophy  in  the  Larynx',  in  The  PhilorophicalImaainary,  p.  129-137. 
51 Le  Doeuff  is  seduced  into  a  world  where  `sexual  identity  is  played  to  the  maximum'.  This 
is  world  in  which  women  play  male  roles  94  Viola,  Portia  and  Rosalind  all  play  to  be  men.  To 
complicate  matters,  in  the  original  casts  men  enacted  the  role  of  these  women  who  were  in  turn 
disguised  as  men.  Lear's  fool  is  so  close  to  Cordelia  that  when  Lear  exclaims  that  his  `poor  fool  is 
hanged'  (V.  3.306)  one  thinks  of  both.  In  fact,  one  actor  may  play  both  parts,  for  they  are  never 
on  stage  together. 
Yet,  this  world  of  fools  turns  out  to  be  inhospitable  for  Le  Doeuff.  Shakespeare  may  play 
sexual  identity  to  the  maximum,  the  sexually  most  ambiguous  role  of  all,  that  of  the  fool,  is  given 
to  men  only.  This  is  too  the  role  which  Le  Doeuff,  when  small,  desired  to  play  dearly.  In  contrast, 
in  the  real  world,  where  there  may  be  less  play  on  sexual  identity,  she  is  not  only  allowed  but  even 
(at  a  particular  stage)  obliged  to  play  that  part.  Le  Doeuff  exalts  and  jokes:  `Blessed  obligation 
which  removed  all  risk  of  being  forbidden.  '  Given  the  topic  of  her  present  book  it  turned  out  to 
be  a  mixed  blessing. 
From  this  image  it  may  be  inferred  that  the  problem  of  women  and  philosophy  is  not  just 
or  perhaps  not  even  a  problem  of  women  playing  men's  parts.  95  The  question  how  women  can 
be  philosophers  and  women,  where  philosophy  has  notoriously  seen  `woman'  as  that  which  it  is 
not,  is  not  dissolved  by  recasting  the  parts  96  By  putting  forward  the  image  of  the  fool  Le  Doeuff 
adds  an  extra  dimension  to  this  problem.  The  (philosopher-)king  is  not  recasted  as  the 
(philosopher-)queen,  but  as  the  sexually  more  ambiguous  (philosopher-)fool.  Recasting  here  does 
not  simply  mean  replacing,  for  the  fool  is  known  to  subvert  hierarchical  order. 
The  fool  is  also  a  marginal  figure.  He  is  only  indirectly  involved  in  the  major 
developments  of  the  play.  97  Tradition  has  occasionally  brushed  him  aside.  98  Nevertheless,  his 
comments  are  persistent  and  also  uncompromising.  As  Sanders  maintains,  `he  speaks  as  one  who 
has  no  need  to  justify  himself  by  overinflated  and  unfounded  arguments  because  his  position  is 
one  which,  unlike  the  King,  does  not  need  to  convince  others  because  he  is  not  demanding 
°4  See  Janil:,  `Introduction',  p.  13,  who  argues  that  the  fool  subverts  the  opposition  between  masculinity  and 
femininity,  and  does  not  replace  the  one  with  the  other. 
95  Compare  too:  'we  do  not  think  that  feminism  is  an  operation  by  which  'woman'  wants  to  be  like  `man',  we  insist 
on  the  fact  that  there  are  women,  quite  different  from  each  other,  and  that  there  are  men  also.  `Woman'  is  a  smoke- 
screen  which  prevents  people  from  seeing  the  actual  situations  of  real  women.  '  (Le  Doeuff,  'Ants  and  Women,  or 
Philosophy  without  Borders',  p.  49) 
96  Le  Doeuff,  `Ants  and  Women,  or  Philosophy  without  Borders',  p.  42,51  ff. 
11  In  this  respect  he  resembles  women,  as  suggested  by  Le  Doeuff  when  she  for  example  in  the  interview  with 
blortley  exclaims:  `One  runs  the  risk  of  being  looked  down  on  by  everybody  of  course,  but,  since  a  woman  is 
doomed  to  scant  respect  anyway,  it  does  not  matter.  If  you  have  nothing  to  lose,  you  can  afford  to  be  daring.  ' 
(Mortley,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff,  ,  p.  85) 
os  In  the  reception  of  King  Lear  the  fool  actually  often  has  been  left  out,  because  he  was  considered  indecorous.  See 
A.  I  lager,  `Lear's  Fool',  in  Janik-,  V.  K.  (ed.  ),  Foolandjesters  in  Literature,  Art,  and  History:  A  Bio-Bibliographica/Soarcplwok 
(Westport,  Connecticut:  Greenwood  Press,  1998)  p.  289-297,  in  particular  p.  293. 
52 anything  on  them  on  the  basis  of  words  or  position.  "»  This  position  grants  the  fool  a  form  of 
authority,  namely  that  of  one  who,  as  Le  Doeuff  states,  can  have  an  `unseasonable  taste  for  truth 
without  pomposity'. 
Thus  by  calling  herself  a  fool  Le  Doeuff  affirms  (or  reaffirms)  her  marginal  position  but 
also  claims  some  form  of  authority.  Yet  authority  is  confirmed  in  other  ways  as  well.  By  retracing 
the  seduction  back  to  childhood,  it  is  implied  that  philosophy  is  what  Le  Doeuff  has  been  doing 
all  her  life  and  to  what  she  has  been  attracted  before  she  was  affected  by  society's  demands  and 
expectations.  Le  Doeuff  is,  in  short,  a  natural  philosopher.  Moreover,  by  calling  herself  a  fool  Le 
Doeuff  also  places  herself  in  line,  not  with  Comte,  but  with  illustrious  philosophers  nevertheless, 
beginning  with  Socrates. 
Le  Doeuff  as  a  philosopher-fool  is  then  part  of  an  old  tradition  in  the  history  of 
philosophy.  The  word  tradition  perhaps  suggests  too  much  cohesion.  This  is  a  tradition  of 
individuals  who  have  singly  challenged  what  is  generally  believed  to  be  true,  or  beyond 
discussion.  They  may  be  characterised  as  preferring  the  image  of  fool  to  that  of  wise,  or  consider 
the  fool  the  wiser.  Even  though  it  would  be  odd  to  speak  of  an  -ism  or  -ean  here,  it  is  neither 
correct  to  consider  such  thinkers  as  entirely  isolated  or  unique.  Avoiding  again  a  strict  division 
between  rebellious  and  dutiful  daughters  these  thinkers  are  perhaps  best  characterised  as  valuing 
their  independence  from  father,  mother,  or  tradition. 
What  is  the  relation  of  these  fools  to  their  Kings?  It  seems  to  me  that  Le  Doeuff  has 
omitted  this  aspect  of  the  image.  This  observation  adds  a  new  dimension  to  Le  Doeuff's 
methodological  propositions.  For  Le  Doeuff  discusses  the  desired  functions  of  an  image 
(emblematic  and  fantasy),  but  does  not  mention  the  possibility  of  undesired  ones.  She  does  not 
mention  the  King  against  whom  the  fool  directs  his  banter.  Sanders  argues  that  Le  Doeuff  does 
not  `fail  to  recognize  that  the  fool's  freedom  is  contained  within  the  limits  of  the  King's  pleasure: 
when  that  pleasure  is  pushed  too  far  the  fool  can  always  be  beheaded.  'l°K'  Yet,  I  do  not  agree  with 
Sanders  here.  When  Le  Doeuff  remarks  to  Mortley  on  the  possibility  of  being  looked  down  upon 
that  `since  a  woman  is  doomed  to  scant  respect  anyway,  it  does  not  matter.  If  you  have  nothing 
to  lose,  you  can  afford  to  be  daring.  ',  I  do  not  sense  any  recognition  that  her  freedom  is 
contained.  101 
Le  Doeuffs  limited  recognition  of  the  containment  of  her  freedom  seems  also  to  have 
affected  her  latest  work,  recently  translated  as  The  Sex  of  Knowing,  which  I  have  omitted  from  the 
discussion  thus  far.  The  present  remarks  are  also  limited  to  observing  possible  limitations  of  the 
99  Sanders,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff:  Reconsidering  Rationality',  p.  426. 
1°0  Sanders,  `Michele  Le  Doeuff:  Reconsidering  Rationality',  p.  426. 
101  hlortiey,  Le  Doeuff,  p.  85. 
53 image  of  the  fool.  Reading  the  work  I  was  reminded  of  Lear's  complaint  that  his  fool  had 
become  bitter  (I.  4.134).  In  her  merciless,  though  engaging  and  warranted  condemnation  of  an 
introduction  to  a  Jane  Austen  novel,  or  of  Warnock's  reasons  for  omitting  Harriet  Taylor  from 
her  collection  of  texts  by  female  philosophers,  I  detect  a  bitter  tone.  102  It  is  as  if  Le  Doeuff,  like 
Lear's  Fool,  perceives  folly  which  is  beyond  help. 
I  may  be  mistaken  in  detecting  this  tone  and  I  am  not  entirely  able  to  sustain  my 
suspicion  that  the  tone  may  also  be  occasioned  by  the  translation  of  the  original  French  text.  103 
Yet,  the  possibility  reinforces  difficulties  surrounding  the  image  of  the  fool.  Or,  as  a  member  of 
the  audience  on  an  presentation  of  paper  on  Le  Doeuff's  could  not  help  wondering  at  the 
wisdom  of  presenting  oneself  as  a  fool,  or  more  precisely  of  a  woman  presenting  herself  as  a  fool. 
Le  Doeuff  does  not  comment  on  the  disadvantages  of  imagery,  yet  the  image  of  the  fool  may 
have  its  undesired  aspects.  With  respect  to  the  general  considerations,  considering  the 
disadvantages  adds  to  the  methodological  presuppositions  discussed  before. 
8.  Concluding  Remarks 
Le  Doeuff  is  a  guide  into  the  world  of  the  philosophical  imaginary,  but  an  unusual  one.  She  provides 
methodological  instruction,  but  also  a  notion  of  philosophy  which  deliberately  undermines  the 
methodology.  Crucial  concepts  are  left  without  much  definition.  She  does  not  impose,  what  an 
image  is,  what  philosophy  is,  or  who  is  a  philosopher.  These  are  questions  she  wants  philosophy 
not  to  decide  in  advance. 
Le  Doeuff  describes  herself  as  fond  of  sarcastic  and  corrosive  utterances  and  of  truth 
without  pomposity,  which  leaves  the  reader  to  wonder  which  is  what.  Le  Doeuff's  philosopher- 
fool  is  not  one  who  wants  to  take  us  by  the  hand  (as  Sartre  took  De  Beauvoir).  On  the  contrary, 
with  a  philosopher-fool  one  should  be  constantly  alert,  both  to  the  banter  and  to  the  truth.  The 
distinction  between  master  and  student  is  only  one  of  the  many  which  the  fool  subverts.  With  a 
fool  one  is  forced  to  think  for  oneself. 
The  work  of  Le  Doeuff  challenges  important  and  strongly  held  assumptions  from  the 
history  of  philosophy.  Some  are  so  established  that  they  are  hardly  recognised  as  such.  Her  work 
encourages  recognition  and  even  defiance  of  reading  habits  suggested  by  tradition  or  by  actual 
texts.  It  calls  attention  to  the  metaphors,  imagery,  and  stories  in  a  philosophical  text,  which 
102  Le  Doeuff,  The  Sex  of  Knowing,  p.  156-7,197. 
103  See  for  example  the  addition  of  exclamation  marks  in  a  discussion  of  Schopenhauer,  where  the  French  text  reads 
'Fort  bien  :  en  conclura-t-il  quelque  chose  d'agreable  our  notre  sexe?  Ne  revons  pas:  ... 
'  (M.  Le  Docuff,  Le  Sexe  du 
Savoir  (Paris:  Flammarion,  1998)  p.  44)  and  the  English  text:  `Very  well;  will  he  reach  a  conclusion  favorable  to  our 
sex?  Don't  even  dream  of  it!  '  (Lc  Doeuff,  The  Sex  of  Knowing,  p.  16.  Compare  p.  47:  `N'esr-ee  pas  formidable?  '  (Le 
Doeuff,  Lt  Sexe  du  Savoir,  p.  47)  and  in  translation:  `Isn't  this  wonderful?!  '  (Le  Docuff,  The  Se.  v  of  Knowing,  p.  18).  It 
should  be  noted  that  Le  Doeuff  read  the  first  draft  of  the  translation. 
54 philosophical  reading  habit  has  often  decreed  to  ignore.  The  first  stage  Lc  Docuff's 
methodological  propositions,  that  of  denegation,  urges  to  look  for  phrases  that  suggest  such  a 
reading  habit. 
Imagery,  according  to  Le  Doeuff,  often  introduces  value  which  is  not  or  even  cannot  be 
sustained  differently.  Often  it  is  concerned  with  establishing  philosophy  as  a  sovereign  discipline. 
The  second  and  third  stage,  iconographic  investigation  and  erudition,  intend  to  reveal  the  significance 
of  the  image  in  a  text,  an  oeuvre,  or  even  a  tradition.  The  second  stage  wonders  whether  the 
image  is  an  isolated  figure  in  the  text,  if  it  appears  elsewhere,  or  even  if  it  has  counterparts.  The 
third  stage  traces  the  image  back  into  the  history  of  philosophy.  The  three  stages  are  completed 
by  the  fourth  stage  of  critical  analysis,  in  which  the  sensitive  points  of  an  argument  are  explored. 
These  stages,  as  well  as  the  more  general  observations  on  the  presence  of  imagery  in 
philosophy,  have  inspired  the  subsequent  reading  of  Murdoch.  My  reading  pursues  the 
importance  Murdoch  attributes  to  metaphors,  even  beyond  the  possibilities  Murdoch  foresees  or 
would  perhaps  accept.  This  is  true  for  example  when  reading  the  image  of  M  and  D  in  the 
subsequent  chapter.  Le  Doeuffs  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary  is  in  this  aspect  also 
important  when  reading  Murdoch  in  the  subsequent  chapters.  This  inspiration  is  not  always 
marked  but  generally  underlines  the  research. 
I  started  this  chapter  by  arguing  that  Murdoch's  concerns  are  closer  to  feminism  than  is 
often  assumed.  This  argument  was  given  in  order  to  counter  possible  objections.  However,  the 
relationship  of  Le  Doeuff  and  Murdoch  to  feminism  is  different  and  justifies  further  research.  As 
for  now,  I  only  point  out  that  it  also  affects  their  consideration  of  imagery.  Le  Docuff  considers 
imagery  because  of  its  excluding  nature.  Her  methodological  propositions  therefore  aim  at 
unveiling  hidden  presuppositions.  Murdoch  does  not  express  such  feminist  concerns.  Her 
concern  with  imagery,  as  for  example  in  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  relates 
more  to  her  own  position,  as  a  contemporary  Platonist.  This  difference  reinforces  Le  Docuff's 
proviso  that  the  methodological  propositions  `do  not  encapsulate  a  method'.  Yet,  because  this 
thesis  is  concerned  with  Murdoch,  rather  than  with  a  comparison  between  Murdoch  and  Le 
Doeuff,  this  comparison  will  only  receive  limited  attention  in  the  subsequent  chapters. 
55 Cl  IAPT'ER  THREE 
LITERATURE,  CHARACTER  AND  MURDOCH'S  EARLY  WORKS  OF  PHILOSOPHY 
1.  Introduction 
Having  discussed  the  importance  of  metaphor  and  imagery  in  philosophy,  I  now  consider 
imagery  which  is  of  particular  importance  in  Murdoch's  early  work.  The  imagery  I  shall  be  first 
discussing  is  the  notion  of  character.  Murdoch  considers  the  portrayal  of  character  in  a  selection 
of  nineteenth  century  novels  to  represent  certain  values  which  she  does  not  find  in  the  analytical 
or  existentialist  philosophy  encountered  when  employed  at  St.  Anne's.  I  am  concerned  with  two 
values  in  particular:  inner  life  and  reality  outside  the  self.  I  shall  first  discuss  how  these  are 
presented  in  Murdoch's  understanding  of  character.  Then,  I  discuss  how  existentialism  is 
regarded  as  insufficient  in  considering  them.  Next,  in  a  discussion  of  'The  Idea  of  Perfection'  I 
consider  the  difficulties  Murdoch  encounters  in  sustaining  a  notion  of  reality  outside  the  self 
while  introducing  the  importance  of  the  inner  life.  In  this  essay  she  is  most  of  all  concerned  with 
contemporary  analytical  philosophy.  ' 
So,  this  chapter  considers  philosophical  positions  which  were,  especially  up  to  the 
publication  of  The  Soverrignty  of  Good  (1970),  of  importance  for  Murdoch's  thought.  The 
importance  of  both  linguistic  analysis  and  existentialism  is  acknowledged  by  almost  every 
commentator.  Some  emphasise  analytical  philosophy,  others  existentialism.  This  chapter  thus 
introduces  two  streams  of  thought  which  each  in  its  own  way  helped  form  Murdoch's  own 
thought.  `Help  form',  however,  should  not  be  understood  in  a  merely  constructive  way.  Even 
though  Murdoch  has  acknowledged  the  merits  of  either  one,  she  has  come  to  posit  her  own 
thought  more  and  more  in  opposition  to  these  two.  When  in  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful 
Revisited'  (1959)  Murdoch  presents  the  images  of  Ordinary  Language  Man  and  Totalitarian  Man 
she  expresses  her  criticism  more  than  her  appreciation.  Ordinary  Language  Man  is  here  the  man 
of  the  contemporary  British  philosophy,  Totalitarian  Man  of  (Sartrcan)  existentialism. 
The  number  of  texts  and  arguments  to  consider  in  this  chapter  is  considerable.  I 
approach  these  texts  from  the  following  perspective.  In  the  first,  introductory  chapter  I  reflected 
on  the  relationship  between  literature  and  philosophy  in  Murdoch's  work.  I  argued  that  whereas 
the  influence  of  the  philosophy  on  the  literature  has  received  ample  consideration,  this  is  not  true 
for  the  influence  of  the  literature  on  the  philosophy.  In  the  present  chapter  I  pursue  this  insight, 
yet  considering  not  so  much  Murdoch's  novels  as  her  understanding  of  literature.  Literature,  and 
'  The  analytical  philosophy  which  Murdoch  encountered  she  also  calls  lnguistic  analysis',  `linguistic  behaviourism'. 
(Compare  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  205n2).  I  shall  be  using  the  term  `linguistic  analysis'  most  of  all. 
56 in  particular  the  nineteenth  century  novel,  provides  for  her  values  which  she  does  not  find  in 
contemporary  philosophy. 
In  the  first  part  of  this  chapter  I  discuss  how  these  values  (inner  life  and  reality  outside 
the  self)  are  taken  from  her  understanding  of  character,  and  how  they  have  usually  been 
discussed.  In  the  second  part  I  discuss  how  she  looks  for  these  values  when  considering 
existentialism.  From  the  various  reasons  she  may  have  had  for  being  attracted  to  existentialism  I 
focus  on  its  representation  of  consciousness.  I  argue  how  Murdoch  is  in  the  end  disappointed  by 
existentialism,  for  its  understanding  of  inner  life  does  not  endorse  evaluation  by  an  independent 
reality.  Her  later  criticism  of  existentialism  concerns  most  of  all  the  similarities  to  linguistic 
analysis,  as  for  example  its  emphasis  on  will.  Existentialism  has  been  an  important,  but  also  a 
passing  concern  for  Murdoch's  thought.  In  the  third  part  of  this  chapter  I  focus  on  Murdoch's 
`The  Idea  of  Perfection'.  I  show  the  difficulty  Murdoch  has  in  sustaining  both  values  in 
challenging  a  central  argument  in  linguistic  analysis,  and  how  the  introduction  of  the  inner  life 
impedes  that  of  the  reality  outside. 
2.  literature,  Character  and  the  Ills  of  Philosophy 
The  present  research  argues  for  the  importance  of  Murdoch's  understanding  of  literature  and 
character  in  her  philosophical  thought.  In  doing  so,  it  diverts  from  most  other  discussions  of  this 
notion,  for  Murdoch's  observations  on  the  nineteenth  century  novel  and  its  notion  of  character 
have  not  been  observed  by  philosophers  as  much  as  by  literary  theorists.  Most  often,  they  have 
been  judged  in  relation  to  her  own  novels.  In  contrast,  I  shall  argue  that  Murdoch  intended  her 
remarks  to  have  a  much  wider  scope,  or  perhaps  a  rather  different  scope. 
A  wider  scope  is  also  suggested  by  Conradi,  entitling  the  sixth  part  of  Existentialists  and 
A  ysticr.  `Can  Literature  Help  Cure  the  Ills  of  Philosophy?  '.  This  heading  is  inspired  by  the 
following  quotation  from  `Against  Dryness'  (1961),  one  of  two  essays  in  this  sixth  part: 
`Literature,  in  curing  its  own  ills,  can  give  us  a  new  vocabulary  of  experience  and  a  truer  picture 
of  freedom.  '2  The  other  essay  in  this  part  is  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'  (1959),  in 
which  Ordinary  Language  Man,  the  man  of  linguistic  analysis,  as  well  as  Totalitarian  Man,  the 
man  of  existentialism,  receive  their  name. 
The  origin  of  the  heading,  the  full  quotation  from  `Against  Dryness',  suggests  something 
different  from  the  heading.  The  ills  are,  contrary  to  what  Conradi's  question  implies,  not  only 
2  Murdoch,  E  xistentialists  and  Mystics,  p.  259,  compare  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness'  p.  295. 
57 philosophical  but  also  literary.  3  One  would  then  be  mistaken  to  think  of  philosophy  as  the 
problem  and  literature  as  the  answer.  Rather,  Murdoch  considers  both  contemporary  philosophy 
and  contemporary  literature  to  be  suffering  from  the  same  ill:  a  `far  too  shallow  and  flimsy  an 
idea  of  human  personality.  '4 
This  contraction  of  all  of  analytical,  or  even  all  of  contemporary  philosophy  to  a  unified 
theory  or  even  person  is  quite  common  in  Murdoch's  work.  5  In  'he  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful 
Revisited'  she  introduces  Ordinary  Language  Man  as  the  man  of  `linguistic  empiricism'  and 
Totalitarian  Man  of  `Sartrean  existentialism.  6  In  `Vision  and  Choice'  she  speaks  of  `the  current 
view',  apologising  to  those  who  do  not  hold  it 
.7 
In  `Metaphysics  and  Ethics'  she  explains  her  use 
of  the  term  `modern  philosophers  and  modern  philosophy'  as  `the  present-day  version  of  our 
traditional  empiricism  which  is  known  as  linguistic  analysis'.  8 
Murdoch  perceives  the  contemporary  (analytical)  philosophers  around  her  as  a  fairly 
harmonised  assembly.  Its  most  significant  members  she  considers  Ryle,  Hare  and  Hampshire. 
Although  she  touches  on  the  differences  between  her  contemporaries,  such  comparisons  do  not 
appear  frequently  and  do  not  have  much  significance,  for  even  in  these  comparisons  Murdoch 
stresses  features  these  philosophers  share.  9  She  considers  her  main  criticism  so  fundamental  that 
it  bypasses  minor  points  of  contrast  and  affects  the  different  philosophers  equally.  In  even  later 
work  Murdoch  combines  her  criticism  of  analytical  philosophy  and  existentialism  in  one  image.  1° 
In  the  same  spirit  Murdoch  argues  in  `Against  Dryness'  that  both  analytical  and 
existentialist  philosophy  display  a  similar  poor  picture  of  human  beings.  She  focuses  on  the  image 
in  analytical  philosophy,  while  arguing  that  any  difference  in  existentialist  philosophy  is  not 
essential.  `Against  Dryness'  presents  in  a  few  lines  what  is  wrong  ývith  the  understanding  of 
human  beings  in  moral  philosophy.  Human  beings  are  in  this  picture  reduced  to  `free  rational 
wills'.  11  This  exclusive  attention  to  the  will  Murdoch  most  laments  in  this  image,  as  well  as  the 
3  Compare  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  266-267,  where  literature  is  said  to  give  `a  more 
telling  diagnosis  of  these  ills  [i.  e.  of  philosophy]'  and  p.  270  where  Murdoch  announces  'to  use  certain  philosophical 
conceptions  in  the  diagnosis  of  certain  literary  ills.  ' 
4  Murdoch,  'Against  Dryness',  p.  287. 
5  The  contraction  of  all  of  philosophy  to  one  image  is  no  more  amazing  than  the  contraction  of  all  of  literature  to 
one  image.  However,  my  comments  on  the  latter  are  limited,  as  I  am  not  considering  Murdoch's  understanding  of 
literature  here,  but  her  understanding  of  literature  in  the  way  in  which  it  functions  in  her  philosophical  thought. 
t  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  267-270. 
7  Murdoch,  `Vision  and  Choice',  p.  77. 
s  Murdoch,  `Metaphysics  and  Ethics',  p.  59. 
9  See  for  example  Murdoch,  `Metaphysics  and  Ethics',  p.  69. 
10  Compare  for  example  the  imagery  of  absorption  in  `On  `God'  and  'Good":  'Existentialism  has  shown  itself 
capable  of  becoming  a  popular  philosophy  and  of  getting  into  the  minds  of  those  (e.  g.  Oxford  philosophers)  who 
have  not  sought  it  and  may  even  be  unconscious  of  its  presence.  '  (Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  `Good",  p.  337-8) 
"  Murdoch  refers  to  S.  Hampshire's  Thought  and  Action  (London:  Chatto  and  W  indus,  1959)  for  a  developed  image 
of  what  she  there  describes  as  `ideally  rational  man'.  She  will  refer  to  this  text  again  in  'T  he  Idea  of  Perfection',  to  be 
discussed  later. 
58 lack  of  any  transcending  reality  or  value.  Murdoch  argues  that  these  human  beings  will  never 
meet  any  real  others,  or  encounter  any  overpowering  reality.  Instead,  they  oversee  their 
surroundings  and  express  their  beliefs  in  acts  and  choices:  We  picture  man  as  a  brave  naked  will 
surrounded  by  an  easily  comprehended  empirical  world.  '12 
This  understanding  of  human  beings  is  the  illness  which  Murdoch  expects  literature  to 
cure.  This  link  between  literature  and  philosophy  is  not  exceptional,  but  found  throughout  her 
work.  Murdoch  naturally  thinks  in  literary  imagery  and  easily  switches  between  philosophy  and 
fiction.  In  `Thinking  and  Language',  for  example,  one  of  the  earliest  essays,  Murdoch  interjects 
the  musing  of  Gwendolin  from  George  Eliot's  Daniel  Deronda,  in  order  to  argue  that  inner 
monologues  are  relevant  in  themselves,  not  only  with  regard  to  subsequent  overt  actions  and 
choices. 
But  in  fact,  to  us  (as  opposed  to  the  external  observer  naming  our  goings  on),  our 
imagined  monologues  are  not  always  unimportant,  and  we  do  attempt  to 
characterise  particular  events  which  occur  in  them.  In  Daniel  Demnda  when 
Gwendolin  hesitates  to  throw  the  lifebelt  to  her  detested  husband,  who 
subsequently  drowns,  it  matters  very  much  to  her  to  know  whether  or  not  at  that 
moment  she  intended  his  death.  13 
The  example  from  Daniel  Dernnda  is  presented  to  dispute  the  assumed  insignificance  of  mental 
events.  `We',  who  recognise  what  Gwendolin  endures  are  contrasted  to  an  `external  observer'. 
Murdoch  here  equates  thinking  about  fictional  characters  and  about  `us'. 
Literature  is  part  of  an  opposition  which  runs  through  the  essay,  of  ordinary  versus 
philosophical.  Murdoch,  while  engaging  in  philosophical  arguments,  positions  herself  in 
opposition  to  philosophy.  So,  she  writes  at  the  beginning  of  the  essay:  `I  set  aside  all 
philosophical  thinking,  old  and  new'  and  `I  shall  assume,  as  we  all  do  when  we  are  not 
philosophising  .... 
'14  Murdoch  in  her  philosophical  writings  engages  literary  examples  as 
representing  the  ordinary  or  recognisable  against  philosophical  positions.  With  literature  she 
brings  in  a  position  she  calls  ordinary. 
However,  only  a  particular  selection  of  literary  works  she  considers  able  to  challenge 
philosophy  thus.  Murdoch  refers  to  this  selection  as  the  nineteenth  century  novel.  This  notion 
includes  works  of  a  diverse  range  of  authors:  Austen,  Scott,  George  Eliot,  HenryJames,  and 
'Z  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  290. 
13  Murdoch,  °Iliinking  and  Language',  p.  36. 
14  Murdoch,  'Thinking  and  Language',  p.  33. 
59 above  all  Tolstoy.  These  authors  she  compares  favourably  to  work  by  another  (disparate)  group: 
the  twentieth  century  novel.  She  expresses  this  distinction  between  those  works  most  succinctly 
in  `Existentialists  and  Mystics': 
The  most  obvious  difference  between  nineteenth-century  novels  and  twentieth- 
century  novels  is  that  the  nineteenth-century  ones  are  better.  Another  clear 
difference  lies  in  the  changing  attitude  to  society.  The  nineteenth-century  novelist 
partly  explores  society,  partly  takes  it  for  granted.  ... 
Society  is  real  and  the  human 
soul  is  pretty  solid  too:  the  mind,  the  personality  are  continuous  and  self-evident 
realities.  15 
In  `Against  Dryness'  Murdoch  similarly  argues  that  the  nineteenth-century  novel  `was  concerned 
with  real  various  individuals  struggling  in  society.  '16 
This  substantial  nature  of  the  nineteenth  century  characters  Murdoch  unmistakably 
prefers  to  those  she  encounters  in  the  twentieth  century  novel.  The  twentieth  century  novel,  in 
contrast  to  nineteenth  century  novels,  she  considers  no  longer  to  present  those  real  individuals. 
In  `Against  Dryness'  she  suggests  that  it  is  either  `crystalline  or  journalistic;  that  is,  either  a  small 
quasi-allegorical  object  portraying  the  human  condition  and  not  containing  `characters'  in  the 
nineteenth-century  sense,  or  else  it  is  a  large  shapeless  quasi-documentary  object,  the  degenerate 
descendant  of  the  nineteenth-century  novel,  telling,  with  pale  conventional  characters,  some 
straightforward  story  enlivened  with  empirical  facts.  '17  This  difference  is  important,  for  she 
regards  creation  of  character  as  `the  main  difficulty  of  the  writer  of  fiction 
...  whatever  sort  of 
attitude  he  may  take  to  this  activity,  whatever  mode  he  uses  in  relation  to  the  presence  of 
characters  in  his  work.  '18  It  is  moreover  the  characteristic  of  literature  in  which  it  shows  itself  to 
be  something  ordinary.  19 
That  nineteenth  century  novels  are  obviously  better,  in  Murdoch's  jest,  or  that  they  are 
most  concerned  with  a  portrayal  of  character,  which  challenges  the  demands  of  an  overarching 
form,  can  be  and  has  been  disputed.  Hillis  Miller,  in  his  introduction  to  The  Great  Victorians 
considers  Victorian  novels  as  structures  in  which  the  characters  fit  into  the  whole:  `Every  element 
draws  its  meaning  from  the  others,  so  that  the  novel  must  be  described  as  a  self-generating  and 
1S  Murdoch,  'Existentialists  and  Mystics',  p.  221. 
16  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  291. 
17  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  291. 
's  Murdoch,  `Art  is  the  Imitation  of  Nature',  p.  253. 
ýý  Murdoch,  `Art  is  the  Imitation  of  Nature',  p.  253ff. 
60 self-sustaining  system.  '20  Bergonzi,  in  his  The  Situation  of  the  Novel  points  out  that  the  enduring 
faith  in  character  expressed  by  Murdoch  in  the  quotation  above  is  not  something  universal,  but 
predominantly  British:  `On  the  Continent  it  seems  to  be  assumed  that  the  realistic  novel  of 
character  has  had  its  day;  while  American  critics  are  agreed  that  it  has  never  properly  flourished  in 
the  United  States.  But  in  Britain  it  is  widely  held  that  such  novels  can  and  should  go  on  being 
written'.  21  In  this  context  Bergonzi  discusses  the  work  of  John  Bayley,  and  Murdoch. 
However,  texts  dealing  particularly  with  Murdoch's  novels  rarely  challenge  her 
understanding  of  the  nineteenth  century  novel.  Instead,  these  comments  on  the  nineteenth  and 
twentieth  century  novel  have  been  merely  regarded  in  relation  to  her  novels.  This  may  be 
explained  by  the  recommendation  with  which  Murdoch  ends  `Against  Dryness'.  Murdoch  here 
recommends  literature  to  change,  so  as  to  bring  about  a  return  to  `a  non-metaphysical,  non- 
totalitarian  and  non-religious  sense,  the  transcendence  of  reality.  '  It  is  literature  rather  than 
philosophy  which  is  going  to  cure  the  ills  of  both.  Indeed,  Murdoch  argues  that  `literature  is  so 
important,  especially  since  it  has  taken  over  some  of  the  tasks  performed  by  philosophy.  '  In  order 
to  do  so  it  needs  to  change.  Murdoch  suggests  a  return  to  `the  now  so  unfashionable  naturalistic 
idea  of  character': 
Real  people  are  destructive  of  myth,  contingency  is  destructive  of  fantasy  and 
opens  the  way  for  imagination.  Think  of  the  Russians,  those  great  masters  of  the 
contingent.  Too  much  contingency  of  course  may  turn  art  into  journalism.  But 
since  reality  is  incomplete,  art  must  not  be  too  much  afraid  of  incompleteness. 
Literature  must  always  represent  a  battle  between  people  and  images;  and  what  it 
requires  now  is  a  much  stronger  and  more  complex  conception  of  the  former.  23 
So,  Murdoch  ends  with  a  recommendation  to  reintroduce  a  notion  of  character,  which  she  claims 
here  has  become  so  unfashionable.  She  engages  this  understanding  of  character  in  a  battle  against 
the  form,  or  myth,  of  the  crystalline  novel.  Character  as  a  `destructive  power'  defies  the  self- 
contained  or  whole.  Thinking  of  the  Russians  one  may  recognise  how  real  people  and 
contingency  destroy  fantasy  and  make  way  for  imagination. 
2°  J.  Hillis  Miller,  The  Form  of  Victorian  Fiction  Thackeray,  Dickens,  Trollope,  Geode  Eliot,  11  feridilh,  and  hIard)  (Notre  Dame 
&  London:  University  of  Notre  Dame  Press,  1968) 
n  Bergomi,  The  Situation  of  the  Novel,  p.  42. 
22  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  293. 
23  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  294-295.  With  the  term  journalistic  Murdoch  refers  here  to  her  criticism  of  the 
contemporary  novel  in  this  essay. 
61 It  is  unlikely  that  such  recommendations  do  not  in  one  way  or  another  relate  to  the 
difficulties  Murdoch  experienced  herself  when  writing  novels.  Critics  have  applied  in  particular 
this  quotation  from  `Against  Dryness'  to  Murdoch's  novels.  Her  plea  in  this  essay  for  `the  now  so 
unfashionable  naturalistic  idea  of  character'  has  been  pivotal  for  some  in  the  appraisal  of  her 
novels,  yet  the  verdict  has  been  far  from  uniform.  Some  critics  consider  these  to  come  up  to  her 
own  theoretical  standards  whereas  others  find  them  decidedly  failing. 
When  applying  these  ideas  to  her  own  novels  literary  critics  have  been  outspoken,  yet 
they  have  also  intimated  the  straightforwardness  of  their  assessment.  For  example,  Bergonzi 
writes  after  the  quotation  on  the  importance  of  character  given  above  that  `...  it  will  be  evident  to 
the  readers  of  Miss  Murdoch's  innumerable  novels  that  she  has  conspicuously  failed  to  put  her 
ideas  into  practice,  at  least  since  The  Bell  came  out  in  1958'.  Indeed,  he  argues  that  the  characters 
may  be  complex,  but  they  cannot  interact  as  real  people.  Instead,  he  argues  `they  can  relate  to 
each  other  only  by  some  form  of  arbitrary  sexual  encounter,  or  an  act  of  violence,  or  by 
involvement  in  the  complicated  or  dangerous  physical  activity  that  Miss  Murdoch  describes 
rather  well.  '24  For  Bergonzi,  even  though  the  characters  in  Murdoch's  novels  may  be  real  and 
rather  complex,  form  plays  the  main  part  25  However,  where  for  Bergonzi  Murdoch  evidentially 
fails,  Conradi  is  adamant  as  well  as  brief  in  his  defence  of  her:  `As  to  her  supposed  relative 
poverty  at  depicting  character,  however,  her  work  everywhere  gainsays  this  judgement.  '26 
Notwithstanding  Conradi's  defence,  Murdoch's  remarks  on  form  in  novels  reflect  the 
difficulties  she  encounters  as  a  novelist.  She  considers  her  own  novels  unfavourably  in 
comparison  to  the  nineteenth  century  novel  in  this  respect:  `I  think  it's  true  that  the  patterns 
which  keep  up  the  structure  in  my  work  -I  think  this  is  true  of  a  lot  of  novelists  writing  today  - 
are  sexual,  mythological,  psychological  patterns,  and  not  the  great  hub  of  society  which  a 
nineteenth-century  writer  relied  on.  '27  An  enlightening  discussion  of  this  point  I  find  the  review 
of  The  Red  and  the  Green  by  Ricks.  He  analyses  how  Murdoch's  use  of  metaphor  is  intended  to 
introduce  the  reality  which  is  to  combat  form,  but  he  considers  it  to  fail  in  this  aim.  Ricks  argues 
that  `Miss  Murdoch's  beliefs  and  intentions  seem  to  me  admirable,  relevant,  and  almost 
completely  unachieved  in  her  novels.  '  He  cites  Murdoch's  (theoretical)  appreciation  of  `history, 
real  beings  and  real  change,  whatever  is  contingent,  messy,  boundless,  infinitely  particular  and 
endlessly  still  to  be  explained',  yet  finds  that  her  routine  use  of  words  like  "[m]ystery'  and  its 
24  Bergonzi,  The  Situation  of  the  Novel,  p.  47  and  48.  (emphasis  added) 
25  See  also  Ch.  Ricks,  `A  Sort  of  Mystery  Novel'  in  New  Statesman,  22  October  1965,  p.  604-5. 
26  Conradi,  The  Saint  and  the  Artist,  p.  375.  Conradi  responds  here  to  Bloom,  who  `championed  Murdoch  as  a 
religious  fabulist,  a  writer  of  brilliant  entertainments  rather  than  a  writer  excelling  at  the  fresh  invention  of 
personalities.  '  (See  H.  Bloom,  `A  Comedy  of  Worldly  Salvation'  in  New  York  Times  Book  Review,  12  January  1986,1,  p. 
30-31.  ) 
27  Interview  in  Listener,  4  April  1968.  Quoted  in  Bergomi,  The  Situation  of  the  Novel,  p.  49. 
62 derivatives,  `vague',  `sinister',  `strange',  `obscure',  `curious',  `somehow',  `weird',  `eerie',  `alarming', 
`appalling"  as  well  as  `a  sort  of  and  `a  kind  of  abandons  any  sense  of  mystery.  He  concludes: 
`The  adjective  duress  and  the  formulaic  repetitiveness  of  her  style  undo  any  independent  life  in 
the  characters,  and  bear  out  a  remark  of  hers  that  is  characteristic  in  its  honesty  but  merciless  in 
its  judgement:  Sartre's 
inability  to  write  a  great  novel  is  a  tragic  symptom  of  a  situation  which  afflicts  us 
all.  We  know  that  the  real  lesson  to  be  taught  is  that  the  human  person  is  precious 
and  unique;  but  we  seem  unable  to  set  it  forth  except  in  terms  of  ideology  and 
abstraction.  '28 
Recalling  chapter  one,  Ricks  is  certainly  not  the  only  one  to  apply  these  words  to  Murdoch's  own 
novels. 
Murdoch's  recommendations  for  the  creation  of  character  have  most  likely  arisen  from 
Murdoch's  own  practise  as  a  novelist.  In  her  novels  she  tries  to  create  characters  unlike  the  flimsy 
personalities  she  encounters  in  most  contemporary  writing,  where  it  is  debatable  how  much  she 
has  succeeded  in  doing  so.  However,  she  is  not  only  writing  as  a  novelist  here.  Other  than  its 
reception  suggests,  Murdoch  is  not  solely  concerned  with  fiction  in  the  essays  discussed  here.  In 
many  of  these  essays  written  in  this  period  Murdoch  is  considering  both  philosophy  and 
literature.  So,  at  the  beginning  of  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'  she  claims  to 
`approach  the  problem  as  a  novelist  concerned  with  the  creation  of  character.  '229  Yet  contrary  to 
one's  expectations,  this  remark  is  followed  by  a  short  history  of  the  notion  of  the  individual  in 
philosophy,  starting  with  Kant.  Conversely,  in  the  second  part  of  the  essay  when  turning  to 
literature  Murdoch  claims  that  she  is  not  a  critic,  but  that  she  is  `doing  what  philosophers  do'.  30 
This  alternation  between  Murdoch  the  novelist  and  Murdoch  the  philosopher  suggests  that 
Murdoch  does  not  limit  herself  here  to  one  discipline.  31 
Conradi's  question  then,  `Can  Literature  Help  Cure  the  Ills  of  Philosophy?  ',  encourages  to 
consider  Murdoch's  concern  with  character  in  a  larger  perspective.  As  a  novelist  concerned  with 
the  creation  of  character  Murdoch  turns  to  philosophy.  As  a  philosopher  concerned  with  the 
individual  she  turns  to  novels.  So,  Murdoch  is  not  only  talking  about  her  own  novels,  but  more 
2R  Ricks,  'A  Sort  of  Mystery  Novel',  p.  605.  The  quotation  is  taken  from  Murdoch,  Sarin:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  148. 
Compare  similar  remarks  by  Byatt,  in  chapter  one. 
29  Murdoch,  The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  261.  The  problem  referred  to  consists  of  a  literary  and  a 
moral  aspect:  `Is  the  Liberal-democratic  theory  of  personality  an  adequate  one?  '  and  'What  is  characteristic  of  the 
greatest  literary  works  of  art?  '  or  'What,  chiefly,  makes  Tolstoy  the  greatest  of  novelists  and  Shakespeare  the  greatest 
of  writers?  ' 
30  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  270. 
63 generally  about  contemporary  literature  and  philosophy.  Her  attempts  to  reintroduce  a  less  flimsy 
notion  of  self  not  only  concern  her  novels  but  also  her  philosophical  writing.  Even  though  her 
concern  is  with  analytical  philosophy  primarily  I  first  turn  to  existentialism  as  a  philosophy  which 
in  its  interest  in  literature  promised  to  be  a  philosophy  interested  in  inner  life. 
3.  The  Merits  of  Existentialism 
It  has  been  argued  that  Murdoch's  turn  to  existentialism  was  motivated  by  `her  deep 
dissatisfaction  with  Anglo-Saxon  philosophy'.  32  Murdoch  has  been  said  to  have  found  the 
attraction  of  existentialism  in  its  interest  in  consciousness  and  in  moral  value.  She  did  not  find 
these  in  the  contemporary  philosophy  she  encountered  in  Oxford  and  Cambridge.  33 
Murdoch  is  also  said  to  have  been  drawn  towards  Sartre's  work  because  it  consisted  both 
of  works  of  literature  and  works  of  philosophy.  Thus  David  Gordon  suggests  that  `[t]he  subject 
of  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist  must  have  recommended  itself  readily  to  someone  of  her  generation 
who  was  well  trained  in  philosophy  and  about  to  publish  a  novel'.  34  Similarly,  Hilda  Spear  writes 
that  `[i]t  is  perhaps  very  much  a  pointer  to  her  underlying  interests  at  the  time  that  the  book, 
although  essentially  a  philosophical  study,  is  based  on  a  consideration  of  Sartre's  novels  which, 
[Murdoch]  suggests,  `provide  more  comprehensive  material  of  study  of  his  thought  .  35 
Sartre's  philosophy  was,  moreover,  at  the  time  very  popular.  The  atmosphere  of 
excitement  which  it  brought  about  after  the  war  Murdoch  vividly  recalls  in  the  1987  introduction 
to  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist.  Sartre,  she  writes,  was  one  of  the  very  few  philosophers  whose 
popularity  has  been  with  large  masses  of  young  people  all  over  Europe,  even  more  than  with 
professional  philosophers: 
It  had  been  long  known  that  God  was  dead  and  that  man  was  self-created.  Sartre 
produced  a  fresh  and  apt  picture  of  this  self-chosen  being. 
... 
The  war  was  over, 
Europe  was  in  ruins,  we  had  emerged  from  a  long  captivity,  all  was  to  be  remade. 
Sartre's  philosophy  was  an  inspiration  to  many  who  felt  that  they  must,  and  could, 
31  Compare  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  289. 
32  I  shall  be  speaking  of  Sartre  only  here.  Ile  was,  of  course,  not  the  only  existentialist  thinker  nor  the  only  one 
discussed  by  Murdoch.  There  is  also,  for  example,  Gabriel  Marcel,  whose  Gifford  Lectures,  The  Afyrtery  of  Bein, 
Murdoch  discusses  in  'The  Image  of  the  Mind'  (1951).  his  thoughts  should  be  much  closer  to  rfurdoch's  for  he,  as 
Phillips  notes:  `stresses  the  need  for  true  communication  with  others  ... 
'  P.  Phillips,  AAencres  of  the  Goodin  the  l  i'ork  of 
Iris  Murdoch  (Frankfurt  am  Alain,  New  York:  Peter  Lang,  1991),  p.  45)  Phillips  notices  Tfurdoch's  'serious  interest  in 
and  close  knowledge  of  bfarcel's  philosophy',  but  she  assumes  that'Afarcel's  thought  has  probably  not  influenced 
and  shaped  Alurdoch's  own  philosophical  stance  as  deeply  and  directly  as  Simone  Weil's  has'.  (Phillips,  llgendes  of  the 
Good,  p.  63  n.  1).  Marcel  is  rarely  mentioned  in  Tturdoch's  later  work. 
33  P.  Conradi,  `Preface',  p.  xxii. 
34  D.  Gordon,  Iris  Murdoch  f  Fahler  of  Un  iing,  p.  17. 
3511.  Spear,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  8.  The  quote  from  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist  is  taken  from  p.  138. 
64 make  out  of  all  that  misery  and  chaos  a  better  world,  for  it  had  now  been  revealed 
that  anything  was  possible.  Existentialism  was  the  new  religion,  the  new  salvation. 
This  was  the  atmosphere  in  Brussels  in  1945  where  I  first  read  LEt  et  le  Neant 
and  where  I  briefly  (and  on  this  occasion  only)  met  Sartre.  His  presence  in  the  city 
was  like  that  of  a  pop  star.  Chico  Marx,  who  was  there  at  about  the  same  time, 
was  less  rapturously  received.  36 
Murdoch's  appreciation  for  existentialism  is  not  only  with  the  `fresh  and  apt  picture  of  a  self- 
chosen  being',  but  also  with  the  abundant  enthusiasm  with  which  this  image  was  perceived  as  `the 
new  religion,  the  new  salvation.  '  When  in  later  writing  she  is  mainly  critical  of  existentialism  she 
still  praises  its  attempt  and  desire  `to  be  a  philosophy  one  could  live  by.  Kierkegaard  described 
the  Hegelian  system  as  a  grand  palace  set  up  by  someone  who  then  lived  in  a  hovel  or  at  best  in 
the  porter's  lodge.  A  moral  philosophy  should  be  inhabited.  '37  Existentialism  Murdoch  deemed 
inhabitable,  yet  if  she  ever  moved  in,  she  did  not  stay  long.  38  In  her  later  work,  the  term  became 
synonymous  for  her  criticism  of  contemporary  philosophy,  both  analytical  and  continental. 
Previously,  I  argued  that  novels  and  characters  regularly  feature  in  Murdoch's  thought.  It 
must  have  attracted  her  to  encounter  philosophers  interested  in  literature.  Sartre's,  Dc  Beauvoir's 
and  Camus'  concern  for  literature  is  moreover  in  Murdoch's  observation  more  than  an  interest. 
`These  writers  would  claim  that  they  are  philosophers  in  the  main  tradition  of  European 
philosophy  -  and  that  their  use  of  literary  means  is  symptomatic  of  the  turn  that  philosophy  as  a 
whole  is  now  taking',  she  argues  in  a  broadcast  for  the  BBC  in  1950.39  This  suggestion,  that 
philosophy  is  taking  a  literary  turn,  recalls  the  argument  in  `Against  Dryness',  where  literature  was 
considered  to  assume  some  of  philosophy's  tasks.  There  is,  however,  a  remarkable  difference 
between  the  two  texts.  The  broadcast  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician'  precedes  `Against  Dryness' 
by  more  than  ten  years.  In  1950  Murdoch  is  still  exploring  existentialism's  possibilities.  Ten  years 
later  her  tone  is  much  more  critical. 
In  the  broadcast  Murdoch  argues  that  Sartre's  novels  have  `a  strictly  didactic  purpose. 
They  are  intended  to  makes  us  conscious  of  the  predicament  that  one  is  free  and  lonely,  so  that 
we  may  pursue  sincerely  and  with  open  eyes  our  human  metier  of  understanding  our  world  and 
conferring  meaning  upon  it.  '40  This  didactic  design  reminds  of  another  aspect  mentioned  above 
Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  9-10. 
37  Murdoch,  'On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  337. 
38  Whether  Murdoch  was  ever  an  existentialist  has  been  debated.  Warnock  `roughly'  applies  the  title  still  in  Ji"omen 
Philosophers  in  1996  (Warnock,  Il"omen  Philosophers,  p.  xliii).  Conradi  reproaches  her  for  doing  so,  calling  her  claim 
`doubtful  and  inattentive'.  (Conradi,  `preface',  p.  xxii) 
39  Murdoch,  The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  101. 
40  Murdoch,  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  103-4. 
65 as  one  which  has  appealed  to  and  also  influenced  Murdoch's  thought.  Existentialism  has  no 
desire  to  remain  neutral.  In  the  modern  world  without  God  it  promises  understanding  and 
meaning.  Existentialism  shows  Murdoch  that  philosophy  as  a  way  to  live  was  not  something 
belonging  to  the  past. 
In  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician'  Murdoch  briefly  explains  Sartre's  understanding  of 
man,  which  his  novels  are  to  demonstrate,  from  his  concept  of  consciousness.  She  argues  that 
this  notion  of  consciousness  is  best  understood  in  relation  to  his  understanding  of  things. 
Consciousness  is  in  Sartre's  well-known  phrase,  understood  as  etrepour-soi,  being-for-itself,  and 
things  as  eire-en-soi,  being-in-itself.  The  en-soi  Sartre  explains  as  being  which  is  in  itself,  and  is  what 
it  is  41  It  is  complete  identity.  Consciousness,  in  contrast,  Murdoch  argues,  `is  not  a  substance  and 
it  has  no  meaning,  although  it  is  the  source  of  all  meaning.  Its  fundamental  character  is 
nothingness,  that  is,  its  freedom  .  4- 
This  radio-broadcast  swiftly  moves  from  the  metaphysical  language  of  pour-soi  and  en-soi  to 
a  picture  for  many  who  like  everyone  `readily  seek  out  pictures  whereby  to  understand 
ourselves'  43  Human  beings  are  not  just  free,  they  are  condemned  to  freedom.  They  have  the 
obligation  to  be  free.  Yet,  the  realisation  of  this  obligation  creates  dread.  Human  consciousness 
has  to  determine  itself.  It  has  to  decide  what  to  believe,  what  to  do,  what  to  avoid.  In  doing  so  it 
has  to  be  wary  of  all  efforts  to  make  it  into  a  thing,  or  an  en-soi.  Consciousness  `has  to  contend, 
not  only  with  the  world  of  things,  but  with  other  selves  who  are  only  too  ready  to  make  it  an 
object  in  their  universe  and  to  give  it  their  alien  significance.  '44  In  Sartre's  existentialism  people 
are  fundamentally  alone  in  an  inimical  world. 
It  is  this  condition  which  the  novels  describe.  Murdoch  concludes  that  these  novels  are  a 
new  kind  of  novel  `in  the  sense  that  the  writer's  attention  is  focused  on  this  unusual  point,  this 
point  at  which  our  beliefs,  our  world  pictures,  our  politics,  religions,  loves  and  hates  are  seen  to 
be  discontinuous  with  the  selves  that  may  or  may  not  go  on  affirming  them.  '45  This  is  a 
remarkable  observation  with  the  hindsight  of  her  later  writing.  Here,  Murdoch  introduces  a  new 
form  of  writing,  which  she  considers  as  providing  exciting  possibilities  for  describing  what  it  is 
like  to  live  and  give  meaning  to  one's  life  in  a  world  without  God.  In  later  writing  this  lonely  man, 
whom  she  recognises  in  most  novels,  embodies  a  much  criticised  understanding  of  human  being. 
41  J:  p.  Sartre,  Litre  et  le  Neant  :  essai  d'ontoloie  phenomenologique  (Paris  :  Gallimard,  1943)  p.  34. 
42  Murdoch,  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  104.  Murdoch  says  too  that  consciousness  `is  nothing'.  This  may  be 
misleading.  It  should  of  course  not  be  understood  to  imply  that  there  is  no  consciousness.  Rather,  consciousness 
relates  to  itself  and  to  everything  else  as  to  something  it  is  not.  This  is  the  origin  of  freedom  for  human  beings. 
(Compare  Sartre,  LEtre  et  !e  Neant,  p.  121) 
43  Murdoch,  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  104. 
°;  Murdoch,  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  104. 
45  Murdoch,  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  107. 
66 The  shift  from  enthusiasm  to  more  sober  judgment  is  explained  by  Sartre:  Romantic 
Rationalist,  particularly  by  its  discussion  of  La  Nausle  and  its  main  character  Antoine  Roquentin. 
Murdoch's  strongest  as  well  as  lasting  fascination  rests,  I  would  argue,  not  as  much  with 
existentialism's  general  picture  as  it  does  with  Antoine  Roquentin  in  La  Nausee.  When  pressed  by 
Magee  to  consider  a  possible  role  for  philosophy  in  literature  this  first  novel  of  Sartre's  is  `the  one 
good  philosophical  novel'  she  can  think  of,  for  it  `does  manage  to  express  some  interesting  ideas 
about  contingency  and  consciousness,  and  to  remain  a  work  of  art  which  does  not  have  to  be 
read  in  the  light  of  theories  which  the  author  has  expressed  elsewhere.  It  is  a  rare  object.  Of 
course  it  is  still  philosophically  `fresh'.  '46  Her  interest  in  this  novel  lasts  from  her  early  writings  to 
the  last,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals. 
Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist  testifies  to  Murdoch's  fascination  with  La  Nausee.  The  novel  is 
discussed  in  the  first  chapter,  as  an  unorthodox  introduction  to  Sartre's  work.  Sartre:  Romantic 
Rationalist  is  not  organised  according  to  chronology.  In  fact,  the  work  does  not  have  much 
resemblance  to  a  more  common  appearance  of  a  work  on  one  thinker,  starting  with  a  description 
of  his  life,  or  an  attempt  at  an  overview  of  his  work.  It  is  instead  ordered  in  a  rather  idiosyncratic 
way.  La  Nausee  poses  a  problem  for  which  Murdoch  in  consequent  chapters  looks  for  a  solution. 
It  is  via  the  image  that  La  Nausee  presents  that  one  may  understand  the  extraordinary 
construction  of  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist. 
This  image  is  that  of  its  main  character  and  narrator,  Antoine  Roquentin.  Roquentin  is 
condemned  to  ethical  and  logical  loneliness  47  He  is  a  man  almost  without  relation  or 
conversation.  Yet  his  loneliness  goes  far  beyond  that  of  any  form  of  ordinary  solitude.  He  feels 
not  only  isolated  from,  but  also  disgusted  by  the  mere  existence  of  things  and  people.  Murdoch 
concisely  relates  how  he  experiences  a  feeling  of  horror  at  different  occasions.  Standing  on  the 
seashore  about  to  throw  a  pebble  into  the  water,  he  is  suddenly  overcome  with  `a  curious  sickly 
horror  .  48  Sitting  in  a  cafe,  `[l]ooking  at  a  glass  of  beer,  at  the  braces  of  the  cafe  patmn,  he  is  filled 
with  a  sweetish  sort  of  disgust'  (une  erpece  d'ecoeurement  douceätrr)'.  49  He  visits  a  museum  full  of 
pictures  of  the  bourgeoisie  in  Bouville.  He  recognises  how  they  claim  that  their  lives  had  meaning 
by  referring  to  the  institutions  of  state  and  family  they  belonged  to  and  Roqucntin  turns  away, 
disgusted.  50 
46  Magee,  `Philosophy  and  Literature',  p.  20.  Yet,  in  the  same  interview  she  expresses  to  feel  horror  at  the  thought  that 
the  same  verdict  is  applied  to  her  own  work. 
47  Murdoch,  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician',  p.  106-7. 
48  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  39. 
Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  39. 
u'  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  40. 
67 It  is  not  just  other  things  which  provoke  this  experience.  Murdoch  notes  that  `what  marks 
him  out  as  an  existentialist  doubter  is  the  fact  that  he  himself  is  in  the  picture:  what  most 
distresses  him  is  that  his  own  individual  being  is  invaded  by  the  senseless  flux;  what  most 
interests  him  is  his  aspiration  to  be  in  a  different  way.  '  51  The  experience  of  nausea  is  first 
encountered  when  he  `looks  at  his  own  face  in  the  mirror,  and  suddenly  it  seems  to  him  inhuman, 
fishlike.  '52  Roquentin  realizes  that  there  is  no  inevitability  in  a  lived  life,  that  there  are  no 
adventures:  `One  can  live  or  tell:  not  both  at  once'.  What  is  the  `I'  that  exists  presently?  It  is 
`merely  the  ever-lengthening  stuff  of  gluey  sensations  and  vague  fragmentary  thoughts.  '53 
The  climax  and  also  the  most  metaphysical  part  of  the  story  Murdoch  considers  to  be 
Roquentin's  realisation  that  word  and  thing  are  not  related  at  all.  The  word  `seagull'  makes  it 
possible  to  think  in  classes  and  kinds,  yet  it  is  delivered  from  the  bird  Roquentin  sees  in  the  park. 
Then  comes  the  final  and  fullest  revelation.  `I  understood  that  there  was  no 
middle  way  between  non-existence  and  this  swooning  abundance.  What  exists  at 
all  must  exist  to  this  point:  the  point  of  mouldering,  of  bulging,  of  obscenity.  In 
another  world,  circles  and  melodies  retain  their  pure  and  rigid  contours.  But 
existence  is  a  degeneration.  '54 
Imprisoned  between  this  existence  and  the  purity  he  is  looking  for,  Roquentin  finds  his  salvation 
through  art,  through  a  book  he  will  write,  and  which  will  enable  him  to  `attain  to  a  conception  of 
his  own  life  as  having  the  purity,  the  clarity  and  the  necessity  which  the  work  of  art  created  by 
him  will  possess'.  55 
Murdoch  is  not  much  convinced  by  this  solution  and  neither,  she  assumes,  is  Sartre.  56  She 
decides  that  La  Nausee's  `interest  lies  in  the  powerful  image  which  dominates  it,  and  in  the 
descriptions  which  constitutes  the  argument.  '57  La  Nausee  is  `a  philosophical  myth'  which  `shows 
to  us  in  a  memorable  way  the  master-image  of  Sartre's  thinking.  '58  It  is  said  to  describe  alternately 
`all  of  us',  the  philosopher  and  Sartre.  At  one  point  Murdoch  allows  for  `Roquentin's  sensations 
[to  be]  not  in  themselves  so  rare  and  peculiar'59,  but  fairly  recognisable.  At  another  point  she 
denies  that  Roquentin  is  an  ordinary  man.  He  regards  the  world  with  the  reflexive  consciousness 
51  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  43. 
52  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  39. 
13  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  40. 
54  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  41. 
55  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  46. 
so  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  46-7  and  50  respectively. 
57  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  47. 
sa  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  42,49. 
68 of  a  philosopher.  In  an  illuminating  comparison  to  K.  in  Kafka's  The  Castle,  Murdoch  points  out 
how  despite  the  absurdity  of  his  surroundings  Imo.  keeps  faith  in  ordinary  communication  and 
signs,  whereas  Sartre's  hero  quickly  abandons  such  hopes  when  he  realises  the  absurdity  of  the 
world.  Murdoch  concludes:  `The  hero  of  La  Nausle  is  reflective  and  analytical;  the  book  is  not  a 
metaphysical  image  so  much  as  a  philosophical  analysis  which  makes  use  of  a  metaphysical 
image.  '6° 
La  Nausee  offers  a  rather  disturbing  image  of  the  human  situation,  yet  it  does  not  offer 
any  solution.  61  Murdoch  looks  for  Sartre's  more  positive  points  in  other  novels,  and  in  his  writing 
on  literature  and  philosophy,  and  finally  in  his  political  work. 
As  a  European  socialist  intellectual  with  an  acute  sense  of  the  needs  of  his  time 
Sartre  wishes  to  affirm  the  preciousness  of  the  individual  and  the  possibility  of  a 
society  which  is  free  and  democratic  in  the  traditional  liberal  sense  of  these  terms. 
... 
As  a  philosopher  however  he  finds  himself  without  the  materials  to  construct  a 
system  which  will  hold  and  justify  these  values;  Sartre  believes  neither  in  God  nor 
in  Nature  not  in  History.  What  he  does  believe  in  is  Reason 
... 
Sartre  is  a  rationalist; 
for  him  the  supreme  virtue  is  reflective  self-awareness.  62 
Here  Murdoch  sketches  the  dilemma  Sartre  finds  himself  in.  He  wants  to  defend  the 
preciousness  of  the  individual,  but  he  despises  most  means  to  do  so:  God,  Nature,  History.  The 
only  true  value  Sartre  acknowledges  is  that  of  self-reflection. 
This  individual  finds  itself  on  the  one  hand  threatened  by  the  deadening  stability  of 
existence,  of  things  as  well  as  people.  In  Sartre's  world  people  can  only  relate  by  domination  or 
submission.  On  the  other  hand  via  its  reason  it  cannot  reach  any  salvation.  Its  notion  of  freedom 
is  contradictory:  `The  empty  consciousness  flickers  like  a  vain  fire  between  the  inert  petrifying 
reality  which  threatens  to  engulf  it  and  the  impossible  totality  of  a  stabilised  freedom.  There  is 
total  freedom  or  total  immersion,  empty  reflexion  or  silence.  '63  His  situation  is  hopeless,  but  as  a 
romantic  he  embraces  this  hopelessness.  `When  in  insuperable  practical  difficulties  a  sense  of  `all 
or  nothing'  is  what  consoles.  '64 
59  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  43. 
6"  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  48. 
of  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  45. 
62  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  105. 
63  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  110-1. 
64  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  111.  Compare  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  'Good",  p.  340-1. 
69 Sarin:  Romantic  Rationalist  expresses  Murdoch's  fascination,  but  also  her  disappointment 
with  Sartre's  understanding  of  human  beings.  This  disappointment  she  expresses  in  the  work's 
last  words: 
[Sartre's]  inability  to  write  a  great  novel  is  a  tragic  symptom  of  a  situation  which 
affects  us  all.  We  know  that  the  real  lesson  to  be  taught  is  that  the  human  person 
is  precious  and  unique;  but  we  seem  unable  to  set  it  forth  except  in  terms  of 
ideology  and  abstraction.  65 
These  words,  I  argued  before,  have  been  often  quoted  as  indicative  of  her  own  thought.  So,  even 
though  she  is  now  more  critical  of  existentialism  than  she  was  in  `The  Novelist  as  Metaphysician', 
it  cannot  easily  be  discarded  as  a  possibility  which  did  not  live  up  to  its  expectations.  Instead, 
existentialism  slowly  comes  to  occupy  her  own  mind  (as  she  puts  it  herself  when  talking  about 
analytical  philosophers66).  Sartre's  problem  becomes  her  problem.  In  the  first  chapter  of  Sartre: 
Romantic  Rationalist  she  cannot  decide  whether  Roquentin  presents  everyone,  or  only 
philosophers,  or  even  only  Sartre's  mind.  In  later  writing  she  has  to  acknowledge  the  similarity 
between  Roquentin  and  between  various  contemporary  representations  of  individuals,  including 
her  own. 
How  profoundly  the  image  of  Roquentin  has  captured  Murdoch's  imagination  can  indeed 
be  seen  in  her  literary  work.  There  are  various  allusions  to  it,  often  in  puns.  For  example  Jake 
Donaghue  in  Under  the  Net  comments  on  parts  of  London  `where  contingency  reaches  the  point 
of  nausea'67.  He  is  also  one  of  the  various  main  (almost  always  male)  characters  and  narrators  in 
Murdoch's  novels,  who  do  not  acknowledge  any  binding  commitment  to  family  or  friends.  They 
literally  embody  this  independent  existence,  for  their  bodies  are  remarkably  immaterial,  hardly 
affected  by  time,  and  without  any  distinguishing  features.  These  men  pride  themselves  on  not 
having  to  shave  often,  on  not  being  bald,  nor  small,  nor  fat,  thin  or  large.  Charles  Arrowby  in  The 
Sea,  The  Sea  thus  contrasts  to  his  cousin  James,  who  `has  to  shave  twice  a  day.  Sometimes  he 
positively  looks  dirty'.  68  Bradley  Pearson  in  The  Black  Prince  prides  himself  on  his  clean  outlook 
and  Rupert  in  A  Fairly  Honourable  Defeat  has  not  lost  his  blond  looks,  whereas  his  wife  Hilda 
decidedly  shows  her  age. 
6s  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  148. 
66  Compare  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  337-338:  Existentialism  has  shown  itself  capable  of  becoming  a 
popular  philosophy  and  of  getting  into  the  minds  of  those  (e.  g.  Oxford  philosophers)  who  have  not  sought  it  and 
may  even  be  unconscious  of  its  presence.  ' 
67  As  quoted  in  Phillips,  Agencies  of  the  Goodin  the  l  Fork  of  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  47. 
68  Murdoch,  The  Sea,  The  Sea,  p.  173-4. 
70 Her  novels  can  be  seen  too  as  attempts  to  create  imagery  in  reply  to  Sartre's.  One  such 
instance  in  one  of  the  earlier  novels  is  discussed  by  Allen,  in  his  `Two  Experiences  of  Existence: 
Jean-Paul  Sartre  and  Iris  Murdoch'.  In  The  Unicorn  Effingham  Cooper,  a  rather  egoistic,  intelligent 
and  successful  civil  servant  finds  himself  at  one  point  trapped  in  a  bog  from  which  there  seems 
no  escape  and  death  is  near.  At  the  proximity  of  his  death  he  has  a  most  unusual  experience. 
Something  had  been  withdrawn,  had  slipped  away  from  him  in  the  moment  of  his 
attention,  and  that  something  was  simply  himself.  Perhaps  he  was  dead  already, 
the  darkening  image  of  the  self  forever  removed.  Yet  what  was  left,  for  something 
was  surely  left,  something  existed  still?  It  came  to  him  with  the  simplicity  of  the 
simple  sum.  What  was  left  was  everything  else,  all  that  was  not  himself,  that  object 
which  he  had  never  before  seem  and  upon  which  he  now  gazed  with  the  passion 
of  a  lover.  69 
Allen  points  out  that  this  image  is  a  response  to  that  of  Roquentin.  Where  the  one  experiences 
reality  as  something  that  must  be  loved,  the  other's  experience  of  reality  is  to  feel  nauseous.  Allen 
points  out  that  neither  experience  is  close  to  any  ordinary  form  of  experience.  Their  importance 
he  places  in  the  evaluation  each  of  them  makes  of  ordinary  experience,  reasoning  from  these 
extraordinary  ones.  Allen  argues  that  for  Sartre  ordinary  experience  is  self-deception,  for 
Murdoch  it  is  serious  distortion.  For  Sartre  there  is  no  way  out:  people  are  craving  for 
completeness,  which  can  never  be  obtained  without  giving  up  freedom.  For  Murdoch  the  inward 
person  needs  to  be  broken  down  in  order  to  make  space  for  what  is  outside.  This  imagery  reveals 
the  direction  of  Murdoch's  thought.  While  maintaining  the  importance  of  consciousness  she 
attempts  to  relate  it  to  a  reality  independent  of  it. 
Sartre's  work  for  Murdoch  then  reveals  a  problem  facing  her  as  a  novelist  concerned  with 
the  creation  of  character.  In  his  work  she  recognises  the  kind  of  hero  found  in  contemporary 
literature.  This  problem  is  one  which,  I  argued  before,  affects  her  too  as  a  philosopher,  reflecting 
on  the  general  perception  of  human  beings.  Like  Sartre,  Murdoch  is  looking  for  means  to  `affirm 
the  preciousness  of  the  individual'.  Yet  already  in  the  first  chapter  of  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist, 
she  doubts  if  the  individual  can  only  be  defended  through  Roquentin's  image,  and  if  the 
individual  can  only  be  imagined  to  be  a  Roquentin.  With  Gabriel  Marcel  she  wonders  in  Satire: 
Romantic  Rationalist's  first  chapter:  `why 
... 
does  Sartre  find  the  contingent  over-abundance  of  the 
69  Murdoch,  The  Unicorn,  p.  167.  Also  quoted  in  D.  Allen,  Two  Experiences  of  Existence:  Jean-Paul  Sartre  and  Iris 
Murdoch'  in  InternationalPhilocopliicalQuarler/y  14.2  (June  1974),  p.  181-187,  p.  182-3. 
71 world  nauseating  rather  than  glorious?  '70  In  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'  she  writes 
how  existentialism's  Totalitarian  Man  `is  entirely  alone.  ... 
In  the  world  inhabited  by  Totalitarian 
Man  there  are  other  people,  but  there  are  not  real  contingent  separate  other  people.  '7'  Her  answer 
to  this  solitude  will  be  to  connect  the  self  to  reality  again,  which  in  these  essays  is  understood  as  a 
common  sense  concept.  Murdoch  attempts  a  return  to  this  world,  which  Sartre  found  nauseating. 
Turning  to  Anglo-Saxon  philosophy  I  shall  argue  how  Murdoch  tries  to  introduce  consciousness 
in  its  relation  to  reality;  how  she  attempts  to  retain  the  (moral)  importance  existentialism 
attributes  to  private  deliberation,  against  a  moral  philosophy  which  focuses  on  observable 
actions;  and  how  she  unlike  existentialism  tries  to  connect  these  deliberations  to  an  independent 
reality.  In  the  following  discussion  of  M  and  DI  shall  consider  what  difficulties  she  encounters  in 
these  attempts. 
4.  Struggle  and  Temperament  in  The  Idea  of  Perfection  ;A  Mother-in-Law  R7  and  her  Daughter  in  Lary  D 
The  example  of  M  and  D  has  become  the  emblem  of  Murdoch's  thought,  yet  it  first  arose  in  a 
specific  context,  the  essay  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  (1964).  This  text  is  the  first  of  three  essays 
which  together  make  up  The  Soverrigniy  of  Good  (1970),  Murdoch's  best  known  work  of 
philosophy.  All  three  had  been  previously  published  individually  and  were  only  assembled  for  the 
series  `Studies  in  Ethics  and  Philosophy  of  Religion',  edited  by  D.  Z.  Phillips  72  In  the  latter  two, 
`On  `God'  and  `Good"  (1969)  and  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  (1967), 
Murdoch  develops  her  own  moral  philosophy  around  the  idea  of  the  Good.  The  state  of 
contemporary  philosophy  is  shortly  and  idiosyncratically  related  in  the  first  few  pages  of  each  of 
the  two  essays  73 
A  first  and  obvious  difference  between  The  Idea  of  Perfection'  and  the  other  two  essays 
is  its  length.  The  Idea  of  Perfection'  is  considerably  longer,  roughly  one  and  a  half  time  the  size 
of  each  of  the  other  two.  Another  distinguishing  feature  may  explain  this  first  difference.  In  `The 
Idea  of  Perfection'  Murdoch  is  constrained  by  the  arguments  as  well  as  by  the  form  of 
70  Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  49. 
71  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  268  and  269. 
72  P.  Conradi,  Iris  Murdoch,  p.  492.  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  in:  I  ale  Review  53.3  (spring  1964),  pp.  342-380;  The 
Sovereignty  of  Good,  London:  C.  U.  Press,  1967  (Leslie  Stephen  Lecture);  `On  "God"  and  "Good"'  in:  M.  Grene  (red.  ), 
The  Anatomy  of  Knowledge  (London:  Routledge  and  Megan  Paul,  1969),  pp.  233-258.  'The  Idea  of  Perfection'  is  based 
on  the  Ballard  Matthews  lecture,  which  Murdoch  gave  in  1962  at  University  College  North  Wales.  'The  Sovereignty 
of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  was  the  Leslie  Stephen  Lecture  in  1967,  held  in  Cambridge. 
73  In  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  Murdoch  proceeds  by  wondering  in  what  way  prayer  can  still  be  valuable  for  those  she 
calls  `unreligious  believers'.  Would  it  be  possible  for  them  to  direct  their  attention  to  the  Good?  What  would  such  a 
Good  be  like?  In  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  she  considers  the  metaphor  of  the  Good  in 
answer  to  a  question  she  also  asks  in  `On  `God'  and  `Good":  `How  can  we  make  ourselves  better?  '.  The  Sovereignty 
of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  368,  compare  `On  `God'  and  'Good",  p.  342:  `What  is  a  good  man  like?  I  low  can 
we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  Can  we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  These  are  questions  the  philosopher 
should  try  to  answer.  ' 
72 argumentation  she  encounters  in  the  prevalent  discussion  in  moral  philosophy.  Because  of  this 
constraint  she  finds  herself  repeatedly  unable  to  pursue  her  own  argument  and  consequently 
forced  to  try  bolder,  new  directions.  This  time-consuming  procedure  is  replaced  by  a  more 
concise,  idiosyncratic  depiction  of  current  moral  philosophy  in  the  other  two  essays. 
The  on-going  dispute  in  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  can  in  first  instance  and  in  its  entirety 
perhaps  best  be  characterised  by  a  metaphor  which  Murdoch  introduces  into  the  discussion.  This 
is  the  metaphor  of  `struggle'.  Images  of  struggle  are  invoked  throughout  this  essay.  Thus  one 
finds  Murdoch  `mounting  an  attack  upon  this  heavily  fortified  position'74  or  appealing  for  `some 
sort  of  change  of  key,  some  moving  the  attack  to  a  different  front.  '75  It  may  be  a  defining 
moment  when  she  remarks,  in  parenthesis:  `(There  is  curiously  little  place  in  the  other  picture  for 
the  idea  of  struggle.  )  .  7o 
This  struggle  is  up  to  a  certain  degree  decided  by  temperament,  which  for  Murdoch  is  a 
natural  ingredient  of  philosophical  debate.  She  does  not  mind  admitting  that  it  may  be 
temperament  which  decides  whether  one  is  satisfied  with  a  certain  argument,  `whether  or  not  we 
want  to  attack  or  whether  we  are  content.  I  am  not  content.  '77  In  the  first  sentence  of  `On  `God' 
and  `Good"  she  even  suggests  that  philosophy  is  as  much  about  temperament  as  it  is  about  truth: 
`To  do  philosophy  is  to  explore  one's  own  temperament  and  yet  at  the  same  time  to  attempt  to 
discover  the  truth.  '78  The  way  in  which  temperament  characterises  the  dispute  in  `The  Idea  of 
Perfection'  is  well  illustrated  by  the  image  of  people  protesting  and  crying  out  to  receive  only  a 
cool  reply  from  philosophers.  79  The  philosophers'  cool  reply  does  not  only  convey  a  very 
different  sort  of  temperament  but  also  suggests  that  temperament  is  of  no  importance  in  a 
philosophical  debate. 
In  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  Murdoch  is  discontent  with  `current  moral  philosophy'  for, 
two  reasons:  `it  ignores  certain  facts  and  at  the  same  time  imposes  a  single  theory  which  admits  of 
no  communication  with  or  escape  into  rival  theories.  '80  Taking  her  cue  from  Moore,  who 
answered  McTaggart's  `time  is  unreal'  by  `I  just  had  breakfast'  Murdoch  proposes  `a  move  back 
towards  the  consideration  of  simple  and  obvious  facts.  ' 
Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  311. 
75  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  318. 
7G  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  317.  These  images  are  present  in  the  other  two  essays  as  well,  even  though 
the  confrontation  with  linguistic  analysis  is  less  turbulent  there.  Compare  the  first  paragraphs  of  `On  `God'  and 
`Good"  and  of  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'. 
77  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  311,  compare  p.  324,  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  'Good",  p.  340,359. 
78  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  337. 
7'  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  309. 
80  Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  299. 
73 Instances  of  the  facts,  as  I  shall  boldly  call  them,  which  interest  me  and  which 
seem  to  have  been  forgotten  or  `theorised  away'  are  the  fact  that  an  unexamined 
life  can  be  virtuous  and  the  fact  that  love  is  a  central  concept  in  morals.  ... 
it  must 
be  possible  to  do  justice  to  both  Socrates  and  the  virtuous  peasant.  81 
Thus,  in  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  Murdoch  starts  an  argument  against  a  position  that  leaves  no 
room  for  other  positions  and  she  does  so  by  returning  to  certain  facts.  Talking  of  facts  is  indeed  a 
`bold'  thing  to  do,  for  in  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  as  in  other  essays  Murdoch  challenges  the  strict 
distinction  between  fact  and  value.  Her  facts  are,  moreover,  of  an  unusual  kind.  The  moral 
philosophers  Murdoch  argues  against  in  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  would  not  at  all  recognise  as 
facts  those  mentioned  by  Murdoch:  `the  fact  that  an  unexamined  life  can  be  virtuous  and  the  fact 
that  love  is  a  central  concept  in  morals'. 
The  position  Murdoch  introduces  against  `current  moral  philosophy'  is  also  largely 
indicated  by  words  like  `simple'  and  `obvious'.  `Simple',  `simply',  `obvious',  `surely'  are  all  regularly 
used,  often  in  opposition  to  philosophy.  So  one  finds  people  protesting  and  crying  out  against 
philosophers,  when  the  latter  have  reasoned  away  the  inner  life:  `Surely  there  is  such  a  thing  as 
deciding  and  not  acting?  Surely  there  are  private  decisions?  Surely  there  are  lots  and  lots  of 
objects,  more  or  less  easily  identified,  in  orbit  as  it  were  in  inner  space?  '  And  even  after  the  cool 
reply  these  people  maintain  that  they  `surely 
... 
do  have  images,  talk  to  [them]selves  etc.  '82 
It  is  the  simple  and  obvious  that  likewise  inspires  the  `rough  ordinary'  analysis  of  the 
example  of  M  and  D,  `as  yet  without  explanation': 
[I]  s  not  the  metaphor  of  vision  almost  irresistibly  suggested  to  anyone  who,  without 
philosophical  prejudice,  wishes  to  describe  the  situation?  Is  it  not  a  natural  metaphor? 
... 
M's  activity  here,  so  far  from  being  something  very  odd  and  hazy,  is  something 
which,  in  a  way,  we  find  eaceedin  familiar.  Innumerable  novels  contain  accounts  of 
what  such  struggles  are  like.  Anybody  could  describe  one  without  being  at  a  loss  for 
words.  83 
With  expressions  as  `without  philosophical  prejudice',  `natural',  and  `exceedingly  familiar' 
Murdoch  is  appealing  to  some  form  of  common  sense  which  all  should  recognise  from  life  or 
from  innumerable  novels. 
81  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  299. 
82  Murdoch,  'The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  309-310.  As  Murdoch  indicates  herself  this  argument  goes  back  to  one  of 
her  earliest  articles,  'Thinking  and  Language'. 
74 The  reference  to  `innumerable  novels'  is  noteworthy  here.  It  recalls  the  part  literature 
plays  in  Murdoch's  thought,  discussed  in  the  first  part  of  this  chapter.  Novels  are  opposed  to 
philosophy  as  well  as  likened  to  the  familiar.  Somebody  looking  for  a  way  to  describe  M  and  D 
would  naturally  use  the  metaphor  of  vision,  Murdoch  maintains.  Innumerable  novels  provide 
vocabulary  for  anyone  to  describe  the  situation  differently  from  the  alien  analysis  of  philosophy. 
The  supporters  of  simple  and  obvious  facts  in  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  dissent  from 
`ideally  rational  man'.  He  represents  the  kind  of  moral  philosophy  Murdoch  intends  to  challenge. 
She  assembles  his  image  from  two  works  by  Hampshire:  Thought  andAction  and  `Disposition  and 
Memory'.  The  term  `ideally  rational  man'  is  taken  from  the  latter.  84  He  is  introduced  with  a 
considerable  amount  of  quotation. 
This  person  would  be  `aware  of  all  his  memories  as  memories  ... 
His  wishes  would 
be  attached  to  definite  possibilities  in  a  definite  future 
... 
He  would  ... 
distinguish 
his  present  situation  from  unconscious  memories  of  the  past  ...  and  would  find  his 
motives  for  action  in  satisfying  his  instinctual  needs  within  the  objectively 
observed  features  of  the  situation.  '  This  ideal  man  does  not  exist  because  the 
palimpsest  of  `dispositions'  is  too  hard  to  penetrate,  and  this  is  just  as  well  because 
ideal  rationality  would  leave  us  `without  art,  without  dream  or  imagination, 
without  like  or  dislikes  unconnected  with  instinctual  needs'.  85 
From  this  quotation  it  is  possible  to  draw  out  ideally  rational  man's  main  features.  First,  his 
intentions  should  be  clear.  Murdoch  writes:  `[Hampshire]  utters  in  relation  to  intention  the  only 
explicit  `ought'  in  his  philosophy.  We  ought  to  know  what  we  are  doing.  '16  In  "The  Darkness  of 
Practical  Reasoning'  and  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  she  argues  that  it  is  indeed  possible  for 
Hampshire  to  maintain  this  requirement,  for  he  considers  it  always  possible  to  take  a  step  back 
and  reconsider  the  situation.  Secondly,  the  thoughts  and  actions  of  `ideally  rational  man'  are 
directed  to  what  is  overtly  observable.  Reality  is  thus  defined  as  `potentially  open  to  different 
observers'.  This  observable  world  of  facts  is  clearly  distinguished  from  the  value  one  may  attach 
to  it.  This  distinction  leads  to  the  third  point.  Decisions  are  made  by  the  will,  which  is  isolated 
from  reason,  belief  and  emotions.  More  than  once  Murdoch  quotes  Hampshire's  `I  identify 
81  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  316-317,  emphasis  added. 
84  Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  303.  Compare  S.  Hampshire,  `Disposition  and  Memory'  (Frredom  of  Mind  and  OlherErsq»..  Princeton,  N 
. 
J.:  Princeton  University  Press,  p.  160-182).  The  quotation  is  taken  from  p.  176. 
8S  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  303-304.  Compare  I  Iampshire,  `Disposition  and  Memory',  p.  176. 
'6  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  304. 
75 M  self  with  my  will'.  87  For  `ideally  rational  man'  as  for  Ordinary  Language  Man  from  `The 
Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'  any  daydreaming  or  musing  has  no  meaning  if  it  is  not  lýlg 
expressed  in  words  or  acts.  Morality  is  reduced  to  choice.  Ordinary  Language  Man  observes  the  I  Iý 
facts,  reasons  the  values  and  chooses.  88  Both  men  are  decidedly  alone,  surrounded  by  a  world  and 
a  language  which  has  no  secrets  for  them.  Other  people  do  not  exist  other  than  as  similar  rational 
agents.  89 
What  Murdoch  is  most  concerned  with  in  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  is  the  (moral)  absence 
of  the  inner  life.  Murdoch's  criticism  is  thus  extended  to  the  philosophy  of  mind  which  sustains 
the  moral  philosophy.  °  In  this  philosophy  of  mind  the  inner  life  is,  if  not  insignificant 
daydreaming,  no  more  than  a  shadow  of  the  public  life.  The  idea  of  a  private  certainty,  as  for 
example  Descartes'  cogito,  cannot  be  part  of  the  structure  of  a  concept  and  is  discarded  in  favour 
of  an  understanding  of  a  concept  as  a  public  structure.  This  understanding  of  meaning  is  lucidly 
illustrated  by  the  concept  of  red:  `the  inner  picture  is  necessarily  irrelevant  and  the  possession  of 
the  concept  is  a  public  skill.  What  matters  is  whether  I  stop  as  the  traffic  lights,  and  not  my 
colour  imagery  or  absence  of  it.  '91 
Of  all  the  different  objections  Murdoch  formulates  against  this  position92  I  focus  on 
those  against  the  argument  which  she  calls  `the  most  radical  argument,  the  key-stone,  of  this 
existentialist-behaviourist  type  of  moral  psychology,  the  argument  to  the  effect  that  mental 
concepts  must  be  analysed  genetically  and  so  the  inner  must  be  thought  of  as  parasitic  upon  the 
outer.  '93  It  is  this  argument  which  makes  the  position  so  difficult  to  challenge.  Murdoch  describes 
how  it  has  originated  in  the  Philosophische  Untersuchungen,  but  was  then  further  developed  by 
`Hampshire,  Hare,  Ayer,  Ryle  and  others'94  in  a  way  which  is  not  found  in  Wittgenstein's  own 
work.  According  to  the  genetic  argument  all  concepts  are  learnt  only  in  public  situations.  `The 
structure  of  the  concept  is  its  public  structure,  which  is  established  by  coinciding  procedures  in 
public  situations.  '95  In  this  line  of  argument  the  inner  life  is  stripped  of  all  relevance  for 
87  Murdoch,  'The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  303,304-5,  and  328. 
88  Compare  Murdoch,  'The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  267. 
99  Murdoch,  'he  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  268. 
9°  See  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  300. 
91  Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  307. 
92  `I  find  the  image  of  man  which  I  have  sketched  above  both  alien  and  implausible.  That  is,  more  precisely:  I  have 
simple  empirical  objections  (I  do  not  think  people  are  necessarily  or  essentially  `like  that'),  I  have  philosophical 
objections  (I  do  not  find  the  arguments  convincing),  and  I  have  moral  objections  (I  do  not  think  people  ought  to 
picture  themselves  in  this  way).  '  (Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  306) 
93  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  306.  Compare  Hampshire,  `Disposition  and  Memory',  p.  167  ff. 
94  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  308.  Compare  p.  311. 
95  Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  307. 
76 determining  the  meaning  of  concepts  and  because  this  is  so,  Murdoch  argues,  'it  has  been  too 
hastily  assumed  that  something  else  is  not  there.  '96 
Recapturing  the  inner  life  proves  to  be  difficult  `7  After  first  attempts  Murdoch  expresses 
the  need  for  an  object  which  we  can  all  look  at.  She  suggests  that  she  might  have  used  an 
example  other  than  that  of  INI  and  D,  namely  that  of  a  ritual.  A  ritual,  just  as  the  example  used, 
begs  the  question  of  the  inner  life  or  of  what  is  extra  to  public  words  and  gestures:  whether  being 
sorry  adds  to  saying  one  is,  or  whether  one  is  repentant  when  one  says  so,  or  beats  one's  chest. 
Murdoch,  however,  does  not  pursue  this  religious  example,  because  'it  might  be  felt  to  raise 
special  difficulties.  '  Instead  she  turns  to  something  'more  ordinary  and  everyday'.  98 
The  following  quotation  gives  the  full  flavour  of  the  example: 
A  mother,  whom  I  shall  call  M,  feels  hostility  to  her  daughter-in-law,  whom  I  shall 
call  D.  M  finds  D  quite  a  good-hearted  girl,  but  while  not  exactly  common  yet 
certainly  unpolished  and  lacking  in  dignity  and  refinement.  D  is  inclined  to  be  pert 
and  familiar,  insufficiently  ceremonious,  brusque,  sometimes  positively  rude, 
always  tiresome  juvenile.  M  does  not  like  D's  accent  or  the  way  D  dresses.  M  feels 
that  her  son  has  married  beneath  him.  Let  us  assume  for  purposes  of  the  example 
that  the  mother,  who  is  a  very  `correct'  person,  behaves  beautifully  to  the  girl 
throughout,  not  allowing  her  real  opinion  to  appear  in  any  way.  We  might 
underline  this  aspect  of  the  example  by  supposing  that  the  young  couple  have 
emigrated  or  that  D  is  now  dead:  the  point  being  to  ensure  that  whatever  is  in 
question  as  happening  happens  entirely  in  M's  mind. 
Thus  much  for  M's  first  thoughts  about  D.  Time  passes,  and  it  could  be  that  M 
settles  down  with  a  hardened  sense  of  grievance  and  a  fixed  picture  of  D, 
imprisoned  if  I  may  use  a  question-begging  word)  by  the  cliche:  my  poor  son  has 
married  a  silly  vulgar  girl.  However,  the  M  of  the  example  is  an  intelligent  and 
well-intentioned  person,  capable  of  self-criticism,  capable  of  giving  careful  and 
just  attention  to  an  object  which  confronts  her.  M  tells  herself:  'I  am  old-fashioned 
and  conventional.  I  may  be  prejudiced  and  narrow-minded.  I  may  be  snobbish.  I 
am  certainly  jealous.  Let  me  look  again.  '  Here  I  assume  that  M  observes  D  or  at 
least  reflects  deliberately  about  D,  until  gradually  her  vision  of  D  alters.  If  we  take 
Murdoch,  `T1he  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  307. 
97  Murdoch,  'The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  309-311. 
Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  312.  Of  course,  it  can  be  disputed  that  religious  examples  arc  not  ordinary 
and  everyday.  Again,  Murdoch  is  not  denying  it  is  ordinary  and  everyday  for  some.  It  is  however  not  so  for  those 
whom  she  considers  her  audience. 
77 D  to  be  now  absent  or  dead  this  can  make  it  clear  that  the  change  is  not  in  D's 
behaviour  but  in  M's  mind.  D  is  discovered  to  be  not  vulgar  but  refreshingly 
simple,  not  undignified  but  spontaneous,  not  noisy  but  gay,  not  tiresomely 
juvenile  but  delightfully  youthful,  and  so  on.  And  as  I  say,  ex  /ypolbesi,  M's 
outward  behaviour,  beautiful  from  the  start,  in  no  way  alters?  ' 
This  engaging  imagery  Murdoch  introduces  as  `an  example  ...  some  object  which  we  can  all  more 
or  less  see,  and  to  which  we  can  from  time  to  time  refer.  '1°°  In  the  secondary  literature  it  has 
obtained  the  status  of  the  emblem  of  Murdoch's  philosophy,  in  particular  but  not  exclusively  in 
Antonaccio's  Picturing  the  Human.  Antonaccio  calls  it  'a  prominent  example  ...  of  a  kind  of 
conceptual  analysis  in  the  form  of  "pictures"  and  images  of  human  existence  in  order  to  analyze 
moral  identity  in  relation  to  the  good'  and  'a  particularly  rich  illustration  of  many  of  Murdoch's 
complex  theoretical  points'.  101.  The  image  is  of  great  significance  in  Antonaccio's  work.  She 
distinguishes  different  aspects  in  which  the  image  is  different  from  Hamsphire's  'Ideally  Rational 
Man'.  102  However,  by  using  the  terms  `example'  and  'illustration'  she  allows  that  the  image  may 
be  omitted. 
I  shall  argue  that  the  image  cannot  be  omitted,  because  it  does  not  only  illustrate 
Murdoch's  arguments,  but  also  shows  their  difficulties.  It  is  indeed  true  that  the  musings  and 
personal  thoughts  cannot  be  omitted.  The  image  is  thus  formulated  that  the  inner  life  is  per 
definition  of  importance  for  moral  philosophy  and  the  change  happening  within  that  inner  life  is 
per  definition  good.  Whatever  it  is  that  is  happening  it  is  only  happening  within  the  inner  life.  M's 
change  of  view  is  not  noticeable,  for  M  has  behaved  correctly  throughout.  Neither  is  there  is  any 
observable  external  cause  which  encourages  or  forces  M  to  change  her  image  of  D.  The  change  is 
not  instigated  by  D  or  by  anyone  else.  What  has  started  the  change  Murdoch  describes  thus:  `the 
M  of  the  example  is  an  intelligent  and  well-intentioned  person,  capable  of  self-criticism,  capable 
of  giving  careful  and  just  attention  to  an  object  which  confronts  her.  M  tells  herself:  'I  am  old- 
fashioned  and  conventional.  I  may  be  prejudiced  and  narrow-minded.  I  may  be  snobbish.  I  am 
certainly  jealous.  Let  me  look  again.  " 
The  words  'intelligent',  `well-intentioned'  etc.  are  deliberately  chosen  to  convey  that  the 
change  of  view  should  be  considered  as  good.  Murdoch  explicitly  asks  her  readers  to  think  of  the 
change  in  that  way.  She  acknowledges  that  `in  real  life,  and  this  is  of  interest,  it  might  be  very 
hard  to  decide  whether  what  M  was  doing  was  proper  or  not,  and  opinions  might  differ....  Some 
Murdoch,  'The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  312-313. 
110  Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  312. 
ý'"  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  22,  and  24. 
78 people  might  say  `she  deludes  herself  while  others  would  say  she  was  moved  by  love  or  justice.  I 
am  picturing  a  case  where  I  would  find  the  latter  description  appropriate.  '"03 
Murdoch  adds  specific  claims  `to  ensure  that  whatever  is  in  question  as  haf'ßenin&  happens 
entirely  in  M's  mind.  '  However,  for  the  analytical  philosophers  she  is  arguing  against  these  claims 
make  the  example  irrelevant  for  moral  philosophy.  The  example  of  M  and  D  is  immediately 
followed  by  its  refutation,  and  Murdoch  characteristically  presents  their  refutation  as  if  in  a 
dialogue.  A  philosopher,  against  whom  the  argument  is  directed,  she  suggests,  can  argue  that 
either  there  is  no  inner  life  and  since  there  is  no  change  in  the  outer  life  either,  it  is  difficult  to 
speak  of  any  change  at  all.  Or,  there  is-some  form  of  inner  life,  but  for  this  form  of  inner  life  to 
regain  meaning  and  not  to  be  just  `the  charmed  and  habitual  rehearsal  of  phrases'104  one  needs 
the  outer  world.  On  her  own  M  cannot  give  meaning  to  what  she  is  doing  or  give  meaning  to  the 
words  she  speaks  to  herself.  105  This  setback  makes  Murdoch  dismally  exclaim:  `this  is  one  of 
those  exasperating  moments  in  philosophy  when  one  seems  to  be  relentlessly  prevented  from 
saying  something  which  one  is  irresistibly  impelled  to  say.  '", 
Murdoch  counters  this  exasperation  by  stating  `in  a  rough  and  ordinary  way  and  as  yet 
without  justification'  what  she  thinks  to  be  the  case.  Part  of  this  explanation  I  quoted  above.  M  is 
`continually  active  ...  making  progress  ... 
her  inner  acts  [belong]  to  her  or  [form]  part  of  a 
continuous  fabric  of  being 
...  one  feels  impelled  to  say  something  like:  M's  activity  is  peculiarly  her 
own.  Its  details  are  the  details  of  this  personality;  and  partly  for  this  reason  it  may  be  an  activity 
which  can  only  be  performed  privately.  M  could  not  do  this  thing  in  conversation  with  another 
person.  '107 
Against  analytical  philosophy's  interest  limited  to  the  observable  Murdoch  posits  the 
importance  of  the  inner  life  and  of  private  deliberation.  In  order  to  strengthen  her  argument  she 
suggests  the  absence  of  any  other  person.  `M  could  not  do  this  thing  in  conversation  with  another 
person.  '  Murdoch  dismisses  even  D:  `the  young  couple  have  emigrated  or  ... 
D  is  now  dead:  the 
point  to  ensure  that  whatever  is  in  question  as  happening  happens  entirely  in  M's  mind'.  So,  when 
Murdoch  later  remarks  that  `M  observes  D'"°  8,  `M  looks  at  D,  she  attends  to  D,  she  focuses  her 
attention'109  it  should  be  surmised  that  this  too  happens  entirely  in  M's  mind.  For  one  has  learnt 
earlier  that  D-  the  object  of  attention-  has  emigrated  or  died. 
102  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  88-95. 
t03  Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  313. 
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Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  313-316.  Compare  M.  Antonaccio,  Piedun'  g  the  I  luman,  P.  88. 
Murdoch,  °The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  316. 
`7  Murdoch,  'Me  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  316-7. 
11e  Murdoch,  'he  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  313. 
""'  Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  317. 
79 The  lasting  absence  of  D  does  not  impede  M's  attempts  to  change  her  thoughts  on  D. 
Yet,  the  stipulation  occasions  a  surprising  contrast  to  the  language  of  vision  and  attention.  Ai 
looks  at  D,  but  D  is  not  actually  present.  The  contrast  arises  again  when  Murdoch  later  connects 
the  idea  of  perfection  and  the  idea  of  the  individual:  `Love  is  knowledge  of  the  individual.  M 
confronted  with  D  has  an  endless  task.  '  Murdoch  also  mentions,  referring  to  Weil,  the  notion  of 
attention,  `the  idea  of  a  just  and  loving  gaze  directed  upon  an  individual  reality.  I  believe  this  to 
be  the  characteristic  and  proper  mark  of  the  active  moral  agent.  '110 
While  the  supposition  of  D's  absence  suits  the  arguments  against  the  analytical 
philosophers,  as  there  is  no  change  but  in  M's  mind,  it  also  creates  an  unusual  picture  of  a  change 
of  mind.  Without  any  external  prompting  or  direction  Iii  conceives  of  a  better  picture  of  D.  If  D 
had  been  there  all  along,  it  is  easy  to  picture  how  M  might  have  changed  her  mind  when  both 
women  would  get  more  used  to  one  another.  Also,  in  D's  absence,  it  is  possible  to  envision  that 
M's  son  has  married  a  woman  even  less  mature,  or  that  M  feels  obliged  to  defend  her  son's 
choice  against  neighbours  or  colleagues.  However,  the  claims  put  upon  this  image  exclude  these 
possibilities.  What  M  is  doing  is  not  perceived  or  influenced  by  anyone.  It  is  a  purely  individual 
activity.  M  changes  her  mind  to  obtain  a  more  realistic  picture  in  complete  solitude. 
Any  difficulty  to  imagine  this  change  of  mind  could  be  explained  by  arguing  that 
imagination  does  not  easily  engage  with  what  is  unfamiliar.  Recalling  the  depressing  picture 
Murdoch  has  of  human  beings,  it  should  not  be  surprising  that  it  is  difficult  to  imagine  something 
unknown,  in  this  case  changing  one's  mind  without  much  external  compulsion.  This  difficulty  to 
envision  this  change  of  mind  does  not  entail  the  impossibility  to  do  so,  yet  it  disputes  the 
supposed  simplicity  of  the  imagery. 
To  imagine  M  is  not  so  simple,  because  Murdoch  adds  extra  claims  in  order  to  meet  the 
philosophical  argument.  What  M  thinks  is  e.  19potbesi  of  importance  and  the  change  is  ex  b  lbeai 
good,  for  if  not  the  picture  would  no  longer  fit  the  philosophical  argument.  'I1he  absence  of  any 
observable  change  necessitates  the  conclusion  that  the  change  must  have  been  in  M's  mind. 
However,  at  the  same  time  Murdoch  also  supposes  the  absence  of  any  reality  of  other  people 
surrounding  M.  M  is  a  lonely  individual,  and  in  her  loneliness  more  like  Roqucntin  than  Murdoch 
would  like  her  to  be.  My  reading  of  the  imagery  of  M  and  D  thus  reveals  the  pervasiveness  of  the 
shortcomings  which  Murdoch  finds  in  contemporary  philosophy,  in  particular  an  understanding 
of  individuals  as  solitary,  and  not  surrounded  by  an  independent  reality. 
Against  this  reading  of  ni  and  D  it  may  be  argued  that  too  much  weight  is  given  to  D's 
absence.  As  a  detail  of  the  picture  it  receives  too  much  emphasis.  Murdoch  is  after  all  not 
10  Murdoch,  'The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  327 
80 concerned  with  D  in  this  example  of  M  and  D,  but  with  M's  inner  life.  She  needs  an  example  to 
challenge  the  arguments  of  analytical  philosophy  and  to  introduce  a  rich  and  important 
understanding  of  inner  life  into  the  philosophical  debate.  D  is  absent  only  as  guarantee  that 
whatever  is  happening  happens  in  M's  mind  alone. 
Against  these  possible  objections  I  would  argue  that  the  noted  difficulty  to  introduce  an 
inner  life  in  relation  to  an  independent  reality  is  not  just  reflected  in  this  detail,  but  instead 
characterises  the  entire  essay.  The  image  of  M  and  D  reflects  the  difficulty  Murdoch  has  when 
trying  to  refute  the  arguments  of  analytical  philosophy  and  to  introduce  the  facts  she  mentions  at 
the  beginning  of  the  essay.  Against  their  exasperating  refutation  of  her  arguments  Murdoch 
adjusts  her  own  argument  in  order  to  make  them  more  decisive.  She  attempts  to  convince  her 
adversaries  of  the  importance  of  the  inner  life  by  making  sure  that  whatever  is  happening 
happens  in  M's  mind  alone.  Yet,  this  attempt  to  present  a  conclusive  argumentation  also 
introduces  imagery  which  surprisingly  contrasts  to  the  central  imagery  of  vision  and  attention. 
Earlier  I  argued  that  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  is  very  different  from  the  other  two  essays 
in  The  Sorýerez  my  of  Goodin  its  representation  of  contemporary  philosophy.  I  pointed  out  that  in 
this  essay  Murdoch  is  more  constraint  by  the  arguments  as  well  as  the  form  of  argumentation 
encountered  in  the  analytical  tradition.  My  reading  of  Ai  and  D  offers  additional  insight  in  this 
difference  by  arguing  that  in  her  involvement  with  the  analytical  tradition  Murdoch  feels 
compelled  to  present  her  own  argument  as  conclusive.  In  contrast  in  the  other  essays,  she 
significantly  recognises  the  limitations  of  her  own  arguments.  Thus,  in  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  she 
acknowledges: 
On  the  status  of  argument  there  is  perhaps  little,  or  else  too  much,  to  say.... 
Philosophical  argument  is  almost  always  inconclusive 
... 
All  one  can  do  is  to 
appeal  to  certain  areas  of  experience,  pointing  out  certain  features,  and  using 
suitable  metaphors  and  inventing  suitable  concepts  where  necessary  to  make  these 
features  visible.  111 
In  order  to  discuss  her  facts  it  may  turn  out  to  be  necessary  for  Murdoch  to  give  up  the  desire  to 
provide  the  final  conquering  argumentation. 
This  absence  of  D  is  thus  not  incidental,  but  may  be  understood  to  point  to  a  more 
general  philosophical  difficulty.  In  encountering  this  difficulty  Murdoch  is  not  alone.  Just  as  M 
does  not  think  any  better  of  D  until  D  is  gone,  so  many  a  philosopher  only  considers  the 
"  Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  360-361. 
81 tiresome  juvenile  reality  which  is  the  real  topic  of  study.  Only  in  the  retirement  of  the  study  can 
this  reality  be  valued.  This  does  not  imply  that  everything  done  there  is  useless.  One  would  be 
cynical  to  suggest  that  what  M  does  is  of  no  use.  Yet,  lei's  example  also  urges  to  leaving  this  study 
and  perhaps  accepting  that  philosophical  argument  in  the  face  of  reality  can  no  longer  be  definite. 
5.  Concluding  Remarks 
This  chapter  ends  with  a  solitary  mother-in-law  and  started  with  Murdoch's  criticism  of  the 
lonely  individual  she  encountered  in  both  analytical  and  existentialist  philosophy.  Against  the 
`flimsy  personality'  of  the  latter  two  I  argued  that  Murdoch  positions  her  understanding  of 
character  found  in  novels  from  the  nineteenth  century.  This  notion  I  regard  not  as  illustration  or 
example,  but  as  a  structuring  principle  in  Murdoch's  thought. 
This  understanding  of  the  role  of  character  in  Murdoch's  philosophical  writing  shows  the 
import  of  Le  Doeuff's  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary  for  the  present  research.  Le  Docuff 
argues  that  imagery  is  part  of  the  argument,  and  should  not  be  disregarded  even  though 
philosophical  reading  habits,  or  an  author's  directions  would  suggest  differently.  The  importance 
of  such  imagery  increases  when  it  appears  at  different  places  in  the  argument  or  in  the  texts  of 
other  philosophers. 
I  regard  Murdoch's  understanding  of  literature  and  in  particular  of  character  as  such 
imagery.  One  finds  various  references  to  literature  from  Murdoch's  earliest  writing  onwards  and  I 
consider  their  frequency  to  increase  their  importance  as  part  of  the  argument,  rather  than  regard 
them  as  omissible  examples.  I  have  related  Murdoch's  reflection  on  character  to  her  philosophical 
writing  rather  than  to  her  novels.  I  have  found  that  as  a  structuring  principle  in  Murdoch's 
thought  this  imagery  is  often  allied  with  the  obvious  or  simple,  and  as  such  posited  in  contrast  to 
philosophy. 
Even  though  Murdoch  will  criticise  both  analytical  and  existentialist  philosophy  more  and 
more  in  the  same  argument,  I  consider  her  criticism  to  be  directed  against  the  former,  more  than 
the  latter.  Murdoch  encounters  existentialism  only  after  her  studies  in  Oxford,  and  when  later 
again  teaching  in  Oxford  she  is  one  of  very  few  philosophers  interested  in  it.  Existentialism  first 
excited  Murdoch  for  its  interest  in  literature,  in  moral  value  and  in  consciousness.  All  these  topics 
were  of  limited  importance  to  the  analytical  philosophy  she  encountered  in  Oxford.  However, 
already  in  her  book  on  Sartre  Murdoch  is  critical  of  existentialism  and  aware  of  possible 
difficulties.  The  most  prominent  of  those  she  notes  in  Sarln":  Romaalic  Rationalists  last  lines.  Sartre 
she  considers  unable  to  defend  the  preciousness  and  uniqueness  of  the  individual  other  than  'in 
terms  of  ideology  and  abstraction'.  Existentialism  shows  itself  unable  to  remedy  analytical 
82 philosophy  and  in  Murdoch's  vocabulary  the  term  becomes  synonymous  for  what  she  considers 
contemporary  philosophy  to  be  failing  in. 
In  the  essay  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  which  features  the  imagery  of  Al  and  D  Murdoch  is 
mainly  concerned  with  analytical  philosophy.  In  my  reading  of  this  text  and  in  particular  of  the 
image  of  MMT  and  DI  have  argued  how  this  form  of  philosophy  and  in  particular  the  genetic 
argument  hindered  Murdoch  in  introducing  a  notion  of  inner  life.  In  my  reading  of  n1  and  D  the 
influence  of  Le  Docuff  shows  again.  This  reading  in  particular  reveals  the  peculiarity  which  may 
accompany  defying  conventional  philosophical  reading  habits,  or  directions  for  reading  given  by 
the  author.  Focusing  on  the  absence  of  D  in  imagery  which  is  concerned  with  AI's  inner  life  may 
appear  as  a  deliberate  attempt  at  misunderstanding.  It  also  shows  the  radical  nature  of  Lc 
Doeuff's  approach  to  philosophy.  My  reading  emphasises  a  difficulty  Murdoch  faces  when 
introducing  an  understanding  of  the  inner  life  in  relation  to  an  external  reality.  Indeed,  I  have 
pointed  out  that  the  difficulties  result  from  attempting  to  do  so  by  means  of  a  deciding  argument. 
`The  Idea  of  Perfection'  differs  from  the  other  two  essays  in  The  SorerkTi  my  of  Good  in 
being  more  involved  with  arguments  from  the  analytical  tradition.  This  close  involvement  lessens 
in  later  writing,  coinciding  with  Murdoch's  retirement  from  St.  Anne's.  The  next  chapter 
considers  the  notion  of  imagination  as  a  successor  to  character  in  attempting  to  establish  an  inner 
life  in  relation  to  an  external  reality.  It  also  features  an  idiosyncratic  reading  of  Kant  and  Plato. 
83 Cl  IAPTER  FOUR 
IMAGINATION:  AIETAPHI  SICSASA  GUIDE  TO  MORALS 
1.  Introduction 
The  previous  chapter  analysed  the  importance  of  literature  and  in  particular  the  notion  of 
character  for  Murdoch's  early  philosophical  writing.  It  argued  that  her  conception  of  character  in 
nineteenth-century  novels  reveals  for  her  the  failings  of  contemporary  philosophy  and  literature. 
Philosophy  employed  too  flimsy  a  notion  of  personality  and  it  had  no  conception  of  independent 
reality.  However,  the  discussion  of  `The  Idea  of  Perfection'  evinces  the  difficulties  Murdoch  had 
when  introducing  the  ideas  of  inner  life  and  transcendent  reality  into  the  contemporary 
philosophical  debate.  She  expressed  exasperation  when  attempting  to  defeat  the  genetic 
argument,  and  in  her  defence  of  M's  inner  life  she  removed  surrounding  reality,  including  D  as 
the  object  of  attention. 
The  present  chapter  considers  the  notions  of  imagination  and  fantasy,  as  in  a  way  the 
successors  of  Murdoch's  understanding  of  character.  Imagination  is  not  a  notion  foreign  to  the 
history  of  philosophy,  and  in  Murdoch's  conception  it  continues  concerns  expressed  in  her 
understanding  of  literature  and  in  particular  of  character.  Murdoch  becomes  interested  in 
imagination  and  fantasy  when  writing  on  Kant's  aesthetics  from  1959  onwards.  In  these  notions 
she  expresses  similar  concerns  for  the  moral  importance  of  the  inner  life  in  relation  to  a  reality 
independent  of  it,  which  are  central  to  her  understanding  of  character. 
Of  the  different  texts  considering  imagination  I  regard  the  longer  depiction  of  the  notion 
in  Murdoch's  last  and  largest  work  of  philosophy,  111e/aplysics  as  a  Gaide  to  Morals,  as  the  most 
important  one.  My  discussion  concentrates  on  this  text,  but  I  shall  also  consider  the  various, 
often  short,  earlier  appearances  of  imagination  in  her  philosophical  writing.  riurdoch's  first  more 
extensive  reflections  on  imagination  are  found  in  articles  on  Kant  and  art,  dating  back  to  the  late 
fifties  and  early  sixties.  '  These  articles  include  'The  Sublime  and  the  Good'  (1959),  'The  Sublime 
and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'  (1959),  and  'Against  Dryness'  (1961).  In  these  articles  one  first  finds 
the  distinction  Murdoch  makes  between  imagination  and  fantasy.  This  distinction  is  present  in  a 
more  established  mode  in  "The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  (1967),  `Philosophy 
and  Literature:  An  Interview  with  Bryan  Magcc'  (1977),  `Art  is  the  Imitation  of  Nature'  (1978) 
I  She  merely  mentions  imagination  in  Sarin:  Romantic  Rationalist  and  in'Knowing  the  Void',  a  review  of  Simone 
Weil's  Notebooks.  (Murdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Rationalist,  p.  96,  Murdoch,  'Knowing  the  Void',  p.  158,159)  Imagination 
in  both  texts  is  understood  to  be  strictly  separated  from  reality.  And  in  this  respect  both  Sartre's  and  Weil's  notion 
of  imagination  is  very  different  from  the  one  Murdoch  develops.  She  does  not  pursue  these  notions  of  imagination. 
84 and  finally  in  one  of  the  Gifford  lectures,  published  first  as  `Ethics  and  the  Imagination'  (1987) 
and  finally  as  the  eleventh  chapter  in  Afelaplrysics  as  a  Guide  to  Aforals  (1992).  2 
In  between  these  two  groups  of  articles  which  I  have  set  out  there  is  another,  which  fits 
neither  group.  This  is  a  review  of  Hampshire's  Frredom  of  the  Indinidaa/  `The  Darkness  of  Practical 
Reasoning'  (1966).  In  this  article  also  one  finds  the  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy. 
Yet,  it  is  presented  in  a  different  way.  `The  Darkness  of  Practical  Reasoning'  is  perhaps  the  last 
article  in  which  Murdoch  closely  engages  with  a  philosophical  text  from  the  analytical  tradition. 
Murdoch  objects  here  to  Hampshire's  relegation  of  imagination  `to  the  passive  side  of  the  mind. 
... 
Hampshire  certainly  regards  imagination  as  a  side  issue.  '  In  contrast  to  this  disinterest  Murdoch 
introduces  imagining  as  `something  which  we  all  do  a  great  deal  of  the  time'  and  which  she 
describes  as  `a  type  of  reflection  on  people,  events,  etc.,  which  builds  detail,  adds  colour,  conjures 
up  possibilities  in  ways  which  go  beyond  what  could  be  said  to  be  factual.  '3  Unlike  Hampshire 
and  much  of  the  analytical  tradition  Murdoch  prefers  art  to  science,  as  a  model  for  philosophy, 
and  imagination  to  reason  .4 
These  preferences  considerably  change  the  outlook  of  philosophy, 
introducing  the  possibility  that  not  everything  philosophy  considers  can  be  presented  with 
absolute  clarity.  5 
In  my  attempt  to  distil  an  understanding  of  imagination  from  the  texts  mentioned  I  found 
myself  confronted  with  several  difficulties.  These  texts  are  written  over  a  period  of  more  than 
thirty  years  and  they  are  concerned  with  different  topics.  With  the  possible  exceptions  of  the 
texts  based  on  the  1982  Gifford  lectures,  Murdoch  is  not  interested  in  imagination  pence.  The 
notion  of  imagination  and  its  counterpart  fantasy  appear  in  texts  concerned  with  art,  art  criticism 
and  art  theory,  as  well  as  moral  philosophy. 
In  order  to  apprehend  this  variety  of  topics  and  texts  I  concentrate  on  the  text  from 
Afelaplysicr  as  a  Guide  to  Morals.  From  the  discussion  of  imagination  in  this  text  I  refer  back  to 
earlier  texts.  Indeed,  I  have  found  that  these  earlier  texts  arc  indispensable  for  understanding 
Afetaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals.  Throughout  the  chapter  there  are  implied  references  to  ideas 
discussed  more  extensively  before.  This  I  have  found  to  be  characteristic  of  Murdoch's 
philosophical  thinking.  Murdoch  habitually  appropriates  ideas  in  telling  imagery,  short  phrases  or 
2  See  Fisten/ia/istsandAlyriics,  'T1he  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  216,  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other 
Concepts',  p.  374,  'Philosophy  and  Literature',  p.  11,14,17,18,28,  'Art  is  the  Imitation  of  Nature',  p.  255-256. 
`Against  Dryness',  p.  292,  `Ethics  and  the  Imagination',  in  Irish  Theological  uarferb,  52.1-2  (1986),  p.  81-95. 
3  Murdoch,  The  Darkness  of  Practical  Reasoning',  p.  198. 
4  In  "The  Idea  of  Perfection'  she  expresses  this  difference  in  rather  puzzling  words:  'WVe  are  men  and  we are  moral 
agents  before  we are  scientists,  and  the  place  of  science  in  human  life  must  be  discussed  in  ii  rds.  This  is  why  it  is 
and  always  will  be  more  important  to  know  about  Shakespeare  than  to  know  about  any  scientist:  and  if  there  is  a 
'Shakespeare  of  science'  his  name  is  Aristotle.  '  (Murdoch,  The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  320-7) 
1  See  Murdoch,  'The  Darkness  of  Practical  Reasoning',  p.  199-200  in  particular. 
85 even  in  a  single  term.  From  these  texts  I  compose  the  different  aspects  of  the  animal  im«grnationale, 
as  Murdoch  considers  human  beings  to  be  `fantasising  imaginative  animals'. 
This  chapter  consists  of  three  parts.  In  the  first  I  discuss  the  distinction  between 
imagination  and  fantasy.  I  regard  this  distinction  central  to  Murdoch's  thought  and  to  the 
chapter's  argument,  because  of  its  consistent  presence  from  rather  early  essays  onwards.  From 
this  discussion  I  proceed  to  examining  Murdoch's  apprehension  of  the  two  philosophers  from 
whom  in  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  she  retrieves  the  different  aspects  of  imagination  and 
fantasy,  Kant  and  Plato. 
2.  Imagination  and  fantasy 
In  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Moral?  chapter  eleven  the  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy 
is  found  at  about  a  third  into  this  chapter  and  marks  a  shift.  The  subsequent  part  of  the  chapter 
consists  of  a  variety  of  different  topics,  for  which  it  is  difficult  to  find  a  structure.  The  discussion 
of  Kant  and  Plato,  in  the  first  part,  is  directed  towards  the  distinction  between  imagination  and 
fantasy. 
To  mark  distances  we  need  for  purposes  of  discussion,  two  words  for  two 
concepts:  a  distinction  between  egoistic  fanlary  and  liberated  truth-seeking  creative 
imagination.  Can  there  not  be  high  evil  fantasising  forms  of  creative  imaginative 
activity?  A  search  for  candidates  will,  I  think,  tend  to  reinforce  at  least  the 
usefulness  of  a  distinction  between  `fantasy'  as  mechanical,  egoistic,  untruthful, 
and  `imagination'  as  truthful  and  free. 
... 
I  want  to  see  the  contrast  ... 
in  terms  of 
two  active  faculties,  one  somewhat  mechanically  generating  narrowly  banal  false 
pictures  (the  ego  as  all-powerful),  and  the  other  freely  and  creatively  exploring  the 
world,  moving  towards  the  expression  and  elucidation  (and  in  art  celebration)  of 
what  is  true  and  deep 
.6 
The  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy  is  introduced  by  remarking  that  it  is  made  `for 
purposes  of  discussion'.  Murdoch  expresses  the  need  for  `two  words  for  two  concepts',  fantasy 
and  imagination,  and  instantly  wonders  whether  this  is  a  proper  distinction.  T ier  doubt  cautions 
against  considering  it  an  absolute  distinction.  Similarly,  in  the  interview  with  Magee  she  suggests 
that  `creative  imagination  and  obsessive  fantasy  may  be  very  close  almost  indistinguishable  forces 
6  Murdoch,  Afelaßlysics  as  a  Guide  to  Rforalr,  p.  321. 
86 in  the  mind  of  the  writer.  '?  The  distinction  is  thus  useful  for  the  discussion,  but  not  easily 
recognised  in  a  writer's  mind  or  in  any  particular  text,  by  Murdoch  or  anyone  clse.  In  this  respect 
it  is  significant  that  Spear  in  her  introduction  suggests  that  `[t]he  theme  of  fantasy  versus 
imagination  is  a  recurrent  one  in  her  non-fiction  and  is  a  significant  index  to  an  understanding  of 
her  fiction',  yet  she  does  not  return  to  this  remark  when  discussing  the  different  novcls.  8 
The  use  of  the  terms  like  `for  purposes  of  discussion'  in  the  quotation  above  exhibits  an 
important  characteristic  of  Murdoch's  philosophy,  closely  allied  to  the  distinction  between 
imagination  and  fantasy.  When  developing  these  notions  Murdoch  increasingly  recognises  how 
the  omnipresence  of  imagination  and  fantasy  inhibits  the  possibility  of  unmediated  perception  or 
knowledge.  Perception  and  imagination,  or  fantasy,  are  intertwined  in  a  way  which  makes  it 
impossible  to  distinguish  them.  Imagination  and  fantasy  determine  the  perception  to  a  certain 
extent,  and  are  determined  by  the  perception.  This  aspect  is  noted  by  Antonaccio,  and  reflected 
in  the  title  of  her  work,  Picturing  the  Human.  Antonaccio  takes  this  title  from  Murdoch's  own 
characterisation  of  philosophy  as  involving  `the  making  of  models  and  pictures  of  what  different 
kinds  of  men  are  like....  Man  is  creature  who  makes  pictures  of  himself  and  then  comes  to 
resemble  the  picture.  This  is  the  process  which  moral  philosophy  must  attempt  to  describe  and 
analyse.  '9  In  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  Murdoch  reaffirms  that  moral 
philosophy  should  be  on  the  one  hand  `realistic',  but  that  on  the  other  `since  [it]  cannot  but 
command  an  ideal,  it  should  commend  a  worthy  ideal.  '10  This  characteristic  mixture  of  real  and 
ideal  also  characterises  Murdoch's  understanding  of  imagination  and  fantasy,  and  the  notion  of 
reality  with  which  the  two  are  distinguished. 
In  the  quotation  from  Aletaplyrics  as  a  Guide  to  Alorals  fantasy  and  imagination  arc 
distinguished  from  one  another  by  terms  like  `egoistic'  on  the  one  side  and  `liberated  truth- 
seeking  creative'  on  the  other;  `mechanical,  egoistic,  untruthful'  are  opposed  to  `truthful  and  free'. 
The  quotation  concludes  by  contrasting  two  active  faculties:  'one  somewhat  mechanically 
generating  narrowly  banal  false  pictures  (the  ego  as  all-powerful),  and  the  other  freely  and 
creatively  exploring  the  world,  moving  towards  the  expression  and  elucidation  (and  in  art 
celebration)  of  what  is  true  and  deep.  ' 
The  distinction  between  fantasy  and  imagination  is  given  in  moral  terms.  Bad  fantasy  is 
opposed  to  good  imagination.  Where  fantasy  is  said  to  be  directed  only  at  the  preservation  of  self, 
7  Magee,  `Philosophy  and  Literature',  p.  11.  Compare  too:  `imagination  (good  by  definition) 
... 
fantasy  (bad  by 
definition)'.  (Murdoch,  Afetaplyrics  as  a  Gxide  to  Morals,  p.  322) 
s  Spear,  It  sMardoch,  p.  9. 
9  Murdoch,  'Metaphysics  and  Ethics',  p.  74-  75.  Compare  Antonaccio,  Pictmring  the  11Nman,  p.  13.  Antonaccio  also 
analyses  how  Dippic's  disregard  of  this  position  (of  'reflexive  realist')  causes  her  to  observe  a  friction,  or  even 
contradiction  between  the  philosophical  writing  and  the  literature.  (Sec  Antonaccio,  Pkturhg  the  1  ian,  an,  p.  138-139) 
10  Murdoch,  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concerts',  p.  363-4. 
87 imagination  looks  at  the  world  and  is  cheerfully  described  as  `creative 
... 
liberated 
...  truth-seeking 
...  elucidation  ...  celebration'.  Fantasy  is  called  mechanical  whereas  imagination  is  connected  to 
creativity  and  exploration.  11 
Imagination  and  fantasy  are  moral  terms.  This  is  true  too  of  the  notion  of  reality  that  is 
used  to  distinguish  them.  Reality  for  Murdoch  is  not  merely  given.  This  understanding  of  reality 
in  the  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy  shows  how  Murdoch  upsets  a  set  of 
distinctions  commonly  applied  to  imagination.  Imagination  has  been  often  attached  to  art  in 
contrast  to  reality  and  facts.  A  list  of  opposing  notions  is  assumed:  fancy  is  opposed  to  fact, 
frivolous  to  serious,  art  to  systematic  thinking,  mcdiacy  to  immediacy,  leisure  to  learning,  messy 
to  clean,  beauty  to  function.  12 
The  reality  which  for  Murdoch  is  to  distinguish  imagination  from  fantasy,  is  outlined  in 
`On  `God'  and  `Good",  where  Murdoch  explicitly  considers  this  notion.  At  first,  her  answer  to 
the  question  `What  is  reality?  '  appears  to  be  simple.  Any  really  good  man  (using  his  imagination 
and  not  his  fantasy),  Murdoch  argues,  `may  be  infinitely  eccentric,  but  he  must  know  certain 
things  about  his  surroundings,  most  obviously  the  existence  of  other  people  and  their  claims.  '"3 
So,  the  good  man  must  be  aware  of  his  surroundings,  but  what  is  meant  by  the  vague  notion  of 
`certain  things'?  What  things?  Is  the  answer  to  this  question  too  obvious  or  too  obscure  that 
Murdoch  does  not  expand  it?  Murdoch  answers  these  questions  by  yet  another  image,  one  from 
art:  `Rilke  said  of  Cezanne  that  he  did  not  paint  `I  like  it',  he  painted  `There  it  is'.  '14 
I  think  that  it  is  both  obvious  and  obscure  what  is  meant  by  `certain  things'.  The  remark 
is  meant  to  appeal  to  an  ordinary  observation.  Murdoch  assumes  everyone  to  understand  what  is 
meant  by  `certain  things'.  No  one,  however,  knows  `certain  things'  fully.  There  is  no  such  thing  as 
immediate  or  absolute  understanding  for  Murdoch,  or  if  there  is  it  is  extremely  rare.  Here  one  is 
reminded  of  the  discussion  of  M  and  D  where  Murdoch  argues  that  `M  confronted  with  D  has  a 
endless  task.  '15 
One  of  the  rare  occasions  in  which  immediate  understanding  would  be  possible  is  when 
the  philosopher,  in  Plato's  famous  myth,  has  come  out  of  the  cave  and  is finally  able  to  look  at 
the  sun.  Significantly,  of  this  image  Murdoch  writes: 
II  The  term  mechanical  originates  in  Murdoch's  reading  of  Kant.  See  part  three  of  this  chapter. 
12  It  is  remarkable  how  much  writing  on  imagination,  and  as  a  defence  of  imagination,  remains  within  this 
dichotomy.  A  distinct  example  can  be  found  in  M.  C.  Nussbaum's  reading  of  Dickens'  Ilardl  Timer,  in  Poe  icJusti  e. 
(See  in  particular  the  second  chapter  of  M.  C.  Nussbaum,  Poetic  Jus/ke.  The  Illeray  Imgginxion  and  Public  IJ%  (Boston: 
Beacon  Press,  1995))  See  for  a  short  overview  of  how  imagination  came  to  be  associated  with  the  arts  in  particular 
E.  McMullin,  'Enlarging  Imagination',  p.  228-240. 
Murdoch,  `On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  347. 
ýa  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  348.  Compare  Antonaccio's  discussion  of  these  words'`I'here  it  is'. 
(Antonaccio,  Pic7uring  the  Human,  p.  138) 
'  Murdoch,  'The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  327. 
88 Plato  pictured  the  good  man  as  eventually  able  to  look  at  the  sun.  I  have  never 
been  sure  what  to  make  of  this  part  of  the  myth....  Perhaps  indeed  only  the  good 
man  knows  what  it  would  be  like  to  look  at  [the  sun];  or  perhaps  to  look  at  the 
sun  is  to  be  gloriously  dazzled  and  to  sec  nothing.  '6 
So,  reality  has  two  simultaneous  meanings.  Reality  in  Murdoch's  writing  is  both  what  one  ought 
to  most  obviously  know  and  what  only  can  know  with  great  difficulty,  if  at  all.  It  is  not  easily 
comprehensible  (if  at  all),  yet  the  good  man  `must  know  certain  MLinas  about  his  surroundings,  most 
obr'iously  the  existence  of  other  people  and  their  claims.  '  Given  the  unlikely  experience  of  looking 
at  the  sun,  reality  means  for  Murdoch  that  the  moment  one  thinks  one  sees  the  sun,  perception 
and  thinking  should  be  mistrusted.  The  notion  of  reality  reminds  that  whatever  it  is  that  we  talk 
or  think  about,  it  is  more  complex,  subtler  than  theories  and  words  can  convey.  Whatever  is  too 
neat,  too  clear  should  be  mistrusted.  At  the  same  time  reality  is  what  one  should  want  to  know. 
The  difficulty  in  understanding  should  not  keep  one  from  trying. 
Imagination  should  then  be  directed  at  reality,  but  reality  is  not  immediately  given.  The 
notion  is  explained  in  terms  of  one's  understanding  or  perception  of  it,  and  its  complexity  via  the 
difficulty  of  perceiving,  thinking  and  imagining  reality.  Yet,  reality  is  not  reduced  to  imagined 
reality.  It  is  while  imagining  or  trying  to  understand  that  one  finds  the  reality  which  is  not 
completely  imagined  or  understood.  Thus,  in  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts' 
Murdoch  writes: 
In  intellectual  disciplines  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  art  and  nature  we  discover  value 
in  our  ability  to  forget  self,  to  be  realistic,  to  perceive  justly.  We  use  our 
imagination  not  to  escape  the  world  but  to  join  it,  and  this  exhilarates  us  because 
of  the  distance  between  our  ordinary  dulled  consciousness  and  an  apprehension 
of  the  real.  17 
Realism  is  not  identical  with  thought,  but  a  characteristic  of  good  thinking. 
This  quotation  also  indicates  the  pervasiveness  of  fantasy  and  imagination.  The  use  of  the 
faculty  is  not  limited  to  the  arts,  but  found  in  `intellectual  disciplines  and  in  the  enjoyment  of  art 
and  nature'.  Of  these,  art  nevertheless  offers  for  Murdoch  the  most  prominent  examples  of 
imagination  and  fantasy.  She  explains  the  distinction  between  the  two  often  by  referring  to  art. 
16  Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  `Good",  p.  357. 
89 From  the  paintings  of  Cezanne,  Vclasqucz,  the  music  of  Bach  and  the  works  of  Shakcspcarc  the 
distinction  between  fantasy  and  imagination  is  best  understood  for  in  these  imagination  is  prescnt 
in  its  most  excellent  form.  18 
The  references  to  the  works  of  these  artists  are  general  and  rarely  explained  in  detaiL'9 
Rather  they  are  introduced  by  an  imperative:  consider. 
Consider  what  we  learn  from  contemplating  the  characters  of  Shakespeare  or 
Tolstoy  or  the  paintings  of  Velasquez  or  Titian.  What  is  learnt  here  is  something 
about  the  real  quality  of  human  nature,  when  it  is  envisaged,  in  the  artist's  just  and 
compassionate  vision,  with  a  clarity  which  does  not  belong  to  the  self-centred 
rush  of  ordinary  life.  '-0 
Murdoch  refrains  here  from  an  explanation  by  means  of  a  discussion  of  artistic  devices.  Her 
argument  suggests  a  shared  understanding  of  the  works  of  these  artists  21  Perhaps  too  she  fears 
that  any  explanation  may  prevent  her  readers  from  exploring  their  own  imagination  and  fantasy. 
The  importance  of  art  is  also  evident  from  Murdoch's  explanation  of  the  meaning  of 
fantasy  by  establishing  its  origin  in  literary  criticism.  In  an  interview  with  Magee  she  remarks: 
It  is  illuminating  in  the  case  of  any  reflecting  discipline  to  see  what  kind  of  critical 
vocabulary  is  directed  against  it.  Literature  may  be  criticised  in  a  purely  formal 
way.  But  more  often  it  is  criticised  for  being  in  some  sense  untruthful.  Words 
such  as  `sentimental',  `pretentious',  `self-indulgent',  `trivial'  and  so  on,  impute 
some  kind  of  falsehood,  some  failure  of  justice,  some  distortion  or  inadequacy  of 
understanding  or  expression.  The  word  `fantasy'  in  a  bad  sense  covers  many  of 
these  typical  literary  faults.  It  may  be  useful  to  contrast  `fantasy'  as  bad  with 
`imagination'  as  good.  " 
17  Murdoch,  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  374. 
18  Murdoch  mentions  the  great  but  not  the  minor  artists  by  name.  On  the  latter  one  finds  some  remarks  only  in  the 
interview  with  Magee,  where  she  remarks:  'In  bad  art  fantasy  simply  take  charge,  as  in  the  familiar  case  of  the 
romance  or  thriller  where  the  hero  (alias  the  author)  is  brave,  generous,  indomitable,  lovable  (he  has  his  faults  of 
course)  and  ends  the  story  loaded  with  the  gifts  of  fortune.  '  (Magee,  'Philosophy  and  Literature',  p.  11) 
19  Of  course,  there  are  exceptions.  See  in  particular  the  discussion  of  Ivng  Lear  in  the  fifth  chapter  of  AleIap/'  pia  at  a 
Guide  to  Morals. 
20  Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  353,  compare  p.  348. 
21  Of  different  examples  confirming  this  understanding  of  literature  the  following  most  strongly  su&;  ests  the 
immediacy  and  collectivity  assumed  in  reading  literature.  In  A1e/ap/?  ysics  as  a  Guide  to  A1oral'  first  chapter  on 
consciousness  Murdoch  quotes  the  pagoda  passage  from  James'  Gohlen  Bonland  concludes:  'I  low  it  is  done?  Well, 
like  that  and  in  innumerable  other  ways.  Do  we  understand?  Yes,  of  course,  we  follow,  in  context,  these  descriptions 
of  states  of  consciousness  with  no  difficulty.  '  (Murdoch,  Aletap/?  ysier  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  171) 
22  Afagec,  'Literature  and  Philosophy',  p.  11. 
90 Murdoch  then  explains  imagination  by  these  frequent  references  to  art  -  and  in  particular  what 
she  calls  `great  art'.  These  are  central  to  her  understanding  of  imagination. 
This  last  quotation  also  demontsratcs  how  Murdoch  habitually  presents  her  ideas  as 
sensible  and  nothing  extraordinary.  `Literature  may  be  criticised  in  a  purely  formal  way.  But  more 
often  it  is  criticised  for  being  in  some  sense  untruthful.  '  To  discuss  art  in  terms  of  true  and  false 
is,  Murdoch  suggests,  a  very  common  thing  to  do.  Similarly,  the  difficulty  of  really  using  one's 
imagination  is  not  a  purely  artistic  one.  Imagination  is  not  given  exclusively  to  the  artistically 
gifted.  The  difficulty  is  moral.  2.3  Imagination  is  difficult  because  of  the  human  generally  dulled 
consciousness.  Imagination  is  not  limited  to  great  art,  but  also  present  in  the  art  of  storytelling 
which  is  something  Murdoch  argues  we  do  all  the  time.  24 
Murdoch  then  presents  her  understanding  of  imagination  and  fantasy  as  nothing 
extraordinary,  but  rather  something  all  virtuous  peasants,  saints  and  mothers  of  large  families 
have  known  all  along.  They  intuitively  know  the  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy, 
while  others  may  learn  it  from  contemplating  Tolstoy  or  Shakespeare  or  from  learning  a  language 
or  a  craft.  The  contemplation  of  art,  which  gives  rise  to  the  distinction  between  imagination  and 
fantasy,  Murdoch  considers  her  readers  able  to  recognise.  It  is,  however,  not  an  easy  distinction 
to  appropriate.  It  is  not  easy  to  use  imagination  rather  than  fantasy.  This  combination  of  at  once 
being  obvious  and  difficult  is  evinced  too  by  the  notion  of  reality  which  distinguishes  good 
imagination  from  bad  fantasy.  This  notion  implies  a  permanent  conflict  between  the  two,  where 
fantasy  stops  at  egoistic  imagery  and  imagination  constantly  moves  on.  They  thus  present  an 
understanding  of  moral  philosophy  as  a  constant  process  of  change. 
Murdoch  sometimes  suggests  that  the  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy  is  not 
connected  to  any  contemplation  of  other  philosophers.  For  example  in  a  discussion  of  Kant's 
Critique  ofJudgment  the  distinction  is  thus  introduced:  `Let  me  now  briefly  and  dogmatically  state 
what  I  take  to  be,  in  opposition  to  Kant's  view,  the  true  view  of  the  matter.  '25  However,  in 
Metapjiysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  in  particular  it  arises  from  reflection  upon  similar  distinctions  by 
other  thinkers.  Here,  she  describes  her  indebtedness  to  two  thinkers,  Kant  and  Plato.  'I13c 
following  discussion  presents  them  in  the  order  from  Afetaßiysicr  as  a  Guide  /o  A[orals. 
23  Compare  `One  might  say  here  that  art  is  an  excellent  analogy  of  morals,  or  indeed  that  it  is  in  this  respect  a  case  of 
morals.  '  (`On  `God'  and'Good",  p.  348) 
24  See  for  example  Magee,  `Literature  and  Philosophy',  p.  11-12. 
25  Murdoch,  'The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  215. 
91 3.  Kant.  Imagination  in  the  Small  Corner  ofArt 
Murdoch  often  returns  to  Kant  as  a  thinker  who,  as  she  once  put  it  `was  marvellously  near  the 
mark'  or  who  `followed  a  sound  instinct  but,  in  my  view,  looked  in  the  wrong  place.  '  In  Kant's 
philosophy  on  the  one  hand  Murdoch  locates  the  presence  of  many  aspects  of  contemporary 
thought  which  she  disputes.  Numerous  examples  may  be  given  here  and  her  imagery  is  not 
always  gentle:  'Kant's  man  had  already  received  a  glorious  incarnation  nearly  a  century  earlier  in 
the  work  of  Milton:  his  proper  name  is  Lucifer.  "-7 
On  the  other  hand  Murdoch  considers  Kant  only  partly  to  blame  for  the  ideas  which  have 
ensued  from  his  work.  She  also  returns  to  it  to  pursue  his  sound  instincts,  in  a  way  different  from 
how  they  have  been  pursued.  This  dual  attitude  towards  Kant's  philosophy  (as  well  as  the  slightly 
condescending  remarks)  one  encounters  too  in  the  chapter  on  imagination. 
At  the  end  of  the  few  pages  devoted  to  Kant  in  this  chapter  of  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to 
Morals  Murdoch  writes: 
How  flexible  can  a  deep  concept  be?  is  a  founding  question  of  philosophy.  Kant, 
in  his  precision,  is  careful  not  to  demand  too  much  of  the  concept  of  imagination. 
He  distinguishes  the  empirical  imagination,  which  spontaneously  yet 
`mechanically'  prepares  a  sensuous  manifold  for  subjection  to  the  synthetic  apriori 
and  empirical  concepts  of  the  understanding,  but  which  is  not  independently 
creative  or  aesthetically  sensible,  from  the  aesthetic  imagination  which  is 
spontaneous  and  free  and  able  to  create  a  `second  nature'.  But  are  `fine  art'  and 
`genius'  as  described  by  Kant  really  such  a  small  corner  of  human  faculty  and 
experience?  The  concept  of  genius  itself  emerges  from  an  appreciation  of  the 
deep  and  omnipresent  operation  of  imagination  in  human  life.  28 
How  flexible  can  the  concept  of  imagination  be?  Perhaps,  Murdoch  suggests,  more  flexible  than 
she  believes  Kant  to  allow  for.  The  flexibility  of  deep  concepts  is  contrasted  to  the  mechanical 
working  of  the  empirical  imagination?  `  It  is  also  understood  in  contrast  to  the  small  corner  to 
which  Kant  directs  the  aesthetic  imagination.  It  must  be  Murdoch  then,  and  not  Kant,  who 
26  See  respectively  Murdoch,  'The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  216,  and  Murdoch,  The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over 
Other  Concepts',  p.  368. 
27  Murdoch,  The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  366. 
2e  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  316. 
M  The  quotation  marks  around  that  word  may  also  refer  to  it  being  used  in  connection  to  fantasy,  later  on.  See 
Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  320. 
92 concludes  that  the  `concept  of  genius  itself  emerges  from  an  appreciation  of  the  deep  and 
omnipresent  operation  of  imagination  in  human  life.  ' 
.  Murdoch  observes  a  friction  between  Kant's  `precision'  and  imagination's  possibilities.  In 
aspiration  for  his  precision  she  understands  Kant  to  place  upon  imagination  different  restrictions. 
These  she  discerns  in  his  strict  distinction  between  the  empirical  imagination  and  the  aesthetic 
imagination.  To  the  empirical  imagination  Kant  assigns  a  confined  role  in  understanding.  Only  to 
aesthetic  imagination  does  he  allow  independent  creativity  and  aesthetic  sensibility.  These 
limitations  Murdoch  contends  in  the  first  few  pages  of  the  chapter. 
Murdoch  begins  her  discussion  of  Kant  with  the  empirical  imagination  as  the  faculty 
which  `spontaneously  yet  `mechanically'  prepares  a  sensuous  manifold  for  subjection  to  the 
synthetic  apriori  and  empirical  concepts  of  the  understanding'.  It  is,  as  Murdoch  points  out,  `a 
mediator  between  sense  perception  and  concepts,  something  between  sense  and  thought.  '  30 
Murdoch  does  not  pay  much  attention  to  the  different  tasks  assigned  to  the  empirical 
imagination,  or  its  distinction  from  the  transcendental  imagination.  She  does  not  mention  the 
epistemological  problems  Kant's  notion  of  imagination  is  commonly  understood  to  solve.  In 
order  to  discern  the  possible  significance  of  this  omission  I  consider  it  necessary  to  provide  a 
limited  account  of  the  epistemological  issue  omitted. 
In  the  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  the  empirical  imagination  is  given  two  tasks.  First,  it  enables 
one  to  recognise  a  certain  object  as  such.  For  example,  it  enables  one  to  recognise  a  particular 
rhododendron  bush  as  a  rhododendron  bush.  The  empirical  imagination's  second  purpose  is  to 
recognise  an  individual  through  time.  For  example,  the  ability  to  recognise  a  rhododendron  bush 
in  the  drive  as  the  one  that  was  there  yesterday  and  the  day  before  is  attributed  to  the  empirical 
imagination.  31 
The  empirical  imagination  Murdoch  distinguishes  from  the  transcendental  imagination. 
As  introduction  to  this  distinction  it  is  useful  to  briefly  consider  of  the  notion  of  transcendental 
as  used  by  Kant.  Transcendental  for  Kant  above  all  designates  the  necessary  or  apriori  part  of 
experience  or  knowledge.  In  The  Critique  of  Pure  Reason  Kant  is  most  of  all  concerned  with  the  a 
30  Murdoch,  Metaßhysict  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  316  and  308  respectively.  Warnock  and  McMullen  point  out  that 
imagination  had  this  function  also  for  earlier  thinkers  (Descartes,  Locke,  Berkeley,  Hume).  Yet,  they  note  too  that 
Kant  gives  a  larger  role  to  this  notion  of  imagination  than  his  predecessors.  McMullen  refers  to  Kant,  Critique  of  Pure 
Reason  A78/B  103  (See  AL  Warnock,  Imagination  (London:  Faber  and  Faber,  1976),  p.  13-15,33  and  McMullen, 
`Enlarging  Imagination',  p.  238)  See  also  P.  Strawson,  `Imagination  and  Perception'  (Freedom  and  Resentment  and  Other 
Elsayr.  London:  Methuen  and  Company,  1974). 
31  I  am  using  Warnock's  example  here:  'When  a  man  sees  his  own  bush,  he  applies  to  it  the  concept  of  `my 
rhododendron  bush',  and  when  he  sees  a  new  bush,  he  applies  to  it  the  concept  `rhododendron  bush';  but  he  could 
not  apply  either  of  these  concepts  unless  he  had  in  his  mind  the  image  of  other  rhododendron  bushes  or  of  his  own 
bush  on  another  day,  both  of  them,  of  objects  not  immediately  before  him  when  he  applies  the  concept.  '  (Warnock, 
Imagination,  p.  29-30) 
93 priori  rather  than  the  a  posteriori  part  of  human  understanding.  32  He  is  thus  more  concerned  with 
what  makes  experience  and  knowledge  possible,  than  with  the  particular  knowledge  or 
experience.  33 
Murdoch  mentions  this  distinction  between  the  empirical  and  transcendental  imagination 
at  the  beginning  of  her  chapter  as  follows.  The  transcendental  imagination,  she  writes, 
`spontaneously  joins  or  fuses  space  and  time  (forms  of  intuition,  perception)  and  the  categories 
(conceptual  forms  of  the  greatest  generalities)  so  as  to  make  an  empty  pattern  or  schematic  form 
of  `an  empirical  object  in  general'.  '  This  transcendental  imagination  is  distinguished  from  the 
empirical  imagination  which  `at  a  less  fundamental  level,  provides  (in  ways  which  may  be 
available  to  conscious  awareness)  sensuously  bodied  schemata  of  classes  of  empirical  objects. 
Imagination  is  a  spontaneous  intuitive  capacity  to  put  together  what  is  presented  to  us  so  as  to 
form  a  coherent  spatio-temporal  experience  which  is intellectually  ordered  and  sensuously  based.  ' 
Murdoch  concludes  that  Kant  gives  imagination  a  large  role  in  comprehending  any  object  3a 
This  distinction  between  transcendental  imagination  and  empirical  imagination,  as  well  as 
the  subsequent  paragraph  on  Hume,  are  later  additions  to  this  chapter.  The  essay  `Ethics  and 
Imagination',  published  five  years  earlier  and  also  based  on  the  1982  Gifford  Lectures  is  for  a 
considerable  part  identical  to  the  chapter  in  Metaphyrics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  yet  it  omits  part  of  the 
text.  35  The  addition  has,  however,  not  resulted  in  major  changes  in  the  remainder  of  the  text,  in 
its  arguments  or  conclusions.  This  is  true  too  of  the  addition  on  Coleridge,  later  in  the  chapter. 
The  present  addition  shows  the  idiosyncratic  way  in  which  Murdoch  reads  Kant.  Her  discussion 
of  the  empirical  and  the  transcendental  imagination  is  brief,  and,  unlike  for  example  Warnock  or 
Strawson,  she  pays  limited  attention  to  the  epistemological  problems  these  understandings  of 
imagination  are  to  solve  for  Kant.  Likewise,  in  her  discussion  of  the  aesthetic  imagination 
Murdoch  does  not  consider  the  relationship  between  the  Critique  of  Judgment  and  the  first  and 
32  See  A.  Vennix,  117aarheid  en  Kennil  (Nijmegen:  Syllabus  1991)  for  a  thorough  and  illuminating  introduction  into  the 
central  problems  of  Kant's  Critique  of  Pure Pun  Reason.  Vennix  writes:  `Dit  onderzock,  dat  zich  zal  bezighouden  met  de 
ontdekking  en  de  systematische  ordening  van  de  mogelijkheidsvoorwaarden  van  synthetische  kennis  a  priori,  moet 
zich  natuurlijk  riet  richten  op  het  aposteriorische  (empirische)  aandeel  in  de  menselijke  kennis,  maar  op  een 
verondersteld  apriorisch  (zuiver)  aandeel  daarin.  '  [This  research,  which  will  be  engaged  with  the  disclosure  and 
systematic  arrangement  of  the  conditions  for  the  possibility  of  synthetic  knowledge  a  priori,  must  not  be  directed  to 
the  aposteriori  (empirical)  part  in  human  understanding,  but  to  a  supposed  apriori  (pure)  part.  ]  Vennix  argues  that 
Kant  `van  meet  of  aan  zowel  de  eenzijdigheid  van  het  rationalisme,  als  die  van  het  empirisme  tracht  to  doorbreken.  ' 
[from  the  beginning  onwards  attempts  to  avoid  the  partiality  of  both  rationalism  and  empiricism.  ]  (Vennix,  W'aarheid 
en  Kennir,  p.  99).  See  also  Warnock,  Imagination,  p.  30  and  p.  31 
33  See  Strawson,  `Imagination  and  Perception',  p.  42,  and  R.  Kearney,  The  11'ake  of  Imagination,  p.  168-169  and  also 
p.  427n.  29  for  a  short  discussion  of  Kant's  understanding  of  transcendental. 
3''  Murdoch,  Metapbricr  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  308.  Compare  here  Warnock,  Imagination,  p.  27  for  this  distinction. 
35  The  part  added  runs  from  `Kant  here  connects  imagination  essentially  with  the  conception  of  an  object'  on  page 
308  to  page  309  `Kant  saw  that  space-and-time  was  `a  special  case',  to  be  seen  as  a  `form  of  intuition';  so  was 
morality,  to  be  seen  as  a  unique  operation  of  reason.  ' 
94 second  critique.  Her  reading  of  Kant's  understanding  of  imagination  is  characterised  by  the  title 
of  the  entire  book,  Metaphysicr  as  a  Guide  to  Morale  She  regards  the  `metaphysical'  concept  of 
imagination  in  regard  to  the  `day-to-day  and  moment-to-moment  pilgrimage'.  37  Moreover,  the 
distinction  between  empirical  and  transcendental  imagination  has  been  generally  noted  to  be 
difficult  to  make,  as  Murdoch  notes  too.  38 
Murdoch  adopts  the  central  place  Kant  attributes  to  empirical  and  transcendental 
imagination  in  understanding,  but  she  also  adds  significant  changes.  Her  reading  of  Kant,  while 
disregarding  some  of  the  commonly  discussed  arguments,  instead  introduces  its  own  imagery.  On 
close  reading  one  finds  that  Murdoch's  concern  with  imagination  is  expressed  in  the  returning 
image  of  `barrier'.  The  transcendental  imagination  she  describes  `as  a  power  of  spontaneous 
synthesis  operating  at  the  transcendental  barrier  of  consciousness.  '  Then  she  wonders: 
Exactly  how  this  transcendental  function  of  imagination  makes  the  phenomenal 
world  available  has  been  much  discussed  and  disputed,  and  Kant  himself  appears 
to  give  different  accounts.  Is  it  misleading  simply  to  read  the  conscious  activity 
back  into  the  unconscious  (transcendental)  activity?  Can  we  intelligibly  speak  of  a 
primal  conception  of  an  object?  Is  the  schema  to  be  thought  of  as  a  sort  of  image 
or  a  sort  of  method  of  assembly?  39 
Murdoch  hesitates  to  accept  a  notion  of  imagination  that  is  barred  behind  a  transcendental  or 
unconscious  barrier.  In  the  quotation  above  the  direction  of  her  own  thoughts  are  already 
revealed  in  the  use  of  an  often  employed  term,  `simply':  `Is  it  misleading  simply  to  read  the 
conscious  activity  back  into  the  unconscious  (transcendental)  activity?  ' 
36  The  second  part  actually  runs  from  the  last  part  of  the  discussion  of  Kant,  from  p.  315  the  sentence  starting  with 
Want  himself  does  not...  '  to  Virgil's  advice  on  p.  317. 
37  Murdoch,  Metaphjsics  at  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  146:  `How  do  the  generalisations  of  philosophers  connect  with  what  I 
am  doing  in  my  day-to-day  and  moment-to-moment  pilgrimage,  how  can  metaphysics  be  a  guide  to  morals?  ' 
Compare  Warnock,  Imagination,  28ff  42ff.  Murdoch  here  diverts  from  various  historical  treatments  of  imagination, 
as  for  example  Strawson's  article,  to,  which  Warnock  admits  to  be  indebted  (she  writes  that  Strawson's  `Imagination 
and  Perception"made  seem  that  my  project  thread-tracing  might  possibly  be  philosophically  respectable,  even  if  I 
have  failed  to  make  it  so  in  the  end'),  as  well  as  Keamey's  narration  of  imagination  in  his  The  It'ake  of  Imagination,  or 
McMullen's  plea  for  the  presence  of  imagination  in  science.  R.  Kearney,  The  IW'ake  of  Imagination:  Toward  a  Postmoden 
Culture  (London:  Routledge,  2001  (1988)),  McMullen,  Enlarging  Imagination'.  Compare  too  E.  T.  H.  Brann.  The 
[Porld  of  the  Imagination:  Sum  and  Substance  (Boston:  Rowman  &  Littlefield  Publishers,  Inc.,  1991),  part  one  in 
particular. 
38  Murdoch,  Metaphysic.  c  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  308-9.  Compare  here  too  Warnock:  `Kant  held  that  to  determine  these 
general  forms  is  the  task  of  transcendental  philosophy,  while  to  determine  what  reminds  me  of  a  palm  tree  is  the 
task  of  psychology.  It  is  not  entirely  obvious  that  this  is  a  proper  distinction.  but  we  can  at  least  distinguish  between 
particular  psychological  truths  about  individual  people,  which  are  part  of  the  history  of  those  people,  and  general 
psychological  truths  about  people  at  large.  What  Kant  is  offering  us  is  ageneralpychologrcal  truth  about  the  function  of 
imagination,  but  a  truth  which  he  claims  is  not  only  universally  applicable,  but  can  be  shown  to  be  necessarily  true.  ' 
(Warnock,  Imagination,  p.  31) 
95 Murdoch  introduces  an  understanding  of  the  empirical  imagination  whose  spontaneous 
operation  in  understanding  does  not  remain  entirely  unaffected  by  any  conscious  operation  of  the 
imagination.  She  attempts  to  understand  imagination's  `unconscious  or  transcendental 
`spontaneity'...  figuratively  upon  analogy.  We  can  attempt  to  give  sense  to  the  idea,  as  we  extend 
and  modify  the  conception  of  a  barrier  or  network  (or  set  of  `schemata),  in  terms  of  empirical 
concepts,  and  (now  also)  of  language  as  a,  to  some  extent  consciously  manipulable,  experiential 
threshold.  '40  So,  Murdoch  attempts  to  lower  the  barrier  until  it  is  no  more  than  a  threshold.  This 
imagery  reveals  a  distinctive  position.  The  impersonal  method  of  assembly  is  not  entirely  closed 
off  for  the  individual,  yet  neither  is it  entirely  in  his  or  her  control.  41 
Access  is  found  via  the  more  conscious  imagination.  `Imagination  provides  essential 
fusion,  also  gratuitous  creation.  At  one  end  of  the  scale  is  the  unconscious  activity  necessary  to 
experience  a  world,  at  the  other  the  free  inventive  power  of  exceptional  minds.  '42  How  this  active 
imagination  relates  to  the  unconscious  one,  is  not  accounted  for.  Murdoch  explains  this  lack  in 
telling  imagery. 
Imagination  is  a  mixed  matter,  in  its  basic  transcendental  use  it  `knows'  both  mind 
and  sense.  It  is  an  intelligent  sensibility,  it  can  feel  about  in  the  dark  and  move 
both  sides  of  the  barriers.  One  might  almost  say  that  `imagination'  is  the  name  of 
the  transcendental  problem,  or  is  used  as  a  convenient  blanket  to  cover  it  up. 
Kant  had  to  invent  the  idea.  At  least,  one  might  add,  it  stirs  thought  to  advance  in 
the  right  direction.  43 
So,  imagination  `can  feel  about  in  the  dark  and  move  both  sides  of  the  barrier'.  Yet,  precisely 
because  it  can  do  this,  Murdoch  writes:  `In  any  case  it  is  too  double-sided  a  concept,  too  much 
like  a  kind  of  feeling,  to  be  allowed  (by  Kant)  near  the  essence  of  morality.  '44  Even  though,  `[w]e 
would  ordinarily  say  that  rational  judgement  must  involve,  for  instance,  an  ability  to  imagine 
39  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  308-9. 
40  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  309. 
41  This  attempt  she  compares  to  earlier  ones  in  which  she  argued  against  networks  of  concepts  or  language. 
Murdoch  detects  this  network  of  language  in  the  analytical  philosophy  she  encountered  in  Oxford,  but  later  also  in 
postmodemism.  In  earlier  work  she  used  words  like  `convention'  to  express  the  idea  that  we  are  operated  by  a 
system  we  cannot  change.  (Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited'.  Compare  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the 
Human,  101-113,180-184.  ) 
42  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  309. 
43  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310. 
44  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310. 
96 various  situations.  In  a  strict  Kantian  view  of  the  concept  this  might  be  seen  as  a  dangerous 
activity.  '45 
In  order  to  learn  about  this  unconscious  form  of  imagination  from  a  more  conscious  one 
Murdoch  turns  to  the  aesthetic  imagination.  Whereas  the  empirical  imagination  is  restricted  to  an 
automatic  performance,  as  Murdoch  understands  Kant,  the  aesthetic  imagination,  recalling  the 
quotation  at  the  beginning  of  the  present  section,  `is  spontaneous  and  free  and  able  to  create  a 
`second  nature".  It  may  have  this  freedom  for  the  aesthetic  imagination  is  also  limited  by  Kant  to 
what  Murdoch  calls  the  `small  corner'  of  art. 
Murdoch  notices  how  Kant's  introduction  of  the  aesthetic  imagination  is  `cautious', 
because,  she  writes,  `here  one  is  certainly  in  `danger'  of  giving  imagination  a  prime  moral 
function.  '46  The  aesthetic  imagination,  Murdoch  writes,  is  `an  exercise  of  freedom',  it  is  `free',  it 
`plays  or  frolics  with  the  understanding  without  being  governed  by  empirical  concepts.  It  is  out  at 
the  edge  of  things.  The  experience  of  beauty  is  often  ineffable,  the  creation  of  art  inexplicable.  '47 
These  characteristics  indicate  the  `danger'  involved,  that  is  the  danger  of  connecting  such  a  free 
and  irrational  faculty  in  any  way  to  morality:  `The  idea  of  such  an  exceptional  and  godlike  power 
might  be  felt  to  be  inappropriate  in  a  strict  account  of  morality.  As  moral  agents  we  are  not  called 
upon  to  be  original  geniuses  but  to  be  good  persons.  '48  Morality  for  Kant  is  decided  by  reason.  A 
moral  agent  should  be  able  to  explain,  to  reason  his  decisions  and  actions.  Murdoch  writes:  `Kant 
would  have  little  patience  with  a  moral  agent  who  could  say  nothing  rational  to  justify  his  choice, 
but  merely  referred  to  a  feeling.  '49 
Morality  for  Kant  cannot  be  something  extraordinary.  It  should  not,  as  Murdoch  puts  it, 
`think  it  is  out  on  the  edge  of  things.  ... 
Morality  concerns  what  an  ordinary  man  may  be 
expected  to  be  able  to  do  and  what  in  Kant's  extended  metaphysical  picture  he  can  do.  '50  Thus, 
`[a]s  moral  agents  we  are  not  called  upon  to  be  original  geniuses  but  to  be  good  persons.  '51 
Conversely,  because  imagination  is  separated  from  morality  it  is  allowed  its  freedom. 
The  imagination,  in  its  free  play,  is  a  more  independently  speculative  faculty,  and 
may  be  so  because  what  it  does,  in  its  discernment  of  the  beautiful,  in  a  sense  does 
not  matter.  The  good  is  compulsory,  the  beautiful  is  not.  We  look  at  clouds  and 
stoves,  we  construct  pictures  in  our  minds.  In  our  experience  of  beauty  in  art  or 
45  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310. 
46  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310. 
47  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310-311. 
48  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310. 
49  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  311. 
so  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  311. 
51  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  310. 
97 nature  imagination  is  free  to  discern  conceptless  forms,  it  plays  or  frolics  with  the 
understanding  without  being  governed  by  empirical  concepts.  It  is  out  at  the  edge 
of  things.  52 
Murdoch,  as  I  maintained  before,  intends  to  take  the  aesthetic  imagination  out  of  a  position 
restricted  to  art.  Her  discussion  is  here  occasionally  bewildering.  Arguments  explored  in  detail 
elsewhere  are  here  omitted,  or  succinctly  referred  to.  With  these  short  remarks  Murdoch  regularly 
switches  between  discussing  the  beautiful,  the  sublime  and  genius,  without  indicating  clearly  that 
she  is  doing  so.  The  present  argument  consequently  relies  on  these  earlier  discussions  of  Kant,  in 
particular  'ne  Sublime  and  the  Good',  and  The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  as  the 
discussion  in  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  is  hard  to  render  on  its  own. 
In  'The  Sublime  and  the  Good'  Murdoch  provides  the  first  and  most  extensive  reading  of 
particular  parts  of  the  Critique  of  Judgment.  Murdoch  is  in  this  essay  concerned  with  two  questions: 
`Is  the  Liberal-democratic  theory  of  personality  an  adequate  one?  '  and  `What  is  characteristic  of 
the  greatest  literary  works  of  art?  '.  The  essay  consists  of  a  philosophical  and  a  literary  discussion. 
She  starts  her  philosophical  discussion  with  Kant,  because  `Kant  is  the  father  of  all  modem  forms 
of  the  problem  of  freedom,  and  also  incidentally  the  father  of  most  modem  theories  of  art'53 
Murdoch's  interest  in  the  Critique  of  Judgment  is  occasioned  by  her  desire  to  understand  as 
well  as  modify  the  contemporary  aesthetic  discussion.  The  few  pages  in  `The  Sublime  and  the 
Good'  read  as  a  short  summary  of  relevant  passages  of  the  Critique  of  Judgment,  which  augmented 
by  a  few  minor  criticisms,  bring  her  at  a  widely  held,  contemporary  view.  Again  it  is  Stuart 
Hampshire  who  is  marked  to  represent  this  view: 
[The  artist]  did  not  set  himself  to  create  beauty,  but  some  particular  thing.  The 
canons  of  success  and  failure,  of  perfection  and  imperfection,  are  in  this  sense 
internal  to  the  work  itself 
... 
Anything  whatever  may  be  picked  out  as  an  object  of 
aesthetic  interest 
... 
An  aesthetic  judgment  has  to  point  to  the  arrangement  of 
52  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  311. 
53  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  262.  The  Critique  of  Judgment  though  is  a  notoriously  difficult  book  to 
read.  Warnock  remarks  how  the  difficulty  is  caused  by  the  variety  of  purposes  of  this  third  Critique  (even  though 
she  does  not  distinguish  them  clearly):  `In  one  sense,  in  this  Critique,  he  was  attempting  to  make  a  link  between  the 
world  of  understanding  and  the  world  of  reason.  '  The  Critique  is  then  written  as  a  link  between  the  first  and  second 
critique  and  meant  to  solve  various  problems  arisen  in  these  two.  (Warnock,  p.  41-42.  Compare  here  p.  45  and  H. 
Berger,  Leesniiler  bj  de  Kr/tiek  van  de  Oordee%kracht  (Tilburg:  Tilburg  University  Press,  1997),  p.  3-34.  )  Murdoch  does 
not  consider  these  questions. 
98 elements  and  to  show  what  constitutes  the  originality  of  the  arrangement  in  this 
particular  case.  54 
An  object  of  art  in  this  view  is  held  to  be  a  thing  on  its  own,  which  is  judged  according  to  its  own 
rules.  55 
Murdoch,  in  contrast,  intends  to  connect  art  to  morals.  She  writes  at  the  beginning  of  this 
essay: 
Tolstoy  rightly  says,  `The  estimation  of  the  value  of  art  ... 
depends  on  men's 
perception  of  the  meaning  of  life.  '  Whether  we  think  art  is  an  amusement,  or  an 
education,  or  a  revelation  of  reality,  or  is  for  art's  sake  (whatever  that  may  mean) 
will  reveal  what  we  hold  to  be  valuable  and  (the  same  thing)  what  we  take  the 
world  to  be  fundamentally  like.  56 
One's  understanding  of  art  then  reveals  one's  values  and  worldviews.  Here  as  elsewhere  Murdoch 
makes  a  strong  connection  between  art  and  morals.  Indeed,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good'  is  the 
essay  containing  the  famous  sentences  `Art  and  morals  are  ...  one.  Their  essence  is  the  same.  The 
essence  of  both  of  them  is  love.  Love  is  the  perception  of  individuals.  Love  is  the  extremely 
difficult  realisation  that  something  other  than  oneself  is  real.  Love,  and  so  art  and  morals,  is  the 
discovery  of  reality.  '57 
Murdoch  in  her  discussion  of  Kant  here  is  concerned  with  preserving  on  the  one  hand  an 
understanding  of  art  as  moral,  and  on  the  other  the  uniqueness  of  the  individual.  That  is,  she 
agrees  with  Tolstoy  that  `our  estimate  of  art  show[s]  our  views  on  good  and  evil'  and  that  `that 
great  art  expresses  religious  feeling,  or  religious  perception,  to  put  the  essence  in  less  controversial 
form'.  58  This  last  remark  indicates  that  whereas  Tolstoy  is  considering  religion,  Murdoch  adapts 
his  concerns  to  moral  philosophy.  In  thus  arguing  that  art  reveals  morals  Murdoch  diverts  from 
Kant  and  from  contemporary  aesthetics.  Yet,  she  agrees  with  them  on  the  uniqueness  of  the  art 
object,  but  again  diverts  by  arguing  for  the  uniqueness  of  the  individual  as  well.  She  literally 
wonders  if  it  is  possible  to  `connect  [Tolstoy's  view  that  great  art  expresses  religious  feeling,  or 
religious  perception]  with  some  of  the  perhaps  acceptable  elements  of  Kant's  view.  '59 
54  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  211. 
ss  Compare  other  essays  (e.  g.  `Against  Dryness)  where  Murdoch  strongly  opposes  the  notion  of  an  object  of  art  as 
something  on  its  own. 
51  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  206. 
57  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  215. 
58  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  211,212. 
59  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  212. 
99 Following  Kant's  own  text  the  discussion  opens  with  the  beautiful.  Murdoch  reads  the 
beautiful  as  prelude  for  the  sublime.  Her  discussion  of  Kant's  notion  of  the  beautiful  is  brief,  and 
proceeds  from  her  appreciation  of  particular  works  of  art.  6°  She  first  introduces  Kant's  familiar 
phrase  of  harmony  between  the  imagination  and  the  understanding,  which  for  Kant  determines 
the  beautiful.  In  an  ordinary  -  not  an  aesthetic  -  perception  of  an  object,  the  empirical 
imagination  prepares  a  perception  for  the  understanding  to  attach  a  concept  to  the  perception 
according  to  specific  rules.  This  mechanism  was  illustrated  earlier  in  the  identification  of  a 
rhododendron  bush.  In  a  judgment  of  beauty,  in  contrast,  no  given  concept  is  attached  to  the 
object  observed.  Such  a  judgment  is  independent  of  any  consideration  of  purpose.  For  Kant, 
Murdoch  argues  `[w]hat  is  truly  beautiful  is  independent  of  any  interest,  it  is  not  tainted  either  by 
the  good,  or  by  any  pleasure  extraneous  to  the  act  of  representing  to  ourselves  the  object  itself  '(,  I 
The  disinterestedness  held  in  the  contemporary  view  is  derived  from  Kant's  understanding  of  the 
beautiful. 
Murdoch's  initial  criticism  of  Kant's  notion  of  the  beautiful  departs  from  what  she 
understands  to  be  a  limited  understanding  of  art.  Given  Murdoch's  constant  preference  for 
works  of  particular  artists  this  is  not  surprising.  In  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good'  she  argues  that 
aesthetics  `must  stand  to  be  judged  by  great  works  of  art  which  we  know  to  be  such 
independently....  So  let  us  start  by  saying  that  Shakespeare  is  the  greatest  of  all  artists,  and  let 
our  aesthetic  grow  to  be  the  philosophical  justification  of  this  judgment.  '62  So,  after  presenting 
Kant's  aesthetics  she  first  notices  that  for  Kant,  only  very  few  things  can  be  said  to  be  truly 
beautiful,  where  true  or  free  beauty  is  contrasted  to  dependent  beauty: 
As  examples  of  free  beauty,  i.  e.  true  beauty,  Tunt  gives  flowers,  birds,  wallpaper 
patterns,  lines  aimlessly  intertwining,  and  `all  music  that  is  not  set  to  words'....  As 
examples  of  dependent  beauty  he  gives  `the  beauty  of  man,  the  beauty  of  a  horse, 
or  of  a  building'  which  `presupposes  a  concept  of  the  end  that  defines  what  the 
thing  has  to  be,  and  consequently  a  concept  of  its  perfection'.  63 
60  The  present  discussion  of  Murdoch's  understanding  of  Kant's  notion  of  the  beautiful  leaves  out  the  more  familiar 
aspect  which  she  does  mention,  as  well  as  those  she  does  not  (like  the  relationship  of  this  critique  to  the  first  two). 
The  elements  left  out  are  for  example  the  well-known  harmony  between  imagination  and  understanding  (see 
Murdoch,  'The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  206)  or  the  distinction  between  dependent  and  independent  beauty. 
Especially  in  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  these  aspects  read  as  a  reiteration  of  pant's  text,  rather  than  part  of 
Murdoch's  argument.  Murdoch  is  most  of  all  concerned  with  the  sublime. 
61  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  207.  Note  that  this  is  only  true  of  independent  beauty.  See  Murdoch, 
'The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  207-8. 
62  Murdoch,  The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  205. 
63  Murdoch,  'The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  207. 
100 In  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  Murdoch  adds  in  brackets:  (Kant  evidently  liked  flowers, 
especially  tulips.  )'64  Shakespeare  does  not  fit  Kant's  limited  understanding  of  art  and  Murdoch 
comments  decidedly:  `Kant  prefers  bird-song  to  opera.  Kant  thinks  that  art  is  essentially  play. 
Now  Shakespeare  is  great  art,  and  Shakespeare  is  not  play,  so  Kant  must  be  wrong.  '65  The  limited 
understanding  of  what  art  is  and  the  strict  separation  of  art  from  anything  else  of  Kant's  theory 
of  art  make  Murdoch  swiftly  move  on  to  the  sublime. 
Murdoch,  both  in  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good'  and  in  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals, 
explains  the  sublime  in  its  contrast  to  the  beautiful.  The  sublime,  other  than  the  beautiful,  is 
connected  with  emotion.  It  is  strictly  not  said  of  objects,  but  rather  of  the  state  of  mind  which 
certain  objects  occasion.  Murdoch  points  out  too  that  `[w]hereas  beauty  results  from  a  harmony 
between  imagination  and  understanding,  sublimity  results  from  a  conflict  between  imagination 
and  reason....  Confronted  with  the  starry  sky,  the  mountains,  imagination  strives  to  its  utmost  to 
satisfy  the  requirements  of  reason,  and  fails.  So  that  on  the  one  hand  we  experience  distress  at  the 
failure  of  the  imagination  to  encompass  what  is  before  us,  and  on  the  other  hand  we  feel 
exhilaration  in  our  consciousness  of  the  absolute  nature  of  reason's  requirement  and  the  way  in 
which  it  goes  beyond  what  mere  sensible  imagination  can  achieve.  '66 
Murdoch  understands  Kant's  theory  of  the  sublime  as  his  theory  of  art,  which  connects 
art  and  morals  67  The  sublime  is  a  `(high)  spiritual  experience.  '68  Confronted  with  the 
overpowering  magnitude  of  a  `mountain  range,  the  starry  sky,  the  stormy  sea,  a  great  waterfall'" 
both  the  limitations  and  the  capacities  of  one's  mental  faculties  are  experienced.  Imagination  on 
the  one  hand  fails  to  grasp  what  it  finds  before  it,  but  reason  on  the  other  hand  exalts  in  its 
requirement  for  totality  and  in  its  ability  to  go  beyond  what  is  merely  sensible. 
I  mentioned  before  that  Murdoch's  interest  in  Kant's  understanding  of  imagination 
proceeds  from  a  particular  point  of  view.  In  the  discussion  of  the  sublime  the  divergence 
between  her  aim  and  Kant's  is  of  particular  importance.  For  Kant,  an  experience  of  the  sublime 
signifies  the  limitations  of  the  imagination.  Warnock  writes  that  `it  is  our  own  very  inadequacy  to 
form  an  image  of  the  idea  suggested  by  the  object  which  constitutes  our  sense  of  the  sublime.... 
64  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  311. 
65  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  211,  cp.  p.  209  and  p.  212,  where  a  similar  argument  is  used  against 
Tolstoy.  Wood  complains  about  this  form  of  art  theory,  as  illogical:  `If  one  simply  knonv  `independently'  that 
Shakespeare  is  great  (though  Murdoch  never  tells  us  whence  comes  this  independence:  nor  can  she,  of  course),  then 
one  cannot  test  one's  aesthetics  by  recourse  to  Shakespeare.  '  (Wood,  `Iris  Murdoch's  Philosophy  of  Fiction',  p. 
179ff.  ) 
66  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  208.  Compare  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  311.  With 
respect  to  the  term  `exhilaration'  it  should  be  noted  that  Warnock  remarks  that  `Kant  argues  that  it  is  more  proper  to 
describe  the  sense  of  the  sublime  as  producing  not  pleasure  so  much  as  awe  or  respect.  '  (Warnock,  Imadinalion,  p.  58) 
67  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  212. 
48  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  311. 
69  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  208. 
101 Imaginatively  we  stretch  out  towards  what  imagination  cannot  comprehend.  '7°  This  experience  of 
the  inadequacy  of  imagination  for  Kant  is  occasioned  only  by  rare  events. 
Murdoch,  in  contrast,  considers  the  experience  of  the  sublime  of  a  more  ordinary  nature. 
Wondering  that  `[w]ith  the  theory  of  the  sublime  we  have  the  distressing  feeling  of  some  vast  and 
wonderful  idea  being  attached  to  a  trivial  occasion'  she  reconsiders  what  occasions  sublime 
feelings.  71  `What  stuns  us  into  a  realisation  of  our  supersensible  destiny  is  not,  as  Kant  imagined, 
the  formlessness  of  nature,  but  rather  its  unutterable  particularity;  and  most  particular  and 
individual  of  all  natural  things  is  the  mind  of  man.  '72  The  experience  of  the  sublime,  and  of  the 
limitations  of  imagination  is  then  for  Murdoch  what  can  accompany  perceiving  other  people.  In 
perceiving  other  people  one  can  experience  the  failure  of  imagination  to  encompass  this 
individual.  The  individual  transcends  any  image  formed  by  the  imagination.  What  for  Kant  is  an 
exceptional  experience,  for  Murdoch  becomes  an  important  element  in  her  moral  philosophy, 
encountered  in  the  perception  of  other  people. 
Moreover,  this  experience  of  the  failure  of  the  imagination  is  for  Murdoch  not  redeemed 
by  any  hope  for  grasping  the  whole.  73  Kant,  Murdoch  writes,  `thinks  of  the  sublime  as  the  failure 
of  imagination  to  compass  an  abstractly  conceived  non-historical,  non-social,  quasi-mathematical 
totality  which  is  not  given  but  only  vaguely  adumbrated  by  reason.  The  sublime  is  a  segment  of  a 
circle,  grasped  by  imagination,  with  the  rest  of  the  circle  demanded  and  as  it  were  dreamt  of  by 
reason,  but  not  given.  '74  Murdoch,  in  contrast,  holds  that  `there  is  no  prefabricated  harmony,  and 
others  are,  to  an  extent  we  never  cease  discovering,  different  from  ourselves.  Nor  is  there  any 
social  totality  within  which  we  can  come  to  comprehend  differences  as  placed  and  reconciled.  We 
have  only  a  segment  of  the  circle.  '75  Murdoch  thus  considerably  transforms  Kant's  understanding 
of  imagination,  and  of  knowledge.  The  failure  of  imagination  is  a  much  more  common  event 
than  it  is  in  Kant's  epistemology.  Moreover,  this  failure  is  not  made  up  for  by  reason's 
adumbration  of  a  totality. 
Moreover,  the  experience  of  the  sublime  is  for  Kant,  Murdoch  argues,  a  `sort  of  moral 
experience'.  76  She  understands  his  texts  not  in  relation  to  his  epistemological  concerns,  as  much 
as  in  relation  to  her  moral  philosophical  ones.  Kant's  main  interest  is  knowledge.  Murdoch  is 
concerned  with  the  question  `How  can  we  become  morally  better?  '.  Murdoch's  reading  of  pant's 
aesthetics  steadily  introduces  appraisal  in  moral  terms.  In  the  present  text  it  is  only  implied  that 
70  Warnock,  Imagination,  p.  57-58. 
71  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  264. 
72  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  215. 
73  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  263. 
74  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  213. 
75  Murdoch,  The  Sublime  and  the  Good',  p.  216. 
76  Murdoch,  `The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  263. 
102 the  automatic  function  of  the  imagination,  which  for  Kant  is  an  ordinary  use  of  imagination  and  a 
crucial  part  of  his  understanding  of  perception,  becomes  in  Murdoch's  terms  a  bad  form  of 
imagination.  Any  perception  of  another  person  which  encompasses  the  person  (as  it  should  in 
any  ordinary  use  of  imagination)  is  at  odds  with  her  understanding  of  human  beings  as  endlessly 
different  77  Murdoch  thus  rejects  the  ordinary  form  of  imagination,  and  introduces  the  notion  of 
genius  in  its  place.  Her  discussion  of  genius  concludes  the  discussion  of  Kant  in  Metaplysics  as  a 
Guide  to  Morals. 
Genius  is  the  same  as  `superior'  imagination.  As  its  main  characteristic  Murdoch 
distinguishes  its  ability  to  create  its  own  rules: 
Genius,  or  high  inspiration,  is  a  spontaneous  imaginative  power  which  enables  the 
artist  to  create  new  unique  original  forms.  `Fine  art  is  the  art  of  genius.  Genius  is 
the  talent  (natural  endowment)  which  gives  the  rule  to  art.  '  Empirical  knowledge 
and  moral  judgment  depend  upon  rules  given  by  the  understanding  and  the  reason 
respectively.  The  art  object  too  must  accord  with  rules,  that  is  have  form,  but 
here,  in  the  creation  of  good  art,  the  rules  are  not  general  rules,  but  rules  invented 
in  and  for  the  making  of  the  individual  object  itself. 
... 
pant's  `genius'  is  a 
spontaneous  faculty  which  its  owner  cannot  explain,  and  whose  products  offer  no 
general  rules  for  imitators.  There  is  `complete  opposition  between  genius  and  the 
spirit  of  imitation.  '78 
Genius  as  a  form  of  superior  imagination  is  not  decided  by  general  rules,  which  are  the  same  for 
everyone.  Not  is  it  possible  to  explain  the  rules  which  are  applied  in  the  creation  of  each  unique 
object. 
It  is  precisely  this  elusive  notion  which  Murdoch  considers  to  `felicitously  extend  or 
amend  [Kant's]  characterisation,  earlier  in  the  Critique  of  Jud  meet,  of  art  generally  in  narrower 
formal  terms  as  the  production  of  conceptless  object,  and  the  experience  of  beauty.  '79  Even  more 
77  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  320. 
78  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  313.  Murdoch  makes  the  following  comparison  with  structuralism: 
`We  may  compare  here  the  place  given  to  genius  in  structuralist  theory,  where  the  original  creative  artist, 
philosopher,  scientist,  as  inventor  of  language  and  meaning,  is  exempt  from  the  general  conventional  preformed 
linguistic  rules  or  codes  whereby  language  speaks  the  man'.  Structuralism,  sometimes  offered  as  `scientific',  is  in  its 
general  tendency  an  aesthetic  system  if  value.  ' 
79  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  313-314:  'he  apprehension  of  beauty  involves  an  individual 
imaginative  synthesis,  as  when  we  attend  to  the  shape  of  a  shell  or  leaf,  or  apprehend  a  wallpaper  pattern.  But  the 
grander  nature  of  fine  art  involves,  for  artist  and  client,  a  creative  imagination  of  a  higher  order  capable  of  inventing 
or  appreciating  far  more  complex,  more  intellectual  laws,  categories  and  modes  of  vision,  incarnate  and  not 
removable  from  the  objects  themselves.  ' 
103 importantly,  this  notion  of  genius  provides  her  with  a  notion  of  imagination  with  which  she  can 
amend  the  empirical  imagination.  The  following  quotation  I  consider  here  essential: 
Kant  tells  us  that  `the  imagination  (as  a  productnm  faculty  of  cognition)  is  a  powerful 
agent  for  creating,  as  it  were,  a  second  naturr  out  of  the  material  supplied  to  it  by 
actual  nature  ... 
By  this  means  we  get  a  sense  of  freedom  from  the  law  of 
association  (which  attaches  to  the  empirical  employment  of  the  imagination).  '  (My 
italics)  So,  imagination  can  create  `a  second  nature'  (a  new  being).  This  idea  can  go 
very  far,  father  perhaps  than  its  author  intended.  If  we  let  art  out  of  the  small 
corner  denoted  by  `fine  art'  and  `genius',  then  we  may  want  to  maintain  that  the 
world  around  us  is  constantly  being  modified  or  `presented'  (made  or  made  up)  by 
a  spontaneous  creative  fire  faculty  which  is  not  that  of  `reason'  thought  of  as 
`beaming  in'  upon  purely  empirical  situations  not  otherwise  evaluated.  80 
In  the  quotation  of  Kant  the  law  of  association  is  still  attached  to  the  empirical  imagination.  Yet 
in  the  lines  following  that  quotation  Murdoch  suggests  a  reconsideration  of  the  empirical 
imagination.  It  is  no  longer  thought  to  be  ruled  by  association,  but  rather  it  is  understood  along 
the  lines  of  the  imagination  of  a  genius.  The  empirical  imagination,  which  appropriates  the 
perception,  is  characterised  as  creating  a  second  nature  out  of  a  first  one.  Imagination  does  not 
present  the  world,  but  it  makes  it,  or  makes  it  up.  Murdoch  concludes:  `Perception  itself  is  a 
mode  of  evaluation.  '  This  conclusion  returns  throughout  the  present  chapter.  8'  Art  is  crucial  in 
understanding  ourselves:  We  have  to  `talk'  and  our  talk  will  be  largely  `imaginative'  (we  are  all 
artists).  '82 
At  this  point,  the  image  of  the  barrier  returns. 
The  point  is,  to  put  it  picturesquely,  the  `transcendental  barrier'  is  a  huge  wide 
various  band  (it  resembles  a  transformer  such  as  the  lungs  in  being  rather  like  a 
sponge)  largely  penetrable  by  the  creative  minds  of  individuals  (though  of  course 
80  Murdoch,  Aletapiysics  as  a  Guide  to  Moralr,  p.  314. 
81  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  315,  p.  328,  p.  329  and  p.  334. 
12  Murdoch  points  out  how  this  conclusion  introduces  a  conception  of  moral  philosophy  which  differs  from  that  of 
Kant  and  Wittgenstein:  `Exactly  boa'  rational  insight  works  upon  its  phenomenal  problematic  data  (the  situations  of 
beings  who  are  phenomenal  as  well  as  nouinenal)  strictly  speaking  cannot  be  said',  as  reason  must  be  supposed  to  be 
an  ultimate  faculty  not  explicable  in  other  terms....  Moral  activity  `shows  itself'  and  it  essentially  solitary  and  silent. 
In  both  cases  (Kant  and  Wittgenstein)  the  metaphysical  picture  is  illuminating  but  likely  to  be  felt  as  intolerable.  ' 
(Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  315.  ) 
104 we  are  culturally  marked  `children  of  our  time'  etc.  )  and  this  creativity  is  the  place 
where  the  concept  of  imagination  must  be  placed  and  defined  83 
It  is  with  this  image  that  Murdoch  concludes  the  discussion  of  imagination  in  Kant.  What  I  have 
assembled  here  as  a  step-by-step  reading  of  the  first  few  pages  of  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  A1orals's 
chapter  eleven  on  imagination  does  not  appear  as  such  in  the  work  itself.  I  have  been  arguing  that 
Murdoch  seriously  reverses  Kant's  theory  of  knowledge.  This  powerful  change  is  not  noticed  as 
such  by  Murdoch.  She  does  not  comment  on  the  disappearance  of  most  of  Kant's 
epistemological  structures,  but  rather  considers  him  `marvellously  near  the  mark'. 
In  her  reading  imagination  is  operative  at  both  an  unconscious  and  a  conscious  level.  It  is 
from  the  conscious  level,  the  imagination  of  the  genius,  that  the  unconscious  one  is  understood. 
Imagination  cannot  always  be  explained  by  its  owner,  and  neither  should  it  be  thought  of  as  mere 
imitation.  It  creates  its  own  rules  for  verification.  It  experiences  its  limitations  in  confrontation 
with  other  people,  when  it  fails  to  encompass  an  individual.  In  this  understanding  of  the  sublime 
Murdoch  introduces  moral  terms  in  her  reading  of  Kant's  aesthetics.  The  subsequent  reading  of 
Plato  further  develops  this  moral  reflection  on  imagination. 
4.  Plato:  The  Artist  and  the  Good 
If  Murdoch's  regard  for  genius  suggests  unconditional  appreciation  for  art  and  artists,  her  reading 
of  Plato  speaks  differently.  Murdoch  considers  Plato  to  be  a  philosopher  who  -  not  unlike  herself 
-  is  an  artist,  and  yet  expresses  deep  distrust  of  artists,  and  one  who  supplies  his  dialogues  with 
persuasive  images  and  yet  is  wary  of  imagery  for  its  misleading  nature.  The  distrust  of  artists,  of 
their  imagery  and  imagination  Murdoch  considers  to  have  been  lost  in  the  Romantic 
understanding  of  imagination:  "The  modern  self-conscious  concept  of  `imagination'  as  something 
generally  exalted  is  Romantic.  '84  Such  an  exalted  notion  still  inspires  the  recently  grown  interest  in 
imagination,  where  some  confess  the  desire  to  write  `a  Praise  of  the  Imagination'.  85 
Whereas  Kant  and  Plato  both  receive  much  attention  in  this  discussion  of  imagination, 
the  Romantics  only  surface  as  a  brief  transition  from  Kant  to  Plato.  Murdoch  seems  not  very 
interested  in  Romanticism  here,  which  is  also  apparent  from  the  general  nature  of  her  comments. 
This  disinterest  is  remarkable.  The  Romantic  understanding  of  imagination  is  generally 
83  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  315. 
14  Murdoch,  Metapiysics  as  a  Guide  to  Moralr,  p.  316.  Again,  I  wonder  here  about  the  use  of  the  quotation  marks.  Do 
they  signify  the  considerable  divide  between  Murdoch's  understanding  of  imagination  and  that  of  the  Romantics? 
ss  E.  T.  H.  Brann,  The  I(°orld  of  the  Imagination:  Sum  and  Substance  (Boston:  Rowman  &  Littlefield  Publishers,  Inc.,  1991), 
p.  4.  In  the  past  twenty  to  thirty  years  the  interest  in  imagination  has  occasioned  several  books  on  the  topic.  Some  of 
these  are  mentioned  in  the  footnotes  throughout  this  chapter. 
105 considered  as  essential  for  the  understanding  of  contemporary  imagination.  Murdoch  admits  as 
much  in  her  remark  on  the  modern  self-conscious  concept  of  imagination,  quoted  above.  "' 
Murdoch's  understanding  of  imagination  is,  moreover,  not  entirely  dissimilar  from  the  Romantic 
understanding.  At  least  in  general  terms  Murdoch  agrees  with  Romantic  authors  such  as 
Coleridge  or  Wordsworth  on,  for  example,  the  importance  of  artists  for  divine  or  religious 
revelation  and  in  understanding  human  beings  as  first  and  foremost  imaginative.  87 
Nevertheless,  throughout  her  work  Murdoch  has  been  invariably  critical  of  ideas  she 
deems  Romantic.  She  admits  to  appreciating  the  Romantic  Movement  for  its  evaluation  of  art 
over  science,  yet  she  opposes  its  `deification'  of  art.  88  Admittedly,  her  criticism  does  not  apply  to 
`the  great  Romantic  artists  and  thinkers  at  their  best',  but  to  `the  general  beaten  track'.  89 
Romanticism  then  stands  for  different  ideas  descended  from  the  `great  Romantic  artists'.  Most 
consistent  of  these  ideas  is  the  image  of  the  Romantic  man  as  a  lonely  man  and  Romantic  art  as  a 
self-contained  myth.  90 
Romanticism,  or  its  remnants  are,  according  to  Murdoch,  still  prevalent  in  contemporary 
thought  and  need  to  be  countered  in  a  return  to  what  Murdoch  describes  as  reality  and  real 
human  beings: 
We  need  to  turn  our  attention  away  from  the  consoling  dream  necessity  of 
Romanticism,  away  from  the  dry  symbol,  the  bogus  individual,  the  false  whole, 
towards  the  real  impenetrable  human  pcrson.  '91 
This  image  of  the  lonely  man  is  found  as  early  as  Murdoch's  first  book  of  philosophy.  In  Sartre: 
Romantic  Rationalist  she  calls  Sartre  a  romantic  for  embracing  a  hopeless  situation  in  which  one  is 
86  Compare  Warnock,  Imagination,  p.  10.  For  Kearney  it  introduces  the  existentialist  imagination.  (Kearney,  The  II''ake 
oflmagination,  p.  181-188) 
87  The  similarity  between  Murdoch  and  romantic  thinkers  has  occasionally  been  suggested  to  me,  but  I  have  not 
found  any  reference  to  it  in  the  secondary  literature.  The  subsequent  discussion  considers  the  difference  Murdoch 
notes  between  her  understanding  of  imagination  and  that  of  the  Romantics. 
ss  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  85.  See  also  Murdoch,  'Salvation  by  Words',  p.  235:  The  Romantics 
felt  instinctively  that  science  was  an  enemy  of  art,  and  of  course  in  certain  simple  and  obvious  ways  they  were  right.  ' 
89  Murdoch,  `The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'.  p.  368.  Compare:  'The  great  Romantics  ... 
transcended  `Romanticism'.  (p.  369)  Compare  too  Murdoch,  'The  Sublime  and  Beautiful  Revisited':  `  he  word 
'Romantic'  is  best  defined  by  what  it  is  opposed  to...  '  (p.  261)  In  this  essay  one  finds  the  most  extensive  discussion 
of  the  Romantic  Movement. 
90  See  respectively  Murdoch,  The  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  264,266,279ff  and  Murdoch,  The 
Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  272.  In  these  characteristics  the  Romantic  Movement  is  certainly  different 
from  the  acclaimed  nineteenth  century  novel.  (See  Murdoch,  'I1ie  Sublime  and  the  Beautiful  Revisited',  p.  271.  ) 
91  Murdoch,  `Against  Dryness',  p.  294. 
106 either  to  be  overcome  by  the  sticky  reality  or  to  seize  control  and  establish  one's  total  freedom 
from  everything  else.  92 
Given  these  earlier  texts  it  is  not  surprising  that  Melapbjsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  provides 
only  a  short  discussion  of  the  Romantic  notion  of  imagination,  which  is  even  a  later  addition  to 
the  text  93  Murdoch  mentions  Coleridge  as  the  one  to  introduce  Kant's  notion  of  imagination  in 
England,  but  she  is  reluctant  to  discuss  his  work: 
For  `the  shaping  spirit  of  imagination'  (Coleridge's  Ode  to  D  jection)  we  in  England 
have  to  wait  for  what  Coleridge  learnt  from  Kant's  German  successors.  Into  this 
morass  or  dark  forest  I  do  not  propose  to  enter  but  will  follow  Virgil's  advice  to 
Dante,  non  ragionem  di  lor,  magutarda  e  pa  sa.  (Don't  let's  talk  about  them,  just  look 
and  pass  by.  )94 
Romantics  are  here  compared  to  the  suffering  souls  outside  the  gates  of  hell,  to  `the  worthless 
crew  that  is  hateful  to  God  and  to  his  Enemies.  '95  This  is  a  curious  comparison,  and  it  is  only 
possible  to  guess  at  its  rationale.  Perhaps  Murdoch's  account  of  the  Romantic  notion  of 
imagination  indicates  the  extent  of  her  knowledge  of  Coleridge  or  Wordsworth.  96  It  may  follow 
contemporary  prejudices,  where  Coleridge  is  not  considered  a  philosopher  or  even  an  original 
thinker.  97  Perhaps  too  her  disapproval  of  the  deification  of  art  she  regards  more  important  than 
any  possible  agreement.  Murdoch  `looks  and  passes  by'  the  Romantics  when  considering 
imagination.  She  moves  on  to  Plato. 
In  Plato  Murdoch  finds  a  notion  of  imagination  which  is  not  `exalted'.  Her  discussion  of 
Plato  opens  by  arguing  that  he  is,  in  contrast  to  the  Romantics,  wary  of  art  and  artists,  as  well  as 
of  their  imagination.  They  are  in  a  state  of  `eikasia'  or  `phantasia',  the  gloomy  situation  of  the 
92  hfurdoch,  Sartre:  Romantic  Ration/ist,  p.  110-111:  'When  in  insuperable  practical  difficulties  a  sense  of  `all  or 
nothing'  is  what  consoles....  The  general  impression  of  Sartre's  work  is  certainly  that  of  a  powerful  but  abstract  model 
of  a  hopeless  dilemma,  coloured  by  a  surreptitious  romanticism  which  embraces  the  hopelessness.  '  Compare  too 
Murdoch,  `Existentialists  and  Mystics',  p.  223:  'The  existentialist  novel  is  the  natural  heir  and  outcome  of  the 
Western  nineteenth-century  thought  and  is  the  child  of  the  Romantic  movement.  ' 
93  Compare  Murdoch,  'Ethics  and  Imagination',  p.  86. 
9+  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  316-7. 
95  Dante,  Inferno,  IN. 
96  In  her  various  overviews  of  the  history  of  literature  Coleridge  is  mentioned  only  occasionally  and  Wordsworth  not 
at  all. 
97  Warnock's  chapters  on  Coleridge  are  in  this  respect  revealing  in  their  attempt  to  handle  the  unsystematic  nature  of 
his  thought  and  writings.  (See  Warnock,  Imagination,  chapter  three.  )  Sec  too  D. Jasper,  Cokrid  e  as  Poet  and  Religious 
Thinker  (Allison  Park,  Pennsylvania:  Pickwick  Publications,  1985):  `Norman  Frumann's  Coleridge:  The  Damaged 
Archangel  (1972)  stands  as  a  sad  monument  to  the  tendency  of  many  critics  to  regard  Coleridge's  work  as  little  more 
than  a  mosaic  drawn  from  his  extraordinary  wide  reading.  The  danger  is,  then,  that  he  becomes  merely  a  channel  for 
the  work  and  ideas  of  others  ... 
'  (Note  how  a  similar  danger  threatens  any  study  of  Murdoch's  philosophical  work.  ) 
107 prisoners  in  the  Cave,  who  mistake  the  shadows  of  the  fire  for  rcality.  98  The  state  of  these 
prisoners  as  well as  of  artists  is  one  of  illusion. 
Plato  is  famously  remembered  for  banishing  the  artists.  In  The  Republic  they  arc  politely 
though  relentlessly  escorted  to  the  borders  of  the  state,  if  they  do  not  accept  a  strictly  confined 
role.  Confined,  that  is,  by  the  philosopher-rulers.  Only  puppets  arc  allowed  to  stay  to  express  the 
truths  of  the  ideal  state.  99  Plato  is  alarmed  by  artists'  inability  to  explain  or  understand  what  they 
are  doing.  This  inability  he  considers  a  moral  failure.  Plato,  Murdoch  writes,  `connects  egoistic 
fantasy  and  lack  of  moral  sense  with  an  inability  to  reflect.  '"'  He  fears  art's  ability  to  charm  and 
to  lead  away  from  reality  by  providing  easy  pleasure. 
Yet,  for  Murdoch  this  image  from  The  Repi,  blic  does  not  fully  express  his  attitude  to  artists. 
Plato  for  Murdoch  always  remained  both  artist  and  philosopher,  and  never  lost  interest  in  art. 
Bronzwaer  argues  that  the  mixture  of  art  and  philosophy  is  what  characterises  the  writings  of 
both: 
And  since  Plato  was  an  artist  (he  set  out  as  a  poet  and  in  Iris  Murdoch's  view  no 
less  than  in  D.  H.  Lawrence's  always  remained  one),  art  played  a  crucial  role  in  his 
own  thinking  and  is  therefore  bound  to  play  one  in  Iris  Murdoch's  own  writings, 
which  are  in  terms  of  Plato  and  which  arc  the  writings  of  an  artist.  101 
Murdoch  notes  that  Plato  does  not  always  treat  artists  in  a  hostile  way.  He  allows  them,  in 
particular  in  the  earlier  dialogues,  the  gift  of  divine  inspiration,  and  he  does  not  always  disapprove 
of  their  inability  to  explain  these  gifts.  102  Moreover,  Murdoch  points  out  that  Plato  uses  myth, 
imagery  and  metaphors  in  philosophical  discussion:  `the  artist  (or  is  it  the  philosopher?  )  in  him 
still  urges  to  explain  by  using  images.  "°3 
Jasper's  study  intends  to  counter  this  image  and  argue  that  that  Coleridge  is  'a  unique  genius  who  was  yet  highly 
sensitive  and  original  in  his  reading.  '  Gasper,  Colerid  je  as  Poet  and  Religious  Thinker,  p.  8) 
98  This  Greek  word  'phantasia'  is  most  likely  the  source  for  Murdoch's  own  use  of  fantasy.  Murdoch  does  not  reveal 
the  origin  of  her  use  of  the  term.  The  closest  she  comes  to  etymology  is  when  she  states  that  the  distinction  between 
imagination  and  fantasy  is  not  to  the  same  as  Coleridge's  distinction  between  imagination  and  fancy.  (Murdoch, 
Afetapfys/cr  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  331.  ) 
'»  Plato,  The  Republic,  398ab. 
"K)  'One  might  take  the  Republic  (597)  passage  about  the  painter  as  indicating  art  which  was  bad  because  thoughtless.  ' 
(Murdoch,  Aletapbjücs  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  317) 
101  Bronzwaer,  'Images  of  Plato',  p.  55. 
102  Murdoch,  The  Fire  and  the  Sun,  p.  387.  See  too  p.  392  for  a  discussion  of  loon,  in  which  Socrates  smirks  at  loon  for 
his  ignorance  of  anything  but  the  art  of  recitation,  and  p.  416  for  a  discussion  of  the  Phaedrus.  Compare  too 
Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  317:  'Plato  refers  more  than  once  to  the  unconscious  non-rational 
creativity  of  poets  who  do  not  know  how  they  do  it  and  cannot  explain  what  they  have  done.  That  great  artist  had 
mixed  feelings  about  such  dangerous  gifts.  ' 
113  Murdoch,  The  Fire  and  the  Sun,  p.  445. 
108 Art  and  philosophy  are  intertwined  in  Plato's  work,  according  to  Murdoch,  and  what 
Plato  objects  to  in  art,  is  not  confined  to  art.  Artists  are  not  the  only  ones  to  betray  `egoistic 
fantasy  and  lack  of  moral  sense'.  Instead,  the  distinction  between  illusion  and  reality  involves  a 
deep  mistrust  of  human  nature  and  of  its  tendency  to  look  for  comfort  rather  than  truth. 
Humans  prefer  illusion  to  reality.  In  chapter  one  it  was  argued  how  this  fallen  state  of  mankind  is 
a  persistent  theme  in  Murdoch's  thought.  She  recognises  it  in  Weil's  notion  of  gravity  and  argues 
that  Freud  `had  provided  us  with  what  might  be  called  a  doctrine  of  original  sin'.  The  most 
eloquent  and  admittedly  `depressing  description'  is  found  in  the  beginning  of  `The  Sovereignty  of 
Good  Over  Other  Concepts'.  104 
Not  merely  artists  but  everyone  can  thus  be  understood  to  be  like  a  prisoner  in  the  Cave. 
Given  this  image  of  human  beings  morality  is  for  Plato  and  for  Murdoch  not  only  a  matter  of 
acting  well  from  time  to  time.  Though  morality  may  be  expressed  in  such  moments,  it  is  not 
limited  to  these.  Plato  and  Murdoch  maintain  an  image  of  moral  progress  or  pilgrimage.  Humans 
are  in  a  state  of  illusion  from  which  it  is  not  easy  to  escape.  The  attempt  to  do  so  is  a  constant 
struggle. 
The  intricate  attitude  of  Plato  to  artists  arises  from  the  fact  that  imagery  is  here  necessarily 
deluding,  and  yet  unavoidable,  as  Murdoch  argues: 
Moral  improvement,  as  we  learn  from  the  Republic,  involves  a  progressive 
destruction  of  false  images.  Image-making  or  image-apprehending  is  always  an 
imperfect  activity,  some  images  are  higher  than  others,  that  is  nearer  to  reality. 
Images  should  not  be  resting  places,  but  pointers  towards  higher  truth.  The 
implication  is  that  the  highest  activities  of  the  mind,  as  in  mathematics  and 
mysticism,  are  imageless.  105 
The  highest  activities  of  the  mind  then  do  not  use  images.  Murdoch  expresses  reservation  about 
considering  mathematics  as  the  highest  activity  of  the  mind.  She  claims  that  Plato  does  not  regard 
mathematics  as  the  summit  of  knowledge  and  adds  that  `[t]he  Greeks  were  impressed  and 
inspired  by  their  own  rapid  progress  in  mathematics,  especially  geometry,  and  likely  to  see  this  as 
an  exemplar  of  understanding.  ' 
Murdoch  is  then  not  that  much  impressed  by  mathematics,  yet  mysticism  she  holds  in 
high  esteem.  Mysticism,  both  eastern  and  western,  Murdoch  considers  to  maintain  that 
t";  See  respectively  Murdoch,  `Knowing  the  Void',  p.  158,  Murdoch,  'On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  341,  and  Murdoch, 
`The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  364.  This  last  text  is  quoted  in  chapter  one. 
"'S  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  317-8. 
109 `theological  mythology,  stories  about  gods,  creation  myths  and  so  on'  arc  at  `a  lower  level  than 
reality  and  ultimate  religious  truth  ...: 
beyond  the  Last  image  we  fall  into  the  abyss  of  God.  '  This 
image  she  derives  from  St.  John  of  the  Cross.  1116  Murdoch  emphasises  that  `Plato's  moral 
philosophy  is  about  demythologisation.  '  Indeed,  she  concludes  -  albeit  with  an  image  -  to  the  end 
of  all  imagery.  Images  should  be  regarded  `as  ladders,  to  be  thrown  away  after  use'. 
Images  thus  plead  the  end  of  all  imagery.  Even  though  Plato  and  Murdoch  argue  that  the 
highest  activities  of  the  mind  are  imageless,  to  make  this  argument  imagery  is  indispensable. 
While  they  present  imagery's  limitations,  they  acknowledge  its  significance.  Their  understanding 
of  imagination  is  not  `exalted'.  Good  imagination  -  as  opposed  to  bad  fantasy  -  is  not  solely 
decided  by  an  artist's  consciousness,  but  as  in  the  myth  of  the  Cave  it  is  directed  at  realities 
surrounding  the  artist  and  finally  at  the  good. 
Murdoch  and  Plato  do  not  respond  identically  to  the  peculiar  situation  in  which  imagery 
is  indispensable  and  yet  mistrusted.  The  divergence  in  their  positions  is  best  explained  by 
pointing  out  the  more  political  nature  of  Plato's  philosophy.  Plato  as  a  politician  has  a  `strain  of 
unbalance,  of  violence,  of  the  beginnings  of  totalitarianism,  of  unlimitedness.  Perhaps  also  of 
fear',  which  Bronzwaer  argues  Murdoch  pictures  so  well  in  the  young  Plato  in  4caslos.  107  As  a 
totalitarian  politician  he  distrust  art.  `Art  is  feared  by  tyrants',  Murdoch  more  than  once 
remarks.  108  Thus  the  artists  are  politely  escorted  to  the  border. 
Yet,  the  puppets  are  allowed  to  remain,  for  Plato  also  recognises  the  necessity  of  imagery. 
He  has  use  for  imagery  for  all  who  cannot  manage  the  deeper  understanding  of  philosophy. 
While  Murdoch  expresses  her  trust  in  the  virtuous  peasant  to  know,  and  `to  go  on  knowing,  in 
spite  of  the  removal  or  modification  of  the  theological  apparatus',  Plato's  Socrates  retains  artists  - 
albeit  the  minor  ones  -  for  the  ideal  state.  Even  the  philosophers  are  given  a  comparison  between 
the  sun  and  the  good,  as  well  as  the  allegory  of  the  cave,  but  above  all  they  must  have  been 
charmed  by  their  election  as  the  only  ones  who  can  do  without  imagery.  In  the  creation  of  this 
final  imagery  one  might  discern  a  role  for  the  great  artist  after  all.  For  who  would  be  able  to 
create  this  imagery,  but  a  philosopher  who  is  also  an  artist? 
Murdoch  indeed  pursues  this  possibility.  It  was  argued  before  that  for  Murdoch  -  in 
contrast  to  Plato  -  great  art  in  particular  can  not  only  play  a  role  in  moral  progress,  but  is  even 
"'o  Murdoch,  Metaßhysirs  as  a  Guide  to  Aforabr,  p.  318.  Compare  here  too  Murdoch,  The  Fin  and  the  San,  p.  443:  `St  John 
of  the  Cross  says  that  God  is  the  abyss  of  faith  into  which  we  fall  when  we  have  discarded  all  images  of  him.  This  is 
the  point  at  which  Plato  starts  making  jokes.  '  Compare  Murdoch,  Afetaßfyrics  as  a  Guide  to  Aforalr,  p.  320:  'The 
spiritual  life  is  a  long  disciplined  destruction  of  false  images  and  false  goods  until  (in  some  sense  which  we  cannot 
understand)  the  imagining  mind  achieves  an  end  of  images  and  shadows  (ex  umbria  et  imaTinilms  in  uritotem),  the  final 
demythologisation  of  the  religious  passion  as  expressed  by  mystics  such  as  Eckhart  and  St.  John  of  the  Cross.  ' 
107  Bronzwaer,  `Images  of  Plato',  p.  63. 
"'s  See  for  example  Murdoch,  119etapbysies  as  a  Guide  to  Aforals,  p.  90. 
110 considered  more  important  than  philosophy.  Murdoch  does  not  mind  the  artists'  lack  of 
explanation.  Similarly,  in  her  moral  philosophy  she  defies  `the  unexamined  life  is  not  worth  living' 
against  the  grain  of  contemporary  philosophy.  110  Moral  agents  and  artists  arc  allowed  their 
inability  to  express  the  truth  or  goodness  of  their  work  and  doings. 
In  Metaplysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  Murdoch  disccrns  this  capacity  of  art,  to  thus  play  a  rolc 
in  the  moral  pilgrimage,  in  what  she  calls  Plato's  concept  of  high  imagination: 
High  imagination  is  passionately  creative.  ... 
In  Plato  the  unmoved  Forms  inspire 
the  creative  love  of  spirit  which  is  active  at  a  lower  level. 
... 
Plato,  teaching  by 
images  and  myths,  also  acknowledges  high  imagination  as  creative  stirring  spirit, 
attempting  to  express  and  embody  what  is  perfectly  good,  but  extremely  remote,  a 
picture  which  implicitly  allows  a  redemption  of  art.  110 
Thus  Murdoch  discerns  in  Plato's  understanding  of  high  imagination  a  possibility  to  attribute  to 
art  this  important  role  in  becoming  morally  better.  High  imagination  looks  at  a  better  reality,  or 
even  at  the  Good,  when  creating.  Murdoch  considers  it  expressed  in  Plato's  image  of  God 
creating  the  world,  as  well  as  anamnesis  in  the  R1eno.  111 
With  this  imagery,  at  the  end  of  this  discussion  of  Plato  Murdoch  returns  to  Kant  and 
concludes: 
So  it  appears  that  Plato,  like  Kant,  offers  two  views  of  imagination.  For  Plato  the 
lower  level,  which  for  Kant  is  necessary  automatic  synthesis,  is  seen  in  human 
terms  as  the  production  of  base  illusions,  or  perhaps  simply  of  the  ordinary 
unimaginative  egoistic  screen  of  our  conceptualising....  The  spiritual  life  is  a  long 
disciplined  destruction  of  false  images  and  false  goods  until  (in  some  sense  which 
we  cannot  understand)  the  imagining  mind  achieves  an  end  of  images  and 
shadows'. 
This  quotation  introduces  the  distinction  between  imagination  and  fantasy,  which  this  chapter 
started  with.  In  Metaplgsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  Murdoch  distinguishes  between  imagination  and 
fantasy  based  on  an  idiosyncratic  discussion  of  Kant  and  Plato.  Murdoch's  reading  of  Kant's 
empirical  and  aesthetic  imagination  introduces  the  ubiquity  of  an  imagination  characterised  as  the 
Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  300. 
""  Murdoch,  AMetaphysks  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  319-320. 
111 imagination  of  genius.  In  the  analysis  of  Plato  and  his  understanding  of  artists  imagination  is 
further  developed  as  a  notion  related  to  reality,  and  finally  to  the  Good.  The  Good  appears  here 
as  both  the  distant  goal  at  which  imagination  should  be  directed  as  well  as  the  source  of 
inspiration  for  high  imagination. 
5.  Concluding  Remarks 
The  distinction  between  fantasy  and  imagination  is  a  defining  characteristic  of  Murdoch's 
understanding  of  these  notions.  The  distinction  is  moral:  fantasy  is  bad  and  imagination  is  good. 
Fantasy  denotes  an  obsession  with  the  self.  Imagination  denotes  attention  to  reality.  The 
distinction  is  presented  as  in  a  way  obvious.  just  looking  at  the  work  of  Velasquez  or  reading 
Tolstoy  leads  to  comprehension.  However,  Murdoch  admits  too  that  the  distinction  may  not  be 
clearly  distinguished  in  an  artist's  or  anyone's  mind. 
In  Metaphysics  as  a  Gmide  to  Morals  the  distinction  between  fantasy  and  imagination  appears 
after  reflection  upon  two  thinkers:  Kant  and  Plato.  In  Murdoch's  reading  of  Kant  the  image  of 
the  barrier  reveals  her  understanding  of  imagination.  The  crucial  step  in  her  reading  of  his  work  is 
releasing  the  aesthetic  imagination  out  of  the  limited  corner  it  was  allotted  by  Kant.  This  notion 
of  imagination  for  Murdoch  also  determines  the  empirical  imagination,  which  is  present  in  all 
perception.  The  empirical  imagination  is  not  hidden  behind  a  barrier,  but  behind  a  threshold. 
Thus,  conscious  imagination  determines  the  unconscious  imagination  up  to  a  certain  extent. 
Yet,  imagination  for  Murdoch  is  not  fully  decided  by  the  individual  (artistic) 
consciousness.  In  turning  to  Plato  Murdoch  reveals  not  only  admiration  but  also  distrust  of 
artists  and  their  imagination.  This  distrust  is  an  expression  of  a  general  distrust  of  all  human 
beings.  Against  natural  egoistic  tendencies  Murdoch's  reading  of  Plato  posits  the  importance  of 
reality  and  ultimately  the  notion  of  Good,  to  which  imagination  should  be  directed.  Moral 
pilgrimage  is  understood  as  a  long  destruction  of  imagery. 
The  pervasiveness  of  imagination,  discerned  in  this  chapter,  reinforces  the  importance 
attributed  to  imagery  in  the  previous  chapter.  The  reading  of  imagery  inspired  by  the  work  of  Le 
Doeuff,  is  now  even  more  justified  by  Murdoch's  reading  of  Plato  where  it  turned  out  to  be 
impossible  to  philosophise  without  resort  to  imagery.  This  chapter  on  imagination  thus  also 
accounts  for  the  previous  interest  in  imagery. 
"I  She  mentions  the  image  of  God  as  a  creative  artist  at  the  end  of  The  Sophist  as  well  as  in  the  Timaeus.  (Murdoch, 
Metaph.  sics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  319-320) 
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RELIGION,  MORALITY  AND  THE  ONTOLOGICAL  PROOF 
1.  Introduction 
The  preceding  chapter  introduced  notions  of  imagination  and  fantasy.  It  was  argued  how 
imagination  and  fantasy  pervade  human  understanding  and  perception.  The  best  way  to 
understand  them  is  from  the  imagination  of  the  artist.  For  Murdoch  the  imagination  of  an  artist 
is  not  in  any  way  `exalted'.  Instead,  it  is  directed  at  an  independent  reality,  and  ultimately  at  the 
Good.  '  Imagination,  it  was  argued,  is  both  directed  at  and  inspired  by  the  Good. 
The  notion  of  the  Good  can  be  understood  to  further  explain  Murdoch's  understanding 
of  reality.  In  the  third  chapter  and  thus  in  Murdoch's  earlier  writing,  reality  was  understood  in  a 
more  or  less  common  sense  way,  which  was  up  to  a  certain  extent  decided  by  Murdoch's 
understanding  of  literature.  In  the  first  part  of  the  fourth  chapter  the  notion  of  reality  was  further 
explored.  I  argued  that  the  notion  of  reality  signifies  for  Murdoch  something  obvious  and  at  the 
same  time  impossible  to  fully  grasp.  In  the  discussion  of  Plato  and  in  particular  in  the  allegory  of 
the  Cave  the  importance  of  reality  in  moral  progress  was  complemented  by  the  importance  of  the 
Good.  To  know  reality  is,  in  Murdoch's  phrasing,  to  see  the  world  in  the  light  of  the  Good. 
This  chapter  considers  the  notion  of  the  Good,  as  both  direction  and  source  for 
imagination.  In  doing  so,  it  returns  to  the  questions  which  I  argued  to  be  central  to  Murdoch's 
work:  `How  can  we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  '  and  `What  is  a  good  man  like?  '.  It  also 
returns  to  what  occasioned  the  importance  of  these  questions  for  philosophy:  the  collapse  of 
religion.  The  answer  to  them,  I  argued,  came  in  an  understanding  of  an  inner  self  in  relation  to  an 
external  reality.  The  inner  self  I  argued  to  be  fantasising  and  imaginative,  the  external  reality  is 
decided  by  the  Good. 
This  chapter  examines  what  the  Good  is  like,  to  what  extent  it  is  possible  to  know  it  and 
whether  and  how  it  can  be  argued  to  exist.  The  questions  are  all  the  more  important  because 
Murdoch  considers  that  little  can  be  learnt  from  people  generally  regarded  as  good: 
Christ,  Socrates,  certain  saints  ... 
if  we  try  to  contemplate  these  men  we  find  that 
the  information  about  them  is  scanty  and  vague,  and  that,  their  great  moments 
apart,  it  is  the  simplicity  and  directness  of  their  diction  which  chiefly  colours  our 
conception  of  them  as  good.  ... 
Goodness  appears  to  be  both  rare  and  hard  to 
1  Imagination  here  reminds  of  attention,  a  notion  Murdoch  receive  from  Weil.  (See  Murdoch,  `Knowing  the  Void) 
113 picture.  It  is  perhaps  most  convincingly  met  with  in  simple  people  -  inarticulate, 
unselfish  mothers  of  large  families  -  but  these  cases  are  also  the  least  illuminating.  2 
Good  people  are  hard  to  picture.  An  answer  to  the  question  `What  is  a  good  man  like?  '  comes  in 
an  understanding  of  the  good  rather  than  in  the  image  of  any  good  person.  In  the  absence  of 
clear  examples,  it  becomes  very  important  to  ascertain  an  understanding  of  the  good. 
For  Murdoch  the  ontological  proof  is  a  most  important  tool  in  doing  so.  In  the  third  part 
of  this  chapter  I  discuss  this  proof,  as  well  as  the  position  of  the  fool  to  whom  it  is  directed.  The 
most  famous  conception  of  this  proof  one  finds  in  Anselm's  Proslogion.  This  conception  especially 
has  had  a  long  and  diverse  reception.  It  has  been  considered  as  a  decisive  logical  proof  for  the 
existence  of  God,  as  an  assertion  of  faith  or  as  a  self-fulfilling  prophecy.  3  Murdoch  cites  the 
ontological  proof  both  in  her  fictional  and  in  her  philosophical  work. 
For  Murdoch  the  proof  is  about  the  Good,  not  God.  In  the  Good  Murdoch  intends  to 
preserve  what  she  considers  universal  and  timeless  in  religion,  and  of  which  she  regards 
Christianity  as  one  expression.  Even  if  the  Good  is  not  considered  a  replacement  of  God,  it  is 
explained  from  a  certain  understanding  of  God  in  religion.  In  order  to  understand  the  Good,  it  is 
necessary  to  further  examine  Murdoch's  understanding  of  religion.  Murdoch's  notion  of  religion 
is  first  discussed  in  this  chapter,  preceding  the  discussion  of  the  ontological  proof  and  of  its  fool. 
This  chapter  thus  begins  with  a  discussion  of  the  different  views  on  religion  expressed  in 
Murdoch's  Platonic  dialogue  Above  the  Gods,  one  of  two  dialogues  presented  in  Acastos  (1986). 
2.  Above  the  Gods  :"  Religion  and  Morality 
Above  the  Gods  is,  as  its  subtitle  confirms,  `A  Dialogue  about  Religion'.  The  remarks  of  its  different 
characters  express  the  particular  angle  from  which  Murdoch  regards  this  topic.  The  dialogue's 
significance  lies  both  in  the  ideas  distinguished  in  this  discussion  and  in  the  ones  disregarded.  The 
dialogue  thus  pursues  an  understanding  of  religion  in,  what  Murdoch  calls,  `the  time  of  the 
angels'.  It  focuses  on  the  notion  of  Good,  and  possible  differences  between  morality  and  religion. 
Yet,  it  disregards  other  aspects  of  religion.  There  is  for  instance  scarcely  any  sense  of  community, 
or  any  interest  in  sacred  texts.  4 
2  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  342.  Compare  Nlurdoch,  Afetaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  318:  'It  is  very 
difficult  to  understand  `what  goes  on'  in  the  souls  of  dedicated  religious  people,  even  when  we  know  them  face  to 
face  and  they  are  trying  to  tell  us.  It  is  also  difficult  to  imagine  ways  of  life  which  are  much  above  our  own  moral  level 
as  being  morally  demanded.  They  exert  no  magnetism  and  cannot  be  seen  except  in  terms  of  senseless  deprivation! 
3  Compare  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  351. 
4  Religions  are  generally  understood  to  consist  of  more  than  belief  in  God  or  Good,  or  be  not  just  a  sustainer  of 
morality.  Murdoch  here  differs  significantly  from  discussions  of  actual  religions.  See  for  example  Smart,  who 
distinguishes  the  following  aspects:  Practical  and  ritual  dimension,  experiential  and  emotional  dimension,  narrative 
114 The  present  discussion  of  the  dialogue  is  thus  used  to  expose  Murdoch's  particular  way  of 
regarding  religion.  It  also  considers  the  dialogical  structure  of  Acastos.  In  particular,  it  considers 
the  way  in  which  this  structure  affects  the  arguments  presented.  It  has  been  noted  before  that  the 
structure  of  a  dialogue  is  prevalent  within  Murdoch's  thinking.  It  presents  itself  not  only  in 
Acactos,  but  also  in  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals.  5  Yet,  Acastos  more  explicitly  reveals  this  form 
and  thus  more  naturally  invites  consideration  of  this  form. 
In  favouring  the  dialogue  form  Murdoch  expresses  her  admiration  for  Plato.  Like  the 
philosopher  `under  whose  banner  [she  is]  fighting'6,  she  considers  it  impossible  to  state 
philosophy's  ultimate  concerns.  She  refers  to  Plato's  Seventh  Letter  especially  in  support  of  this 
statement:  `The  Seventh  Letter  makes  the  point  even  more  emphatically.  What  is  really  important  in 
philosophy  cannot  be  put  into  written  words  and  scarcely  indeed  into  words.  (Language  itself 
may  be  a  barrier.  )'?  A  dialogue,  with  its  unfinished,  interrupted  thoughts,  and  undermining  banter 
exposes  the  limitations  of  the  thoughts  and  arguments  developed.  They  are  presented  by 
particular  people  in  particular  circumstances,  which  convey  the  contingency  of  their  truth.  It  thus 
inhibits  a  reading  in  which  one  position  is  considered  as  ultimate  truth.  8  The  limitations  of 
language  are  most  pressing  where  the  notion  of  the  Good  is  concerned.  When  contemplating  the 
Good  the  characters  in  Plato's  dialogues  also  employ  imagery,  most  famously  the  Allegory  of  the 
Cave,  where  the  sun  represents  the  Good.  Murdoch  considers  this  imagery  at  length  in  `The 
Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts'  and  The  Fire  and  the  Sun  in  particular. 
In  this  dialogue  about  religion,  the  characters'  minds  are  not  exclusively  occupied  by  this 
topic.  The  discussion  is  larded  with  their  expressions  of  love,  sexual  desire  or  jealousy  for  one 
or  mythic  dimension,  doctrinal  and  philosophical  dimension,  ethical  and  legal  dimension,  social  and  institutional 
dimension,  material  dimension.  )  N.  Smart,  The  117orldý  Re,  &ons.  -  Old  Tra&fions  andModern  Transformations  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge  University  Press,  1998)  p.  12-21. 
5  Tracy  even  argues  that  Melapbysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals'  -  even  more  than  Nlurdoch's  explicitly  Platonic  dialogues  in 
Acaslos  -  seems  to  me  more  faithful  to  the  kind  of  form  needed  for  rendering  a  Platonic  theory  of  the  Good  in  the 
late  twentieth  century  ... 
For  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  in  spite  of  its  occasional  appearance  of  meandering 
formlessness,  seems  less  a  treatise  and  more  like  the  great  mime-like  Platonic  dialogues.  '  (Iracy,  'The  Nfany  Faces  of 
Platonism',  p.  66) 
6  Murdoch,  'The  Sovereignty  of  Good  Over  Other  Concepts',  p.  364. 
7  Nfurdoch,  Tbe  Fire  and  the  Sun,  p.  405. 
8  Reading  Plato's  dialogues  as  dialogues  is  not  common  practise.  For  example,  the  main  speaker  in  The  So0bist  has 
been  regarded  as  Plato's  spokesperson,  even  when  he  is  called  a  stranger  rather  than  guest  from  Elea  (xenos),  and 
even  though  he  commits  parricide  by  arguing  that  'non-being  is'.  For  readings  which  do  regard  the  dramatic  aspects 
of  the  dialogue  see  S.  Rosen,  Plato  ý  Sophist:  The  Drama  of  Oii 
, ginal  and  Ima 
, ge  (New  Haven  and  London:  Yale 
University  Press,  1983).  Rosen  is  not  surprisingly  cluoted  approvingly  in  Metqpý  iaa  uide  o  Moral  for  an  ys,  es  sGts 
observation  on  Plato  in  another  work:  'Stanley  Rosen,  in  his  excellent  book  The.  QuarrrIbefoven  Philosoply  and  Poe/g, 
speaking  of  Heideggees  failure  to  understand  Plato,  suggests  that  the  elusive  Being  which  Heidegger  attempts  to 
discover  for  us  is  in  fact  the  kSbt  which  illuminates  the  atmosphere  of  the  Platonic  dialogues!  (Murdoch,  Melapbjsics 
as  a  Guide  loNforals,  142)  See  also  J.  Sallis,  Beiq  and  LoSos.  The  117ay  of  the  Platonic  Dialogues  (A  flantic  I  lighl  ands,  N  J.: 
Humanities  Press  International  Inc,  1986)  for  a  general  discussion  on  reading  Platonic  dialogues,  and  a  discussion  of 
6  of  the  dialogues. 
115 another.  This  sexual  play  both  invigorates  and  undermines  the  discussion.  In  their  love  for 
Socrates  his  friends  try  to  stretch  their  mind  while  at  the  same  time  ridiculing  each  other's  ideas. 
Especially  the  entrance  of  Alcibiades  at  the  end  of  the  dialogue  and  his  constant  mockery 
of  Plato  undermine  the  discussion  as  a  whole.  He  enters  the  discussion  just  after  Socrates  has 
declared  to  like  Plato's  words  and  to  love  him  while  he  speaks.  Plato  reveals  great  anxiety  by 
asking  if  he  is  not  loved  all  the  time.  Upon  this  delicate  moment  Alcibiades  bursts  in,  establishing 
himself  immediately  as  a  serious  rival: 
SoCR.  tTES:  Plato  has  been  telling  us  about  being  in  love. 
ALCIBLADES:  My  subject  too! 
TIMON.  X:  He's  in  love  with  Good. 
ALCIBLADES:  Is  it  mutual?  9 
In  a  typically  Murdochian  iconoclastic  move  the  reader  is  left  feeling  uncertain  about  the  worth 
of  anything  said  before. 
As  is  often  the  case  with  banter,  Alcibiades'  remark  is  not  only  comic,  but  also  touches 
upon  a  serious  difficulty  in  Murdoch's  understanding  of  the  Good.  The  question,  whether  the 
Good  is  as  much  in  love  with  Plato  as  Plato  is  with  the  Good,  reminds  of  `someone's'  objection 
in  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  that  `[i]t  makes  sense  to  speak  of  loving  God,  a  person,  but  very  little  to 
speak  of  loving  Good,  a  concept.  `Good'  even  as  a  fiction  is  not  likely  to  inspire,  or  be  even 
comprehensible  to,  more  than  a  small  number  of  mystically  minded  people,  who,  being  reluctant 
to  surrender  `God',  fake  up  `Good'  in  his  image,  so  as  to  preserve  some  kind  of  hope.  The 
picture  is  not  only  purely  imaginary,  it  is  not  even  likely  to  be  effective.  '  And,  the  objector 
continues,  would  it  not  be  better  to  give  up  all  metaphysical  speculation,  now  that  the  concept  of 
God  the  father  is  `outdated'  and  `rely  on  simple  popular  utilitarianism  and  existentialist  ideas, 
together  with  a  little  empirical  psychology,  and  perhaps  some  doctored  Marxism,  to  keep  the 
human  race  going.  '  Murdoch  immediately  admits  to  be  `often  more  than  half  persuaded  to  think 
in  these  terms  [her]se1P.  '10  Likewise,  in  Above  the  Gods  Alcibiades  wonders  whether  Plato's  Good 
is  not  purely  imaginary,  thought  up  by  a  poetic  mind.  Did  he  not  on  entering  ask  Plato  whether 
he  had  `written  any  poems  lately,  dear?  Love  poems?  "  1 
9  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  522. 
10  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  359. 
11  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  521. 
116 Despite  the  stage  setting  as  `Athens  in  the  late  fifth  century  BC'12  the  dialogue  is  both 
contemporary  and  historical.  This  is  suggested  by  the  author's  note  that  the  piece  is  to  be 
performed  either  in  modern  dress  or  in  period  costume.  It  is  also  confirmed  by  the  nature  of  the 
conversation  and  explicit  references  to  contemporary  incidents.  Acastos  for  example  comments: 
`when  the  priests  change  the  old-fashioned  language  into  modern  words  it  sounds  so  ugly  and 
awkward,  it  loses  spiritual  force  -  it's  as  if  the  gods  can't  speak  to  us  any  more,  they  are  silent, 
they've  hidden  themselves.  '13  So,  Acastos  complains  how  this  change  of  language  occasioned 
religion  to  loose  its  attraction.  Their  language  has  lost  its  force  and  its  sound.  His  words  are  a 
prominent  reminder  of  Murdoch's  opposition  to  the  modernisation  of  liturgy  in  the  Anglican 
Church. 
In  a  small  piece  written  against  this  change  it  emerges  that  Murdoch  considers  the  values 
lost  to  be  timeless:  `The  loss  of  lively  and  natural  access  to  the  Authorised  Version  of  the  Bible 
and  Cranmer's  Book  of  Common  Prayer  is  a  literary  loss  comparable  to  losing  touch  with 
Shakespeare.  It  is  also,  whether  or  not  one  believes  in  God,  a  spiritual  loss. 
... 
These  words  have 
been  treasured  and  understood  for  centuries  by  people  whose  use  made  of  them  timeless 
language,  perfectly  comprehensible  and  illuminating,  a  part  of  ordinary  life  for  educated  and 
uneducated  alike.  Now  an  ephemeral  parochial  `modernism'  threatens  to  cut  us  off  from  these 
sources  of  spiritual  and  literary  nourishment.  Such  a  loss  could  be  irrevocable.  '14  Murdoch 
considers  the  words  of  the  Authorised  Version  and  of  the  Book  of  Common  Prayer  timeless 
because  of  their  being  used  by  generations.  So  too,  in  rescuing  the  Good  from  the  disappearing 
God  she  is  concerned  with  timeless  values,  which  makes  the  dialogue  contemporary  or  historical, 
or  even  suggest  a  timeless  position. 
The  topic  of  discussion  has  come  up  at  the  characters'  return  from  a  religious  festival  to 
which  they  go  back  at  the  end.  This  festival  provides  of  course  a  good  opportunity  to  start 
discussing  religion.  This  beginning  duplicates  the  beginning  of  The  Republic,  and  as  such  may  be 
understood  as  a  homage  to  Plato.  Yet  no  philosopher-king  emerges  from  Above  the  Gods.  The 
dialogue's  decisive  interest  is  not  with  politics.  So,  if  this  beginning  is  also  a  reminder  of  the 
origination  of  new  communities,  in  particular  religious  communities,  at  festivals  of  the  previous 
ones,  this  does  not  have  political  consequences. 
The  characters  all  attend  this  festival,  even  though  none  of  them,  except  for  the  servant 
and  perhaps  Socrates15,  believe  in  the  gods  who  are  honoured.  Belief  in  the  gods  is  considered  to 
12  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  496. 
13  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  507. 
14  See  I.  Murdoch,  [untitled]  in  PR  Review  13  no.  6.5  (1979),  p.  5. 
15  'ALCIBIADES:...  But  have  you  really  been  talking  about  them?  (pointing  upwards) 
SOCRATES:  I  think  we've  passed  beyond  the  gods.  No  one  seems  to  want  to  defend  them  except  me. 
117 be  something  of  the  past.  Their  garlands  infected  with  fleas  reveal  the  deplorable  state  of  religion. 
They  wear  them  while  the  flowers  look  nice,  but  when  the  fleas  are  discovered  they  get  rid  of  the 
garlands  as  quickly  as  they  can.  16  And  thus,  they  discuss  religion,  but  none  of  them  really 
confesses  to  being  a  religious  man. 
The  classification  of  religion  as  belief  in  gods  is  not  differentiated.  Even  though  these 
Greek  men  as  citizens  of  ancient  Athens  talk  about  the  gods  in  the  plural,  these  gods  remain 
without  any  qualification  and  the  men  might  as  well  have  been  talking  about  one  god.  God  is 
here  the  god  of  philosophers,  the  god  who  received  his  name  from  Pascal's  famous  testament.  17 
The  conversation  is  that  of  philosophers  of  religion.  18  God  or  the  gods  represent  an  idea  to 
which  general  concepts  are  attributed.  These  men  do  not  consider  a  god  known  from  religious 
experience,  or  from  any  particular  religious  practice  or  text.  Their  god  is  primarily  a  structuring 
principle  in  politics  or  morality  and  their  main  concern  the  question  what  may  replace  his 
beneficial  usages.  19 
In  the  absence  of  any  professed  belief  in  god  the  discussion  promptly  shifts  to  morality. 
Religion  is  only  considered  from  its  ethical  dimension.  Or,  one  could  also  argue,  that  morality  for 
Murdoch  is  something  so  serious  that  it  is  religious,  as  an  angry  young  Plato  puts  it  in  Above  the 
Gods. 
`PLATO  (vehemently  intern  pting,  very  fast):  Religion  isn't  just  a  feeling,  it  isn't  just  a 
hypothesis,  it's  not  like  something  we  happen  to  know,  a  God  who  might  perhaps 
be  there  isn't  a  God,  it's  got  to  be  necessary,  it's  got  to  be  certain,  it's  got  to  be 
proved  by  the  whole  of  life,  it's  got  to  be  the  magnetic  centre  of  everything  - 
SOCRATES:  ... 
Moral  ideas  can  change  people  too. 
PLATO:  Not  so  deeply,  not  in  the  way  that's  required  of  us,  this  isn't  something 
optional,  we're  not  volunteers,  we're  conscripts.  We're  bad,  we  have  to  become 
TIMONAX:  Socrates! 
ALCIBIADES:  Ile  's  a  deep  one.  We  don't  know  how  to  have  himl 
... 
'  (Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  522) 
16  Alurdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  497  and  498.  Compare  p.  507. 
17  These  were  the  first  lines  of  a  text  found  on  the  piece  of  paper  found  sown  into  his  coat  after  his  death,  relating 
what  he  experienced  one  night  in  1654. 
11  B.  Clack,  B.  R.  Clack,  The  Pbilosopby  ofRehg7ion.  A  CrificalIntroduction  (Cambridge:  Polity  Press,  1998)  p.  6.  Clack  and 
Clack  discuss  here  how  many  works  suggest  that  theism  is  the  main  concern  for  philosophy  of  religion.  (See  p.  190 
n.  1  I  and  191  n.  12  for  references.  )  In  this  book  Clack  and  Clack  offer  alternative  approaches  as  well.  Note  also  that 
Murdoch  has  been  called  'a  friend  to  theistic  religion'  (F.  I.  Gamwell,  'On  the  Ioss  of  11-ieism',  p.  175,  compare  W. 
Schweik-er,  qbe  Sovereignty  of  GoXs  Goodness',  p.  209),  because  her  interest  in  religious  ideas  is  exceptional 
among  contemporary  philosophers. 
19  Compare  Kerr  on  what  he  calls  the  general  misconception  of  religion,  in  particular  Christianity  by  philosophers. 
(F.  Kerr,  Immortall-ongin 
, 
gs.,  Versions  offranscending  Humaniýi  (London:  SCPK,  1997),  p.  viiff,  compare  the  discussions 
of  the  various  authors,  and  in  particular  p.  154.  ) 
118 good,  it's  a  long  way.  Anyhow,  morality,  if  it's  anything  serious,  is  something 
religious.  ' 
So,  the  term  religion  is  used  to  emphasise  the  serious  nature  of  morality.  It  is  doubtful,  however, 
whether  this  use  of  the  term  is  generally  recognisable.  Plato  later  confesses  not  to  have  much  use 
for  the  notion,  precisely  because  `people  think  of  religion  as  something  exotic  and  formal,  and  a 
bit  aside  of  life,  whereas  what  I  mean  is  everywhere,  like  breathing.  '21 
As  stated  before,  Murdoch  considers  this  dialogue  both  contemporary  and  historical.  Yet, 
the  religion  in  question  is  perhaps  more  Christianity  than  Greek  mythology.  The  demise  of 
Christianity  is  a  constant  presumption  in  Murdoch's  work.  In  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  she  starts 
from  the  presumption  that  religion  is  collapsing,  though  she  later  admits  that  her  assumption  that 
"there  is  no  God'  and  that  the  influence  of  religion  is  waning  rapidly'  may  be  challenged.  22  If  only 
Socrates  had  been  more  persistent  when  arguing  that  `[q]uite  a  lot  of  educated  people  believe  in 
gods'23,  one  could  argue,  the  discussion  may  have  been  given  a  different  direction.  The 
suggestion  that  only  the  uneducated,  i.  e.  the  servant,  can  be  religious  and  believe  in  gods  would 
have  been  disputed.  24 
Such  criticism  is  partly  refuted  by  pointing  out  that  Murdoch's  principal  interest  is  not 
with  religious  believers,  but  with  whom  she  calls  `unreligious  believers'.  25  She  is  not  arguing  that 
there  is  no  use  for  religion  any  more,  but  that  she  is  preoccupied  with  people  for  whom  this  is 
true.  Her  work  is  about  and  for  these  people  who  are  and  have  been  without  religion  for  quite 
some  time.  They  can  no  longer  imagine  any  return  to  the  previous  belief,  but  at  the  same  time 
regret  the  loss  of  religion  for  different  reasons.  In  this  time  of  angels  Murdoch  endeavours  to 
retain  its  essentials  in  a  way  they  can  recognise.  26. 
Among  these  people  Murdoch  distinguishes  different  positions,  which  in  Above  the  Gods 
are  represented  by  the  different  characters.  First  there  is  Antagoras.  The  dialogue  takes  place  at 
20  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  513-514.  (Compare  Nfurdoch:  Religion  may  be  called  moral  philosophy  'so  long  as  it 
treats  those  matters  of  'ultimate  concerns,  '  our  experience  of  the  unconditioned  and  our  continued  sense  of  what  is 
holy'  (NIurdoch,  Me4bjsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  511-12,  as  quoted  in  Schweik-er,  'Me  Sovereignty  of  God's 
Goodness',  p.  209.  Compare  also  Nfurdoch,  Metapbjsics  as  a  Guide  toMorals,  p.  416) 
21  Nfurdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  519. 
22  Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good"I  p.  337  and  361  respectively. 
23  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  498. 
24  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  three  theological  essays  in  Antonaccio  (1996)  all  consider  Nfurdoch's  moral 
philosophy  and  its limits  for  a  Christian  (theistic)  position.  That  is,  as  (confessed)  Christian  theologians  they  have 
embraced  Murdoch's  work  (especially  Hauerwas  openly  confesses  to  doing  so)  at  least  partly  because  she  is  one  of 
the  few  philosophers  who  take  religion  seriously.  Yet,  in  the  articles  they  reconsider  this  embrace  because  Nfurdoch's 
thoughts  are  not  as  hospitable  for  Christianity  as  first  assumed. 
25  Nfurdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  344. 
26  Rozanov  uses  this  term  to  refer  to  the  present  time  without  god  (Nfurdoch,  The  Philosopberý  Pmpil  p.  187). 
Compare  too  Carel's  Bishop's  'interregnum'in  Murdoch,  The  Time  oftheA,  ýTielr,  p.  101. 
119 his  house.  He  is  characterised  as  `a  sophist,  in  love  with  Timonax',  who  is  identified  as  `a  socially 
conscious  youth'.  Antagoras  and  Timonax  consider  religion  from  a  political  perspective.  Next  are 
Acastos,  `a  serious  questioning  youth'  and  a  servant.  They  present  an  argument  from  the  obvious, 
as  the  virtuous  peasant  and  his  more  educated  counterpart.  The  dialogue  culminates  when 
Socrates  questions  a  young  and  angry  Plato.  They  are  interrupted  by  Alcibiades,  who  enters  near 
the  end  of  the  dialogue.  27  The  dialogue  proceeds  to  a  culmination  in  the  discussion  between 
Plato,  Alcibiades  and  Socrates.  In  these  persons  Murdoch  expresses  her  most  personal 
convictions. 
Antagoras,  the  first  to  offer  his  thoughts  on  religion,  finds  only  one  use  for  religion.  This 
is  a  political  one.  Religion  is  useful  to  control  the  uneducated  masses:  'considered  simply  as  a 
social  phenomenon  religion  can  be  a  useful  stabilising  factor.  We're  living  in  a  period  of 
, geivus  interim.  ... 
if  intellectual  and  psychological  shock,  a  time  of  deep  change,  an  interregnum,  a  dan 
people  worshipped  the  gods  and  kept  quiet  this  m  ight  save  the  state  from  worse  things.  So  long 
as  there's  an  uneducated  mob,  there's  a  place  for  something  like  religion.  128  He  emphasises  the 
use  of  fear  religion  may  imbue.  Pressed  by  Socrates  he  is  eventually  forced  to  admit  to  the 
deification  of  the  state.  29 
This  conclusion  infuriates  Timonax,  who,  speaking  fast,  expresses  his  disapproval  of 
religion.  'Religion  is  immoral,  it  stops  people  from  thinking  about  how  to  change  society.  ... 
Religion  had  always  been  a  reactionary  force,  it  makes  people  lazy  and  stupid,  it  consoles  them 
for  their  rotten  lives 
...  Religion  is  false,  it's  degrading,  it  makes  real  morality  impossible 
...  it's  a 
political  force,  it  commits  terrible  crimes,  intolerance  and  persecution  and  cruelty,  it's  like  a 
political  party,  it  is  a  political  party.  130  His  outburst,  vehement  as  it  may  be,  is  not  given  much 
reflection.  Socrates  is  quick  to  point  out  an  inaccuracy  in  Timonax'  reasoning,  but  more 
devastatingly,  he  confesses  that  Timonax'  eloquence  makes  him  tired.  Antagoras  merely  ridicules 
him. 
Timonax  and  Antagoras  both  represent  positions  wl-&h  are  clearly  political.  Antagoras  is 
a  statesman  with  little  interest  in  the  masses.  He  considers  himself  (intellectually  and  morally) 
superior  to  'die  uneducated  mobl.  31  For  this  mob  he  wants  religion  to  continue  in  order  for  the 
state  to  last,  yet  only  as  long  as  civilisation  has  not  fully  grown  up  and  come  to  see  the  truth  of 
27  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  496  and  521  respectively.  In  the  Platonic  dialogues  Plato  and  Socrates  never  appear 
together.  There  are  only  three  references  to  Plato  (Apolog  34a,  38b  and  Phaedo  59b).  Socrates  appears  of  course  in 
most  of  Plato's  dialogues  and  Alcibiades  only  in  The  Symposion.  The  names  of  the  other  three  characters  are  not  taken 
from  Plato's  dialogues,  but  from  Greek  mythology.  The  characters  in  Above  the  Gods  are  almost  the  opposite  of  their 
namesakes.  Acastos  is  son  of  Peleus,  Antagoras  a  poet,  Timonax  a  king. 
28  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  501. 
29  Murdoch,  Above  the  Godr,  p.  502. 
30  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  503-4. 
120 science.  He  significantly  speaks  of  the  distinction  between  fact  and  value,  to  which  Murdoch 
draws  our  attention  by  means  of  italics. 
AKTAGORAS:...  Now  we  can  separate  facts  from  value,  give  each  its  proper  place  in 
life,  get  rid  of  the  supernatural  on  both  sides.  Instead  of  cosmic  mythology  we 
have  science,  instead  of  picturesque  god  fables,  we  have  independent  moral  men 
making  up  their  minds  and  choosing  their  values  32 
Timonax  is  young  and  a  fiery  communist  (avant-la-lettrr).  His  characterisation  of  religion  as  'a  drug 
to  stop  people  from  resisting  tyranny'33  reminds  of  course  of  Marx"opium  for  the  people'. 
Unlike  Antagoras,  whom  he  accuses  of  cynicism  and  61itiSM34  Timonax  has  much  confidence  in 
the  masses.  He  trusts  that  equality  and  brotherhood,  and  morality  as  something  'absolute',  'as 
caiinýg  aboutpeople,  35  would  be  possible,  if  it  was  not  for  religion. 
These  positions  of  reactionary  and  communist  do  not  return  in  the  remainder  of  the 
dialogue,  though  Antagoras  and  Timonax  will  offer  serious  though  short  challenges  to  the  ideas 
of  Acastos,  Plato  and  Alcibiades.  Murdoch  does  not  disregard  the  political  consequences  of 
thought  or  her  own  aspiration  to  speak  for  or  even  control  the  masses.  Indeed,  Timonax  can  be. 
understood  to  resemble  her  younger  self,  and  Antagoras  her  older  self,  who  is  both  in  love  and 
annoyed  with  his  youth.  Yet,  politics  is  not  her  primary  concern  when  considering  religion. 
Antagoras  and  Timonax  state  their  position,  but  these  are  not  much  explored. 
Ile  next  person  questioned  by  Socrates  is  young  and  serious  Acastos.  From  this  point 
onwards  the  dialogue  changes  direction.  The  questions  Socrates  asks  shift  from  equating  religion 
with  belief  in  god  or  godS36  to  distinguishing  religion  from  morality.  37  He  also  changes  his  role 
from  questioning  to  more  positively  stating  what  he  deems  to  be  the  case.  Unlike  Antagoras  and 
Timonax  Acastos  is  not  stating  positive  theories,  but  more  stuttering  his  answers.  Acastos  is  a 
nice  and  perhaps  even  a  good  person.  He  notices  'certain  things'  around  him.  His  concern  for 
flies  reminds  of  James  in  T17e  Sea,  The  Sea.  38  Unlike  Antagoras  and  Timonax  he  does  not  regard 
the  slave  as  an  object,  though  he  does  feel  uncomfortable  in  talking  to  him.  He  is  also  friendly  to 
Plato,  offering  him  a  seat  in  the  beginning  and  taking  him  along  to  the  festival  in  the  end. 
31  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  501. 
32  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  499-500. 
33  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  503. 
34  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  501. 
35  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  504. 
36  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  498,500,502,505. 
37  Murdoch,  Above  Me  Gods,  p.  509,513. 
3'  Murdoch,  The  Sea,  The  Sea,  p.  179,  where  Charles  notes  that  James  and  the  fly  looked  at  each  other! 
121 Acastos  most  eminently  talks  with  the  sort  of  emphasis  which  is  characteristic  for  many 
of  the  discussions  in  Murdoch's  novels,  and  which  gives  them  their  unique  and  also  peculiar 
timbre.  One  can  only  speculate  about  the  use  of  this  idiosyncratic  device.  I  understand  it  as  an 
attempt  to  convey  a  sense  of  knowing  something  for  sure  while  at  the  same  time  being  at  a  loss 
to  express  what  is  known  with  so  much  certainty.  It  is  also  open  to  easy  ridicule. 
ACASTOS:  I  think  religion  contains  morality.  It  goes  beyond  common  sense,  it  goes 
beyond  that  sort  of  limited  attitude,  dividing  the  world  into  manageable  bits. 
Religion  is  believing  that  your  life  is  a  whole  -I  mean  that  goodness  and  duty  are 
just  everywhere  -  like  always  looking  further  and  deeper  -  and  feeling  reverence  for 
things  -a  religious  person  would  care  about  everything  in  that  sort  of  way,  he'd 
feel  everything  mattered  and  every  second  mattered. 
SOCRATES:  No  time  offl39 
His  ideas  and  metaphors  remind  one  of  Murdoch's  own  words,  as  in  the  earlier  quotation  of  his 
criticism  on  the  change  from  old-fashioned  to  modern  language.  Constantly  questioned  by 
Socrates  he  struggles  with  the  paradox  of  being  `drawn  to  the  idea  of  a  sort  of  central  -  good  - 
something  very  real'40,  which  at  the  same  time  cannot  be  named.  He  wonders  whether  religion 
can  go  on  existing  yet  without  lying,  and  does  not  `want  worship  and  ritual  and  prayer  and  so  on 
just  to  go  -there's  a  valuable  -  precious  -  thing  inside  it  all'.  This  something  is  more  remembered 
than  invented  41 
Yet,  when  pressed  by  Socrates, 
SOCRATES:  Can  there  be  religion  without  mythology,  without  stories  and  pictures? 
Should  we  be  trying  now  to  think  of  it  like  that? 
ACASTOS:  I  don't  know! 
SOCRATES:  Is  a  certain  opaqueness,  a  certain  nystey,  necessary  to  it? 
ACASTOS(alniost  tearful:  I  don't  know! 
SOCRATES:  Would  you  say  that  religion  is  something  naturaR'42 
Acastos,  almost  in  tears,  has  to  confess  that  he  doesn't  know.  However,  being  unable  to  express 
one's  thoughts  does  not  entail  bad  morality.  It  has  been  noted  before  that  Murdoch  does  not 
39  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  508. 
40  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  506. 
41  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  507. 
122 condemn  the  inability  to  express  morality.  In  his  concern  for  the  flies,  the  slave  and  for  Plato 
Acastos  exemplifies  virtue  and  concern  for  other  human  beings.  After  the  vexing  moment  quoted 
above  Timonax  rescues  Acastos  by  suggesting  a  break.  In  this  interval  the  servant  is  questioned. 
In  this  dialogue  the  simple  truth  is  embodied  by  the  servant,  whose  belief  in  god  defies 
the  logic  of  the  debating  men.  He  cannot  comprehend  that  they  ask  what  god  is  like,  or  that  they 
ask  after  the  reasons  why  the  gods  should  be  loved. 
ACASTOS:  Are  they  good? 
SLAVE:  (putitiled)  I  don't  know.  They  are  gods.  43 
In  his  broken  language  he  explains  to  the  men  what  God  is  like  and  how  he  is  everywhere  and 
everything  for  him.  Antagoras  and  Timonax  make  fun  of  him,  but  Acastos  is  most  of  all 
embarrassed.  44 
Plato's  angry  interruption  occurs  just  after  this  interval.  His  manner  of  speech  is  rather 
different  from  that  of  Acastos.  He  is  unsocial  and  obsessed  with  Socrates,  but  indifferent  if  not 
hostile  to  the  others.  Yet,  he  is  equally  unable  to  proceed  at  the  end.  Acastos'  and  Plato's  ideas 
and  metaphors  are  not  that  different,  as  affirmed  by  Acastos'  meek  remarks  of  assent  45  Plato  too 
speaks  of  something  absolute.  This  is  introduced  with  the  undermining  sense  of  comedy,  so 
typical  for  Murdoch's  writing: 
SOCRATES:  What  is  this  `it'  that  you're  certain  of  in  this  special  unique  way,  which 
isn't  God  and  which  has  to  exist  and  is  proved  by  everything  and  is  seen  in  the 
clear  light  beyond  the  shadows? 
PI.  ATO:  Good. 
ANTAGORAS:  What  did  he  say? 
PLATO:  Good.  46 
Plato  helpfully  mentions  the  difference  between  his  ideas  and  those  of  Acastos,  which  is  to  be 
found  in  the  notions  of  love  and  desire.  Indeed,  Plato's  ideas  are  in  comparison  notably 
42  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  509-10. 
43  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  529.  CE  p.  512. 
44  It  is  interesting  to  compare  this  embarrassment  to  that  felt  by  readers  at  the  presence  of  this  slave.  (See  M.  C. 
Nussbaum,  'Miscast  in  Dialogue  Form'  in  Times  Literary  Supplement  15  August  1986,  p.  881).  Nussbaum's  criticism  is 
justified  if  the  slave  is  mainly  introduced  to  convey  the  position  of  the  virtuous  peasant.  However,  I  consider  him 
even  more  important  for  conveying  these  thinkers'  uncomfortable  attitude  to  a  position  which  is  not  sustained  by 
argument,  but  may  be  worthwhile  nevertheless. 
45  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  515. 
123 psychological,  in  the  sense  that  they  have  to  do  with  the  p.  ryche.  47  He  distinguishes  its  different 
levels:  one  part  is  concerned  with  truth  and  reality,  the  rest  consists  of  mere  fantasies  and  `selfish 
tricks'.  48  Deeply  moral  or  religious  change  is  compared  to  learning  mathematics  or  a  trade.  Thus 
one  may  learn  that  there  is  something  outside  us,  and  to  forget  oneself.  49  One  may  even  learn  this 
from  falling  in  love.  At  Socrates'  suggestion  Plato  eagerly  admits  that  there  is  a  god  after  all  and 
his  name  is  Eros,  or  rather  that  Eros  is  `a  holy  passionate  spirit  ... 
in  love  with  the  Good.  '50 
Despite  his  sceptical  audience  Plato  maintains  that  everyone  instinctively  knows  that  the 
Good  is  real  and  absolute,  in  a  variation  on  Descartes'  famous  experiment: 
PLATO:  ... 
People  know  that  good  is  real  and  absolute,  not  optional  and  relative, 
all  their  life  proves  it....  We  can  think  everything  else  away  out  of  our  life,  but  not 
value,  that's  in  the  very  -  ground  of  things.  51 
Moral  philosophy,  for  Plato  as  for  Acastos,  is  everywhere.  52 
Plato's  questioning  by  Socrates  is  terminated  by  the  crushing  entrance  of  Alcibiades. 
Alcibiades  is  above  all  an  iconoclast.  He  has,  as  Antagoras  suggests,  castrated  all  the  statues  of  the 
gods.  This  literal  desecration  is  yet  preceded  by  a  figural  one,  for  by  being  offended  by  the  gods 
for  `flaunting  their  organs  at  us'  (his  reason  for  castrating  them)  Alcibiades  has  first  brought  the 
gods  down  to  the  level  of  ordinary  humans,  by  making  them  subject  to  human  morality.  53 
Alcibiades  is  told  about  the  preceding  discussion,  where  Socrates  admits  that  he  is  the 
only  one  who  wants  to  defend  the  Gods.  54  In  a  constant  mockery  of  Plato  and  his  sexual  jealousy 
Alcibiades  declares  that  religion  is  power: 
ALCIBIADES  (solemn  and  sonorous):  Knowledge  is  power,  as  we  all  know.  Power  is 
the  knowledge  that  good  and  evil  are  not  enemies,  they  are 
, 
friends....  So  evil  isn't 
really  evil,  good  isn't  really  good,  we  pass  beyond  the  ordinary  childish  abstract 
notions  of  good  and  evil  and  enter  into  the  unity  of  the  world!  Then  we  are  kings, 
46  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  514. 
47  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  515. 
48  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  515. 
49  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  516. 
50  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  518. 
51  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  518. 
52  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  516. 
53  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  522: 
`SOCRATES:  I  imagine  you  wouldn't  call  yourself  a  religious  man? 
ANTAGORAS:  Was  it  you  who  castrated  all  those  statues  of  the  gods? 
ALCIBIADES:  Ssssh!  The  gods  deserve  to  be  castrated.  Who  are  they  to  flaunt  their  organs  at  us?  But  have  you  really 
been  talking  about  them?  (pointing  upwards)' 
124 then  we  are  gods,  the  unified  soul  is  the  lord  of  reality.  Thais  religion,  that's  the 
mystery  which  the  initiated  know,  and  now  is  the  new  era  when  at  last  it  will  be  made 
plain.  55 
Plato  attacks  him  for  his  thoughts  in  a  bloodthirsty  desire  to  kill  them.  Alcibiades  is  highly 
amused  by  this. 
If  nothing  else  this  derisive  Nietzschean  response  allows  Socrates  to  return  away  from  the 
elaborate  arguments  to  common  sense  and  SiMpliCity.  56  He  argues  to  simply  try  to  be  good,  to  see 
the  extent  in  which  religion  and  morality  are  allies  and  the  extent  in  which  one  should  live  by 
external  rules:  'Goodness  is  simple,  it's  just  very  diffiCUlt.  '57  This  plea  for  simplicity  amuses 
Alcibiades  and  evokes  a  solemn  reaction  from  Plato.  Even  though  Socrates  has  beseeched  him 
not  to  make  a  drama  of  it,  Plato  declares  to  kneel  at  what  he  perceives  to  be  a  newly  built  shrine. 
Socrates'  plea  for  simplicity  here  is  reminiscent  of  the  beginning  of  theThe  Idea  of 
Perfection'.  In  a  reproach  of  a  well-known  phrase  of  the  earlier  Socrates  Cthe  uncxamined  life  is 
not  worth  hving5ý  Murdoch  argues  that  'it  must  be  possible  to  do  justice  to  both  Socrates  and 
the  virtuous  peasant.  159  In  Above  The  Gods  likewise  Murdoch  warns  the  intellectuals  debating  not  to 
disregard  simple  answers,  where  an  intellectual  approach  is  naturally  likely  to  favour  an 
intellectual  answer.  The  dialogue  thus  endorses  the  truth  of  this  simplicity.  In  the  various 
arguments  presented  there  is  constant  warning  against  preference  for  the  own  (intellectual) 
approach  as  well  as  wariness  of  Plato's  too  violent  feelings  that  the  answer  cannot  be  simple. 
Ile  dialogue  ends  when  the  characters  return  to  the  festival  in  order  to,  as  Socrates  puts 
it,  'enjoy  our  gods  while  we  can'.  He  walks  away,  'affectionally  arm  in  arm  with  Alcibiades'. 
Socrates  does  not  mind  the  latter's  ideas,  but  Plato  does.  Alcibiades  is  amused  by  Socrates'  plea 
for  simplicity,  but  Plato  can't  bear  it.  The  stage  directions  instruct  the  actor  to  'hold  his  bursting 
head.  ' 
In  Above  the  Gods  as  in  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  the  Good  appears  after  observing  the 
decline  of  religion.  In  `On  `God'  and  `Good"  Murdoch  notices  a  void  in  philosophy,  as  it  is 
unable  to  rescue  the  values  involved  in  the  collapse  of  religion.  That  essay  attempts  to  retain  in 
54  Is  Socrates  ironic  here?  See  Timonax'  response.  (Nfurdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  cp.  519-521) 
ss  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  523. 
so  It  is  a  reminder  of  Murdoch's  great  admiration  for  Wittgenstein.  Compare: 
`SOCRATES:  Beware  in  philosophy  of  things  which  `must  be  so',  at  least  look  at  them  with  a  cool  eye.  '  (Murdoch, 
Above  the  Gods,  p.  524)  and: 
`And  of  course,  as  Wittgenstein  pointed  out,  the  fact  that  one  is  irresistibly  impelled  to  say  it  need  not  mean  that 
anything  else  is  the  case.  '  (Murdoch,  `The  Idea  of  Perfection',  p.  316.  L.  Wittgenstein,  Philosophische  Unterruchunnen 
(Frankfurt:  Suhrkamp,  1984),  or.  299) 
57  Murdoch,  Above  the  Gods,  p.  525. 
58  Plato,  Apolo&y,  38a. 
125 the  notion  of  the  Good  a  central  concept  with  the  characteristics  of  the  old  God.  60  Above  the  Gods 
features  a  discussion  of  characters  who,  inspired  by  the  love  for  one  another  and  in  particular  for 
Socrates,  consider  moral  philosophy  rather  than  religion,  even  though  the  dialogue's  subtitle 
suggest  differently.  The  topic  of  religion  is  first  proposed,  but  quickly  replaced  by  moral 
philosophy,  because  none  of  the  characters  confesses  to  believe  in  god  or  gods,  the  servant  and 
perhaps  Socrates  excepted. 
The  characters  consider  the  task  of  moral  philosophy  now  that  religion  has  disappeared. 
Even  though  religion  may  not  be  their  prime  concern  their  (tacit)  understanding  of  religion 
decides  the  discussion  of  moral  philosophy.  The  first  speakers  express  political  concerns.  Yet,  the 
dialogue  is  more  interested  in  an  understanding  of  moral  philosophy  as  concerned  with 
individuals  and  the  Good.  When  Plato  uses  `religious'  or  `religion'  it  is  to  warrant  the  seriousness 
of  his  moral  philosophy.  `Religion'  denotes  here  a  timeless  truth,  exemplified  in  Christianity 
concerning  an  individual's  relation  to  an  absolute  truth,  but  not  something  sustained  by  a 
community,  or  expressed  in  particular  texts  or  sacraments.  With  the  entrance  of  Alcibiades  this 
understanding  of  `religion'  is  put  into  question  and  portrayed  as  purely  imaginary  and  ineffectual. 
Socrates'  final  words,  as  well  as  the  presence  of  the  slave,  caution  against  ignoring  the  position  of 
the  layperson  in  this  debate. 
Above  the  Gods  thus  reveals  the  positions  which  alternately  decide  Murdoch's 
contemplation  of  the  good,  and  the  subsequent  discussion  of  the  ontological  proof:  Plato's  desire 
to  build  shrines,  Socrates'  plea  for  simplicity  and  Alcibiades'  iconoclasm,  as  well  as  the  servant's 
presence.  How  can  she  defend  the  Good  against  Alcibiades  and  should  she  do  so  at  all  costs? 
How  much  does  it  matter  that  Murdoch  forfeits  most  aspects  of  religion? 
3.  The  ontological  proof  The  `belie  that  the  proof  tries  to  p»nve' 
In  particular  Murdoch's  later  oeuvre  affirms  the  importance  of  the  proof  for  her  philosophical 
thinking.  It  first  occurs  in  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  where  Murdoch  remarks  that  'the  ontological 
proof  is  seen  to  be  not  exactly  a  proof  but  rather  a  clear  assertion  of  faith 
....  which  could  only 
confidently  be  made  on  the  basis  of  a  certain  expcrience.  '61  In  Tbe  Fi1v  and  lbe  SWn  she  calls  it 
'Plato's  main  ideal.  62  The  proof  then  appeared  as  the  topic  of  one  of  her  Gifford  lectures  in  1982. 
She  used  this  text  again  in  the  Van  der  Leeuw  lecture  in  Groningen,  in  1987,  and  in  1992,  in 
59  Murdoch,  q1e  Idea  of  Perfection' 
,  p.  299-300. 
60  Nfurdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  344. 
61  Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  351,  compare  349. 
62  Murdoch,  The  Fite  and  the  Smn,  p.  458. 
126 Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  she  devotes  two  chapters  to  it.  The  proof  is  also  interjected  by  the 
most  mystically  minded  characters  in  her  novels  from  The  Unicorn  onwards.  63 
The  importance  of  this  proof  has  been  generally  recognised.  Conradi  points  out  that  `the 
ontological  proof  has  deep  roots  in  Murdoch's  thought.  '64  It  is  discussed  by  more  than  half  of  the 
contributors  to  Iris  Murdoch  and  the  Search  for  Human  Goodness.  The  proof  has  too  an  important 
place  in  Antonaccio's  Picturing  the  Human.  She  argues  that  `[Murdoch's]  account  of  the  good  is 
validated  by  a  version  of  the  ontological  proof.  '65 
The  present  discussion  of  the  ontological  proof  starts  with  Murdoch's  reading  of  Anselm 
in  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  while  also  remembering  the  different  characters  of  Above  the 
Gods.  The  contrast  between  the  learned  and  the  simple  encountered  in  Above  the  Gods  returns  at 
the  end  of  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals'  (first)  chapter  on  the  ontological  proof  when  Murdoch 
writes: 
An  ultimate  religious  `belief  must  be  that  even  if  all  `religions'  were  to  blow  away 
like  mist,  the  necessity  of  virtue  and  the  reality  of  the  good  would  remain.  This  is 
what  the  ontological  proof  tries  to  `prove'  in  terms  of  a  unique  formulation.  This 
is  for  thinkers  to  look  at.  The  ordinary  fellow  `just  knows',  for  one  is  speaking  of 
something  which  is  obvious,  the  unique  nature  of  morality.  66 
In  this  quote  Murdoch  distinguishes  between  thinkers  and  ordinary  fellows.  The  proof  as  well  as 
its  object  -  the  necessity  of  virtue  and  the  reality  of  the  good  -  is for  thinkers  to  look  at.  Thus  they 
are  distinguished  from  ordinary  fellows.  Wloever  looks  at  the  proof  is  thus  identified  not  as  an 
ordinary  fellow  who  'just  knows'  Cin  quotation  marks),  but  as  a  thinker  who  looks  at  this-  ultimate 
religious  'belief  (in  quotation  marks)  that  the  ontological  proof  tries  to  'prove'  (also  in  quotation 
marks).  Murdoch  thus  recreates  the  environment  of  Above  The  Gods  where  the  learned  discussed 
religion  in  the  presence  of  an  ordinary  believer.  As  in  the  dialogue,  the  ordinary  fellow  may  be 
regarded  as  an  object  of  ridicule  or  desire,  or  a  cause  of  embarrassment,  but  more  interlude  than 
part  of  the  discussion. 
Looking  at  the  proof  is,  however,  a  rather  complicated  matter,  witness  its  many  and 
divers  interpretations.  Looking  at  it  does  not  at  all  certify  that  the  thinker  will  find  what  the 
ordinary  fellow  'just  knows'.  On  the  contrary,  it  may  obscure  and  diffuse  the  'ultimate  religious 
63See  Conradi,  The  Saint  and  The  Arfixt,  p.  108-109,  p.  314,  p.  392n.  13  for  references  to  The  Saard  and  Profane  Love 
Machine,  The  Sea,  The  Sea,  Nuns  and  Sol&ers,  Tbe  Philosopher  ý  Pupil 
"Conradý  The  Saint  and  The  Artist,  p.  392n.  13. 
65Antonaccio,  Piduting  the  Human,  p.  15. 
66Nfurdoch,  MeVbjsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  428. 
127 `belief  that  even  if  all  `religions'  were  to  blow  away  like  mist,  the  necessity  of  virtue  and  the 
reality  of  the  good  would  remain.  '  For  various  thinkers  have  dismissed  the  proof  for  convincing 
reasons. 
As  a  way  to  the  `belief  then  the  approach  of  the  thinker  may  not  be  the  most  secure  one. 
It  may  not  even  be  a  feasible  one.  Murdoch's  distinction  between  thinkers  and  ordinary  fellows 
thus  introduces  an  important  point  of  debate  in  the  reception  of  this  proof.  It  has  been  argued 
that  the  ontological  proof  is  not  so  much  a  proof  as  an  affirmation  of  faith.  If  this  is  the  case,  it 
cannot  be  proven  or  understood  from  any  (thinker's)  faithless  position. 
This  affirmation  of  faith  has,  moreover,  been  said  to  be  personal.  67  Murdoch  observes 
that  it  is  `a  proof  which  a  man  can  only  give  to  himself,  herein  resembling  codito  ego  suer,  to  which 
it  is  indeed  related  by  Descartes.  '68  The  ontological  proof  thus  considered  is  different  from  any 
proof  of  which  the  outcome  may  be  accepted  by  testimony.  There  are  many  such  proofs,  which 
one  does  not  prove  oneself,  because  it  suffices  to  trust  someone  else's  expertise.  The  ontological 
proof,  on  the  contrary,  has  to  be  proven  by  each  individual. 
For  Murdoch  these  two  aspects,  the  importance  of  faith  and  of  proving  the  proof 
individually,  set  the  proof  apart  from  all  other  proofs,  but  do  not  affect  its  importance: 
Yet  these  reminders  do  not  set  the  Proof  aside  as  a  piece  of  history  or  items  of 
private  piety,  and  in  spite  of  having  been  apparently  demolished  by  Kant  it  has 
continued  to  interest  philosophers  and  theologians.  Credo  sit  intelligam  (I  believe  in 
order  to  understand)  is  not  just  an  apologist's  paradox,  but  an  idea  with  which  we 
are  familiar  in  personal  relationships,  in  art,  in  theoretical  studies.  I  have  faith 
(important  place  for  this  concept)  in  a  person  or  idea  in  order  to  understand  him 
or  it,  I  intuitively  know  or  grasp  more  than  I  can  yet  explain  69 
In  Murdoch's  explanation  of  credo  ut  inlelli:  gam,  this  faith  does  not  belong  to  a  specific  person  or 
group.  It  is  not  expressed  by  any  particular  religious  belief,  but  it  is  'an  idea  with  which  we  are 
familiar  in  personal  relationships,  in  art,  in  theoretical  studies.  'T'he  faith  considered  by  Murdoch 
is  recognised  by  all.  It  is  the  faith  in  persons  and  beliefs  which  goes  beyond  explanation. 
If  this  faith  is  not  a  specific  faith,  what  about  the  'belief'  that  the  ontological  proof  tries  to 
'prove'?  Anselm  in  the  most  famous  formulation  of  the  proof  considers  God  to  be  the  object  of 
the  proof.  It  has  been  pointed  out  that  his  understanding  of  God  as  'that  than  which  nothing 
67This  is  too  very  important  in  Antonaccio's  reading  of  the  proof.  She  argues  that  for  Murdoch  the  proof  starts  in 
consciousness.  (Antonaccio,  Piduriq  fhe  Hmman,  chapter  V  and  VI) 
68NIurdoch,  Afelaphysicszr  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  392. 
128 greater  can  be  thought'  is  not  merely  Christian.  Steel  mentions  a  similar  phrase  found  in  Seneca. 
However,  he  also  argues  that  Anselm  found  the  origin  of  the  phrase  'that  than  which  nothing 
greater  can  be  thought'  in  a  text  by  one  of  the  church  fathers:  Augustine's  De  libem  arbilrio.  70 
In  comparison,  Murdoch  refers  to  the  object  of  the  proof  as  'an  ultimate  religious  'belief' 
...  that  even  if  all  'religions'  were  to  blow  away  like  mist,  the  necessity  of  virtue  and  the  reality  of 
the  good  would  remain.  '  She  provides  yet  another  explication  by  twice  quoting  Tillich,  at  the 
ysics  as  a  Guide  to  Aforals.  In  this 
. 
ph  beginning  of  both  chapters  on  the  ontological  proof  in.  Aleta 
quotation  from  his  Systematic  Tbeolog  Tillich  speaks  of'the  acknowledgement  of  the  unconditional 
element  in  the  structure  of  reason  and  reality.  171 
These  descriptions  are  not  the  same.  In  Murdoch's  reading,  the  proof  is  no  longer 
considered  within  a  particular  religious  tradition.  The  belief  goes  beyond  different  religious 
traditions.  Here  again,  I  understand  Murdoch  to  be  writing  most  of  all  for  these  unreligious 
believers.  Similar  to  her  reading  of  Kant  Murdoch  does  not  consider  Anselm's  concerns,  but 
rather  appropriates  his  ideas  in  order  to  answer  the  question  'How  can  we  make  ourselves 
morally  better?  '. 
What  then  does  the  proof  prove  for  Murdoch?  Murdoch  hesitates  to  describe  the  import 
of  this  proof,  which  is  apparent  from  her  abundant  use  of  quotation  marks.  What  kind  of  belief  is 
one  in  quotation  marks  that  is  proven  in  quotation  marks?  How  can  it  be  called  religious  when  it 
is  to  remain  even  if  all  religions  (in  quotation  marks)  were  to  blow  away  like  mist?  To  what  extent 
is  Murdoch  creating  or  ordering  this  belief  by  stating  that  it  must  be,  not  that  it  is?  In  answering 
these  questions  I  first  consider  the  object  of  the  proof  and  then  the  position  of  the  unbeliever  or 
fool. 
4.  The  DßrentArguments  inAnselm'.  r  Proslogion 
Most  of  the  writing  on  Anselm's  Proslogion  concentrates  on  only  three  of  its  26  chapters.  These 
three,  the  chapters  two,  three  and  four,  constitute  the  famous  ontological  argument  for  the 
existence  of  God.  This  argument  has  fascinated  thinkers  greatly,  even  to  the  extent  in  which  they 
69  Murdoch,  Metapbysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  393. 
70  Steel  argues:  'Zo  heeft  men  terecht  gewezen  op  een  parallelle  passus  by  de  stdische  filosoof  Seneca:  'Quid  cst 
deus? 
... 
Sic  demum  magnitudo  illi  sua  redditur,  qua  nulla  maius  cogitari  potest,  ... 
'  (quaestiones  nalurales,  1,13,7s).  Het 
is  echter  bij  Augustinus  dat  Anselmus  de  aardeiding  voor  zijn  beroemde  formule  gevonden  heeft.  Zie  De  kberv 
arbiltio,  II,  VI,  14:  het  bestaan  van  God  zal  pas  bewezen  zijn,  wanneer  aangetoond  is  dat  er  een  wezen  bestaat  'quo 
nullus  est  superior'.  '  [Along  these  lines  a  parallel  passus  has  been  pointed  out  in  the  work-  of  the  stoic  philosopher 
Seneca:  'Quid  est  deus? 
...  Sic  demum  magnitudo  illi  sua  redditur,  qua  nulla  maius  cogitari  potest,  ... 
'  (quaestiones 
naturales,  1,13,7s).  However,  Anselm  found  in  Augustine  occasion  for  his  famous  formula.  See  De  kbem  arbitrio,  II, 
VI,  14:  the  existence  of  God  will  be  proven  when  it  has  been  demonstrated  that  there  is  a  being'quo  nuUus  est 
. gd  door  de  discussie  mel  Gaunilo,  ingeleid,  vertaald  en  geannoteerd  superior'.  ]  (Anselmus  van  Canterbury,  Pmslo 
, gion,  gevol 
door  dr.  Carlos  Steel  (Bussum:  het  Wereldvenster,  1981)  p.  50n.  19) 
71,  Nfetapbysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  391-392  and  p.  431.  See  also  P.  Tillich,  Systemalic  TI)eologv,  Part  I,  section  I. 
129 felt  it  impossible  not  to  take  a  stand,  as  Steel  suggests.  Some  have  tried  to  formulate  its  final 
refutation  (Gaunilo,  Thomas  Aquinas,  Gassendi,  Kant,  Russell),  others  to  find  new  positive 
versions  of  the  old  argument  Puns  Scotus,  Descartes,  Spinoza,  Leibniz,  Hegel,  Hartshome).  72 
The  fascination  principally  concerns  these  three  chapters,  yet  by  singling  these  out  one 
directly  enters  the  discussion  on  the  interpretation  of  the  proof,  The  in-  or  exclusion  of  the  first 
chapter  is  especially  significant.  This  introductory  chapter,  an  'Exhortation  of  the  mind  to  the 
contemplation  of  God',  is  a  prayer.  Anselrn  laments  his  inability  to  find  God  and  his  unfortunate 
fate  which  has  removed  him  from  God's  presence.  He  expresses  his  desire  to  see  God  and  he 
asks  for  his  help. 
This  prayer  is  a  moving  and  beautiful  piece  of  prose,  yet  is  it  also  part  of  the  proof?.  The 
answer  to  this  question  is  decided  by  the  importance  one  attributes  to  faith.  Those  who  regard 
the  ontological  proof  as  a  rational  argument  consider  this  first  chapter  to  be  merely  literary 
ornamentation.  For  those  who  underline  the  importance  of  faith  it  is  more  truly  introductory.  For 
them  the  prayer  reveals  Anselm's  intentions  and  argumentation.  In  the  ontological  proof  Anselm 
looks  for  reasons  which  will  support  his  belief.  'Ile  prayer  reveals  his  desire  to  come  thus  closer 
to  God  as  well  as  his  sorrow  at  his  present  distance  to  him.  73 
Murdoch  quotes  a  few  lines  from  this  first  chapter,  which  she  calls  a  preface  to  the  proof, 
in  order  to  argue  that  possible  limitations  to  the  proof  -  the  'context  of  deep  belief  and 
disciplined  spirituality,  74  -  are  not  real  limitations.  That  the  proof  is  preceded  by  faith  is  nothing 
unusual,  but  in  contrast  something  'with  which  we  are  familiar'.  'Faith  (loving  belieý  and 
knowledge  often  have  an  intimate  relation  which  is  not  easy  to  analyse  in  terms  of  what  is  prior 
72  Steel  argues:  'Het  is  wel  merkwaardig  dat  allc  grote  dcnk-ers  zich  genoodzaakt  zagen  tegenover  dit  argument 
steffing  te  nemen,  hetzij  om  het  af  te  wijzen,  hetzij  orn.  het,  mits  gewijzigd,  te  aanvaarden.  De  stellingrien-Ling 
tegenover  het  ontologisch  argument  is  zelfs  kenmerk-end  voor  het  type  fflosofie  dat  wordt  beoefend.  '  Pt  is  curious 
that  all  great  thinkers  feel  obliged  to  take  a  stand  against  this  argument,  either  to  reject  or  to  accept,  granted  in  a 
changed  version-  The  stand  with  regard  to  the  ontological  argument  characterises  the  sort  of  philosophy  practised.  ] 
(Anselmus,  Pms)ogion,  p.  7,  compare  p.  26)  Compare  too  p.  7-8,  where  (like  Afurdoch)  Steel  seems  to  suggest  that  the 
proof  is for  thinkers  (plural)  rather  than  for  the  individual  believer:  ýDeze  tekst  zal  dus  een  zeer  gevarieerd  pubhek 
kunnen  interesseren:  theologen  en  filosofen,  metafysiciý  logiciý  taalfilosofeti,  mediaevisten  en  -waarorn  niet?  -  de 
gelovige  'die  zoekt  naar  inzicht  in  zijn  geloof.  '  rINs  text  may  interest  a  very  diversified  audience:  Ilieologians  and 
philosophers,  metaphysicians,  logicians,  philosophers  of  language,  mediaevists  and  -  why  not?  -  ffie  believer  who 
'seeks  to  understand  his  faith'.  ]  See  Steel  (Anselmus,  Proslogion,  p.  9-31),  A.  NkGiU'Recent  Discussions  of 
Anschn's  Argument)'  a.  Hick-,  A.  McGill  (eds),  The  Many-FacedAquxent.  -  Recent  Studies  on  the  OnfolqicalAqumentfor 
theE%istence  ofGod(London:  AfacNffflan,  1968),  p.  33-1  10)  for  an  overview  of  recent  scholarship  on  the  proof 
73  Steel  refers  to  F.  Schmitt,  Anselm  Pon  Canterbug  (Stuttgart/Bad  Cannstadt,  1962)  as  one  who  favours  a  typically 
rationalistic  interpretation  of  the  ontological  proof  and  who  considers  this  first  chapter  as  literary  ornamentation. 
Steel  mentions  in  contrast  two  articles  by  A.  Stolz,  which  give  a  more  significant  role  to  this  chapter.  Thinking  is 
happening  in  speaking  to  God  (pros-logion).  See  A.  Stolz,  'Zur  T'heologie  Anselms  im  Proslogion'  (Call)okca  2 
(1933),  p.  1-24)  and  A.  Stolz,  'Das  Proslogion  des  111.  Anselms'  (Revue  Nnidiefine  47  (1935),  p.  331-347).  See  Steel  too 
on  the  division  of  the  remaining  chapters.  Murdoch  follows  Stolz's  classical  division.  (Anselmus,  PM.  Flogion,  p.  22-23 
and  p.  40n.  10) 
74  Murdoch,  Afelqpýysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  392. 
130 to  what.  '75  It  was  pointed  out  before  that  Murdoch  is  not  referring  to  a  specific  faith  here.  She  is 
most  of  all  intent  on  reassuring  her  audience  that  Anselm's  proof  does  not  proceed  from 
unfamiliar  grounds.  Even  those  without  any  awareness  of  the  Christian  faith  can  understand  what 
it  is  to  `have  faith 
... 
in  a  person  or  idea  in  order  to  understand  him  or  it'.  76  At  this  point  in  the 
text  Murdoch  disregards  any  difference  between  having  faith  in  God  and  having  faith  in 
something  else. 
Murdoch  swiftly  moves  to  what  she  calls  the  proof's  `first  formulation',  in  Proslogion's 
chapter  II,  in  which: 
`God  is  taken  to  be  the  Ens  Realissimum,  aliquid  nibil  mains  cogitaripossit,  the  most 
real  being,  than  which  nothing  greater  [or  more  perfect]  can  be  conceived.  '77 
The  Latin  quote  is  not  in  its  entirety  taken  from  Prorlogion  chapter  II.  Anselm  does  not  use  the 
term  Ens  Realissimum,  the  most  real  being.  The  addition  of  Ens  Realisrimum  is  odd,  for  it  is  in 
disagreement  with  both  the  logical  and  the  transcendental  understanding  of  Anselm's  argument, 
to  be  discussed  shortly.  Nevertheless,  I  doubt  it  if  one  should  attribute  much  importance  to  this 
addition  where  Murdoch's  understanding  of  the  proof  is  concerned.  Her  interest  in  the  proof 
does  not  really  concern  this  first  formulation. 
After  describing  God  as  `that  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived'  Anselm 
wonders  if  there  is  `no  such  nature,  since  the  fool  hath  said  in  his  heart,  there  is  no  God  (Psalms 
XIV.  I)'78  Yet,  he  argues,  the  fool  surely  understands  what  he  hears  and  what  he  understands  is  in 
his  understanding.  Anselm  concludes: 
And  assuredly  that,  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  cannot  exist  in 
the  understanding  alone.  For,  suppose  it  exists  in  the  understanding  alone:  then  it 
can  be  conceived  to  exist  in  reality;  which  is  greater. 
Therefore,  if  that,  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  exists  in  the 
understanding  alone,  the  very  being,  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived, 
is  one,  than  which  a  greater  can  be  conceived.  But  obviously  this  is  impossible. 
75  Afurdoch,  MeJaPbysks  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  P.  393. 
76.  Nfurdoch,  MelaPh-vsks  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  P.  393. 
77  Nfurdoch,  MelapbYsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  P.  393. 
78  Saint  Anselm,  Basic  IVIrilings.  Proslo 
, giu-,  MonokTlium,  Gaunilo  k  On  BehajFof  lbe  Fool,  Cure  Deus  Homo,  translated  by 
S.  W.  Deane,  with  an  introduction  by  Charles  Hartshorne  (La  Salle,  Illinois:  Open  Court  Publishing  Company,  1962. 
(Second  edition)),  p.  7.  Tlýs  is  the  same  translation  as  the  one  Nfurdoch  uses.  Other  translation  used  is  the  Dutch 
translation  v6th  Comments  by  Steel. 
131 Hence,  there  is  no  doubt  that  there  exists  a  being,  than  which  nothing  greater  can 
be  conceived,  and  it  exists  both  in  the  understanding  and  in  reality.  79 
The  crux  of  this  argument  is  the  negative  description  of  God.  God  is  not  posited  as  a  positive 
entity,  but  as  something  which  is  always  different  and  always  greater.  For  every  positive 
understanding  of  God,  it  is  possible  to  think  of  something  greater.  It  is  thus,  Steel  argues,  by 
indirect  demonstration,  that  one  has  to  conclude  to  his  actual  existence.  Steel  also  speaks  of  a 
reductio  ad  absurdum  of  the  atheist  position.  If  God  only  existed  in  the  mind,  he  would  not  be  God. 
Therefore  he  does  not  only  exist  in  the  mind,  but  also  in  reality.  8° 
Murdoch  stresses  in  her  reading  that  this  formulation  of  the  proof  distinguishes  between 
existing  in  the  mind  (in  intellectu)  and  existing  in  reality  (in  '). 
To  exist  in  re  is  taken  to  be  a  quality  (predicate),  in  the  case  of  something  good  a 
perfection,  which  is  extra  to  that  of  existing  only  in  intellectu.  It  is  then  clear  that  if 
we  can  understand  the  idea  of  God,  which  we  surely  can,  then  we  must  also 
understand  that  God  exists,  since  if  he  did  not  then  he  would  lack  one  important 
quality  of  perfection,  that  of  existence,  and  would  fail  to  be  that  than  which 
nothing  greater  can  be  conceived,  in  intellectu  and  in  re  being  greater  than  in  intellectu 
alone.  81 
The  idea  of  God,  which  we,  Murdoch  writes,  can  surely  understand,  entails  his  existence.  If  God 
did  not  exist  he  would  lack  a  quality  (i.  e.  existence)  and  not  be  that  `than  which  nothing  greater 
can  be  conceived.  '  By  speaking  of  a  quality  or  predicate  Murdoch  evokes  the  criticism  Kant  and 
Russell  levelled  at  the  ontological  proof.  She  points  out  that  they  contended  that  `[t]he  idea  of 
existence  adds  nothing  to  a  concept,  existence  is  not  a  predicate'.  82 
79  Anselm,  Basic  Viitings,  p.  8. 
10  Compare  Steel:  '...  het  is  ook  geen  'id6e  claire  et  distincte',  maar  een  negative  omschrijving  die  alles  uitsIuit  wat  niet 
in  overeensternming  is  met  de  'grootheid'  van  het  object.  Het  object  wordt  zodanig  ornschreven  dat  het 
transcendent  bhjft  ten  opzichte  van  de  omschrijving.  '  [..  neither  it  is  an  'id6e  claire  et  distincte'.  but  a  negative 
description  that  excludes  everything  that  does  not  fit  the  'greatness'  of  the  object.  The  object  is  in  such  a  way 
described  that  it  remains  transcendent  with  regard  to  the  description.  ]  Steel  also  remarks  that  it  may  not  be  correct 
to  consider  the  argument  as  a  syllogism.  Anselm.  is  concerned  with  one  argument.  Wlat  is  proven  is  the  same  as  the 
proof  itself  (Anselmus,  Pioslogion,  p.  48-50  n.  19.  See  also  n.  24  for  the  understanding  of  the  argument  as  reauedo  ad 
absurdum) 
81  Murdoch,  Metapbysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  393. 
82  Nfurdoch,  Metapbjsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  394.  See  also  Steers  comments,  Anselmus,  ProsloTion,  p.  52  n.  25.  Note 
too  that  Kant  did  not  direct  his  criticism  at  Anselm  directly,  for  he  did  not  know  his  work,  as  Steel  points  out. 
(Anselmus,  Proslqjgion,  p.  26) 
132 Murdoch  discusses  only  briefly  the  way  in  which  Kant  has  criticised  the  proof  for  its 
understanding  of  existence  as  a  predicate.  83  More  attention  is  given  to  the  question  of  whether 
`we  can  surely  understand'  the  idea  of  God.  Murdoch  writes: 
Anselm's  earliest  critic,  a  contemporary  monk,  Gaunilo,  who  of  course  believed  in 
God,  anticipates  such  objections  [i.  e.  the  conviction  that  God  exists  is  contained 
in  the  believer's  initial  idea  of  God  which  appears  in  the  premises.  ].  He  challenges 
Anselm's  assumption  that  he  can  frame  an  idea  of  God.  `I  do  not  know  that  reality 
itself  which  God  is,  nor  can  I  frame  a  conjecture  of  that  reality  from  some  other 
reality.  For  you  yourself  assert  that  there  can  be  nothing  like  it.  '  If  one  is  going  to 
argue  from  perfect  essence  to  real  existence  then  could  one  not  argue  anything 
into  existence  from  the  imagined  idea  of  a  single  perfect  instance  (for  example  the 
idea  of  a  perfect  island?  )84 
Two  objections  may  be  distinguished  in  this  quotation.  First,  it  is  argued  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
understand  `that  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived'.  Secondly,  the  argument  needs  not 
be  confined  to  God's  existence  alone,  but  can  be  applied  to  anything.  Gaunilo  thus  famously 
suggested  that  the  existence  of  a  perfect  island  may  be  proven  in  like  manner.  85 
Murdoch  answers  this  second  objection  first,  moving  on  to  what  she  regards  as  a 
clarification  of  the  first  argument.  This  clarification  is  found  in  Prosloäion's  third  chapter  and  in 
Anselm's  answer  to  Gaunilo.  Here  Anselm  argues  that  he  is  not  concerned  with  God's  incidental 
existence,  but  with  God's  unique,  necessary  existence.  God  does  not  exist  in  the  way  that  other 
beings  exist,  for  he  cannot  be  thought  of  as  not  existing.  86  Murdoch  writes: 
The  definition  of  God  [h]as  having  necessary  not  contingent  existence  is  an 
important  clarification  for  any  interested  party.  87 
83  'Critics  of  the  Proof  (most  famously  Kant)  argue  that  existence  cannot  so  be  treated.  The  idea  of  existence  adds 
nothing  to  a  concept,  existence  is  not  a  predicate.  '  (Nfurdoch,  Aletaplysits  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  393-394) 
U  Murdoch,  Melaphjsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  394.  CE  Anselrn,  Basic  Frifin 
, gs,  p.  148. 
85  Anselm,  Basic  lrrifiqs,  p.  150-151. 
11  See  also,  Antonaccio,  Pidwing  Me  Human,  p.  125.  See  also  p.  214  n.  28  where  Antonaccio  remarks  that  'this  line  of 
interpretation  has  been  pursued  by  Charles  Ilartshorne  and  Norman  Malcolm!  Steel  considers  Barth  (1932)  to  be 
the  first  to  make  a  distinction  between  the  two  chapters:  93arth  beschouwt  P  II  en  III  als  twee  etappes  in  de 
bewijsvoering.  In  II  wordt  aangetoond  dat  God  in  re  bestaat  terwijl  in  III  de  b#,  -ondere  wijze  van  Gods  bestaan  wordt 
onderzocht.  '  [Barth  considers  P  II  and  III  as  two  stages  in  the  argument.  In  II  it  is  demonstrated  that  God  exists  in 
re,  whereas  in  III  the  particular  way  of  God's  existence  is  demonstrated.  ]  Steel  also  refers  to  flartshorne  and  Malcolm. 
(Anselmus,  Proslqgion,  p.  54  n.  26) 
87  Murdoch,  Metaplysits  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  395. 
133 This  important  clarification  moves  the  argument  away  from  the  indirect  demonstration,  and 
according  to  Antonaccio  (an  interested  party),  away  from  its  original  logical  nature,  into  a 
transcendental  argument  proving  a  necessary  structure  in  consciousness,  where  Murdoch 
considers  the  Good  rather  than  God  the  object  of  the  ontological  proof.  88 
In  Pidmiq  the  Hmman  Antonaccio  comprehensively  examines  Murdoch's  application  of 
the  ontological  proof  In  the  first  chapter  she  asserts  that  '[Murdoch's]  account  of  the  good  is 
validated  by  a  version  of  the  ontological  proof.  189  After  the  extensive  discussion  in  chapter  five 
she  maintains  in  her  sixth  and  last  chapter  that  'the  proof  reveals  that  the  good  is  an  objective 
principle  of  perfected  moral  knowledge  that  is  only  accessible  though  the  medium  of  "personal 
resonance",  and  that  'Murdoch  justifies  this  reflexive  argument  with  a  version  of  the  ontological 
proof.  '90  Antonaccio  meticulously  examines  possible  objections  to  the  proof  and  shows  how 
Murdoch  refutes  these.  Throughout  my  discussion  I  shall  be  returning  to  Antonaccio's 
interpretation,  not  so  much  because  as  'validation'  and  'justification'  it  would  have  pleased  young 
Plato,  but  because  it  affects  the  position  of  the  fool,  which  I  consider  later. 
When  examining  the  transcendental  argument  Antonaccio  repeatedly  argues  that  the 
object  of  the  proof  is  grasped  through  consciousness.  Murdoch,  Antonaccio  argues,  `reads 
Anselm's  proof  along  much  the  same  lines  as  Charles  Taylor.  God's  existence  is  grasped  as 
necessarily  real  in  and  through  the  structures  of  human  knowing.  '91  Indeed,  in  Taylor  Antonaccio 
finds  two  important  points  for  Murdoch's  understanding  of  the  proof.  `the  proof  takes  it  starting 
point  in  consciousness'  and  secondly  `according  to  the  proof  the  idea  of  God  must  occur  to  us, 
because  it  is  the  very  condition  for  our  consciousness  of  ourselves  as  "selves".  '92  The  human 
consciousness  while  reflecting  on  that  `than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived'  has  to 
acknowledge  what  both  presupposes  and  surpasses  all  of  its  activities. 
The  transcendental  argument  thus  conceives  of  God's  existence  as  unique  and  necessary. 
The  object  of  the  proof,  according  to  Murdoch, 
cannot  be  a  particular,  a  contingent  thing,  one  thing  among  others;  a  contingent 
god  might  be  a  great  demonic  or  angelic  spirit,  but  not  the  Being  in  question.... 
God's  necessary  existence  is  connected  with  his  not  being  an  object.  God  is  not  to 
g  The  Human,  p.  126.  88  Antonaccio,  Rautin 
89  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  15. 
90  Antonaccio,  Picturing  The  Human,  p.  165  and  169  respectively. 
91  Antonaccio,  Picturing  Me  Human  P.  126.  (Ch.  Taylor,  Sources  oftlie  Self,  P.  140.  Compare  also  Ch.  Taylor,  'Iris 
Murdoch  and  Moral  Philosophy'  (M.  Antonaccio  and  W.  Schweiker  (red.  ),  Iris  Alurdoeb  and  Me  SearrbJor  Human 
Goodness.  Chicago  and  London:  The  University  of  Chicago  Press,  1996,  p.  3-28)  in  particular  p.  18-28.  ) 
92  Antonaccio,  Picturing  11je  Human,  P.  124. 
134 be  worshipped  as  an  idol  or  identified  with  any  empirical  thing;  as  is  indeed 
enjoyed  by  the  Second  Commandment  93 
So,  the  proof  takes  as  its  starting-point  something  that,  as  it  turns  out,  is  unlike  all  other  things. 
Even  to  call  is  sometbing  can  be  misleading.  94  In  order  to  express  the  singularity  of  this  situation 
Murdoch  uses  different  expressions.  She  remarks  that  God's  'non-mistence  is  im  os  b,  at  he  p  ji  Y  th 
exists  necessarily,  that  only  in  this  case  'if  you  can  conceive  of  this  entity  you  are  i  sof  cert 
.p 
acto  ain 
that  what  you  are  thinking  of  is  real',  that  God  is  not  'one  thing  among  others',  and  not  an 
object.  95  These  different  phrases  reinforce  Gaunilo's  first  objection  that  it  is  not  possible  to 
understand  'that  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived',  raising  the  question  of  the 
meaning  of  the  notions  'existence',  'reality,  'object'  and  'ontological'. 
Because  Gaunilo's  objection  would  counter  the  proof,  as  it  must  be  possible  to  form  such 
a  notion  in  order  to  engage  in  the  ontological  proof,  in  addition  to  this  transcendental  argument  a 
metaphysical  argument  is  supplied.  Anselm's  answer  to  Gaunilo  is  strictly  speaking  twofold.  96 
Anselm  first  replies  by  appealing  to  Gaunilo's  `faith  and  conscience  to  attest  that  this  is  most 
false.  '97  Next,  he  provides  an  answer  that  is  `evident  to  any  rational  mind',  and  even  to  `the  fool 
who  does  not  accept  sacred  authority.  '98 
Everything  that  is  less  good,  in  so  far  as  it  is  good,  is  like  the  greater  good.  It  is 
therefore  evident  to  any  rational  mind  that  by  ascending  from  the  lesser  good  to 
the  greater  we  can  form  a  considerable  notion  of  being  than  which  a  greater  is 
inconceivable.  99 
Anselm  provides  a  way  to  infer  if  not  to  think  `something  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be 
thought'  and  anyone  who  will  try  to  do  so  will  realise  its  reality  as  of  necessity.  It  is  impossible  to 
entirely  comprehend  that  `than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  thought',  but  it  is  not  beyond  all 
recognition.  100 
93  Nfurdoch,  Metoysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  395.  Compare  Antonaccio,  Picturing  d9e  Human,  P.  125-126. 
94  Antonaccio,  Piduring  the  Human,  p.  125-6. 
95  Nfurdoch,  Metapbjsics  as  a  Guide  Io  Morals,  p.  395. 
16  Steel  considers  it  remark-able  that  Anselm  first  directs  his  answer  to  the  Christian  and  not  to  the  fool,  but  also 
notes  that  later  in  his  answer  Anselm.  'zal  aantonen  dat  ook  voor  de  niet-gelovige  de  intelligibiliteit  van  'IQNf 
gerechtvaardigd  kan  worden.  '  [will  show  the  un-believer  too  the  intelligibility  of  IQTNI  can  be  justified]  (Anselmus, 
Pmslogionj  40  n.  117)  Compare  too  n.  1  49  and  145,  where  Steel  notes  on  the  difference  between  talking  of  God  and 
talking  of  IQM  in  response  to  an  argument  by  Gaunilo.  God  can  only  be  understood  by  believers,  IQNI  by  all. 
97  Anselm,  Basic  Viifin 
, gs,  p.  154. 
98  Anselm,  Basic  117rifiý 
, gs,  p.  167-8. 
99  Murdoch,  Metqpýyxics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  394. 
1110  See  too  Steel  (Anselmus,  Prvsý!  gion,  p.  162  n.  147) 
135 Murdoch  similarly  attributes  large  importance  to  inferring  the  greater  good  from  the 
lesser  good,  and  in  pursuing  the  metaphysical  argument  she  suggests  a  return  from  God  to  Good, 
understanding  the  argument  within  moral  philosophy: 
the  definition  of  God  as  non-contingent  is  given  body  by  our  most  general 
perceptions  and  experience  of  the  fundamental  and  omnipresent  (uniquely 
necessary)  nature  of  moral  value,  thought  of  in  a  Christian  context  as  God.  This  is 
essentially  an  argument  from  morality  not  from  design.  It  appeals  to  our  moral 
understanding,  and  not  to  any  of  the  more  strictly  rational  considerations  relied 
upon  by  Aquinas 
... 
[Those]  who  feel  perhaps  that  the  Proof  proves  something, 
but  not  any  sort  of  God,  might  return  to  Plato  and  claim  some  uniquely  necessary 
status  for  moral  value  as  something  (uniquely)  impossible  to  be  thought  away 
from  human  experience,  and  as  in  a  special  sense,  if  conceived  of,  known  as 
real.  'o1 
Thus,  Murdoch  considers  the  proof  to  be  about  the  Good  rather  than  God.  Through  'our  ability 
to  distinguish  good  and  evil'  it  may  prove  the  necessary  existence  of  moral  value.  It  is  moreover 
not  only  rational  argument,  but  also  '[i]n  learning,  loving,  creatively  imagining,  [that]  we  may  be 
overcome  by  a  sense  of  certainty  at  a  particular  point.  1102  Consequently,  throughout  her  work 
Murdoch  urges  her  readers  to  do  precisely  that:  to  learn,  to  love,  and  to  imagine.  As  the  object  of 
the  proof  also  surpasses  consciousness  as  'a  distant  goal  of  perfection'103  it  directs  all  imagination, 
learning,  loving.  Murdoch  is  not  urging  her  readers  to  merely  imaoine,  but  to  imagine  as  ivell  as  1bg 
can. 
So,  while  properly  imagining  one  has  to  acknowledge  the  presence  of  something  that 
both  presumes  and  surpasses  one's  imagination.  Murdoch  recognises  the  proof  as  such  in  the 
myth  of  anamnesis  in  Plato's  Meno.  What  is  proven  is  as  it  were  remembered,  a  process  with 
which  we,  according  to  Murdoch,  are  all  familiar.  104  The  'belief'  hat  the  ontological  proof  tries  to 
`prove'  urges  itself  upon  anyone  who  is  properly  imagining  with  the  certainty  of  something 
already  known  or  intuited.  By  the  recurring  use  of  `we'  Murdoch  urges  `us'  to  start  imagining  and 
thus  to  `prove'  what  we  already  intuit.  The  `belief'  is  religious  yet  independent  of  `religions'. 
5.  The  Fool 
101  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  396. 
102  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  400. 
103  Antonaccio,  Picturing  the  Human,  p.  52.  Cf  p.  128. 
136 The  position  of  the  'ordinary  unbeliever  or  Fool'105  has  become  rather  awkward.  What  to  think  of 
him  of  her  if  he  or  she  persists  in  denying  the  existence  of  the  Good?  'Me  unbeliever  must  be 
unable  or  unwilling  to  understand.  Perhaps  he  enjoys  not  understanding.  He  must  be  either 
stupid,  unrighteous,  or  a  sophist.  Whatever  he  is,  he  is  not  right  and  does  not  speak  the  truth. 
Should  this  then  be  the  final  word  on  the  fool?  Such  a  conclusion  seems  incongruous 
with  much  of  the  tone  and  content  of  Murdoch's  work.  Her  work  is  hospitable  to  different 
opinions  and  she  is  seldom  wholly  dismissive  of  positions  dissimilar  from  her  own  argument. 
(Exception  is  made  not  for  ordinary  but  for  learned  fools,  such  as  Nietzsche  and  Heidegger:  'As 
for  Nietzsche  and  (late)  Heidegger,  roughly,  I  regard  those  great  writers  as  essentially  demonic.  '106 
Tossibly  Heidegger  is  Lucifer  in  petson.  1107  Yet,  even  in  these  strong  remarks  she  expressed 
doubt  Croughly',  'possibly)  and  her  last  unfinished  work  was  a  study  of  Heidegger.  100 
The  fool  is  not  easily  dismissed.  When  considering  Le  Doeuff  as  fool  in  the  second 
chapter  of  this  thesis,  it  was  found  that  she  was  not  the  only  fool  in  the  history  of  philosophy,  but 
rather  part  of  a  long  tradition  of  fools.  Some  of  them  are  encountered  in  the  reception  of 
Anselm's  ontological  proof,  which  reveals  an  eagerness  to  identify  with  the  fool  and  to  argue  on 
his  behalf.  Gaunilo  is  only  the  first  of  a  group  of  distinguished  thinkers.  One  wonders  if  Anselm 
would  have  regretted  the  appearance  of  this  fiction  in  his  proof,  had  he  realiscd  its  popularity. 
With  regard  to  Murdoch's  work  too,  one  can  feel  compelled  to  identify  with  Murdoch's 
'ordinary  unbeliever  or  Fool',  if  not  in  an  immediate  reaction,  then  certainly  after  considering 
limitations  in  her  work:  limitations  in  her  understanding  of  religion,  in  the  art  which  Murdoch 
refers  to  in  her  philosophical  essays  or  in  the  characters  she  creates  in  her  novels.  The  Good  may 
be  somehow  inextricably  bound  up  with  the  lives  and  thoughts  of  Oxford  dons  and  London 
artists,  but  is  it  also  with  the  fools  outside  those  worlds?  May  one  assume  that  the  proof  has 
convinced  Alcibiades,  that  talking  about  the  Good  is  not  just  imaginary  and  ineffectual? 
I  shall  remain  in  the  role  of  thinker  and  look  at  the  proof  again,  especially  at  the  position 
of  its  fool.  I  shall  do  so  by  resuming  the  comparison  of  Anselm's  and  Murdoch's  understanding 
of  the  ontological  argument.  As  pointed  out  before,  Anselm  introduces  the  fool  when  unfolding 
his  ontological  proof  in  the  second  chapter  of  the  Proslogion.  After  stating  that  `we  believe  that 
thou  art  a  being  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived'  he  wonders  `[o]r  is  there  no  such 
nature  since  the  fool  hath  said  in  his  heart,  there  is  no  God.  '109 
'01  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  393. 
105  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  410. 
106  Murdoch,  Metaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  456. 
107  Murdoch,  `On  `God'  and  `Good",  p.  358. 
108  Conradi,  `Preface',  p.  xxi. 
109  Anselm,  Basic  li/ritin,  gs,  p.  7 
137 Anselm  addresses  the  foolishness  of  the  fool  in  chapter  IV.  Why  does  the  fool  say  that 
there  is  no  God?  `Why,  except  that  he  is  dull  and  a  fool?  '110  Ansehe  finds  the  solution  to  this 
riddle  by  means  of  a  semantic  analysis. 
There  is  not  only  one  sense  in  which  something  is  `said  in  one's  heart'  or  thought, 
for  in  one  sense  a  thing  is  thought  when  the  word  signifying  it  is  thought;  in 
another  sense  when  the  very  object  which  the  thing  is  is  understood.  11' 
In  other  words,  the  fool  uses  the  word  `God'  without  giving  it  its  proper  meaning  or  giving  it  any 
meaning  at  all.  112  The  fool  thinks  `that  than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived'  not  in  the 
way  which  will  lead  to  the  conclusion  of  its  existence. 
Where  does  this  leave  Gaunilo,  the  first  to  answer  Anselm?  That  Gaunilo  is  no  fool 
becomes  apparent  at  the  last  part  of  his  answer  where  he  suggests  a  correction  to  the  proof  and 
, gion  that  follow  after  the  first  foUr.  113  And  so  Anselm  directs  his  praises  the  chapters  in  the  Prvslo 
answer  to  'one  who,  though  speaking  on  the  Foors  behalf,  is  an  orthodox  Christian  and  no 
fool.  1114  Murdoch,  significantly,  calls  Gaunilo  'a  professional  holy  man'  and  remarks  that  he'of 
course  believed  in  God.  '115  So,  Anselm  first  replies  by  appealing  to  Gaunilo's  'faith  and 
conscience'.  The  argument  on  the  fool's  foolishness  thus  enters  again  an  impasse.  The  fool  is 
nothing  but  a  regrettable  fiction.  Every  thinker's  identification  with  the  fool  is  likely  to  lead  the 
thinker  away  from  the  argument  and  from  the  belief  in  the  reality  of  the  Good. 
Yet,  fools  are  not  only  in  the  habit  of  turning  up  when  least  expected,  they  also  appear  in 
various  disguises.  So  far  I  have  assumed  a  strict  division  between  philosophers  and  their  fools. 
Anselm  and  his  fool,  however,  are  not  necessarily  that  far  apart.  It.  can  be  argued  that  Anselm 
needs  the  fool  in  his  argument,  even  that  the  fool  is  indispensable  in  the  argument.  This  is  argued 
for  instance  by  Hayen  (another  orthodox  Christian).  116 
The  fool,  Hayen  argues,  is  needed  for  two  different  reasons:  first,  because  of  Anselm's 
Christian  perspective  and  secondly  for  the  argument's  sake.  Ansehn  starts  his  argument  not  from 
the  perspective  of  an  unbeliever,  but  instead  desires  to  understand  what  he  beheves  Vides  quaerrns 
110  Anselm,  Basic  IrrifinTs,  p.  9.  Steel  remarks  that  when  encountering  a  contradiction  Anselm  often  looks  for  a 
solution  by  means  of  a  semantic  analysis.  Another  example  he  finds  in  chapter  VIII,  concerning  the  assertion:  God 
can  (not)  do  everything.  (Anselmus,  Proslý 
, gion,  p.  56  n.  31) 
Anselrn,  Basic  Viifiý  TS,  P.  9-10. 
112  Compare  Steel  (Anselmus,  Prosiogion,  n.  104). 
It'  Anselrn,  Basic  Irrifiqs,  p.  151,152-3. 
U4  Anselm,  Basic  Wlrifiqs,  p.  153. 
1  Is  NfurdochNfetaphysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  396  and  394  respectively. 
138 intellectum).  Christian  belief  is  never  questioned  in  the  argument.  Instead,  the  proof  is  considered 
as  a  step  on  the  way  to  redemption,  `of  re-establishing  man  -  at  least  partially  -  in  that  state  from 
which  he  has  fallen.  '117 
This  process  will  not  be  finished  until  all  have  been  redeemed,  not  only  all  Christians,  but 
also  all  heretics,  heathens  and  other  fools.  118  Without  the  fool's  redemption  Anselm  will  not  be 
redeemed  either.  Anselm  does  not  direct  his  argument  against  the  fool,  but  to  the  foo1.119  Then 
again,  it  is  not  correct  to  conceive  of  Anselm  as  the  simply  righteous  one  who  teaches  the  fool. 
Anselm's  fool  is  no  absolute  stranger  to  him,  but  instead  he  is  his  own  fool.  The  first  chapter  of 
the  Proslogion,  so  often  omitted  in  the  discussion  on  the  ontological  proof,  reveals  Anselm's  desire 
to  see  God  as  well  as  his  despair  at  God's  absence.  12°  Anselm's  argument  is  directed  to  both  his 
own  and  the  fool's  disbelief. 
The  second  reason  why  Anselm  needs  the  fool,  according  to  Hayen,  stems  from  the 
exercise  of  arguing.  Anselm  desires  to  understand  what  he  believes.  His  faith  is  never  separated 
from  the  act  of  reasoning,  yet  reason  is  not  simply  enriching  faith.  It  is  seeking  its  own 
fulfilmentl2l  Reason  is  for  Anselm,  Hayen  argues,  not  'a  mere  "faculty",  and  still  less,  a  mere 
abstraction  called  "Reason".  It  is  the  concrete  existing  reasoning.  12-"  This  is  why  Anselm  allows 
for  space  for  intervention  of  actual  reasoning  by  the  fool,  but  even  more  by  Gaunilo.  Anselm 
does  not  direct  his  reply  to  the  fool,  but  to  the  Christian  who  speaks  on  behalf  of  the  fool.  He 
invites  Gaunilo  to  aciiially,  reflect  on  his  own  faith  and  his  own  conscience.  123  For  it  is  in  the 
116  A.  Hayen,  'Ilie  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm  and  the  Necessarily  Apostolic  Character  of  True  Christian 
Reflection'  0.1-  Eck  and  A.  C.  3,  kGill  (eds.  ),  The  Afany-FacedArhument.  Recent  Studies  on  the  OnlokT.,  icalArgmmentfor  the 
Existence  ofGod,  London  and.  Nfelboume:  MacMillan,  1968,  p.  162-182) 
111  Hayen,  The  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm',  p.  167  and  168.  Hayen  is  quoting  from  P.  Vignaim,  Philosopby  in  the 
MiddleAges,  translated  by  E.  C.  Hall  (New  York-:  Meridian,  1959)  p.  39ff.  Vignaux  remarks  on  the  first  chapter  of  the 
Proslogion:  'It  is  a  dialogue  of  the  creature  with  his  Creator.  quaero  vullum  Mum,  "I  seek  your  face.  "  This  desire  to  see 
the  face  of  God  lies  in  a  creature  -  in  ourselves  -  who  have  been  created  precisely  for  that  vision.  Nevertheless,  we 
have  never  done  that  for  which  we  were  made.  ' 
118  Hayen,  Me  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm,  p.  168ff.  '...  it  is  a  matter  of  participating  in  the  redemptive  work  of 
the  first  bom  from  the  dead,  of  entering  into  the  struggle  of  Christ  against  the  devil,  into  the  victory  achieved  by 
Jesus,  who  must  continue  to  reign  "until  he  has  placed  all  his  enemies  under  the  feet,  so  that  God  may  be  everything 
to  everyone"  (I  Cor.  15:  25,28),  which  is  to  say,  so  that  God  may  be  everything  in  the  reason  of  the  fool,  just  as  he 
is  everything  in  the  mind  of  Anselm  and  the  monks,  and  in  that  of  the  blessed  who  already  contemplate  the  Father 
face  to  face.  '. 
119  Hayen,  'Me  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm',  p.  168.  Compare  McGill,  'Recent  Discussions  of  AnseWs 
Argument'.  p.  63:  Hayen  is  one  of  the  '[s]everal  Frenchspeaking  Roman  Catholics  scholars  [who]  insist  on  the 
importance  of  faith,  but  question  Barth's  further  thesis  about  Anselm  and  the  fool.  How,  they  ask,  can  Barth  say 
that  Anselm  constantly  sets  himself  "against"  the  fool,  that  he  refuses  to  have  anything  to  do  with  him  in  his  belief 
and  only  'lets  him  go  on  repeating  his  counterthesis  until  the  last  day?...  (Compare  Hayen,  'Ilie  Role  of  the  Fool  in 
St.  Anselm',  p.  168,  also  n.  30) 
120  'Come  then,  Lord  my  God,  teach  my  heart  where  and  how  to  seek  You,  where  and  how  to  find  You.  Lord,  if 
You  are  not  present  here,  where  since  You  are  absent,  shall  I  look  for  you?  On  the  other  hand,  if  You  are 
everywhere  why  then,  since  You  are  present,  do  I  not  see  You?  '  (Anselm,  Basic  117rifings,  p.  1) 
t2l  Hayen,  The  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm'.  p.  174. 
122  Hayen,  q1e  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm',  p.  176. 
123  Hayen,  'The  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm,  p.  176ff. 
139 concrete  act  of  reasoning  that  reason  may  be  fulfilled  and  find  under  the  guidance  of  faith  in  'that 
than  which  nothing  greater  can  be  conceived'  the  reasonable  reality  of  'that  than  which  nothing 
greater  can  be  conceived.  "24 
This  last  point  reinforces  an  aspect  of  the  proof  noted  before.  The  ontological  proof  is  an 
unusual  proof  It  is  not  a  proof  which  someone  can  do  for,  or  force  its  result  upon,  another 
person.  Instead,  this  proof  one  has  to  give  to  oneself.  Hayen's  understanding  of  reason  seeking 
its  own  fulfilment  as  well  as  Antonaccio's  assertion  that  the  ontological  proof  has  its  starting- 
point  in  consciousness  emphasise  the  necessarily  personal  aspect  of  this  proof.  Indeed,  both  in 
her  philosophical  and  her  fictional  writing  Murdoch  shows  a  great  concern  for  her  reader's 
consciousness.  She  often  addresses  them  directly,  urging  them  to  use  their  imagination,  to  look 
upon  great  work.  In  her  novels  the  narrative  reveals  the  presence  of  an  author  who  is 
continuously  warning  her  readers  not  to  be  too  enchanted  and  not  to  simply  accept  or  indulge  in 
the  story.  The  last  sentence  of  The  Pbilosopber's  Pupil  serves  here  as  the  most  eminent  example, 
where  the  narrator  confesses  to  having  had  'the  assistance  of  a  certain  lady.  '125 
Therefore,  with  respect  to  Hayen's  second  point  then  I  recognise  similarity  between 
Anselm  and  Murdoch  in  relation  to  their  fools.  However,  with  respect  to  the  first  point  I 
consider  Anselm's  and  Murdoch's  position  to  be  also  very  different,  even  though  it  may  be  that 
just  as  Hayen  argues  that  Anselm  in  a  way  is  his  own  fool,  Murdoch  is  not  totally  dissimilar  from 
her  fool.  Indeed,  her  writing  constantly  confirms  her  doubts  about  her  own  argument.  126 
The  difference  between  Anselm  and  Murdoch  is  here,  however,  considerable.  Hayen 
argues  that  Anselm.  in  the  argument  never  questions  his  Christian  faith  and  that  his  proof  aims  at 
re-establishing  fallen  man.  Even  though  Murdoch  also  considers  man  as  fallen,  this  similarity  is 
overshadowed  by  a  more  striking  difference.  Anselm,  writing  tl-,  Lis  particular  tradition,  does  not 
end  his  Proslo 
, gion  with  the  fourth  chapter,  but  continues  by  establishing  God's  many  qualities. 
Murdoch  does  not  confess  to  writing  within  a  certain  religious  tradition.  Earlier  it  was 
noted  that  she  looks  for  a  religion  which  is  to  remain  'if  all  religions  were  to  blow  away  like  mist', 
and  in  the  discussion  of  the  ontological  proof  it  was  repeatedly  argued  how  she  reformulates 
notions  so  as  to  make  them  comprehensible  outside  the  religious  tradition  from  which  she 
retrieves  them. 
-  One  way  to  describe  the  difference  between  these  thinkers  is  by  introducing  another  fool. 
This  fool  or  madman  took  his  lantern  one  bright  morning  and  looked  for  God  on  a  market  place. 
124  Hayen,  'I'he  Role  of  the  Fool  in  St.  Anselm',  p.  180-181. 
125  Murdoch,  Philoropherý  Pupil,  p.  576. 
126  1  noted  before  how  she  introduces  'individuals  into  her  text  who  question  the  argument.  In  'On  'God'  and 
'Good"  she  even  adrrýts  to  be  'often  more  than  half  persuaded  to  think  in  these  terms  myself'  (Nfurdoch,  'On  'God' 
and  'Good",  p.  359.  )  The  use  of  'we',  too,  includes  both  her  readers  and  herself 
140 The  people  around  him  were  not  upset  or  angry  with  him,  but  merely  amused.  They  laughed  and 
made  fun  of  his  quest.  The  fool  called  out: 
Where  is  God  gone  ... 
I  mean  to  tell  you!  We  have  killed  him,  -  you  and  I!  We  are  all 
his  murderers!  127 
Between  Anselm  and  Murdoch  one  discerns  the  acclaimed  death  of  God,  acclaimed  that  is,  by  a 
fool. 
Now  addressing  a  fool  who  killed  God  would  considerably  change  the  proof  Murdoch 
sometimes  suggests  that  God  has  to  be  created  in  order  for  him  to  exist,  as  for  example  in  the 
quoted  words  of  Val6ry  who  'with  poetic,  and  spiritual,  inspiration  in  mind,  says  that  the  'proper, 
unique  and  perpetual  object  of  thought  is  that  which  does  not  exist....  And,  'At  its  highest  point, 
love  is  a  determination  to  create  that  being  which  it  has  for  its  object.  11128  Yet,  even  though 
Murdoch  uses  the  phrase  'the  death  of  God'  in  the  1987-introduction  to  Sartre.,  Romantic 
Rationalist,  her  language  generally  suggests  a  different  metaphor,  not  that  of  the  death  of  God,  but 
rather  of,  what  Hillis  Miller  has  indicated  as,  the  disappearance  of  God:  'God  exists,  but  he  is  out 
of  reach.  ...  As  a  result  the  nineteenth  and  twentieth  centuries  seem  to  many  writers  a  time  when 
God  is  no  more  present  and  not  yet  again  present  ...  In  this  time  of  the  no  longer  and  not  yet, 
man  is  "Wandering  between  two  worlds,  one  dead,  /The  other  powerless  to  be  born.  "'129  By 
speaking  of  'the  collapse  of  religion',  or  of  religion  as  'waning  rapidly'  Murdoch  expresses  her 
preference  for  the  gradual  disappearance  of  God  over  his  violent  and  abrupt  death.  Ile  'time  of 
no  longer  and  not  yet'  recalls  Murdoch's  time  of  the  angels,  where  the  return  of  God  is  not 
impossible. 
In  the  Good  Murdoch  tries  a  replacement  for  the  disappeared  God.  In  'On  'God'  and 
'Good"  Murdoch  describes  the  Good  as  a  concept  retaining  the  characteristics  of  the  old  God:  'a 
single  perfect  transcendent  non-representable  and  necessarily  real  object  of  attention'.  130  In  this 
essay  it  is  also  questioned  whether  the  Good  can  appeal  to  any  but  the  most  mystically  minded.  I 
pointed  out  how  Alcibiades'  banter  recalls  this  argument.  Is  this  an  argument  made  by  a  fool  who 
does  not  think  as  he  ought  to?  Can  one  love  the  Good? 
127  F.  Nietzsche,  TheJoyful  117isdom  rTa  Gaya  Sden!,  a),  translated  by  1h.  Common,  Edinburgh,  London:  T.  N.  Foulis, 
1910.  (Wohinist  Gott?  rief  er,  ichwill  es  euch  sagenI  Wir  haben  ihn  get6ttet,  -  ihr  und  ichlWir 
Alle  sind  seine  N16rder!  '  (F.  Nietzsche,  DiefW)kcbe  IFIrsenschaft.  Yrilisebe  GesamtausTabe,  herausgegeben  von  G.  Colli 
und  Nf.  Nfontinariý  Berlin,  New  York-.  -  Walter  de  Gruyter,  1972) 
128  Metapýysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals,  p.  401.  Quotation  from  Mauvaises  Pensies  etAutres,  P16iade  edition,  vol.  II,  pp.  785. 
129  J.  Hillis  Miller,  The  Disappearance  of  God.  Fim  Nineteenlb-Centug  11'riters  (Cambridge,  Massachusetts:  Ile  Belk-nap 
Press  of  Harvard  University  Press,  1963),  p.  1-2.  The  quotation  is  taken  from  C.  B.  Tinker  and  H.  F.  Lowry  (eds.  ),  TIje 
Poetical  Vorks  ofMalzbexAmold  (London,  1950),  p.  302. 
141 Recalling  the  discussion  of  Le  Doeuff,  it  is  likely  that  a  fool  win  not  only  stay  with  the 
argument,  but  look  at  the  imagery  as  well.  Such  a  fool  may  find  that  the  imagery  Murdoch  applies 
to  the  Good  often  emphasises  its  emptiness:  the  Good  encountered  at  the  end  of  all  image- 
making  is  the  abyss  into  which  one  falls;  Murdoch  does  not  consider  it  easy  to  imagine  what  it  is 
like  to  look  into  the  sun,  in  Plato's  allegory  of  the  Cave,  and  supposes  that  'to  look  at  the  sun  is 
to  be  gloriously  dazzled  and  to  see  nothing'131;  Met4bysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  ends  with  a  last 
chapter  called  'The  Void'.  132  Given  such  imagery  would  the  fool  not  be  justified  in  concluding 
that  'it  looks  like  religious  and  moral  anorexia  all  round'?  133  Can  such  an  empty  Good  feed  the 
imagination? 
The  doubts  of  the  fool  Murdoch  cannot  entirely  abandon.  Yet,  she  can  continue  to  point 
out  how  in  thinking,  imagining,  loving  anyone  can  prove  the  proof  of  the  necessary  existence  of 
the  Good  as  the  structuring  principle  of  consciousness.  It  may  be  enough  to  be  deeply  in  love 
with  Socrates  to  do  so.  The  importance  of  Murdoch's  works  lies  in  having  supplied  the 
unreligious  believers  with  this  variety  of  possibilities  for  proving  the  ontological  proof  and  to 
have  thus  reintroduced  an  absolute  value  in  her  imaginative  philosophy,  even  if  it  is  only  for 
those  who  want  to  believe. 
6.  Concluding  Remarks 
This  chapter  returns  to  the  question  'How  can  we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  '.  In  the 
discussion  of  Above  the  Gods  it  considers  religion  after  the  disappearance  of  god  or  gods.  I  argued 
that  Murdoch  notes  the  political  consequences  of  this  disappearance,  but  that  these  are  not  her 
primary  interest.  Instead,  she  reconsiders  what  the  disappearance  means  for  individuals  in  relation 
to  some  independent  reality.  She  looks,  as  young  Plato  puts  it,  for  a  morality  which  is  so  serious  it 
is  religious.  Yet,  religious  does  not  refer  to  any  'religion'  in  particular  here. 
In  Above  the  Gods  the  positions  of  Socrates,  Plato  and  Alcibades  interest  her  most:  Plato 
vehemently  arguing  for  something  necessary,  Alcibiades  as  iconoclast  and  Socrates,  preaching 
simplicity  and  never  satisfied  with  any  neat  answer.  Murdoch  reminds  her  readers  that  the 
arguments  in  this  dialogue,  lofty  as  they  may  be,  are  made  among  friends  who  have  much  more 
on  their  minds  than  the  disappearance  of  religion.  She  also  shows  that  any  intellectual  debate  is 
bound  to  be  embarrassed  by  those  who  do  not  participate. 
130  Murdoch,  'On  'God'  and  'Good",  p.  344. 
131  Murdock  'On  'God'  and  'Good"I  p.  357. 
132  Compare  Antonaccio,  'Form  and  Contingency  in  Iris  Murdoch's  Etl-ýics%  p.  136-7. 
133  Compare  A.  Loades,  [review  of  N1.  Antonaccio,  W.  Schweik-er  (eds.  ),  bis  Murdoch  and  the  Searchfor  Human  Goodness] 
it,  Literature  and  Theolo 
,g 
13.1  (1999),  p.  94-95. 
142 These  different  positions  return  in  the  discussion  of  the  ontological  proof.  It  is  a  proof 
for  thinkers  to  look  at.  The  considerable  discussion  in  this  chapter  also  shows  that  the  proof 
easily  allows  for  long  discussion.  For  Murdoch  the  ontological  proof  proves  the  existence  of  the 
Good,  for  all  who  have  faith.  The  Good  both  precedes  and  surpasses  consciousness  as  a 
principle  to  which  to  direct  the  imagination. 
In  a  return  to  the  position  of  the  fool  I  questioned  the  assumed  universality  of  this  belief 
in  the  Good.  Why  does  the  fool  continue  to  deny  the  Good's  existence?  It  is  of  course  always 
Possible  to  reproach  a  fool  for  improper  consideration  of  an  object.  This  reproach  does  not  need 
to  be  without  reason,  yet  Murdoch's  fool  might  rejoin  by  arguing  that  the  object  of  the  proof 
does  not  allow  for  much  inspiration.  By  emphasising  the  timeless  and  universal,  but  also  empty 
character  of  the  Good,  it  loses  its  attraction  for  even  the  most  mystically  minded.  Yet,  Murdoch 
considers  this  proof  possible  for  anyone  to  prove,  not  just  in  contemplating  the  Good,  but  in 
almost  any  activity. 
143 CONCLUSION 
This  dissertation  proposes  a  reading  of  Murdoch's  philosophical  work,  which  takes  as  its  starting- 
point  the  question  'How  can  we  make  ourselves  morally  better?  '.  It  argues  that  Murdoch  believes 
Pt  presently  so  important  for  philosophy  to  consider  this  question,  because  of  what  she  calls  the 
collapse  of  religion.  In  response  to  this  collapse  Murdoch  develops  what  I  have  described  as  a 
form  of  imaginative  philosophy,  which  draws  largely  on  her  understanding  of  literature  and 
imagination,  and  which  is  inspired  by  the  difficulties  she  encountered  as  a  writer  of  novels. 
In  my  discussion  of  Murdoch's  work  I  have  been  concerned  with  philosophy,  using  the 
term  both  generally  as  well  as  in  consideration  of  specific  texts.  I  have  questioned  more  and  less 
stringent  assumptions  of  what  philosophy  is  or  should  be  like.  Discussing  these  assumptions  in 
general  terms  may  give  rise  to  complications.  Any  general  claim  dan  be  countered  by  mentioning 
a  philosopher  who  does  not  hold  that  assumption.  Is  philosophy  really  excluding  stories,  imagery, 
etc.?  Does  it  maintain  a  limited  notion  of  reason  and  of  argument? 
Notwithstanding  these  doubts  I  have  considered  it  necessary  to  present  part  of  my 
argument  in  general  terms.  In  doing  so  I  have  followed  the  two  philosophers  most  important  to 
this  thesis.  Murdoch  and  Le  Doeuff  both  formulate  their  criticism  of  philosophy  in  these  general 
terms  and  they  both  also  continue  using  the  term  philosophy.  They  would  acknowledge  that  their 
criticism  does  not  apply  to  all  philosophers.  Yet,  they  present  their  criticism  in  general  terms, 
because  it  goes  well  beyond  individual  philosophers  or  particular  philosophical  texts.  The  general 
term  evinces  also  that  Murdoch  and  Le  Doeuff  include  even  themselves  in  this  criticism. 
The  work  of  Le  Doeuff  considers  the  relationship  between  imagery  and  philosophical 
reasoning  in  general  terms  and  introduces  methodological  propositions  for  reading  imagery. 
These  propositions  are  considered  to  reveal  philosophical  reading  habits  relating  to  imagery  as 
well  as  hidden  arguments  within  these  texts.  In  particular  when  philosophy  is  intend  on 
presenting  itself  as  independent  of  other  disciplines  or  as  able  to  sustain  its  own  foundations,  Le 
Doeuff  argues,  it  relies  on  itnagezy  which  is  exclusive,  while  maintaining  a  strict  division  between 
philosophy  and  imagery.  In  contrast  to  this  understanding  of  philosophy  Le  Doeuff  suggests 
forms  of  philosophical  thinking  which  acknowledge  their  relation  to  and  dependence  on  other 
disciplines.  In  acknowledging  the  importance  of  imagery  it  also  recognises  its  own  imagery. 
Le  Doeuff's  notion  of  the  philosophical  imaginary  provides  this  thesis  with  insight  into 
reading  philosophical  imagery.  I  have  discussed  the  different  methodological  propositions  she 
provides,  and  argued  how  these  affect  expectations  of  philosophy  and  of  philosophical  argument. 
Le  Doeuff  presents  herself  as  a  philosopher-fool,  and  such  a  fool,  I  have  argued,  may  undern-dne 
144 his  or  her  own  discourse  and  ordinary  explanation  for  reading  texts.  A  philosopher-fool  can 
ignore  directions  for  reading  given  by  an  author,  or  by  tradition,  and  leave  concepts  without 
much  definition.  ' 
It  is  helpful  to  reconsider  philosophical  reading  habits  when  considering  Murdoch's  work. 
In  this  respect  I  regard  my  reading  experience  of  Meta  ysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  as  the  origin  of  ph 
this  research.  Like  so  many  of  its  readers  I  have  been  baffled  by  this  work's  long  quotations  and 
asides,  and  by  its  unusual  argumentation.  It  has  brought  the  work  much  disparagement.  Its 
idiosyncratic  readings  of  Kant,  or  Anselm  have  been  denounced.  An  overall  argument  has  been 
said  to  be  lacking. 
In  this  thesis  I  have  been  apprehensive  about  considering  these  characteristics  as  vice 
rather  than  virtue.  Meta  pbysics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  has  occasioned  me  to  look  for  hidden 
assumptions  and  reading  practices,  some  of  them  my  own.  I  have  chosen  to  follow  Murdoch's 
own  argument  rather  than  pursuing  the  various  sideways  she  offers. 
I  have  first  considered  Murdoch's  earlier  work,  because  many  of  Murdoch's  arguments 
originate  in  her  encounter  with  existentialism  as  well  as  the  analytical  philosophy  in  the  1950s.  I 
argue  that  Murdoch's  criticism  of  both  forms  of  philosophy  arises  from  her  understanding  of 
nineteenth  century  literature.  Existentialism  and  linguistic  analysis  for  Murdoch  both  lack  what 
the  nineteenth-century  novel  exemplifies  in  its  understanding  of  character:  a  substantial 
understanding  of  self  in  relation  to  an  independent  reality.  Murdoch  appreciates  existentialism  for 
its  interest  in  consciousness,  but  criticises  in  the  image  of  Antoine  Roquentin  its  disinterest  of 
reality  outside  this  consciousness.  In  the  subsequent  reading  of  the  imagery  of  M  and  DI  argue 
that  Murdoch  cannot  entirely  evade  this  criticism  in  her  own  thought.  In  'The  Idea  of  Perfection' 
she  is  contending  the  compelling  and  prominent  genetic  argument  of  linguistic  analysis.  In  doing 
so,  I  have  argued,  Murdoch  has  difficulty  maintaining  an  understanding  of  a  richer  inner  life 
which  is  at  the  same  time  related  to  an  external  reality.  In  her  attempt  to  present  a  conclusive 
argument  she  practically  removes  the  reality  surrounding  N1. 
From  her  understanding  of  literature  in  her  philosophy  I  have  proceeded  to  imagination. 
The  importance  of  this  notion  is  affirmed  by  Murdoch's  conception  of  it,  as  well  as  by  the 
abundant  presence  of  imagery  in  her  writing.  In  making  imagination  the  central  notion  in  her 
philosophy  Murdoch  confirms  the  importance  of  art  for  her  thinking.  She  retrieves  her  notion 
from  contemplating  art  as  well  as  in  reading  Kant  and  Plato.  In  Kant  she  recognises  an 
understanding  of  imagination  which  affects  all  perception  and  thought.  Ordinary  imagination  she 
understands  via  his  notion  of  genius.  The  subsequent  reading  of  Plato  nuances  this  understanding 
of  imagination,  by  emphasising  Plato's  mixed  feelings  about  artists.  Murdoch  emphasises  that 
145 Plato  was  an  artist,  and  yet  rather  critical  of  art.  Imagination  becomes  in  this  understanding  not 
'exalted',  but  is  directed  to,  as  well  as  inspired  by,  the  Good. 
Murdoch's  understanding  of  imagination  is  part  of  a  recently  growing  interest  in  this 
notion,  also  found  in  the  interdisciplinary  discussion  of  philosophy,  theology,  and  literature. 
Murdoch's  work  provides  different  important  contributions  to  this  discussion.  She  challenges  any 
strict  distinction  between  imagination  and  reason.  Such  distinctions  are  found  in  the  work  of 
both  imagination's  advocates  and  its  foes.  She  also  doubts  that  imagination  may  be  only  found  in 
art,  as  opposed  to  philosophy  or  theology.  Imagination  is  for  her  not  just  the  property  of 
novelists,  even  though  they  may  express  it  in  its  finest  form.  Imagination  is  not  opposed  to 
reasoning,  or  even  philosophical  reasoning.  Instead,  imagination  is  part  of  philosophical 
argumentation.  Murdoch's  writings,  and  in  particular  Metapbjsics  as  a  Guide  to  Morals  testify  to  the 
acute  changes  the  embodiment  of  imagination  in  philosophy  may  have,  in  its  unusual  forms  of 
argumentation  as  well  as  in  the  abundant  presence  of  imagery. 
Murdoch  is  also  cautious  where  imagination  is  concerned.  In  this  respect  she  differs  from 
thinkers  who  only  desire  to  celebrate  the  imagination.  Perhaps  her  practice  as  novelist  has  taught 
her  well  the  dangers  of  imagination,  which  she  denotes  by  the  term  fantasy.  Fantasy  is 
imagination's  bad  opposite.  For  fantasy  only  the  ego  counts  and  everything  and  everyone  else  is 
subjected  to  its  demands  and  anxieties.  Often  it  is  impossible  to  properly  distinguish  imagination 
from  fantasy.  So,  despite  considering  imagination  the  most  important  faculty  Murdoch  is  not 
univocally  positive  about  it. 
Good  imagination  (as  opposed  to  bad  fantasy)  is  learned  by  paying  attention  to  reality  and 
ultimately  to  the  Good.  The  notion  of  the  Good  makes  most  apparent  that  for  Murdoch 
philosophy  has  to  rescue  values  involved  in  the  collapse  of  religion.  She  does  not  consider  the 
Good  as  a  replacement  of  God,  but  uses  an  understanding  of  (the  Christian)  God  and  of  (the 
Christian)  religion  when  exploring  the  Good.  For  understanding  the  Good  it  is  therefore 
important  to  explore  Murdoch's  understanding  of  religion. 
I  have  examined  Murdoch's  understanding  of  religion  in  a  discussion  of  Aeaslos.  In  this 
dialogue,  which  is  both  historical  and  contemporary,  the  characters  equate  religion  with  belief  in 
god  or  gods.  The  disappearance  of  this  religion  occasions  a  discussion  of  the  continuation  of 
religion  in  a  form  of  morality  which  sustains  an  understanding  of  the  Good.  I  have  argued  how 
the  conversation  is  undermined  by  the  characters'  various 
, 
exclamations  of  love  and  sexual  desire. 
I  have  next  discussed  the  validation  of  this  notion  of  Good  by  the  ontological  proof.  Murdoch 
explains  this  proof  as  applicable  to  all  thinking  and  imagining,  where  faith  is  professed  beyond 
146 what  is  yet  explained.  For  her  the  proof  proves  the  unconditional  element  in  such  thought  and 
imagination.  This  unconditional  element  she  suggests  to  be  the  Good. 
When  finally  turning  or  returning  to  the  fool,  I  have  asked  whether  this  proof  made  the 
position  of  the  fool  preposterous.  Perhaps  a  fool's  position  is  always  preposterous.  I  have  also 
argued  that  Murdoch  and  the  fool  were  not  necessarily  that  far  apart.  The  disbelief  of  a  fool,  like 
Alcibiades,  is  perhaps  also  her  disbelief  In  particular,  the  fool  may  consider  the  imagery  of  abyss 
and  emptiness  and  thus  express  doubts  about  the  Good  as  source  of  inspiration.  Murdoch  would 
counter  this  doubt  by  drawing  attention  back  to  particular  things.  Such  attention  may  initiate  the 
moral  pilgrimage. 
With  these  concluding  remarks  I  ended  the  last  chapter  of  this  thesis,  which  began  by 
arguing  that  it  is  not  easy  to  characterise  Murdoch's  work.  In  the  first  chapter  I  have  considered 
the  intricate  relationship  between  philosophy  and  literature.  The  subsequent  chapters  have 
examined  the  possible  influence  of  literature  on  philosophy.  It  has  been  argued  that  Murdoch's 
thought  is  difficult  to  grasp,  because  she  has  a  very  idiosyncratic  way  of  reading  texts,  and  of 
regarding  literature,  which  goes  against  general  practice. 
I  have  to  become  to  regard  Murdoch's  idiosyncratic  position  as  both  the  strength  and  the 
weakness  of  her  work.  Her  idiosyncrasy  shows  in  various  ways:  in  her  understanding  of  literature, 
her  understanding  of  Kant,  of  religion,  of  Plato.  I  consider  its  most  valuable  insight  that  she  takes 
art  rather  than  science  as  a  model  for  philosophy.  In  doing  so,  she  diverts  from  much  in  the 
modern  and  contemporary  philosophy.  I  have  only  started  to  realise  the  impact  of  this  shift  on 
philosophical  reading  habits. 
I  hope  to  have  shown  the  importance  of  particular  idiosyncrasies.  Murdoch  has  been 
severely  ctiticised  for  her  understanding  of  literature,  yet  I  hope  to  have  shown  that  it  enabled  to 
take  an  original  position  in  contemporary  philosophy  and  challenge  various  presuppositions  held 
without  much  consideration.  Most  important  perhaps  is  here  the  distinction  between  fact  and 
value.  Her  reading  of  Kant  ignores  more  generally  held  concerns,  but  it  has  enabled  her  to  place 
imagination  in  the  centre  of  out  consciousness.  Her  unusual  interest  in  Plato  has  enabled  her  to 
posit  an  understanding  of  imagination  which  is  not  exalted,  while  also  retaining  or  reintroducing 
the  Good  as  an  absolute  standard  into  philosophy.  Her  reading  of  religion  may  disregard  and 
misinterpret  various  aspects  of  the  Christian  religion,  but  it  has  enabled  her  to  describe  a  form  of 
contemplation  which  she  considers  open  for  everyone. 
Murdoch's  idiosyncratic  position  involves  withdrawing  from  contemporary  discussions 
and  works.  This  I  find  to  create  a  weakness  in  her  thought.  Murdoch  attempts  to  find  a  timeless 
form  of  attention,  which  she  recognises  in  both  the  Christian  religion,  and  Plato.  Even  though 
147 she  sometimes  remarks  on  being  a  child  of  her  time,  she  also  removes  herself  from  contemporary 
discussions  and  works  of  art  and  she  presents  her  readings  and  preferences  as  unqualified.  Of 
course,  such  remarks  should  not  entirely  be  taken  at  face  value.  Moreover,  this  attitude  does  not 
make  her  position  timeless,  and  it  is  well  possible  to  relate  her  preference  for  Tolstoy  and 
Shakespeare,  her  interest  in  character  and  her  understanding  of  religion  to  various  stages  of  her 
(British,  Oxford,  philosophical)  education.  11us  one  may  argue  that  Murdoch  is  more  culturally 
determined  than  she  admits  to  be.  More  importantly,  however,  I  find  this  preference  for  such 
timeless  attention  to  weaken  her  argument  and  remove  some  of  its  intensity.  In  preferring  the 
universal  to  the  actual  Murdoch  at  times  appears  as  a  philosopher  who  has  only  just  returned  to 
the  cave  and  whose  eyes  still  need  to  adjust  to  the  darkness.  This  philosopher  can  make  general 
observations  about  the  particularity  of  things  and  may  urge  contemplation  of  these,  but  one  is 
waiting  for  the  eyes  to  adjust  even  more,  to  see  the  particulars  themselves,  their  relation  to  one 
another,  their  history  and  possibilities.  Or,  as  Virginia  Woolf  once  put  it:  'The  truer  the  facts,  the 
better  the  fiction! 
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